CANARA LAND INVESTMENTS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1975 DIGILAW 77 (KAR)

( 1 ) AS common questions of law and fact arise for consideration in these three writ petitions, they are disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in these three petitions have questioned the validity of a notification issued by the State Govt bearing No. HMA 369 TDI, 74 dt. 11th April, 1975 (hereinfater referred to as the Notification), revoking the Central Ward Town Planning Scheme, Udipi (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme) in exercise of its powers under Cl. (a) of sub-sec (2) of S. 49 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 11 of 1963) (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner in WP. 1955 of 1975 is a company registered under the Companies Act having its Office in Udipi in the Dist of S. Kanara. The petitioners in the other two petitions are residents of that town. When the Dist of S. Kanara formed part of the former Province of Madras, the Madras Govt gave its sanction to the scheme in exercise of its power under sub-sec (3) of S. 14 of the Madras town Planning Act, 1920 (Madras Act VII of 1920) providing for the development of the Central Ward Area of Udipi Town. The Municipal council of Udipi constituted under the Madras Dist Municipalities Act, 1920, was constituted as the Executive Authority under the Scheme. The Scheme, inter alia, provided in para 14 (1) thereof, as follows :" Save as otherwise provided in the Scheme, every part of the area, shall be entirely utilised for residential purpose only; provided hotels, clubs and buildings for public worship or institutions (other than a reformatory or industrial school or schools for mentally defective or epileptic persons or as places of social intercourse or recreation or as hospitals or dispensaries or for any other purpose, may be permitted by the responsible authority with the previous approval of the Director. " further in Cl. " further in Cl. 15 (b) of the Scheme it was provided that : " Shops and business premises may be permitted only in places shown as reserved for the purpose in Map No. 3 and 4 (TP No. 20 of 43-44) along Budugupet Road, Hanuman Office Road, Post Office road and in such other places, as may be decided upon from time to time by the responsible authority with the previous approval of the director. " ( 4 ) THE Executive Authority, i. e. , the Municipal Coucil of Udipi, was constituted as the responsible authority for the purpose of the Scheme for a period of twenty years from the date of the Scheme. The Scheme was in force on the eve of the re-organisation of States. By virtue of S. 119 of the states Re-organisation Act, both the Madras Town Planning Act 1920 and the Scheme continued to be in force in the area in question even after the re-organisation of States. By S. 83 of the Act, the Madras Town Planning act, 1920 was repealed. It was, however, provided that such repeal would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said Act. It was further provided that any scheme sanctioned by the State Govt under the Madras Act should be deemed to. have been sanctioned or made under the provisions of the Act and would continue to be in force accordingly, unless and until it was superseded by anything done or any action taken under the Act. ( 5 ) IN or about the year 1968, a Swamiar of one of the Mutts in Udipi made an application to the Municipal Council, Udipi, for sanction for the construction of a Kalyana Mantapa-cum-lecture hall. With the sanction of the Municipal Council he constructed a Kalyana Mantapa-cum-Lecture Hall. Later on, being desirous of converting the said Hall into a cinema theatre, he moved the Municipal Council for permission. The Municipal Council granted him permission to convert the hall into a cinema theatre. The petitioner in WP. 1877 of 1975 who was aggrieved by the permission accorded by the Municipal Council, filed WP. 934 of 1972 on the file of this Court, questioning the power or authority of the Municipal Council to give such permission. This Court dismissed the petition. The matter was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The petitioner in WP. 1877 of 1975 who was aggrieved by the permission accorded by the Municipal Council, filed WP. 934 of 1972 on the file of this Court, questioning the power or authority of the Municipal Council to give such permission. This Court dismissed the petition. The matter was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the resolution of the Municipl Council according permission to convert the said Hall into a cinema theatre-Ramdas Shenoy v. Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council, Udipi AIR. 1974 SC, 2177. . The principal ground on which the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, was that the establishment of a cinema theatre within the area covered by the Scheme amounted to infringement of the terms of the Scheme and therefore it was not open to any person and more particularly the Municipal Council which was the planning authority under the Act, to accord permission to do so, in violation of the express terms of the Scheme. After the decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above case, the Municipal Council which was the planning authority under the Act. resolved to recommend to the State govt to revoke the Scheme by its resolution d/. 23-8-1974. On receipt of the resolution of the Municipal Council the State Govt consulted the Director of Town Planning as to the desirability of making an order of revocation of the Scheme in accordance with the request made in the application of the planning Authority, i. e. , the Municipal Council. The Director of Town planning recommended to the State Govt that there was need for revocation of the Scheme. On the basis of the application made by the Planning authority and the recommendation of the Director of Town Planning, the state Govt passed the impugned order of revocation and published the notification in the Karnataka Gazette d/. 14th April, 1975. ( 6 ) IN these three writ petitions, the petitioners have questioned the validity of the Notification. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions urged by the parties in these cases, it is necessary to set out the Scheme of the Act. 14th April, 1975. ( 6 ) IN these three writ petitions, the petitioners have questioned the validity of the Notification. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions urged by the parties in these cases, it is necessary to set out the Scheme of the Act. The Act was passed by the State Legislature to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning scheme in the State of Karnataka, as can be seen from the preamble of the Act. The Act provides for the appoinment of a Planning authority and the procedure that has to be followed by the Planning Authority and the State Govt, in order to bring into existence a scheme for the development of any area within the State of Karnataka. Chap. III of the act provides for the preparation of an outline Development Plan and Chapter iv for the preparation of a Comprehensive Development Plan. Chapter V deals with town Planning Schemes. The Scheme in question must be considered as one having been made under S. 45 of the Act, in view of the provisions in S. 83 of the Act. The procedure for making a Final Scheme under S. 45 of the Act is to be found in Ss. 26, 30, 32, 34, 43 and 45 of the act. S. 47 confers the power on the Planning Authority to enforce the scheme. S. 48 empowers the State Govt to vary the Scheme or modify it suitably, if it is found that there is an error or irregularity or informality in the Final Scheme that has to come into force. S. 49 confers the power on the State Govt to revoke or vary a Town Planning Scheme. Sec. 49 (2) reads as follows :"49. (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . (2) The State Government- (a) on the application of Planning authority, or (b) of its own motion, after making such enquiry as it deems fit and after giving the Planning Authority an opportunity to be heard, may at any time, after consulting the Director, by notification, revoke a Town Planning Scheme if it is satisfied that under the special circumstances of the case the Scheme should be revoked. "in the instant case, the State Govt has taken action under Cl (a) of sub- sec (2) of S. 49 of the Act. The contention urged on behalf of the petitioners can be summarised as follows : (1) S. 49 (2) is violative of Art. 14 of the Constn, because, the procedure to be followed by the State Govt to revoke the Scheme is different from the procedure prescribed by the Act for making a Final Scheme or for varying it, and there is no justifiable ground for prescribing two different procedures as stated above; (2) having regard to the purpose with which the Act is enacted and the prejudice that is likely to be caused to the persons residing in any area covered by a scheme by its revocation, it should be held that it is implicit in S. 49 (2) that the State Govt should give sufficient opportunity to all those persons who would be affected to make representation regarding any action that the State Govt proposes to take under S. 49 (2) of the Act. As no such opportunity was given by the State Govt before issuing the Notification, it should be held that it had been made without due compliance of the requirements of S. 49 (2) of the Act; (3) the decision of the State Govt to revoke the Scheme is based on an irrelevant ground; and (4) the action taken by the State Govt in publishing the Notification has to be declared as ultra vires the provisions of the statute, as it is not taken in furtherance of the object of the statute. ( 8 ) THERE is, however, no controversy about the fact that an appplication was made by the Planning Authority (Municipal Council) to the State government about the fact that the State Government had consulted the Director of Town Planning before it passed the impugned order of revocation as required by S. 49 (2 ). Pursuant to its resolution di. 13-8-1974, the Planning Authority applied to the state Govt under s. 49 (2) (a) of the Art. In Ihe course of its application, it stated as fellows:" With reference to the above subject, I would like to place before you the following facts for your kind consideration and necessary action in the matter. The Central Ward Town Planning Scheme was envisaged in the year 1945 vide G. O. 1367 d/. The Central Ward Town Planning Scheme was envisaged in the year 1945 vide G. O. 1367 d/. 24th May 1945 under the Madras Town planning Act, 1920. This was very much necessary at that time considering the situation in that locality existing then as there were very few roads in the Central Ward and to see that all the residents were provided with good roads and to see that their residences were easily accessible In those davs Central Ward was iust like Moodanidambur ward of today with very few roads and residences were accessible only by lanes. At that time residential localities like Ajjarkad, Brahmagir, kunjbettu, Ambalpadi, now beautifully coming up, were not vet all thought of. It was considered that Central Ward could provide a nice residential locality without business premises and shops. The importance of the town educationally was unknown at that time nor anybody could surmise Udipi would be internationally known for its educational institutions. Between 1945 and 1965 (within which the Scheme is to be completed) times have changed and Udipi has grown in importance as a pigrimage Centre, in the educational sphere and also as hinter-land to the fishing port at Malpe which is coming up very fast. Shops, business premises, such as Cinema Theatre, Hotels, Photo studios, Printing Presses, Offices, Dispensaries, Petrol Bunks, Arrack depots and such other commercial institutions have come up within the central Ward Town Planning Area thus making the Scheme practically an absolute one. These instituutions, which have come up here, were necessitated by the fact, that they were essential for the smooth living and have become one with the civic life of the residents of the Central ward without which it is very much difficult for the people to live here. Due to the increased facilities of transport the residential localities have come up beautifully in Ajjarkad, Ambalpadi, Kanakapady, kunjibettel etc, Central Ward has no more remained as residential area. The Central Ward Town Planning Scheme has outlived the purpose for which it was envisaged. It is good that the Central Ward Town planning Scheme has been instrumental for the growth and improvement of this area and it has provided the locality adequate roads. But now it has become an hindrance to the further development of the town in genearal and Central Ward in particular. It is good that the Central Ward Town planning Scheme has been instrumental for the growth and improvement of this area and it has provided the locality adequate roads. But now it has become an hindrance to the further development of the town in genearal and Central Ward in particular. Now after considering all the above aspects the Municipal Council which met on 23-8-1974 in its urgent special General Meeting has resolved to make an application to the Govt under S. 49 (2) of Karnataka town and Country Planning Act, 1961 for the revocation of the Scheme in the interest of preserving the already developed civic life of the town (the copy of the resolution is enclosed herewith ). Now I request the govt to kindly consider the application of the Municipality and pass necessary order by notification revoking the Scheme and at the same time keeping in tact all the development made in the Central Ward under the various provisions of the said scheme. "the Director of Town Planning who was consulted by the State govt recommended that the Scheme should be revoked by his letter d|. 24-12-1974. In the course of his letter, he observed as follows :" The Asst Director of Town Planning of this Office visited Udipi along with the Asst Director of Town Planning, Mangalore and has prepared an existing land use plan of T. P. Scheme area (Fig. 2 ). It is observed that a number of commercial and small scale industrial establishments have come up along most of the roads in the Scheme Area contravening the original proposals of the Scheme and thereby violating the ss. 14 (1) and 15 (b) of the Scheme. It could be seen from the plan that proposals of the old T. P. Scheme are completely changed and the trend of development has been followed by the Municipality in granting permission. Hence, the T. P. Scheme has become obsolete and cannot be adopted in view of the changed physical and socio-economic condition of the area. The proposal of the Municipality to revoke the t. P. Scheme is to be considered by Govt under the changed circumstances. After careful study of the proposals made in T. P. Scheme (shown in Fig. 1) and the present trend of development (shown in Fig. The proposal of the Municipality to revoke the t. P. Scheme is to be considered by Govt under the changed circumstances. After careful study of the proposals made in T. P. Scheme (shown in Fig. 1) and the present trend of development (shown in Fig. 2), I am of the opinion that the Central Ward T. P. Scheme of Udipi sanctioned by the erstwhile Govt of Madras has almost become defunct, as the municipality has failed to implement and enforce the Scheme within the period of 20 years fixed by Govt and have not evinced any interest to implement the Scheme. In view of the changed circumstances and trends of development after a lapse of nearly 30 years since the inception of the Scheme, I feel that the T. P. Scheme, be revoked. "in the course of the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State govt, the special circumstances which persuaded it to make an order revoking the Scheme are set out. It is pleaded that on account of non-enforcement of the scheme in accordance with law over a period of nearly thirty years, a large number of bulidings had come up in the area to which the scheme applied and many of them were being used for non-residential purposes. The list of buildings which are being used for non-residential purposes is also enclosed to the statement of objections. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondent 2 also, similar allegations have been made. On behalf of the State Govt it is urged that the continuance of the scheme was considered to be not in public interest and that there was compelling necessity to revoke the scheme. It is further pleaded that action was being taken by the State Govt in consultation with the Planning Authority and the Director of Town Planning to prepare a fresh Scheme for the area in question. ( 9 ) THE allegation made in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State Govt that a large number of non-residential buildings had been allowed to come up in the area in question in violation of the Scheme when it was in operation, is not controverted by the petitioners. ( 9 ) THE allegation made in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State Govt that a large number of non-residential buildings had been allowed to come up in the area in question in violation of the Scheme when it was in operation, is not controverted by the petitioners. Similarly, the truth of the statements made in the application of the Planning Authority and in the recommendation of the Director of Town Planning regarding the existing situation is not disputed by the petitioners. In view of the above, it has to be held that the special circumstances set out in the application made by the Planning Authority and in the recommendation of the director of Town Planning showing that the area was no longer a residential area prompted the State Govt to issue the Notification. ( 10 ) I shall now prqceed to consider seriatim the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. It is no doubt true that under the Act the procedure prescribed for the making of a Scheme is different from the procedure prescribed for its revocation. The first contention urged is that by presccribing two different procedures as mentioned above, the State Legislature has violated Art. 14 of the Constn. It is well settled that while dealing with a case In which Art. 14 of the Constn is invoked, the Court has to consider whether there is any intelligible differentia between the class of persons and things grouped together and the class of persons and things excluded from the group and whether there is any reasonable nexus between the object to be achieved and the basis adopted for classification. A perusal of the provisions of the Act dealing with the consequences that would ensue by the introduction of a scheme in any area, would show that on its enforcement, the rights of persons who own immovable properties in the area, would get attenuated. After a Scheme comes into force, they can use the lands owned by them only in accordance with its terms. Any building constructed on those lands contrary to the scheme, is liable to be pulled down. In view of the above consequences, the State legislature was right in prescribing an elaborate procedure to be followed before a scheme was finalised and enforced. Any building constructed on those lands contrary to the scheme, is liable to be pulled down. In view of the above consequences, the State legislature was right in prescribing an elaborate procedure to be followed before a scheme was finalised and enforced. The procedure prescribed for that purpose provides for the publication of the draft of a scheme calling for representations from persons who would be affected by the scheme in the area and consideration of those representations. It is quite probable that in the absence of such procedure the scheme would be exposed to the criticism that it is violative of Art. 19 (1) (f)of the Constn. But, when a scheme is revoked, the consequences that would ensue would not be of the same character or magnitude as the consequences that would ensue when a scheme is imposed on any area. On the revocation of a scheme, the rights of the holders of immovable property would get enlarged. In other words, the owners of the properties would become free from the restrictions that are imposed by a scheme. The State Legislature, therefore, thought it fit to prescribe a different procedure altogether in the case of the revocation of a scheme. In order to revoke a scheme, the State Govt has to follow one of the two procedures set out in Cls (a) and (b) of sub-sec (2) of S. 49 of his act. In the case falling under sub-sec (a), the State Govt is moved by the planning Authority by an application. On receipt of the application, the Govt has to consult the Director off TP. On the basis of the application made by the planning Authority and the opinion expressed by the Director of Town planning, the State Govt has to decide whether there exist any special circumstances which require the Scheme to be revoked. If the State Govt is satisfied about the existence of the special circumstances, the State Govt can proceed to revoke the Scheme. In this case, the State Govt has followed the above procedure. ( 11 ) THE case of making of a scheme and the case of revocation of a scheme give rise to different consequences as already mentioned. It cannot be said that there is no intelligible differentia between the two and there is no reasonable nexus between the classifiation and the object to be achieved. ( 11 ) THE case of making of a scheme and the case of revocation of a scheme give rise to different consequences as already mentioned. It cannot be said that there is no intelligible differentia between the two and there is no reasonable nexus between the classifiation and the object to be achieved. I do not, therefore, think that the decision of the state Legislature to treat them differently can b considered as violativfi of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 12 ) IT cannot also be said that the power conferred on the State Govt under S. 49 (2) of the Act is arbitrary. The State Govt has to consider the application made by the Planning Authority and the opinion of the Director town Planning before taking action; it has got also to consider whether there are any special circumstances which require the revocation of a scheme. Moreover, in the instant caw, the power of revocation is directed to be exercised by the State Govt which ordinarily cannot be expected to discharge its duties arbitrarily. ( 13 ) SRI Shivashankar Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Anandji Haridas and co (P) Ltd v. S. P. Kasture AIR. 1968 SC. 565. , in support of the above contention. In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of the procedure prescribed under Ss. 11 (4) (a) and 11a (1) of C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act (21 of 1947 ). The Supreme Court was of the opinion that a registered dealer who failed to submit returns could be proceeded against both under ss. 11 (4) (a) and 11a (1),and when the dealer was proceeded under S. 11, (4) (a), he could not have the benefit of the period of limitation prescribed by S. 11a (1) in view of S. 11a (3 ). It was therefore held by the Supreme cc,urt that the prescription of two different procedures, one of them being more prejudicial to the dealer, was not in consonance with Art. 14 of the constn. The facts of these cases are different from the facts of the case before the Supreme Court. It was therefore held by the Supreme cc,urt that the prescription of two different procedures, one of them being more prejudicial to the dealer, was not in consonance with Art. 14 of the constn. The facts of these cases are different from the facts of the case before the Supreme Court. The State Govt is not given the option in these cases to adopt either the procedure prescribed for the formulation of a scheme or the procedure under S. 49 (2) while exercising its power of revocation. The only procedure prescribed is that provided under Sec. 49 (2 ). Hence no reliance can be placed by the petitioner? on the above decision. Similarly, no assistance can be. derived by the petitioners from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam v. State of punjab AIR. 1972 SC. 2587. , in which the Supreme Court was concerned with a case where there was a possibility of hostile discrimination as Govt had been given the option to follow one of two procedures without any guidance as to which should be followed in a given case. In the instant case when the Planning authority makes an application for the revocation of the Scheme, the Govt has to follow only one procedure and it has no choice in the matter. Hence, the first contention urged on behalf of the petitioners has to fail. ( 14 ) INCIDENTALLY, the contention of the petitioners that the prescription of the one procedure for the variation of a scheme under S. 48 of the Act and a different procedure for its revocation contravenes Art. 14 of the Constn is also liable to be rejected on the same ground on which the earlier contention has been rejected. S. 48 of the Act deals with the procedure that has to be followed by the State Govt in order to rectify any error or mistake committed while making the scheme and it has nothing to do with a case of revocation. S. 48 of the Act deals with the procedure that has to be followed by the State Govt in order to rectify any error or mistake committed while making the scheme and it has nothing to do with a case of revocation. ( 15 ) THE next contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that, although the law does not expressly require that the residents of an area covered by a scheme should be given an opportunity to make representation to the State Govt regarding the desirability of revoking it, the Court should hold that by necessary implication , S. 49 (2) of the Act requires the state Govt to follow such procedure before revoking a Scheme. In support of the above contention, Sri Shivashankar Bhat drew my attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi. and govt of Mysore v. J. V. Bhatt AIR. 1975 SC. 596. It is no, doubt true that in shenoy's case (1), the Supreme Court has observed that the persons who are residing within an area to which a scheme applies have a right to insist upon the due observance of its terms and conditions. In the said decision, the existence of statutory right in such persons has no doubt been recognised. But a right created by a statute can always be taken away by resorting to the procedure prescribed therefor. 