JUDGMENT : B. D. Singh, J. This application by Bijoy Kumar Bhagat under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against an ORDER :dated 28-11-1974 (Annexure 1) passed by the Chairman, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (respondent no I), whereby he has allowed the appeal of Messrs Agrawal Transport (respondent no. 3). In the writ application, therefore, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of Annexure 1'. . 2. In ORDER :to appreciate the points involved in this application 1t will be necessary to state the facts briefly. In paragraph 2 of the application the petitioner has stated that he was an experienced bus operator and was carrying on his business of transport efficiently since 1970. In the other paragraphs of his application he stated that Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority (Respondent 00.2) (for the sake of brevity hereinafter to be referred to as 'the R T A') invited applications for grant of temporary permit for four months in respect of the route Ranchi-Sessai- Bargaon- Sogara- River Koel (East Bank)-Gumla, in response to which a number of persons, including the petitioner and respondent no. 3, filed applications. On 16-8-1973 a meeting of R T A took place in which it was decided to grant temporary permit for the route in question to the petitioner. In pursuance thereto on 28-8-73, a letter was sent to the petitioner, intimating him of the fact of the grant of temporary permit in respect of the route in' question and calling upon him to produce the vehicle and necessary papers. It seems, the petitioner could not produce the aforesaid things within the prescribed time and, therefore, he requested for extef.1sion of time. It appears, he was twice granted extension of time for the said purpose. On 16-10-1973 the petitioner produced the vehicle and necessary papers. Thereafter he was allowed to operate the bus on the said route. The said temporary permit was valid tit four months from 19-10•73 when it was granted to him. Aggrieved with the said ORDER :respondent no. 3, in relation to the extension of time to the petitioner for producing vehicle, preferred revision no. 62/73, and against the final ORDER :granting temporary permit, it fi1ed appeal no 97/ 73. The said temporary permit was valid tit four months from 19-10•73 when it was granted to him. Aggrieved with the said ORDER :respondent no. 3, in relation to the extension of time to the petitioner for producing vehicle, preferred revision no. 62/73, and against the final ORDER :granting temporary permit, it fi1ed appeal no 97/ 73. It may be stated here that one Basant Kumar Lall was also one of the applicants for grant of temporary permit for the aforesaid route, and since he was not granted the said permit, in preference to the petitioner, he also filed appeal no. 99/73 against the said ORDER :, by which the petitioner was granted temporary permit. On 28.11.74 the said revision and the two appeals were heard and disposed of by a common ORDER :.1 (Annexure 1) by respondent no. 1. I may mention here that in this case we are concerned with the impugned ORDER :relating to petitioner and respondent no. 3. The effective part of the ORDER :is to be found in paragraph 16, which is as follows :- . "So far as T. A. 97/73 is concerned I shall ORDER :that the claim of the appellant in T. A. 97/73 is definitely superior to that of Bijoy Kumar Bhagat and all other persons who had appeared as applicants in response to the notification for grant of the temporary permit and as such I shall ORDER :that the temporary permit be granted to this appellant. The ORDER :of the Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority dated 16.8.1973 is set aside and it is directed that the temporary permit so granted by this authority will henceforth cease to be effective. The appellant of 97/73 shall abide by all such terms and conditions which would be imposed on this appellant by the Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority for running this route. Subject to what I have stated above T. A. 97/73 is allowed. 3. Being aggrieved by the said ORDER :, as mentioned earlier, the petitioner filed this application on 12.12.74, which was admitted on 23.12.74. Interim ORDER :staying the operation of the impugned ORDER :was also passed on that date. 4. Respondent no. 3 filed show cause on 4.1.75 supporting the impugned ORDER :, and it again filed a supplementary affidavit on 7.1.75. The petitioner filed a reply thereto on 7.1.75. Interim ORDER :staying the operation of the impugned ORDER :was also passed on that date. 4. Respondent no. 3 filed show cause on 4.1.75 supporting the impugned ORDER :, and it again filed a supplementary affidavit on 7.1.75. The petitioner filed a reply thereto on 7.1.75. Both the petitioners and the respondents were heard on the stay matter by this court on 7.1.75 and the ordel7 fop continuance of the stay till disposal of this application was passed on that date. Later, respondent no. 3 filed a counter affidavit on 25.1.75 supporting the impugned ORDER :and controverting certain facts as alleged in the writ application. The petitioner then filed on 29.1.75 a reply to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 3. 