R. L. NARAYAN v. K. S. RANGAIAH SHETTY — 1975 DIGILAW 83 (KAR)

SRINIVASA IYENGAR, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant is the owner of a premises situated in Bangalore City. The respondents are the legal representatives of one Rangaiah Shetty who was a tenant of the said premises, having taken it on lease from the appellant. On the ground that the premises was bona fide and reasonably required for his own occupation and. that he had no other house of his own in Bangalore city, the appellant filed a petitition for eviction of the tenant from the said premises in HRC. 991/63 on the file of the Court of 1st Mmisiff, Bangagalore. The ground on which eviction was sought came within the purview of S. 21 (1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. The petition was filed on 21-11-1963. ( 2 ) ON notice being served on the tenant, he entered appearance, on 16-1-1964 and several adjournments were taken by him to file objections, but as no objection was filed, the petition was allowed, on 25-3-1964. ( 3 ) IT transpires that the thereafter the tenant filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte order and that application was allowed. The tenant filed his objections on 7-10-1964 and thereafter the case was posted for evidence The case was being adjourned from time to time for this purpose. ( 4 ) THE tenant had defaulted in the payment of the rent accruing due, and, therefore, an application had been filed by the landlord under S. 29 of the Act for stopping further proceedings and debarring the tenant from contesting the application for eviction. It appears that the tenant paid a sum of Rs. 1,050 by means of a cheque on 28-7-1965 and therefore the application field by the landlord in that behalf was rejected and the main case posted for evidence. ( 5 ) ON 12-11-1965 when the case stood posted for evidence, the parties as well as their Counsel were present. On the representation of the parties and their Counsel, an order was made by the Court as follows, on that day :"by consent of parties, the petition is allowed for eviction of the respondent with five years' time for him to vacate. No costs. "the order sheet of that day was signed by the petitioner, respondent (tenant) and their Counsel. ( 6 ) THE tenant Rangiah Shetty passed away in November, 1970. No costs. "the order sheet of that day was signed by the petitioner, respondent (tenant) and their Counsel. ( 6 ) THE tenant Rangiah Shetty passed away in November, 1970. ( 7 ) AFTER the expiry of the time allowed under the decree, the landlord sought to execute the decree against the legal representatives of the original tenant. The legal representatives raised an objection that the decree was void and inexecutable. The objection raised is as follows :"that eviction order in question passed in HRC. 991/63 on the file of this Hon'ble Court has been passed by consent of parties in the said crse without applying its mind and satisfying itself as to the existence of the ground of eviction mentioned in the said petition. As such, the said order of eviction passed on consent of the parties only is null and void and unexeeutable in law as held by the Supreme Court of india and the High Court of Karnataka. That the decreerholder is, therefore, not entitled in law to seek for the execution of the said order of eviction passed in HRC. 991 1963". ( 8 ) THE learned Munsiff observing that the order had been made by consent and referring to the decisions cited before him, held that the order of eviction passed was without jurisdiction and a nullity and therefore inexecutable. For the landlord the decision of the Supreme Court in K, K. Chari v. R. M. Seshadri, AIR, 1973 SC. 1311, was relied upon. But the learned Munsiff held that the facts in that case were distinguishable from those in the instant case and therefore did not apply. Accordingly, the execution petition was dismissed. ( 9 ) AGAINST this, an appeal was filed before the Civil Judge, Bangalore. He agreed with the conclusion reached by the learned Munsiff and dismissed the appeal. In this second appeal, the correctness of the orders of the Courts below is challenged. ( 10 ) THE matter came up before Venkataswami, J. who has referred the appeal to a Division Bench under S. 7 of the Hign Court Act. He agreed with the conclusion reached by the learned Munsiff and dismissed the appeal. In this second appeal, the correctness of the orders of the Courts below is challenged. ( 10 ) THE matter came up before Venkataswami, J. who has referred the appeal to a Division Bench under S. 7 of the Hign Court Act. In the the order of reference the learned Judge has observed : " The question that has arisen in this appeal is whether a decree made pursuant to consent of the parties after the case had reached the stage of trial, would be a nullity in the absence of anything in writing specifically indicating that the Court had applied its mind to the question whether the landlord satisfied one or more of the grounds specified in s. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. " it appears that decisions of the Supreme Court and some single Judge decisions of this Court were cited before him. He was of the opinion that the single Judge decisions of this Court cited before him did not cover the point arising in the appeal and as in his opinion the question raised was an important one, reference to a Bench was called for. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of validity of a decree for eviction made by a Court in pursuance of the consent of the parties in the light of enactments imposing restrictions an the eviction of tenants. Three earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have been noticed and considered in the decision reported in Chan's case (1 ). All these cases have been noticed by the Supreme Court in Nagindas v. Dalpatram, AIR. 1974 SC. 471. A reference to Chan's case (1) and Naginda's case (2) would suffice, in our opinion in this appeal. ( 12 ) REFERRING to the two earlier decisions in Bahadur Singh v. Muni sumrat Das, (1969) 2 SCR. 432, and Kaushalya Devi v. K, L. Bansal, (1969) 2 SCR. 1048 , the learned Judges observed in K. K. Chari's case (1), that a Court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord; but those decisions do not lay down how exactly that satisfaction was to be expressed or gathered from the materials on record. Referring to Ferozi La1 v. Man Mal, AIR. Referring to Ferozi La1 v. Man Mal, AIR. 1970 SC, 794, it was noticed that in that case (1) at no stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the plea of subletting was true or not, (2) the order made by the Court did not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of had taken place and (3) that there was no either material on record to show that the court was so satisfied, and accordingly it was held that the decree for eviction had been based solely on the basis of the compromse arrived at between the parties in the circumstances pointed out that the decree was void. It was further observed in relation to the said decision in Ferozi Lal's case (5) as follows :" 23. In the last decision in our opinion, there is an indication as to how the satisfaction of a Court can be expressed or gathered in a particular case. If a stage had been reached in a particular proceeding for a Ccurt to apply its mind regarding the existence of a statutory condition, it may be held that it was so satisfied about the plea of the landlord. Again from other material on record, it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied. ""with regard to the the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the tenant that the decree for eviction in that case (K. K. Chari's case (1)) had been based solely on the basis of the compromise, the learned Judges did not accept that contention. It was observed. " No doubt a reading of the order of the Court dated March 31, 1969, isolated from all other circumstances, may give the impression that the decree for eviction is passed because of the compromise between the parties. It is no doubt true that tine order on the face of it does not show that the Court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. If the Court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the Court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the Court to apply its mind to the relevant question? If the Court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the Court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the Court to apply its mind to the relevant question? Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if the Court was so satisfied. The High court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was material before the Court when it passed the order of eviction by consent, from which it can be shown that the Court was satisfied about the requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, this view is erroneous. "summing up the position in law, it has observed at para 26 of the judgment," The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz, the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S. 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Count was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. "the position was further clarified by the following observations in para 27:" It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact, admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. But if the tenant in fact, admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify in inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds. "the question was again considered by the Supreme Court in Nagindas's case (2), The learned Judges referred to the observations in K. K. Chari's cese (1) at paras 26 and 27, and after noticing the earlier decisions it was held:" 26. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. "ultimately the Supreme Court held in Nagindas's case (2) as follows :" 29. Be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity is taken, the executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial Court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for 'the trial Court's jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial Court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could haves-as distinguished from must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case, there was a clear admission in tine compromise incorporated in the decree, of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under Sec. 12 (3) (a), the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. " ( 13 ) THE position in law is quite clear. A decree for eviction is not a nulljty merely on the ground that it is based upon a compromise or consent. The validity of such a decree depends upon the existence of one or more grounds on which eviction could be sought under the relevant Act. If there be an assertion on the part of the landlord of the existence of such ground and the tenant even though he has disputed it at one stage subsequently withdraws that objection realising the truth of the assertion of the landlord and the Court acts upon such withdrawal (of the objection) thereby accepting the truth of the version of the landlord and passes a decree, it cannot be said that the decree is a nullity. By virtue of the act of the tenant withdrawing the objection and admitting that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable, it becomes unnecessary for the Court to make any further enquiry. By virtue of the act of the tenant withdrawing the objection and admitting that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable, it becomes unnecessary for the Court to make any further enquiry. The Court is always entitled to act upon an admission of a party when it is voluntary. ( 14 ) AN order of eviction made on the basis of consent of a party in such circumstances as would indicate the admission of the existence of a ground for eviction under the particular Statute is as good and effective as a decree passed in another case where evidence hus been let in and decision is given by the Court on merits. There is no prohibition in the Karnataka rent Control Act, 1961, that a decree should not be made by consent or that the existence of the grounds required by the Statute can never be conceded by the opposite party. The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 could be contrasted with Statutes relating to marital rights under which divorce or judicial separation cannot be granted merely because the opposite party consents for such a decree. The latter statutes provide that the petitions filed should contain specific averment that there is no collusion between the parties Question of public policy is involved in such matters and the court is enjoined with the duty of giving a specific finding that there is no collusion between the parties. The Court is not to act upon mere consent of the paities. Relationship created by marriage is one for the lifetime and can be disrupted only by having recourse to law and strictly complying with the provisions thereof. There is a mutual obligation between the spouses to conform to the marital relationship. Under the Rent Control Act merely because the house is let to a tenant, 'the latter is not obliged to continue in occupation of the premises for ever and the landlord cannot, enforce such continuous occupation. The restriction imposed under the Rent Statute is in regard to unreasonable evictions. Existence of ground on which eviction could be made can be proved by evidence or by the admission of the opposite party. Merely on the grouund that the order of eviction is based on consent it is not void. The restriction imposed under the Rent Statute is in regard to unreasonable evictions. Existence of ground on which eviction could be made can be proved by evidence or by the admission of the opposite party. Merely on the grouund that the order of eviction is based on consent it is not void. It is clear from the decisions of the Supreme court referred to above, that the satisfaction of the Court need not be expressly recorded while making the order of eviction and it could be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 15 ) IN the instant case, there was a clear averment in the petition filed by the landlord that he required the premises for his own bona fide use and occupation. There was also an averment that he did not own any other house in Bangalore City. This averment was not at all controverted by thetenant in his statement of objection. The order of the Court as drawn up refers to the ground on which the petition had been filed, viz, bona fide use and occupation of the landlord. A stage had been reached in the case at which the Court had to apply its mind to the existence or otherwise of the ground mentioned in the petition. At that atage the tenant consented to an order for eviction and further prayed that he should be given five years' time to vacate. This consent clearly amounts to withdrawal of the defence questioning the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The fact that the landlord had no other house of his own in Bangalore City having not been controverted and there not being any other ulterior motive in seeking eviction, the requirement pleaded, prima facie, had to be regarded as bona fide and reasonable. The question of the requirement being bona fide and reasonable is a matter for inference from the facts and circumstances in each case. A tenant consenting to an order for eviction subscribes to the contention of the landlord that he required the premises bona fide for his occpuation and puts the matter beyond the pale of controversy. It is, therefore, clear that there was material on record on the basis of which the Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction and the decree made by the trial Court was valid and executable. It is, therefore, clear that there was material on record on the basis of which the Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction and the decree made by the trial Court was valid and executable. ( 16 ) THE appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order dismissing the execution application is reversed and the executing Court shall proceed with the execution of the decree. The appellant is entitled to costs of this appeal. --- *** --- .