YASHODA NANDAN, J. This petition arises out of an election petition presented under Rule 35 of the U. P. Keshtra Samities (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962 hereinafter referred to as the Rules. By means of the election petition, opposite party No. 3 challenged the declara tion of the petitioner as Pramukh of the Kshetriya Samiti concern ed. The election petitioner paid a court-fee of Rs. 75/ -. In the writ- ten statement filed, the petitioner challenged the maintainability of the election petition on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped. An issue was framed by the Election Tribunal with regard to the sufficiency or otherwise of the court-fee affixed to the election peti tion. It was found that under Article 22, Schedule II of the Court-fee Act, opposite-party No. 3 should have fixed a court-fee stamp of Rs. 200/ - instead of Rs. 75 -. The Election Tribunal allowed opposite party No. 3 time to make good the deficiency by November 6, 1973. Against that order, the petitioner filed a revision which was dismiss ed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Varanasi on October 21, 1973. Aggrieved by the orders of the Election Tribunal and the learned First Additional District Judge, Varanasi, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the elec tion petition was found to be deficiently stamped, the Election Tribu nal had no option but to reject it and had no power to grant time to opposite party No. 3 to make good the deficiency. It was urged that the Election Tribunal as well as the learned Additional District Judge have erred in law in taking the view that by reason of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was open to the Election Tribunal to grant time to the election petitioner to make good the deficiency in court-fee. There is, in our opinion, no force in this contention. Rule 40 of the Rules runs as follows: "40 (1 ). There is, in our opinion, no force in this contention. Rule 40 of the Rules runs as follows: "40 (1 ). Except so far as provided by the Act or in these Rules, the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code, 1901, in re gard to suits, shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the Act or any provisions of these Rules and it can be made applicable, be followed in the hearing of the election petitions: Provided that. . . . . . . . . . " The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have been made ap plicable to the hearing of election petitions and till there has been a valid presentation of the petition, there can be no hearing and con sequently Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code would not be at tracted as a consequence of Rule 40 as extracted above. The sub mission lacks merit and must be rejected. It was held by Jagdish Sahai, J. in Sriniwas Prasad Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer (Com pensation Officer) Sadar Tehsil Mirzapur and another 1960 A. L. J. 557, that, "whenever the word hearing has come up for judicial inter pretation, it has been considered in the setting in which it has been used in that particular Act or section. . . . . . . . " The learned Judge placed reliance on Whartons Law Lexicon in which the expression hearing has also been defined as having been used in the sense of trial. Jagdish Sahai, J. also with approval relied upon the meaning of the word hearing as given in Rama Natha Iyers Law Lexicon 1940 Edition in which it has been said that, "the trial of a suit is called a hearing and technically consi dered this includes not only the introduction of the evidence and arguments of solicitors but the pursuance of the decree by the Chancellor. " The word hearing has not been defined in the Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Act or in the Rules. It has consequently to be given a meaning bearing in mind the context in which it occurs in that Act. A provision identical with Rule 40 occurs in Section 23 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. " The word hearing has not been defined in the Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Act or in the Rules. It has consequently to be given a meaning bearing in mind the context in which it occurs in that Act. A provision identical with Rule 40 occurs in Section 23 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. This provision in the U. P. Municipalities Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Bhushan Saran v. Onkar Singh and others A. I. R. 1956 All. 715. It was held by the Bench which decided that case that, "it appears to us that the word hearing in Section 23, U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 is used in a broad sense to cover the entire stage of trial and not in the restricted sense of only a parti cular stage beginning with the examination of parties under Or der 10, Civil Procedure Code and ending with the arguments in the case. " We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the two decisions cited above. The word hearing in Rule 40 has, in our opinion, been used in a wide sense and includes the presentation of the election petition. Sec tion 149 of the Civil Procedure Code was consequently applicable and under that provision the Election Tribunal had the power to give time to opposite-party No. 3 to make good the deficiency in court-fee. The order passed by the Election Tribunal and upheld in revision is nei ther without jurisdiction nor suffers from any patent error of law. For the reasons given, this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .