JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 147 of 1973 : Shri Natwarlal Patel and another v. Union Government of India and 2 others. ( 2. ) THE petitioners are owners of bungalow No. 8, Theatre Road, cantonment, Jabalpur. The original lease of land, measuring 2. 02 acres out of Survey No. 99 was granted for and on behalf of the Secretary of State for india on 5-3-1922 in favour of Sydney Allexander Ballarry and Jessie Agues may Ballarry. They constructed a bungalow upon it with proper permission of the Cantonment authorities. The petitioner purchased the same on 18-11-1957 for a consideration of Rs. 22,000 from their successors in title. After the purchase, the petitioners made additional constructions sometime in 1963 and the Central Government was pleased to grant a supplementary lease for the land covered by the said construction measuring 3337 Square feet, on 21-9-1968. According to the petitioners, they had spent Rs. 45,000 over the new construction and on the date the Central Government sought to resume the land, the value of the old and new structures was not less than Rs. 1 Lac. The Central Government gave a notice to the petitioners (Annexure V)that they proposed to resume the land under Clause 27 of the contract of lease and that they offer them a compensation of Rs. 8,027 for the structures. The notice is dated the 23rd April, 1970. The covering letter was from the office of the Military Estate Officer, which enclosed a cheque for the said amount and required the petitioners to vacate the bungalow by 28-5-1970. The petitioners have come to this Court challenging the legality and validity of the notice of resumption and pray that the said notice be quashed. ( 3. ) CLAUSE 27 of the contract under which the resumption of the land is claimed reads as under: "[right of the Government to resume the land on payment of compensation for buildings. ] The Local Government may resume the land or any portion after giving one months notice in writing and on payment of compensation for such buildings standing on the land or portion thereof as shall have been erected under proper authority. ] The Local Government may resume the land or any portion after giving one months notice in writing and on payment of compensation for such buildings standing on the land or portion thereof as shall have been erected under proper authority. If there shall be any dispute as to the amount of such compensation, the same shall be referred to a committee of arbitration, which shall be constituted or provided in Chapter XX of the Cantonment code, 1912, and the lessee shall be bound by the decision of the Committee of arbitration. " ( 4. ) THE petitioners first contention before us is that under the said clause, right has been conferred upon the Local Government to exercise the option of resumption. The Local Government under the context, would mean the Provincial Government or the State Government. Though the lessors were the Secretary of State for India, that is, the Central Government, the lessors did not reserve to themselves the right of resumption but conferred the said powers upon the local Government. The lease was executed in 1922 when the Government of India Act, 1919 held the field and Local Governments were understood to mean the "provincial Governments". The Act of 1919 dealt with the provisions relating to local Governments in Part V. The petitioners say that the notice of resumption ought to have been issued by the State Government. The notice issued by the Central Government would be inoperative and ineffective. ( 5. ) IN advancing this contention, the petitioners overlook the fact that the contract of lease was granted under the provisions of the Cantonments act, 1910, and the conditions of lease and the form in which it was required to be executed, were governed by the Cantonment Code, 1912, in particular form B, Schedule VI contained therein. The Cantonment Act, 1910 came to be repealed and re-enactment in the year 1924, was further amended from time to time. The amended re-enacted Act regulated the management of lands in the Cantonment area. Reading section 8 of the General Clauses Act along with sections 18 and 24 for construction of references to repealed enactment, we are in no manner of doubt that the successor functionary in the matter of resumption of Cantonment land would now be the Central Government. The amended re-enacted Act regulated the management of lands in the Cantonment area. Reading section 8 of the General Clauses Act along with sections 18 and 24 for construction of references to repealed enactment, we are in no manner of doubt that the successor functionary in the matter of resumption of Cantonment land would now be the Central Government. Pertinent attention may be drawn to the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937, which directs that throughout the cantonment Act, 1924 (II of 1924), save as otherwise expressly provided, for "local Government", the words "central Government" have to be substituted. The instrument granted to the lessees under the 1912 Code shall have to be construed with reference to the form and provision re-enacted, and in the light of such construction the expression "local Government" shall have to be replaced by the expression "central Government". ( 6. ) THE Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937, under which the leases are now granted, authorize the lessor to terminate the lease on paying to the lessee the market value of the buildings. The lessor obviously is the Central Government. One cannot conceive of two functionaries in the matter of resumption of land, that is for old leases the State Government and for the new leases the Central Government. After the repeal of the Act of 1910, action has to be taken with reference to the re-enacted provisions and the functionary under the new Act, shall be the functionary for enforcing rights and obligations arising under the old Act. We may also like to mention that in the Code of 1912, the expression "local Government" meant the Government in India. The Government of india Act, 1858 recognized Home Government, that is, the