JUDGMENT This appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against a judgment and decree dated March 5, 1973, passed by a learned single judge of this court in a second appeal setting aside a concurrent decree for eviction passed by the two courts below. The appeal arises out of a suit for eviction of tenants whose tenancy is admittedly governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 1956. 2. The plaintiff appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) had admittedly inducted one Bhagat Ram Pasricha (since, deceased), predecessor-in-interest of the present defendant-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) as a tenant in a part of premises. No. 221/1, Rash Behari Avenue, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the suit premises). Though the plaintiff alone thus became the landlord, he happens to be only a co sharer owner of the suit premises, being one of the heirs of late Motital Sen, to whom the property belonged. The plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction of the' defendants from the suit premises on two-fold grounds of default and reasonable requirement thereof for his own occupation including therein the occupation of the members of the family consisting of the other heirs and legal representatives of Motilal, namely, his, mother and his brother. 3. The suit was contested by the tenant-defendants on various defences. 4. The learned judge in the trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds of default and reasonable requirement. On the question of reason able requirement, the learned judge in the trial court, however, held that the plaintiff being only a co-sharer owner he cannot be said to be the owner within the meaning of section 13 (1) (f) [since re-numbered as section 13 (1) (ff) on amendment] of the Act, as aforesaid. At the same time, however, he held that the plaintiff having succeeded in proving the case of reasonable requirement of the persons for whose benefits the premises are held by him, i.e., the requirement of the members of the family including the other heirs of Motilal, he is entitled to succeed on the latter part of section 13 (1) (f) as aforesaid. 5. On an appeal by the defendants, the learned judge in the lower appellate court set aside the finding on the issue of default and held that the defendants cannot be said to be at default. 5. On an appeal by the defendants, the learned judge in the lower appellate court set aside the finding on the issue of default and held that the defendants cannot be said to be at default. He, however, affirmed the finding of reasonable requirement. On behalf of the tenant-defendants it was contended before him that the suit cannot succeed on the ground specified in section 13 (1) (f), inasmuch as the plaintiff not being the owner is not entitled to get a decree for eviction on, the requirement for his own occupation. Nor can he succeed on the requirement for the occupation of other members of the family as he is not a trustee holding the property in trust for their benefit. This contention appears to have been overruled by the learned judge in the lower appellate court when he held that the plaintiff as the landlord is competent to file the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement for the occupation of those for whose benefit the premises were being held by the plantiff. The learned judge, however, 'was not very clear as to whether the suit should succeed on the requirement for plaintiff's own occupation as the owner thereof or for the occupation of persons for whose benefit the premises were being held by the plaintiff. In other words, the learned judge was not specific as to which of the two material parts of section 13 (1) (f) would govern the case. The learned judge thus affirmed the decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement. 6. Being aggrieved by such a decree the tenant-defendants preferred the above second appeal, being S.A. No. 1524 of 1970, Before the learned single Judge, the concurrent finding of the two courts below on the question of actual requirement and reasonableness thereof was not disputed. What; however, was disputed was that even on the requirement proved, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for eviction under the provisions of section 13 (1) (f) as aforesaid. Reasons put forward in support of such a contention were the same as they were before the lower appellate court and here they succeeded. What; however, was disputed was that even on the requirement proved, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for eviction under the provisions of section 13 (1) (f) as aforesaid. Reasons put forward in support of such a contention were the same as they were before the lower appellate court and here they succeeded. Our learned brother in this Court held that the plaintiff being only a co-sharer is a part owner and such a part owner not being the 'owner' within the meaning of section 13 (1)(f) is not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of requirement for his own occupation. He observed : "The landlord must have absolute ownership of the premises in respect of the quality or nature of interest he has therein. He must also possess the full interest of ownership in the premises in quantity, and possession of such interest only will make the landlord a owner of the premises. It will not be sufficient if the reasonable requirement is of all members of the family of the co-owners, but such co-owners must again be the landlords who only are made entitiled to a decree for recovery of possession under section 13 (1) (f)". . Our learned brother further held that in order to come within the sanction of the latter part of section 13 (1) (f), one must hold the property not only being in actual possession thereof but also being invested with a legal title to bold the same for the benefit of others before he can succeed to get eviction on the requirement of others for whose benefits the property is being held. In the case under consideration according to him, the legal title in the property not being vested as such in the plaintiff, as in the case of trustees, the plaintiff cannot succeed merely on the proof of requirement of the members of the family including the other heirs and legal representatives of the deceased father, Motilal In this view, our learned brother held that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for eviction under the provisions of section 13 (1) (f) notwithstanding the requirement for own occupation proved and established at the trial. 