15a. The applicability of the rule of audi alteram Purtem to any case however depends upon the nature of the right involved and the surrounding circumstances. The expression 'rights' when used in a general sense includes within its scope (i) rights in the strict sense (including all proprietary rights); (ii) liberties or privileges (including personal rights); (iii) powers (including authority) and (iv) immunities. Their correlatives are (i) duties; (ii) no-rights; (iii) liability or subjection, and (iv) disabilities, respectively. (For detailed discussion on this topic see Salmond on Jurisprudence 11th Edn. Chap. 10; Hohfeld: Fundamental Legal Conceptions ). When the first two, kinds of rights are enjoyed by the holders of those rights, there may not be any perceptible loss of rights on the part of others but when powers or immunities are exercised or enjoyed, loss of rights on the part of others is bound to ensue, in view of the liability or disability imposed on them. When the first two, kinds of rights are enjoyed by the holders of those rights, there may not be any perceptible loss of rights on the part of others but when powers or immunities are exercised or enjoyed, loss of rights on the part of others is bound to ensue, in view of the liability or disability imposed on them. On account of this distinguishing feature Courts have to show greater concern towards those who are under subjection and those who are under a disability while interpreting laws governing them. A scheme under the Act confers an immunity on the public generally who reside in the area to which the scheme applies and impose a corresponding disability on the owners of immovable properties because they cannot enjoy their properties as they choose in view of the restrictions imposed by the scheme. When a scheme is revoked the members of the public would only loose the advantages they were deriving by the curtailment of the rights of others. They do not suffer injury to any proprietory or personal rights. ( 16 ) IN Binapani Dei's case AIR. 1967 SC. 1269. it was held that the rule of audi alteram partem would be applicable to adjudications upon matters involving civil consequences. In Kraipak's case AIR. 1970 SC. 150. the Supreme court applied the said rule to a case in which personal rights were involved. These cases were followed in Govt of Mysore v. J. V. Bhat in which the question of curtail-- mant of rights of owners of properties was involved. In these cases the supreme Court was considering the applicability of the rule of audi atterm partem to adjudication or administrative decisions affecting proprietory or personal rights. No decision was however cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in which the said principle was applied to a case involving loss of an immunity as in these cases. ( 17 ) IN Daud Ahmed v. Dist Magistrate, Allahabad AIR. 1972 SC. 8996. , the Supreme Court court observed as follows :" It is the nature of the power and the circumstances and condi- tions under which it is exercised that will occasion the invocation of the principle of natural justice. Deprivation of property affects rights of a person. ( 17 ) IN Daud Ahmed v. Dist Magistrate, Allahabad AIR. 1972 SC. 8996. , the Supreme Court court observed as follows :" It is the nature of the power and the circumstances and condi- tions under which it is exercised that will occasion the invocation of the principle of natural justice. Deprivation of property affects rights of a person. If under the Requisition Act the petitioner was to be deprived of the occupation of the premises the Dist Magistrate had to hold an enquiry in order to arrive at an opinion that there existed alternative accommodation for the petitioner or the Dist Magistrate was to provide alternaive accommodation"in that context, the Supreme Court held that the rule was applicable by implication as the case was one which involved deprivation of a right in property In Kraipak's case (6) the Supreme Court said :" What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which enquiry is held and the constituion of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. "in Putta Bhatt v. State of Mysore AIR. 1972 SC. 2185. the Supreme Court declined to apply the principle of audi afierm partem to a case of compulsory retirement. ( 18 ) THE Act requires the State Govt to take into consideration the opinion of the Planning Authority which is a representative body representing the residents of the towji and the opinion of the Director of Town planning who is considered to be well versed in the preparation and enforcement of schemes before taking action under S. 49 (2) of the Act. I do not think that it would be reasonable to read into the provisions of S. 49 (2) of the Act, the requirement of giving opportunity to persons who were likely to lose certain immunities arising from the non-exercise of rights by others to show cause