Crown and the secretary of State in England and the Governor General in Council in India. The expression "local Government", it appears, referred to the Government other than the Home Government in England. The Act of 1858 does not refer to any provincial or local Government in that sense. We are inclined, therefore, to hold that the Central Government is the proper authority to issue a notice of resumption. ( 7. ) THE second contention of the petitioners is that the notice was wrong both in the description of the land sought to be resumed, as also in the mention of the dates of the original lease and the supplementary lease. ( 7. ) THE second contention of the petitioners is that the notice was wrong both in the description of the land sought to be resumed, as also in the mention of the dates of the original lease and the supplementary lease. Whereas the petitioners were the lessees of the land leased out on 5-3-1922, the notice gives the date of lease as 17-12-1919. The supplementary lease in favour of the petitioners is dated 21-9-1968, but the notice gives 12-11-1968 as the date. The confusion in the notice goes to the root of the resumption proceeding. One could easily see that the authorities were apt to commit mistake in the matter of calculation of compensation payable to the person whose lease was being determined. They possibly worked on a wrong data available with them in the official records. The dates in the notice could not be absolutely fictitious. There were leases of such dates as mentioned in the notice and the lands were being mistaken one for the other. That being the position, the notice must be quashed. We are not prepared to accept that the authorities were not mistaken about the identity of the land sought to be resumed. Clause 27 of the contract was common to all old leases. The authorities, in enforcing a particular lease, ought to have been careful about its date and the boundaries mentioned therein. ( 8. ) THE third and the most important contention of the petitioners is that the offer of Rs. 8027 /- was both illusory and arbitrary. The petitioners had purchased the bungalow in 1957 for Rs. 22000/ -. They spent Rs. 45. 000/-over additional constructions in 1963. The cost of construction was fast going up. The buildings were worth more than Rs. 100,000/. The offer of rs. 8027/-had absolutely no reasonable relationship with the value of the buildings sought to be acquired. Besides, in determining the value, the petitioners were never heard. One could understand, they say, that an Engineer were deputed to collect the details of the measurements and costing, by examination of the walls, the foundations, joinery and finishes and he worked as per Appendix j in the "standing Orders" issued by the Engineer-in-Chief army Head quarters 1971, or on any other technical formula. One could understand, they say, that an Engineer were deputed to collect the details of the measurements and costing, by examination of the walls, the foundations, joinery and finishes and he worked as per Appendix j in the "standing Orders" issued by the Engineer-in-Chief army Head quarters 1971, or on any other technical formula. But then, a notice could be given to the petitioners to be present when the data for assessing the value was being collected and they could be apprised of the principles adopted in fixing the value. Nothing of the sort had been done. The petitioners strongly rely on the authority of the Allahabad High Court reported in Bhagwati Devi v. President of India (1973 All W R 483.) for the propositions (i) That the grantees interest can come to an end only after he has been given one months notice and paid the value of the authorised buildings. It cannot hence be said that the Government acquires right to take possession of the land on the expiry of one months notice. The paying of the value of the buildings is as much a condition as is the giving of one months notice before the power to resume can be effectively exercised. And (ii) that the principles of natural justice are attracted even to administrative proceedings which affect the civil rights of the grantee. This is what their Lordships said in paras 6 and 7 which observations aptly apply to the facts of the present case: "6. It is evident that the assessment of value of the buildings for paying compensation to the grantee is a proceeding which affects the civil rights of the grantee. In our opinion the principles of natural justice are attracted to such proceedings. It is now well settled that the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings if they affect a persons civil rights. See State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi (A I R 1967 SC 1269.) and A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 150 .) It was stated in the latter case that the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure natural justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. 7. The appellant stated in the writ petition that the notice of resumption has been issued to her without giving her any opportunity to represent her case. 7. The appellant stated in the writ petition that the notice of resumption has been issued to her without giving her any opportunity to represent her case. The petitioner has not been given an opportunity to prove the market value of the property. In reply it has been stated that there is no provision of any opportunity of being heard. The value of the buildings had to be fixed by the Military Engineering Service Authorities as provided in standing Order No. 241. It is thus clear that though the Government purported to act in accordance with Standing Order No 241 yet the appellant was not allowed to participate in the enquiry. A perusal of that Standing Order shows that the valuations have to be substantiated in a Court of law and so they have to be supported by accurate details. Even though the appellant has challenged the valuation yet no effort has been made on behalf of the respondents to file a copy of the valuation report made by the Military Engineering service Authorities. According to that assessment the value of the