JUDGMENT HARI SWARUP, J. 1. This petition has been filed against the proceedings before the civil court initiated on the basis of a plaint. Respondent No. 1 filed suit No. 363 of 1971, in the court of Munsif, Hathras for the following relief: "That the defendants being incapable and incompetent to espouse the cause and represent the workmen of the plaintiff's factory, a permanent injunction restraining them from espousing the cause of or representing the plaintiff's workmen be granted." The plaintiff in the case is the employer and the defendants are the petitioners in this petition. During the pendency of the suit plaintiff moved an application for the grant of a temporary injunction in terms of the relief claimed in the suit. Trial Court granted the injunction and restrained the defendants from espousing the cause of the plaintiffs workmen or representing them before any tribunal or authority in any proceedings during the pendency of the suit. Defendants went up in appeal which was dismissed. Defendants then filed revision Section 115, C.P.C. which is still pending. Petitioners have filed the present petition mainly on the ground that the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant the relief was barred by the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act). Petitioners have claimed a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the orders passed by learned Munsif and the learned Civil Judge in the interim matters. A writ in the nature of Mandamus is also sought to direct the company not to frustrate the hearing of certain cases pending before the Tribunal and the Labour Court. 2. The contention of the petitioners is that the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit was in effect a relief for a declaration that the defendant union had no capacity to espouse the cause of the workmen which will mean a declaration that the union could not by itself support or espouse an individual dispute or convert into an industrial dispute as contemplated by the Act. The necessary implication of granting such a relied will be a declaration to the effect that any reference made by the State Government would be a bad reference as the reference espoused by the union would not be deemed to be espoused by a competent union. The necessary implication of granting such a relied will be a declaration to the effect that any reference made by the State Government would be a bad reference as the reference espoused by the union would not be deemed to be espoused by a competent union. The further implication will be that an industrial tribunal or a Labour Court will not be competent to proceed with such a dispute that may be referred to it by the State Government. Granting the other part of the relief regarding the representation of the plaintiff's workmen before any industrial tribunal in the matters of industrial disputes or otherwise will mean prohibiting the union to prosecute the case of the workmen before such tribunals. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that such relief could not be claimed in a civil suit as the granting of such relief would offend the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. The primary question, therefore, to be determined in this petition is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit, because if it has that jurisdiction it has jurisdiction to grant an interim relief. Section 9, C.P.C. provides: "The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." Even if it be taken that the relief claimed by the plaintiff is of a civil nature the civil court will have no jurisdiction if the cognizance of such a claim is expressly or impliedly barred by some law. Section 21(2) expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to consider or adjudicate upon any order that may be made in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act. The Code of Civil Procedure normally deals with cases of individual rights. It permits the filing of suits where the rights of many persons are concerned in representative capacity. The Industrial Disputes Act deals with a different class of right, i.e., collective rights. When a dispute becomes a collective dispute it acquires the form of an industrial dispute. It then goes out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It permits the filing of suits where the rights of many persons are concerned in representative capacity. The Industrial Disputes Act deals with a different class of right, i.e., collective rights. When a dispute becomes a collective dispute it acquires the form of an industrial dispute. It then goes out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Once there is an industrial dispute its decision can be made specifically by an industrial tribunal or Labour Court on a reference made to it by the State Government under Section 4(k) of the Act. Whether the dispute has been properly espoused or not or is not an industrial dispute can always be decided by the industrial tribunal before whom the matter may come up for adjudication. 3. Similarly, the question of representation by a particular person can be decided by the Tribunal before which the proceedings are pending. Section 6(1) of the Act provides for representation and Section 6(3) states that no officer of the union will be entitled to represent any party unless a period of two years has elapsed since its registration under the Trade Unions Act. The question of representation of a party can arise only before a tribunal where representation is claimed and can always be decided by that tribunal. It is thus clear that the Industrial Disputes Act provided for the decision of the matter which the plaintiff now seeks to be decided through a civil court without any of his being pending before it. If Section 21 of the Act bars civil court's jurisdiction to sit in judgment over an order of the industrial tribunal it follows that civil court's jurisdiction is also barred as regards issuing of injunction or deciding matter meant to be decided by the industrial tribunal under the Act. In the case of Glass Works Mazdoor Sangh v. B. M. Glass Works 1972(25) F.L.R. (H.C.) 285., it was held that the question whether the dispute referred to the Labour Court was an industrial dispute could be raised before the Labour Court and that the Act provided an adequate remedy for the adjudication of the question and as such it could not be agitated in a civil court. As already seen the real relief claimed by the plaintiff is so interlinked with the question of reference of the dispute and its adjudication that it must be deemed to be a matter beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the civil court. In the case of Ramji Das v. Trilok Chandra 1970 A.L.J. 1143, it was held that when a matter was specifically determinable under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, no suit could lie for its adjudication; same principle will apply in the present case and bar the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the following decisions in support of his plea that the suit is not barred. In the case of Firm I. S. Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 322, it was held that in view of Section 6-A of the Madras Sales Tax Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred from deciding the matter which could be decided in proceedings under the said Act. In Syndicate Bank v. B. R. Lobo 1971 Labour and Industrial Cases 1055. it was held that a suit by the workman against the personal grievance was maintainable if a reference of the same for adjudication as an industrial dispute was not made by Government under Section 10 of the Act. It was held by the Court that for an industrial dispute remedy was provided by the Act and hence remedy was not available in the civil court. In the case of K. M. Mukherji v. Secretary, State Bank of India 1968 Labour and Industrial Cases 127. it was held that the suit by a dismissed employee for wrongful dismissal in violation of the statutory award was maintainable and was not barred under the provisions of the Act. None of these cases helps the respondent. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has contended that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief as they had already availed of the alternative relief of revision, had filed the petition after considerable lapse of time were in contempt and had come to this Court with false assertions. There is no merit in these objections. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has contended that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief as they had already availed of the alternative relief of revision, had filed the petition after considerable lapse of time were in contempt and had come to this Court with false assertions. There is no merit in these objections. Once it is held that the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter, the question of alternative relief cannot stand as a bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Secondly, the revision is not as efficacious a remedy as is available through the Writ jurisdiction of this Court. Thirdly, the revision filed by the petitioners has remained pending so long without any decision, while the Writ Petition filed much after the filing of the revision has already come up for decision. In the present case time is of importance. The availability of a speedy remedy cannot, therefore, be denied to the petitioner because of the pendency of the revision. Fourthly, the respondent himself had objected to the maintainability of the revision before the District Judge. In the case of U. P. State v. Mohammad Noor, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86. it was held that there was as no rule with regard to certiorari as there was in the case of Mandamus that it will lie only where there was no equally effective remedy. The Supreme Court approved of the observations in the Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn. Vol. 11, p. 130) to the effect that the pendency of the revision or availability of an alternative remedy is only a matter which can be taken into consideration by the Court in the exercise of its discretion in granting or refusing the writ, but that is not a ground on which the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the Writ may be challenged. When the Court finds that the subordinate court is proceeding without any jurisdiction, the Court will not deny to the petitioner the relief on the ground of pendency of the revision, particularly when the order to be passed in revision by the subordinate court will itself be liable to be considered by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied on the decision in Custodian Evacuee Properties v. Abdul Shakoor A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1087. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied on the decision in Custodian Evacuee Properties v. Abdul Shakoor A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1087. This was a case which arose out of proceedings under the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act. The Court had found that under the said Act the revisional powers were very wide, and could provide adequate alternative remedy but the powers under Section 115, C.P.C. are not so wide. In the case of K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Comm. A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 395. it was held that where a reference had been made to the High Court in terms of the provisions of Section 8(5) of the Taxation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act it would not be proper to allow the petitioners to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, at that stage. In the present case, no proceeding is pending in this Court where the petitioner can get adequate relief. 5. Naini Glass Works v. Central Excise A.I R. 1954 S.C. 207. was a case under the Central Excise and Salt Act and it was held in that case that the Court would not exercise jurisdiction when there was an alternative remedy. In the present case, as the entire order is without jurisdiction and is affecting adversely the right of the petitioners, the remedy under Article 226 cannot be refused. 6. The writ petition can also not be said to be barred by the principle of latches as the appellate order was passed on April 6, 1973 and the revision was pending before the District Judge. It was on October 19, 1973 when the date was fixed for hearing of the revision that objection was raised by the opposite party No. 1 to the effect that the revision was not maintainable. The writ petition was then filed on November 26, 1973. The petition cannot, therefore, be thrown out on the ground of latches, particularly because the injunction order is still operating. As regards the petitioner being in contempt, it has been alleged in the counter-affidavit that they had disobeyed orders passed by the Munsif and the petitioner's property had been attached. The contempt cannot, therefore, be deemed to be continuing so as to bar the present petition. The false plea which has been made by the petitioner is in respect of the assertion in paragraph 39 of the petition to. The contempt cannot, therefore, be deemed to be continuing so as to bar the present petition. The false plea which has been made by the petitioner is in respect of the assertion in paragraph 39 of the petition to. the effect that because of the injunction order issued by the Munsif, proceedings in adjudication cases pending in the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal had been stayed. In the counter-affidavit it had been asserted that they were not stayed but adjourned at the instance of the petitioners. The statement in paragraph 39 is only a bad expression of the fact that the proceedings were not going one. This cannot be taken as a false assertion of a character which may disentitle the petitioners from seeking the relief from this Court. 7. The impugned orders, viz., the order passed by the learned Munsif granted a temporary injunction and the order of confirmation passed in appeal are accordingly liable to be quashed on the ground that they were passed by courts which had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the interim orders were passed. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated June 2, 1972 issued by learned Munsif Hathras is quashed. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs from respondent No. 1. Petition allowed.