as to why a scheme should not be revoked. ( 19 ) THERE is one more ground on which the second contention of the petitioners has to be rejected. On a close reading of Ss. ( 19 ) THERE is one more ground on which the second contention of the petitioners has to be rejected. On a close reading of Ss. 45, 48 and 49 of the act it becomes manifest that the State Legislature did not intend that the rule of audi alteram partem should be applied to proceedings under S. 49, (2) (a) of the Act. The State Legislature expressly provides an elaborate procedure for the preparation and modification of a scheme. Under S. 49 (1) it directs a scheme would stand revoked when it is substituted by another scheme which is made by following the procedure prescribed for the introduction of a new scheme. Under S 49 (2) (b) of the Act when the State govt suo motu takes action to revoke a scheme it is required to make an enquiry as it deems fit. But when the Planning Authority makes an application the State Govt is not required to make any enquiry. If the State legislature intended that the rule of audi alter am partem should be followed in a case falling under S. 49 (2) (a) it would have said so. I am of the view that because the State Legislature did not intend to do so it enacted 8. 49 (2) (a) in the manner it was enacted. In the context in which S. 49 (2), (a) appears, it is difficult to hold that the rule of audi atteram partem is applicable to proceedings under it, particularly when the non-application of that rule does not make the provision unconstitutional. ( 20 ) THE third contention raised by the petitioners is that the State gqvt has relied on an irrelevant circumstance in reaching its decision to revoke the scheme. In this connection my attention is drawn to the clause, "whereas the Town Municipal Council has not asked the Govt for extension of time for implementation after expiry of 20 years" in the Notification. In this connection my attention is drawn to the clause, "whereas the Town Municipal Council has not asked the Govt for extension of time for implementation after expiry of 20 years" in the Notification. It is argued that the Scheme as observed by this Court and by the Supreme court in Shenoy's case (1), was one which could be enforced even after the expiry of 20 years from the date on which it came into force, and, therefore, any decision taken by the Stale Govt on the basis that the scheme would come to an end at the expiry of 20 years should be held to be one made on irrelevant considerations. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State Govt, it is stated that although such was the impression which the state Govt had before this Court rendered the decision in Shenoy's case (1), the State Govt did not' consider while passing the impugned order that the scheme would cease to be in operation by reason of the fact that the period of 20 years had elapsed. I think that there is good deal of substance in what is urged on behalf of the State Govt. If really the State Govt had felt tha,t the scheme had ceased to be in operation after the expiry of 20 years, it would not have proceeded to exercise its power under S. 49 (2) and revoke it. Moreover, even the recital on which reliance is placed by the petitioners does not show that the State Govt had in its contemplation a scheme which had ceased to be in operation while making the order. The relevant part of the impugned order only states that the Town Municipal Council had not asked for extension of time for implementation of the scheme after the expiry of 20 years. It contains a statement of fact. The truth of that statement is not also controverted. It is further to be seen that the recital does not refer to any material fact. It is only when an administrative body relies upon an irrelevant factor relating to a material aspect, of the case, it may be said that its decision is vitiated on the ground that it is based on irrelevant considerations. The present case is not of that nature. This contention is, therefore, rejected. It is only when an administrative body relies upon an irrelevant factor relating to a material aspect, of the case, it may be said that its decision is vitiated on the ground that it is based on irrelevant considerations. The present case is not of that nature. This contention is, therefore, rejected. ( 21 ) IT was lastly contended that as any decision taken under any of the provisions of the Act should be only in furtherance of the object of the Act and as the Notification is inconsistent with it the Court should declare it ultra vires the statute itself. In the statement of objections it is stated that the scheme was revoked by the State Govt with the object of preparing a fresh scheme after following the prescribed procedure. There is no reason to reject the truth of the said statement. In the absence of any allegation of want of good faith on the part of the State Govt, it has to be held that the notification which is impugned in this writ petition has been issued in public interest. The Notification is not, therefore, ultra vires the Act. ( 22 ) NO other contention is urged. ( 23 ) IN the result, these writ petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100 in each case. --- *** --- .