7. 7. It is the decision which is the subject matter of challenge before us in this appeal, under clause, 15 of the Letters Patent which has been preferred on a certificate granted by our learned brother. 8. Mr. Lala appearing in support of this appeal has strongly contend that our learned brother was in error in his interpretation of section 13 (1) (f) when he held that a co-sharer when he is the landlord is not the owner within meaning of the aforesaid provision entitling him to a decree for eviction on the reasonable requirement for his own occupation. Mr. Mukherji appearing on behalf of the defendants has strongly contested this point raised by Mr. Lala and supported the judgment now under appeal. 9. In great reverence as we hold our learned brother whose decision is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal and the views expressed by him, we have given serious consideration to the contention put forward by Mr. Lala acceptance whereof would mean differing from our learned brother in the matter of construction of section 13 (l) (f) of the Act. Section 13 (1) (f) in the relevant part and at the relevant time provided as follows :- "13. Protection of tenant against eviction-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- * * * * (f) where the premises are resonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held. (The latter amendment separating two parts of this clause into two clauses having no relevance for consideration of the point now under consideration) The qualifying clause "if he is the owner" was introduced for the first time in the Act of 1956. There was no such restriction clause in the previous corresponding Act of 1950 where the corresponding expression was quite general and unrestricted, namely, "for his own occupation". Now the question involved is what exactly is the import of this restricting clause. There was no such restriction clause in the previous corresponding Act of 1950 where the corresponding expression was quite general and unrestricted, namely, "for his own occupation". Now the question involved is what exactly is the import of this restricting clause. On the plain reading of the clause a landlord in order to be entitled to evict his tennant on the requirement for his own occupation must be the owner or in other words, must own the premises. The term 'own' or 'owner' has not been defined or explained by the statute. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 'owner' means "one who owns or holds something" or "one who has the rightful claim or title to a thing". On such a meaning the term 'owner' would not only include an absolute owner, unrestricted in the interests held by him but also a restricted owner whose ownership is limited to some extent but at the same time giving him a right to hold and enjoy the property though subject to any paramount title of some one else as in the case of a lessee. Though the statute has not excluded such a restricted owner nor has qualified the term owner as the absolute owner. this Court in the context of the changes brought into the statute and to give a meaning and effect to the restriction brought in-by the change had held that the term owner in this clause must be construed to mean absolute 'owner' in contradistinction to a lessee. Reference may be made to two decisions of this court in the cases of (1) Jogamaya Pakhira v. Shanti Sudha Bose, ILR (1968) 2 Calcutta 70 followed and reaffirmed again in (2) Carrit Moran & Company Limited v. Roneo, ILR (1969) l, Calcutta 347. One of these decisions has been relied on by our learned brother. Though Mr. Lala has questioned the property of the restriction so introduced by this Court in these decisions which does not follow from the language thereof, in my opinion, that is an issue need which not be gone into in the present case. 10. It is well known that when the Act of 1956 came to be enacted different grades of tenants and landlords had come into existence and the Act did give recognition to the pre-Act sub-tenancies. 10. It is well known that when the Act of 1956 came to be enacted different grades of tenants and landlords had come into existence and the Act did give recognition to the pre-Act sub-tenancies. In that context, the right to get eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own occupation might have been limited only in favour of the head-lessor, the owner and may not have been intended to be given to the lessee-landlords holding interests subordinate to the owner. 11. Though no land can be claimed to be held absolutely by any citizen when in fiction all lands belong to the sovereign State, ¥et the above decisions of this court proceed on the basis of what corporeal ownership means in jurisprudence. His jus in re propria is as opposed to jus in re aliena. Rights in re aliena are subordinate interests created and are in the nature of encumbrances. As pointed out by Salmond, the distinction is clear. "The owner of a chattel has jus in re propria a right over his own property; the pledge or other encumbrance of it has jus in re aliena a right over the property of someone else". "No man is said to own a piece of land or a chattel, if his right over it is merely an encumbrance of some more general right vested in some one else. The ownership of a jus in re aliena is always incorporeal, even though the object of that right is a corporeal thing. I am not said to own a chattel merely because lawn a right to have it transferred to me, or because I own a lien over it or a right to the temporary use of it. When, on the other hand, a right is not a mere encumbrance of another right-when it is self-existent jus in re propria-the terminology of ownership is applicable to the material thing which is its subject matter." (Salmond on Jurisprudence, l1th Ed. Chapter XII, Section 90). 