JUDGMENT : Petitioners 1 to 3 in this Original Petition are pupils of the Panoor High School. The grievance of the petitioners is against Exts. P1 and P3 orders. By Ext. P1 petitioners 1 to 3 were dismissed by the 1st respondent-Headmistress under R.6 (iii) of Chapter IX of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (for short the Rules). By Ext. P3 the 2nd respondent-District Educational Officer. Tellicherry dismissed the appeal from Ext. P1 order. The question that arises for consideration is the extent to which the Head of a school should observe the principles of natural justice in taking disciplinary action against pupils. 2. It seems, on 15tb August 1974 when Independence Day was celebrated in the school, some unhappy incidents took place and that has resulted in the dismissal of petitioners 1 to 3. The 1st respondent issued Ext. P7 notice dated 15-8-1974 to petitioners 1 to 3 alleging that at the time of unfurling the National Flag on 15-8-1974, they indulged in hooting and thereafter under their leadership a meeting was held in Standard X class room wherein petitioners 1 to 3 made speeches against celebrating the Independence Day. By Ext. P7 petitioners 1 to 3 were asked to appear before the Commission appointed for enquiry on 22-8-1974. On receipt of Ext P7, a joint representation Ext. P8 dated 22-8-1974 was submitted to the Ist respondent by the Secretaries of three student organisations and the President of another student organisation. In Ext. P8 certain allegations are seen made against the way in which the Independence Day was celebrated in the school. 3. The Ist respondent by Ext. P1 order dated 6-9-1974 dismissed petitioners 1 to 3 under R.6 (iii) of Chapter IX of the Rules. From Ext. P1 an appeal was filed before the 2nd respondent who by Ext. P3 order dated 30-9-1974 dismissed the same and confirmed Ext. P1 order of dismissal. 4. In Ext. P-3 the 2nd respondent has mentioned that Ext. P-l dismissal was with the approval of the school staff council held on 3-9-1974. The petitioners have produced Exts. P-4, P-5 and P-6 affidavits by three teachers of the School wherein it has been stated that the staff council held on 3-9-1974 did not take a decision to dismiss petitioners 1 to 3. The petitioners have approached this Court for quashing Exts. P-l and P-3 orders. 5. The petitioners have produced Exts. P-4, P-5 and P-6 affidavits by three teachers of the School wherein it has been stated that the staff council held on 3-9-1974 did not take a decision to dismiss petitioners 1 to 3. The petitioners have approached this Court for quashing Exts. P-l and P-3 orders. 5. By order dated 8-10-1974 on C. M. P. No. 13384 of 1974 this Court allowed the petitioners to amend the Original Petition to incorporate certain additional grounds. By the above petition, two additional documents, Exts. P-7 and P-8, were also marked. Then by order on C. M. P. No. 16631 of 1974 dated 12-12-1974 this Court removed the 2nd petitioner from the party array. 6. The 2nd respondent in para 4 of his counter-affidavit has stated that the 1st respondent gave notice to the parents of the pupils that the pupils will be dismissed from the school since they have dishonoured the National Flag and misbehaved at the Independence Day celebrations. It is also pointed out that petitioners 1 to 3 were dismissed on charges of gross indiscipline and misbehaviour. The 2nd respondent also denies the allegation of mala fides. The dismissal was made after conducting a proper enquiry and after complying with the provisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The Ist respondent in her counter-affidavit has stated that the action was taken against petitioners 1 to 3 because they by their proved conduct were likely to cause an extremely unwholesome influence on other pupils in the school. In Para.10 of the counter affidavit it is pointed out that on 19-8-1974 notice was given to petitioners 1 to 3 about the proposed action and they were asked to adduce necessary evidence if they desired. The Committee appointed to enquire into the matter conducted enquiries from 22-8-1974 to 24-8-1974 and examined more than 50 persons. Petitioners 1 and. 3 also participated in the enquiry and their evidence was also taken. The report of the Committee was placed before the staff meeting on 3-9-1974 which approved the action taken. The three teachers who have filed affidavits, Exts. P-4 to P-6, also attended the staff meeting. After the decision was taken, notices were issued to the guardians of the pupils as required under R.6 (iii) of Chapter IX of the Rules, but the guardians did not reply. The three teachers who have filed affidavits, Exts. P-4 to P-6, also attended the staff meeting. After the decision was taken, notices were issued to the guardians of the pupils as required under R.6 (iii) of Chapter IX of the Rules, but the guardians did not reply. Thereupon, petitioners 1 to 3 were informed by Ex. P-l that they will be dismissed from 10-9-1974. In Para.20 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the petitioners 1 to 3 were informed about the charges levelled against them. The violation of the principles of natural justice alleged in the writ petition is denied by the Ist respondent. 