Judgment S.K.JHA, J. 1. This is an appeal by defendants 1, 8 and 11 and the heirs of deceased defendant No. 9. The suit was filed in the Court of the Munsif, Buxar, by respondent No. 1 for partition by metes and bounds of his eight annas share in the suit properties. The properties in suit comprise only two plots of land, viz., Survey Plots Nos. 1176 and 1533, measuring, respectively, 17 and 34 acres, situate at mauza Pandey Patti within Buxar Police station. The trial Court had decreed the suit for partition. The lower Appellate Court, where appeal had been preferred by original defendants 1, 8, 9, and 11, namely, the first three appellants and the predecessor-in-interest of appellants 4 to 9 of this Court has dismissed the appeal on the ground of abatement. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dismissing the appeal on the ground of abatement, the appellants have come to this Court. 2. The short facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of the appeal are these. The case of plaintiff respondent No. 1 was that the aforesaid two plots appertaining to khata No. 109 were jointly recorded in the cadastral survey record-of-rights in the names of the plaintiffs father and one Parmeshwar, who is said to have been the father of Jagarnath, Hari, Ramanandan and Rama. It was asserted in the plaint that the interest of to the two joint owners, namely, the plaintiffs father and Parmeshwar aforesaid, was eight annas each. Defendants 1 to 7 were the heirs of Jagarnath. Hari and Ramanandan whereas defendant No. 8 was Rama aforesaid. According to the plaintiffs case, he was entitled to the eight annas moiety, while the remaining eight annas belonged to defendants Nos. 1 to 8. Defendant No. 9 was alleged to be a purchaser from defendant No. 8 by two registered sale deeds one in respect of .023/4 acre and the other in respect of 18 dhurs in survey Plot No. 1176. Defendant No. 10 likewise was said to be a purchaser of a portion from out of the share of some of the defendants other than defendant No.8. Defendant No. 10 likewise was said to be a purchaser of a portion from out of the share of some of the defendants other than defendant No.8. Defendant No. 11 was said to have purchased some share and was added subsequently in the suit as a party defendant and was not impleaded on the allegation that he was a purchaser of a portion of both the plots from some of the other co-sharers after the filing of the suit. Defendants Nos. 1, 8, 9 and 11 filed separate written statements, and the case of the contesting defendants was that instead of eight annas share claimed by the plaintiff, actually he was entitled to one-third moiety in the suit properties, one-third share belonged to defendants Nos. 1 to 7 and the remaining one-third belonged to defendant No. 8. The three purchasers, viz., defendants Nos. 9 to 11, claimed to have rightly purchased the land from the suit plots from the different defendants. Their further case was that partition on the basis of one-third share had been effected long ago and that therefore, a fresh suit for partition was not maintainable. 3. The trial Court framed a number of issues. The only three issues which are being mentioned are relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. They are issues 2, 3 and 4. Issue No. 2:- "Is the share claimed by the plaintiff in the two suit plots correct ?" Issue No. 3:- "Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for partition of the suit plot by metes and bounds ?" Issue No. 4:- "Have defendants Nos. 9 and 10 acquired any valid title in the suit land by virtue of their purchase to the detriment of the plaintiff ?" With regard to Issues 2 and 3 the finding recorded by the trial Court was that the share claimed by the plaintiff in the two plots was correct and further that there had been no previous partition by metes and bounds and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for partition by metes and bounds. With regard to issue No. 4 the trial Court found that, to quote its language,- "By the first sale deed defendant No. 9 purchased .023/4 acre in S. P. No. 1176. In the same plot through the other sale deed she purchased 18 dhurs more. With regard to issue No. 4 the trial Court found that, to quote its language,- "By the first sale deed defendant No. 9 purchased .023/4 acre in S. P. No. 1176. In the same plot through the other sale deed she purchased 18 dhurs more. Defendant No. 10 has purchased in S. P. No. 1533 ever a little less than his vendors share. Defendant No. 9 also has not purchased more than the total share of defendant No. 8 in the two plots. They must be held therefore to have acquired valid title in the land purchased by them. But it will be without detriment to plaintiffs interest. Since I have said that defendant No. 9 through her two sale deeds had not purchased more than the total share of her vendor and I have found that there has been no partition as yet by metes and bounds the question of limitation and adverse possession does not arise." Accordingly, a preliminary decree for partition was passed by the trial Court declaring the plaintiffs share in the suit plots to the extent of eight annas, with a further direction that the plaintiff respondent No.1 would be entitled to get a partition by metes and bounds through appointment of a pleader commissioner who was also directed not to disturb the purchasers possession. Against the aforesaid preliminary judgment and decree defendants Nos. 1, 8, 9 and 11 preferred an appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal there Musammat Dhana Kuer, defendant No. 9 who was appellant No. 3 died. It appears that no step was taken by the remaining appellants for getting her name expunged from the record and her heirs legally substituted in her place in the appeal. On the 9th of February 1970 the plaintiff respondent No. 1 filed a petition stating before the Lower Appellate Court that Musammat Dhana Kuer aforesaid had died on the 25th of June, 1965, to the knowledge