12. Applying this test or definition, we can legitimately exclude lessees, mortgagees in possession and all such subordinate interest-holders from the term owner as sought to be done by this Court in the above two decisions. But we find little scope for a further extension of such limitation to exclude a co-sharer owner as done by our learned brother in his decision now under appeal. But we find little scope for a further extension of such limitation to exclude a co-sharer owner as done by our learned brother in his decision now under appeal. In our opinion, a co-owner is as much an absolute owner as a sole owner is with reference to the interest held by him. "It is not correct to say that a right owned by co-owners is divided between them, each of them owning a separate part. The right is an undivided unit, which is vested at the same time in more than one person .........the several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part of the right instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of the right owned" (Jurisprudence-Supra, Section 92). Therefore, there is no reason to think why a co-owner or a co-sharer owner as in the instant case, is not the owner even in the sense of one who holds 'the corporeal ownership. Exclusion of such a co-sharer owner does not follow from the plain language of the statute nor does it follow as a necessary implication from the provisions in the statute; nor in my opinion, such a result could have been intended by the legislature because such a construction would lead to undesirable and inconsistent results. In that case if by any chance one co-sharer owner happens to be the landlord having inducted a tenant on a joint property, section 13 (1) (f) would never afford a ground for eviction of such a tenant under any circumstance because the landlord being a co-sharer owner is not the owner and he is also not a person holding the property for the benefit of other co-sharers as held by my learned brother. It is settled law at the same time that where there are more landlords than one, requirement of one for his own occupation would come within the sanction of section 13 (1) (f) for getting an eviction of the tenant when sued by the landlords. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of (3) Kanika Debi v. A.N. Roy Chowdhury, 65 C.W.N. 1078. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of (3) Kanika Debi v. A.N. Roy Chowdhury, 65 C.W.N. 1078. If such a requirement come within the sanction of section 13 (1) (f), it stands to no reason why such requirement I of one of the co-sharer owners or of all the co-sharer-owners would be no valid ground for eviction merely because all the co-sharer owners had not joined in the act of inducting the tenant and one of them having done so happens to be the landlord. Such a situation' cannot be ascribed to have been intended by the legislature in enacting section 13(1)(f) on its present terms. This aspect was brought to the notice of my learned brother but he refused to take cognizance of the situation by observing, "It is, however, not for the court to import its conception which is obviously foreign to the import of the word owner in the statute". What he meant was that to obviate such a result the term owner has to be interpreted to include the co-sharer owner but such an inclusion would be entirely foregin to the import of the term, owner. With great respect I have failed to persuade myself to agree with this view. I have pointed out hereinbefore that the term owner in its ordinary import as also in its legal concept would mean and include a co-sharer owner and in giving that meaning one is not required to impute anything foreign to the import of the term owner. In my view, ownership consists of a bundle of rights. The various rights and interests may vest in the same person or may vest in different persons. Section 13 (1) (ff) when it restricted the right therein provided in favour of a owner-landlord, it only contemplated that he must be the person holding above all the subordinate rights which are normally called interests in property so that persons possessing such subordinate rights like lessess, mortgagees etc., are excluded. For reasons aforesaid, I must hold that the plaintiff though a co-sharer owner was nevertheless the owner of the premises and the requirement for his own occupation would be a good ground for eviction of the tenant-defendants and our learned brother was not correct in holding otherwise. For reasons aforesaid, I must hold that the plaintiff though a co-sharer owner was nevertheless the owner of the premises and the requirement for his own occupation would be a good ground for eviction of the tenant-defendants and our learned brother was not correct in holding otherwise. Here, in .the present case, plaintiff's own requirement would obviously include the requirement of the family including his mother and brother living together. It is also not in dispute that to meet such requirement the entire premises should be required by the plaintiff. Therefore, on the requirement concurrently found by the courts below the plaintiff is certainly entitled to the decree as granted in his favour by the courts below. This being the position, I do not consider it necessary to go into the other question as to whether the plaintiff can be said to be holding the property for the benefit of his other co-sharers so that he can still get a decree on the requirement of such other co-sharers, they being the persons for whose benefit the plaintiff can be said to- be holding the property. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of our learned brother are set aside and that of the court of appeal below restored. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order for costs in this appeal. Let the operation of this order remain stayed for a period of one month from this date.