5. Mr. Basudeva Prasad. learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has assailed the impugned ORDER :and has raised the following points for consideration by this Hon'ble court. (i) When the ORDER :was passed in appeal as well as in revision, the period of temporary permit, under which the petitioner was authorised to ply his vehicle on the route in question had already expired and on that date respondent no I could not have passed an effective ORDER :. In other words, the appeal as well as revision had become infructuous and they had ceased to be maintainable. (ii) The direction given by respondent no. 1 that the temporary permit would be granted to respondent no. 3 in place of the petitioner was bad because in the impugned ORDER :respondent no. 1 observed that temporary permit granted by respondent no. 2 by an ORDER :dated 16.8.73 from the date of the ORDER :, namely, 28 1.74, would cease to be effective. 6. It will be convenient to take up both the points together. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'), which provides for temporary permit. The relevant portion of the said section reads thus: "(1) A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in Section 57 grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to, exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily(c) to meet a "particular temporary need" Under the provisions of the said section, it was notified by respondent no. 2, inviting applications in the prescribed form for the said route, for issuing of a temporary permit. Notice was issued on 14.4.73 vide Annexure 'C' to the counter affidavit of respondent no. 3. The petitioner respondent no. 3 and .others filed their application forms in response to the said notice, and their applications were considered by respondent no. 2, by ORDER :dated 16.8.73 as would be evident from Annexure 6' to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner filed on 23.12.73 In view of the said ORDER :learned counsel pointed out that permit was granted to the petitioner on 19.10.73 for a' period of four months, the validity of which was to expire on 16.2.74. It was the grant of the said temporary permit, learned counsel pointed out, that respondent no.3 had preferred an appeal, and its revision was also against extension of time granted to the petitioner for producing his vehicle in respect of the said permit which bad expired after four months, as mentioned above. He submitted that the impugned ORDER :was passed on 28.11.74, after several months of the expiry of the period of the permit, that is, 16.2.74. In that view of the matter he contended that on the date of the ORDER :, namely, 28.11.74 the appeal as well as revision bad ceased to be maintainable and respondent no. I could not have passed any effective ORDER :since the appeal and the revision had become infructuous. 7. In ORDER :to find support to his contention be bas relied on a Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in (1) Regional Transport Authority, - Phulbani V. Purna Chandra Agrawala (A.I.R. 1975 Orissa 3). In that case their Lordships were considering the issuance of a temporary permit under Section 62 of the Act. He drew our attention to paragraph 2 of the JUDGMENT : at page 4. In that case also the period of temporary permit had expired when the Appellate Tribunal had passed the ORDER :. In that case their Lordships were considering the issuance of a temporary permit under Section 62 of the Act. He drew our attention to paragraph 2 of the JUDGMENT : at page 4. In that case also the period of temporary permit had expired when the Appellate Tribunal had passed the ORDER :. Therefore, their lordships held in that paragraph "we have no doubt in our mind that the appeal had ceased to be maintainable with the lapse of time and the reasoning 'advanced by the appellate Tribunal is not sustainable in law." He also referred to paragraph 3 of the JUDGMENT :, which is to this effect : "Erroneously enough the appellate Tribunal referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 156 ( M. P. S. R. T. Corporation V, R. T. Authority) and was of the view that even if the appeal was not maintainable and had to be dismissed it was open to it to indicate guideline. On more than one occasion this court has indicated to the Appellate Tribunal that it is not a court of record and its decisions have no precedent value. They would not even blind him in another case much less his successor. Litigating public before him would not be bound by any observation made by him. Therefore it was not at all necessary for the Appellate Tribunal to have referred to the Supreme court decision and proceeded to indicate guideline for whom one does not know. The Supreme court stands on a very different position. Apart from its position as the highest forum in the judicial process, under Article 141 of the Constitution its decision have been declared to be the law of the land and bind one and all in regard to interpretation of statutes as also the law laid down by it.” 8. Mr. Saptami Jha. learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 3, on the other hand, contended that in the instant case, although the ORDER :was passed by respondent no. 2 for granting the permit for a period of four months, in reality it was a permanent grant of permit to the petitioner. He submitted that on the basis of Annexure 6', subsequent permits to the petitioner are being renewed from time to time by respondent no. 2 for granting the permit for a period of four months, in reality it was a permanent grant of permit to the petitioner. He submitted that on the basis of Annexure 6', subsequent permits to the petitioner are being renewed from time to time by respondent no. 2 and it is in a way continuity of the ORDER :passed under Annexure 6. In other words, it was in the nature of a permanent permit. Therefore, be urged that on the date of impugned ORDER :, namely, 28.11.74. the parties had subsisting interest. Besides, in the impugned ORDER :respondent