7. The petitioners have filed two reply affidavits; the first reply affidavit dated 6-11-1974 was to answer the contentions raised in the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent and the second reply affidavit dated 28-11-1974 was to answer the contentions raised in the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. The statement in para 15 of the second reply affidavit is that the 1st respondent did not give an opportunity to petitioners 1 and 3 to leave the institution with the transfer certificates and that the averments to the contrary contained in the counter-affidavit are devoid of any truth. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners contend that the action taken by the 1st respondent is absolutely malafide. The 1st respondent also dismissed petitioners 1 to 3 at the instance of others who are in the position of superiors to her. The order of the 2nd respondent rejecting the petitioners' appeal and affirming the dismissal order is equally mala fide and tainted by malice Ext. P-l order purported to have been passed by the 1st respondent is illegal, ultra vires, null and void. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies on the decisions of this Court in Kumaran v. The Headmaster, Government Secondary School for Boys, Quilandy (1972 KLR. 409) and K. S. Cyriac v Vice-Chancellor, Kerala University (1974 KLT. 504) and contends that Exts. P-l and P 3 cannot be substained. In Kumaran v The Headmaster. Government Secondary School for Boys, Quilandy (1972 KLR. 409) it has been said: "What the court said in 1971 KLT. 658 was not that in holding an enquiry against a student and punishing him whether it be by way of temporary removal or by way of dismissal no rules of natural justice need be adhered to. That certainly cannot be said. 409) it has been said: "What the court said in 1971 KLT. 658 was not that in holding an enquiry against a student and punishing him whether it be by way of temporary removal or by way of dismissal no rules of natural justice need be adhered to. That certainly cannot be said. This court only indicated that in certain circumstances it may be open to the Court to say that rules of natural justice have not been violated though the strict norms of such rules have not been observed. May be there has been no enquiry as contemplated in regard to enquiry in such matters. May be the rules of evidence have not been strictly conformed to in the matter of enquiry. These will not vitiate the enquiry or the result thereof. Ultimately in such matters the question is whether there has been fair play in the proceedings resulting in the punishment against the student. What sort of safeguard is necessary for a student to secure his right of being heard will depend upon the nature of the misconduct alleged, the nature of the evidence available and such other matters and it is not possible to strait jacket this as a rule. Of course, it appears to be that the minimum that any student is entitled to have is a hearing either personally or in writing. He must have occasion to say what he has to in answer to the charge against him, how that occasion is to be afforded is again a matter on which no uniform rule could be laid down. In the case of suspension of a student R.6 of Ch. IX indicates that it is meant as a punishment. Therefore, before a student is punished, the minimum that would be expected is the consideration of his case after haying had occasion to know what answer he has in the matter. R.6 of Chapter IX, which, is one relating to punishment, requires that "before a pupil is suspended or dismissed from school, the Headmaster shall inform the pupil's guardian of the fact". This again is not a mere requirement of form. It is to give the guardian an opportunity not only to answer the charge or to give his own explanation, but also to plea for the boy, very often possibly effectively and therefore when such a rule is violated it cannot be ignored". This again is not a mere requirement of form. It is to give the guardian an opportunity not only to answer the charge or to give his own explanation, but also to plea for the boy, very often possibly effectively and therefore when such a rule is violated it cannot be ignored". In K S. Cyriac v. Vice-Chancellor, Kerala University (1974 KLT. 504) it has been said: "The show cause notice, Exhibit P-7 was served on the petitioner only on 7-8-1973, and it gave him 15 days time to show cause. Immediately on receipt of that notice, the petitioner wrote to the second respondent requesting for copies of the evidence of