of the other appellants there, and since no step for substitution of her legal heirs had been taken the whole appeal had abated. On the 9th of February 1970 the plaintiff respondent No. 1 filed a petition stating before the Lower Appellate Court that Musammat Dhana Kuer aforesaid had died on the 25th of June, 1965, to the knowledge of the other appellants there, and since no step for substitution of her legal heirs had been taken the whole appeal had abated. On the 12th of February, 1970, Dinanath Sah, husband of the deceased Dhana Kuer, and Madan Prasad, Gaya Prasad and Chhotan Prasad, who are her sons, and Suryamukhi Devi and Parbati Devi, her daughters, all of whom are appellants before this Court, filed a petition before the Lower Appellate Court for being added as parties to the appeal there. They had asserted in the petition that the aforesaid Dhana Kuer had acquired interest in the joint property and had been made a party defendant to the suit in the capacity of a transferee from defendant No. 8. It was also stated in the petition that the vendor of Dhana Kuer, namely, Rama Sah, was already an appellant before the Lower Appellate Court and that, therefore, Dhana Kuer was not a necessary party to the appeal. It was, however, prayed that in the circumstances those heirs should be added as parties to the appeal in place of their predecessor-in-interest, Dhana Kuer. The Lower appellate Court, however, held that since no application for substitution had been filed within ninety days of the death of Dhana Kuer and no application for setting aside abatement had been filed, nor had any application for the condonation of the delay been filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, the substitution could not be allowed. Their petition was accordingly rejected, and it was held that the appeal had abated as against Dhana Kuer, appellant No. 3 before the Lower Appellate Court. It was further held that since the appeal arose out of a partition suit the entire appeal must be held to have abated. 4. The short question that falls for determination in this case is as to whether the appeal in the Lower Appellate Court could be said to have abated in so far as the original defendant No.9, Dhana Kuer, who was appellant No.3 there, was concerned. Whereas Mr. 4. The short question that falls for determination in this case is as to whether the appeal in the Lower Appellate Court could be said to have abated in so far as the original defendant No.9, Dhana Kuer, who was appellant No.3 there, was concerned. Whereas Mr. Janeshwar Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, urged that the principle of abatement could not be said to be attracted on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case. learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appeal had rightly been held to have abated in the Lower Appellate Court and that since the appeal had arisen out of a decree in a partition suit, the Court below must be held to have rightly held the appeal to have abated. In my view, the contention put forward by learned counsel for the appellants seems to have much substance. For the purpose of deciding as to whether abatement at all could be said to have occurred in the Lower Appellate Court, the first consideration relevant would be as to whether Dhana Kuer was a necessary party to the suit itself. As already stated above and as has been held by the trial Court, she had purchased a portion of the interest of defendant No. 8, and the interest so purchased by her, according to the finding of the trial Court, was much within the area to which, even according to the plaintiffs case, defendant No. 8 would be entitled on partition. It is true that a partition necessarily affects the interest of a purchaser or an alienee of an undivided share, since after the partition his security is upon the divided share or the separate allotment made when the equities are being finally adjusted at the time of partition by mates and bounds. Formerly, there seemed to be some amount of divergence of opinion as to whether a transferee or a mortgagee who had either purchased or got in mortgage some property from out of undivided share of joint or co-owners could be held to be a necessary party in a suit for partition. In Mohindro Bhoosun V/s. Soshee Bhoosun. (1880) ILR 5 Cal 882. In Mohindro Bhoosun V/s. Soshee Bhoosun. (1880) ILR 5 Cal 882. however, Sir Arthur Wilson was dealing with a question as to whether a person having a disputed claim to be a mortgagee from the plaintiff in a partition suit could be joined as a necessary party to the action; and while refusing the application Sir Arthur held; "The question as between the plaintiff and the defendant is who is entitled to the property in dispute ? To determine that question it is not necessary that the mortgagees should appear: they will not be bound by any finding come to in their absence. In case of a decree for partition being made the mortgagees should have leave to come in and attend the partition proceedings." So also in Khetterpal Sritirutno V/s. Khelal Kristo Bhuttacharjee, (1894) ILR 21 Cal 904, Sale. J., stated the practice being followed in such matter in these terms: "A mortgagee is not a necessary party to a partition suit but he may and frequently does obtain leave to attend the proceedings as a quasi-party." In my view, the law has been very precisely laid down by Sale, J., and I respectfully reiterate that an alienee or a transferee from one of the co-owners or tenants-in-common from out of any joint property really attains the status of a quasi-party. He may, if the parties so choose, be brought on the record in a partition suit. But if a question crops up as to whether such a transferee by virtue of his own right can insist on being brought on the record of a partition suit in his own independent capacity, the Court will not be bound to bring him so on record. The decisions referred to above have since been noted with approval by Sir George Rankin