no.1 has also considered merit of the claim of respondent no 3, whereby he has held that respondent no. 3 had offered 1973 model vehic1e and on merit permit ought to have been granted to respondent no. 3 and not to the petitioner, as mentioned in the final ORDER :, already quoted above. Learned counsel for respondent no.3 further submitted that the revision was also for the illegal extention of the period for producing the vehicle. He pointed out that one extension was granted by the secretary of respondent no.2. He urged that it was the Chairman alone, who under the law could have granted extension. He submitted that in the case of temporary permit, which cannot exceed more than four months under Section 62 of the Act, if an aggrieved person prefers an appeal, in most cases the appeal by the Tribunal would not be disposed of within four months and thus in every such case appeal would become infructuous and a great hardship is caused to the litigant public. In the instant case he contended that the Tribunal was not constituted and for that reason also the appeal could not be disposed of expeditiously. If the appellate Tribunal had given its finding in favour of the appellant. that should not be ignored. 9. MF. Jha referred to Annexure 7' to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, which relates to the subsequent grant of permit to the petitioner. If the appellate Tribunal had given its finding in favour of the appellant. that should not be ignored. 9. MF. Jha referred to Annexure 7' to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, which relates to the subsequent grant of permit to the petitioner. In Annexure 7 as well as in other permits which were subsequently granted after the appellate ORDER :(Annexure 6) it is clearly mentioned "on the terms and conditions attached to the previous T. P.” This, he has pointed out, was in ORDER :to find support to his contention that the same permit, which was granted under Annexure 6, was being continued and it was in existence at the time when the impugned ORDER :was passed. 10. In my opinion, on this basis it would be difficult to hold, that the same permit, which was granted by the ORDER :contained in Annexure 6, was being continued. Instead of writing the terms in every subsequent permit they were merely referred to the previous temporary permit. It was merely a sort of imposing condition by reference. Besides, there is no provision for renewal of temporary permit in the Act Temporary permit, as mentioned earlier, is granted under Section 62 of the Act. which does not contemplate renewal of permit. On every occasion after expiry of the maximum period of four months a fresh permit has to be granted under the said section. In my opinion, only in case of permanent permit. contemplated under Section 57 of the Act, there is a provision for duration and renewal of permit under Section 58 of the Act. Besides, by reference to Annexure 'D' to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 3, it is also apparent that on each subsequent occasion the permit granted to the petitioner was considered as a fresh grant as it may be noticed that respondent no. 3 also on the second occasion. when temporary permit was being granted to the petitioner, had filed an application for grant of the same to it, but on that occasion, the case of respondent no.3 was not considered and the petitioner was granted temporary permit. That would at least show that on each occasion there was fresh grant. Therefore, it is clear that on the date, when the impugned ORDER :was passed, the period for which the earliest temporary permit was granted to the petitioner, had expired. That would at least show that on each occasion there was fresh grant. Therefore, it is clear that on the date, when the impugned ORDER :was passed, the period for which the earliest temporary permit was granted to the petitioner, had expired. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the instant case respondent no. 1 could not have passed the effective ORDER :, particularly substituting respondent no. 3 in the permit, which was existing then in favour of the petitioner. On that score the impugned ORDER :cannot be sustained. The revision, as mentioned earlier related to the extention of the period for providing the bus by the petitioner in respect of the earliest permit, which had also expired. Therefore, according to me, revision had also become infructuous. It is true that hardship is caused to the litigant public, who choose to file an appeal against the grant of temporary permit. The right to litigant public for preferring an appeal is provided under Section 64 of the Act. In the case of temporary permit, as illustrated above, in almost all the cases it would not be possible for the appellate Tribunal to dispose of the appeal before the period of temporary permit expires, and, therefore, the appeals are bound to become infructuous. This, I am pointing out in ORDER :to bring to the notice of the Legislature to make necessary amendment so that litigant public may have effective right to appeal against the ORDER :for grant of permit. 11. After careful consideration, therefore. I allow this application and quash the ORDER :contained under Annexure 1'. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. since hardship has been caused to respondent no. 3, I direct respondent no. 2 to consider the claim of respondent no. 3, if any such claim is made by it, at the time of fresh grant of permit for the said route. In the circumstances, however there will be no ORDER :as to costs. BIRENDRA PRASAD SINHA, J. I agree. Application allowed.