the witnesses and the report of the enquiry officer for enabling him to submit his explanation. There was no response to this request. The third respondent did not conduct any oral enquiry, since the petitioner did not appear for the enquiry. Therefore, there was no question of giving him copies of the evidence; but he was entitled to get a copy of the enquiry report, and a reasonable opportunity to submit his explanation to the findings therein. Admittedly this was not dona; and the impugned order, Ext. P-9, was issued before the expiry of the period allowed to him by Ext. P-7 to submit his explanation. So this order is bad under law". I think both the above decisions are distinguishable on facts. What has been said in Kumaran's case (1972 KLR. 409) is that the minimum safeguard that any pupil is entitled to have is a hearing either personally or in writing. He must have occasion to say what be has to in answer to the charge against him. This has been done in this case before Ext. P-l was issued. Before Ext. P-3 was issued, the parents were also heard. In K.S. Cyriac's case (1974 KLT. 504) the order was passed within the time allowed to show cause. Not only that, a copy of the enquiry report asked for was not furnished. In this case, the petitioners have no such contention in Ext. P-2 appeal to the 2nd respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on three decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. R.G. Teredesai (AIR. 1969 S.C. 1294), State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi (AIR. 1969 S.C. 1302) and Kesava Mills Co. v. Union of India (AIR. P-2 appeal to the 2nd respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on three decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. R.G. Teredesai (AIR. 1969 S.C. 1294), State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi (AIR. 1969 S.C. 1302) and Kesava Mills Co. v. Union of India (AIR. 1973 S.C. 389). In State of Gujarat v. R. G. Teredesai (AIR. 1969 S.C. 1294) the Supreme Court said: "The requirement of a reasonable opportunity, therefore, would not be satisfied unless the entire report of the Enquiry Officer including his views in the matter of punishment are disclosed to the delinquent servant". In State of Maharashtra v. B.A. Joshi ( AIR 1969 S.C. 1302 ) the Supreme Court said: "The failure on the part of the competent authority to provide the plaintiff with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity contemplated by Art.311(2)". It is pertinent to note that both the above decisions were rendered in matters arising from disciplinary proceeding against Government servants. In Kesava Mills Co. v. Union of India (MR. 1973 S.C. 389) the Supreme Court said: "The principles of natural justice do apply to administrative orders or proceedings. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait jacket. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly." The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that there is nothing in Ext. P-l to show that Ext. P-8 representation was considered and what is really contemplated is a proper enquiry and not an empty formality. 9. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent relies on a decision of the Privy Council in Furnell v. Whangarei High School Board ((1973) 1 All E.R. 400), a decision of the Chancery Division in Herring v. Templeman and others ((1973) 2 All E.R. 581) and a decision of the Court of Appeal in Herring v. Templeman and others ((1973) 3 All E.R. 569) and contends that no strict compliance of the principles of natural justice is necessary in cases like this. In Furnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board ((1973) 1 All E. R.400), a case of disciplinary action against a teacher, the Privy Council said: "......in the appellant's case there were no grounds for thinking that the respondent board had acted unfairly in exercising their discretionary power to suspend him; they had to take into account the interests of the pupils and parents and of the public as well as those of a teacher and in the circumstances they had not acted irresponsibly or unfairly." In Herring v. Templeman and others ((1973) 3 All E.R. 569) the Court of Appeal said: ".........the assumption that the plaintiff was entitled as of right to a full legal trial on every detailed matter was fallacious; the hearing before the governing body was neither a law suit nor a legal arbitration; its purpose was to give the student a fair chance to show why the recommendations of the academic board, which was the competent body to make an assessment, and the principal should not be accepted; it was the duty of the governing body to act fairly; on the evidence there was nothing to show that it had acted unfairly in any way; the plaintiff had been told why the recommendations were made and what the relevant facts were". In the above case, an action against a student based