buildings is Rs. 6,650 /-, while according to the appellant its value is not less than Rs. 1,00,000/ -. In our opinion, the principles of natural justice were clearly attracted and they were undoubtedly contravened by the authorities. " ( 9. ) THE learned counsel for the Central Government, however, argued on the strength of the decision reported in Sh. Raj Singh v. The Union of India (AIR 1973 Delhi 169.)that the Governments right of resumption was absolute upon giving a months notice and the question of compensation could be considered in a separate proceedings as provided in the clause itself If the lessee was dissatisfied with the compensation offered, he could ask for an arbitration. Neither the contract, nor the Act or Rules framed thereunder require the determination of the value by following a judicial or quasi judicial procedure. It must be presumed, the learned counsel says, that the Government in determining the value of the structures, had deputed a qualified person who acted bona fide and under the Standing Orders in collecting the data and in furnishing the the report. The lessee had a remedy in approaching the arbitrators if the offer was not acceptable. ( 10. It must be presumed, the learned counsel says, that the Government in determining the value of the structures, had deputed a qualified person who acted bona fide and under the Standing Orders in collecting the data and in furnishing the the report. The lessee had a remedy in approaching the arbitrators if the offer was not acceptable. ( 10. ) WE are more inclined to accept the view their Lordships of the allahabad High Court have taken in Bhagwati Devis case. In the Delhi case, their Lordships construed the grant to be one in the nature of a licence which could be revoked by the grantor. The grantee has no right or interest in the land. In the present case, the instrument is a lease and the determination of the lease is permitted to the lessor subject to his giving a months notice and to his paying compensation for the structures standing on the land. The obligation to pay compensation is a civil liability. The determination thereof must, therefore, follow the principles of natural justice. The structures have been erected by the lessee with the consent of the lessor. That being so, the lessee can legitimately claim that he should be heard on the question of compensation before he is deprived of those structures. It would not be correct to say that the lessee had erected the structures at his own risk since he knew that there was a clause in the lease-deed for resumption of the land. He knew at the same time that he was entitled to receive compensation for whatever he erected on the land. ( 11. ) IN the present case, the respondents did not furnish to us the data on which the compensation was determined. The report of the Engineer, if it was called at all, was not shown. If all that has been done is arbitrary and without notice to the petitioners, they have a legitimate grievance to make. Before they are required to go to arbitrators, they must know the details upon which the compensation was worked out. The valuation must be such as could prima facie be sustained in a Court of law. ( 12. ) IN this view of the matter, the notice dated the 23rd April, 1970 (Petitioners Annexure V) deserves to be and is hereby quashed. The petitioners shall get their costs from the respondents. Counsels fee Rs. The valuation must be such as could prima facie be sustained in a Court of law. ( 12. ) IN this view of the matter, the notice dated the 23rd April, 1970 (Petitioners Annexure V) deserves to be and is hereby quashed. The petitioners shall get their costs from the respondents. Counsels fee Rs. 150/-, the security amount shall be refunded to the petitioners. Misc. Petition No. 147 of 1973: Natwarlal Patel and another v. Union government of India and two others: ( 13. ) THE petitioners are the owners of bugalow No. 4, Howbagh Road, jabalpur Cantonment. The original lease for the land sought to be resumed was granted to the petitioners predecessors in title by lease-deed dated the 21st September, 1908, under the provisions of the Cantonment Code of 1899. The petitioners had purchased the bungalow and the land in August, 1927, for Rs. 30,000/ -. The present value of the bungalow, according to the petitioners, was more than 150,000/ -. The Central Government gave a notice to the petitioners on 15th January, 1973, that they had decided to resume the land under the terms of the aforesaid lease and that they offer a compensation of Rs. 4590/ -. They asked the petitioners to deliver vacant possession on expiry of 30 days from the receipt of the notice. The petitioners have in this writ petition, challenged the legality and validity of the said notice. ( 14. ) THE petitioners raised two grounds before us: (i) That the notice of resumption should have been issued by the local Government which under the context would mean, according to them, the State Government, and (ii)that the lease-hold rights could come to an end only upon payment of compensation which ought to have been determined after due notice to the petitioners following the principles of natural justice. ( 15. ) AS discussed above, the first ground is not available to the petitioners. The second ground, however, must prevail. The offer of the compensation could not be arbitrary and capricious. Compensation must be determined on settled principles after due notice to the petitioners. We have agreed with the dictum of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in bhagwati. Devis case. ( 16. ) IN that view of the matter, the petition is allowed and notice (Petitioners Annexure III) is quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs from the respondents. We have agreed with the dictum of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in bhagwati. Devis case. ( 16. ) IN that view of the matter, the petition is allowed and notice (Petitioners Annexure III) is quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs from the respondents. Counsels fee Rs. 150/ -. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petitions allowed.