of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Jadunath Roy V/s. Parameshwar Mullick, (AIR 1940 PC 11) where the status of such a transferee came up for discussion by their Lordships, and, while dealing with this matter at page 14, (right-hand column) their Lordships observed that the mortgagee of an undivided share might be prejudiced if that share did not receive a proper allotment in severalty, and it is for the benefit of all other persons interested in the joint property that such a mortgagee should be bound by the allotment. In such cases, therefore, it will, in general, meet the case if he is allowed to attend and be heard at the stage at which the making of a proper allotment is effected, just as in other types of cases a person interested only in the result of a particular account may be allowed to attend at the taking of that account, especially if it be in the interests of others that he should not thereafter dispute the result. So much for the status of defendant No. 9 who is now being represented in this court by appellants Nos. 4 to 9. I accordingly hold that defendant No. 9 was not a necessary party for the effective adjudication of the rights of the co-owners, namely the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 8. 5 There is yet another aspect of the matter to which I may incidentally advert in support of the proposition that in such cases the question of abatement cannot arise. Can it be said that on account of the death of defendant No. 9, (appellant No. 3 in the Lower Appellate Court) the appeal could not be proceeded with and the equities between the parties and the legal rights and liabilities could not be disposed of even in the absence of defendant No. 9 ? I have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative; for after all what was the interest which was being claimed by defendant No. 9 in the suit ? She was merely entitled to, on a final allocation and allotment of the properties to be made at the time of the final decree, the area purchased by her from out of the interest which would ultimately be allotted to the share of her transferor, defendant No. 8. The suit was one for partition pure and simple, the plaintiff respondent No. 1, claiming eight annas share in the property, in accordance with which share trial Court has granted him the decree. Out of the remaining eight annas share, the trial Court decree is meant to be apportioned in accordance with the proportionate share of defendants Nos. 1 to 8, and out of the shares so allotted to them such portions of the property which the co-sharers had in their turn transferred to the transferees, namely, defendants 9, 10 and 11 could be finally allotted and allocated in their favour. 6. 1 to 8, and out of the shares so allotted to them such portions of the property which the co-sharers had in their turn transferred to the transferees, namely, defendants 9, 10 and 11 could be finally allotted and allocated in their favour. 6. The two fundamental principles to be borne in mind in dealing with such cases are these. A transferee from one of the co-sharers from out of his share of an undivided property has no separate existence for the purpose of the partition suit, apart from his transferor. That being so, in a pure suit for partition the derivative title of such a transferee does not fall for any adjudication. The second basic principle in cases of this nature is that although such a transferee of an undivided share of a joint property cannot claim as a matter of right to be added as a necessary party to the suit, yet the important advantage of his being so permitted to be represented at the time of final allocation and allotment of shares is that it lightens the partition suit by avoiding the necessity of deciding as to the existence and validity of the transfers claimed over the undivided shares. Keeping these principles in view, it cannot be said that in the absence of defendant No. 9, who was appellant No. 3 in the Lower Appellate Court, the rights and liabilities of the parties in so far as the partition of the suit lands was concerned could not be effectively adjudicated upon. It also follows as a necessary concomitant of the second principle enunciated above that in order to lighten the partition suit by avoiding the necessity of deciding as to the existence and validity of the transfers in question it is meet and proper in the circumstances of the case to add the present appellants 4 to 9, who are the heirs of the original defendant No. 9 as party appellants before the Lower Appellate Court ex debito justitiae. 7. For the reasons stated above I must hold that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court holding that the appeal before that court had abated must be held to be wrong. As a necessary corollary to what I have already observed above it is meet and proper in the ends of justice to add the present appellants Nos. 7. For the reasons stated above I must hold that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court holding that the appeal before that court had abated must be held to be wrong. As a necessary corollary to what I have already observed above it is meet and proper in the ends of justice to add the present appellants Nos. 4 to 9 as party appellants before the Lower Appellate Court. The decree of the Lower Appellate Court holding that the entire appeal had abated there on account of the fact that the appeal was directed from the judgment and decree in a partition suit must also be struck down as illegal. Accordingly, while holding that the present appellants Nos. 4 to 9 be added as party appellants in the Lower Appellate Court, this appeal must be allowed, the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court must be set aside and the case be remitted back to the Lower Appellate Court for hearing the matter on merits and disposing it of in accordance with law. The costs of this appeal will abide the final result of the appeal in the Lower Appellate Court. S.N.P.SINGH, J. 8 I agree.