on the recommendations of the academic board, the plaintiff contended that there had been a departure from the rules of natural justice in the proceedings before the governing body in that it had refused to reopen the academic board's assessment of his fitness to be a teacher and had refused to allow witnesses to be called, examined and cross-examined in that connection and to reveal to him all the evidence, opinions and reports, on which the assessment had been reached by the academic board. The learned counsel points out that by Ext. P7 petitioners 1 to 3 were informed of the charges against them. The Committee constituted for the enquiry examined more than 50 persons. Petitioners 1 and 3 participated in the enquiry and gave statements also. The report of the Committee was placed before the staff meeting held on 3-9-1974 and it was approved. Thereafter, notices were issued to the guardians of the pupils but they did not respond. The pupils were ultimately dismissed on 10-9-1974. The learned counsel points out that even if Ext. The report of the Committee was placed before the staff meeting held on 3-9-1974 and it was approved. Thereafter, notices were issued to the guardians of the pupils but they did not respond. The pupils were ultimately dismissed on 10-9-1974. The learned counsel points out that even if Ext. P3 cannot be sustained, that cannot be a reason for interfering with Ext P1. 10. The learned Government Pleader points out that the 2nd respondent heard the guardians and the pupils before passing Ext. P3 order rejecting the appeal. The learned Government Pleader also relies on the decision in Raghavan v. D. E. O. Attingal ( 1971 KLT 658 ) wherein this Court said: "Rule 6 has a purpose and that is to maintain discipline and order in a school; and from the language of the said rule, it does not appear that it is intended that, when a Headmaster takes action under this rule, the rules of natural justice should be followed strictly. By necessary implication the rule excludes the strict application of any rules of natural justice. It follows that the punishment imposed by the Headmaster (at any rate, the District Educational Officer) on the students cannot be impugned on the ground of failure to apply the principles of natural justice." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners replying the contentions of the counsel for the respondents relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hira Nath Mishra v. Rajendra Medical College (AIR. 1973 SC. 1260) and contends that except in certain exceptional circumstances the evidence must be taken in the presence of those who are facing the enquiry. In the above decision the Supreme Court said: "Principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. When a proper enquiry is held by an enquiry committee consisting of three respectable and independent members of the staff as appointed by the Principal of a Medical College to enquire into the complaint of the inmates of the Girls hostel against certain male students of that College about their indecent behaviour with them in the hostel compound itself during odd hours of night, in such a case the rules of natural justice does not require that statement of girl students should be recorded in presence of the male students concerned or that the latter should be furnished with the report of the enquiry committee". 12. 12. On a consideration of the contentions raised by the counsel on both sides and the facts and circumstances of the case, I come to the following conclusions: A pupil against whom disciplinary action has been taken by the head of an educational institution cannot insist that principles of natural justice should be strictly complied with. There is a substantial difference between an enquiry in a disciplinary action against a civil servant and that in a disciplinary action against a pupil of an educational institution. When in the former strict compliance of the principles of natural justice is imperative, in the latter if the pupil has been given a fair chance to answer the charges that is sufficient. The question is whether there has been fair play. If the head of an educational institution had not in any way acted unfairly there is no reason why the action taken cannot be sustained. In this case, the pupils were informed of the charges against them. Then an enquiry was conducted by a staff committee. The pupils participated in the enquiry and gave statements. The decision was taken with the approval of the staff council. The pupils' guardians were informed of the action proposed to be taken. Only thereafter the pupils were dismissed. This is more than sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice in a disciplinary action against pupils by the head of an educational institution. 13. For the reasons stated above, the Original Petition is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed