Judgment Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. This application is directed against an order dated the 3rd June, 1974 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna City, in exercise of powers conferred 'on him under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the (new Code), by which, after looking into the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the statements of the witnesses examined in course of the inquiry, the learned Magistrate held that a prima facie case under section 148, 447, 452, 380 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code was made out against the petitioners. Accordingly he summoned the petitioners to stand their trial. 2. On the 1st October, 1973, a complaint was filed by Griwardhari Mahto against the petitioners before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Patna City, alleging, inter alia, that the petitioners, along with eight other persons, came in the office room of the complainant Headmaster of Mahanth Harihar Das High school, Poonadih, armed with lathi, bhala, garasa etc., and abused the complainant. When the complainant protested; the petitioners asked him to keep quiet otherwise he would be killed. Thereafter, the petitioners took away registers, books and a small trunk belonging to the complainant, containing Rs.400/-. The said complaint was ordered to be put up on the 13th October, 1973, when the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, after examining the complainant on solemn affirmation, sent the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the (old Code) to Shree C. Rajak, Magistrate, 1st Class, before whom: witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant. In his report, dated the 4th February, 1974, the inquiring Magistrate was of the view that there was a dispute regarding the office of the Headmaster of the School and the complaint was the result of that dispute. Accordingly, he recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The said report was placed before the learned Judicial Magistrate on the 3rd June, 1974, when he passed the impugned order, differing from the report of the inquiring Magistrate, and summoned the accused-petitioners as stated before. 3. Accordingly, he recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The said report was placed before the learned Judicial Magistrate on the 3rd June, 1974, when he passed the impugned order, differing from the report of the inquiring Magistrate, and summoned the accused-petitioners as stated before. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has challenged the legality of the said order, dated the 3rd June, 1974, on the ground that, on the 3rd June, 1974, the learned Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to consider the inquiry report and to pass an order summoning the petitioners, in view of the fact that, al though the new Code had come into force on the 1st April, 1974, none-the-less it was a case which was covered by sub-section (2) of section 484 of the new Code and the order summoning the accused petitioners should have been passed only by the Sub-divisional Magistrate who had initially taken cognizance. Alternatively, it was submitted that, even if it is held that the new Code is applicable to the present case, still the Judicial Magistrate could not be said to be the temporary or permanent successor-in-office of the Magistrate who had taken cognizance under section 190 (1) (a) of the old Code. 4. The petition of complaint had, no doubt, been placed before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who had examined the complainant on solemn affirmation of the 13th October, 1973, and, as such, it will be deemed that cognizance had been taken by that very Sub-divisional Magistrate. Section 204 of the old Code prescribed that if, in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, there was sufficient ground for proceeding, then he could issue summons or warrant, as the case might be. Whether any other Magistrate could exercise this power under section 204 has been the subject-matter of controversy. But, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Nath Mahto Vs. T. Gangooly and the Full Bench of this Court in Krishnadeo Prasad Vs. Mt. Bundhni, it has been settled that the power under section 204 of the old Code, regarding the issuance of summons or warrant after receipt of the' inquiry report, if any, is to be exercised by the Magistrate who had initially taken cognizance of the offence under section 190 (1) (a) of the old Code, or by his temporary or permanent successor in office. In that view of the matter, if it is held in the instant case that it is to be governed by the provisions of the old Code, then the summonses should have been issued either by the Magistrate who had taken cognizance, that is, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, or by his successor in office, either temporary or permanent. 5. Section 484 (2) (a) of the new Code, which is the relevant section for the purposes of determination as to which Code will govern the present case, reads as follows: “(2) Notwithstanding such repeal,- "(a) if, immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force, there is any appeal, application, 'trial, inquiry or investigation pending then such appeal, application, trial, inquiry investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), as in force immediately before such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the Old Code) as if this Code had not come into force; Provided that every inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Old Code, which is pending at the commencement of this Code, shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Code; From a bare reference to section 484 (2) (a) it is obvious that, if any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation is pending on the date the new Code came into force, the said appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation is to be disposed of or continued, as the case may be, in accordance with the old Code. There is no specific mention about a petition of complaint in the said sub-section. But, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the word "application" will also include a petition of complaint; and; on the 1st April, 1974, when the new Code came into force, the petition of complaint which had been filed by the complainant on the 1st October, 1973, was pending and the order summoning the accused petitioners was passed on the 3rd June, 1974; and, as such; it should have been passed in accordance with the Old Code. 6. 6. 'Complaint' had been defined in section 4 (h) of the Old Code in these words:- 'Complaint' means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer." The word, 'complaint' has again been defined in the new Code under section 2 (b). There is virtually no difference in the definition of complaint in the two Codes; in the new Code only an explanation has been appended after the definition, which is not relevant for the present case. If the framer of the new Code had in mind to include in sub-section (2) (a) of Section 484 even a petition of complaint, they could have specifically mentioned the word 'complaint' in that sub-section. It should not be assumed that the word 'application' includes such 'complaint' because the word 'complaint' has been specifically defined even under the new Code. From the definition of the word 'complaint' it is obvious that a complaint can be oral also. Such complaints cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be included within the word 'application'. It cannot be held that the old Code will' apply to complaints in writing and the new Code to the proceedings which have been initiated on the basis of oral complaints. In my opinion, Sub-section (2) of section 484 is not applicable to a complaint pending in the sense that neither an order under section 203 dismissing the complaint had been passed nor had an order directing issuance of processes against the accused persons been passed under Section 204. Once it is held that sub-section (2) of section 484 is not applicable then it has to be held, as a necessary, corollary that the new Code will apply to such complaints and they have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the new Code. Even in Section 204 of the new Code, the same words "If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for• proceeding" occur. Even in Section 204 of the new Code, the same words "If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for• proceeding" occur. As such, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Rajendra Nath Mahto and by this Court in the aforesaid Full Bench decision in Krishnadeo Prasad is applicable, that is, the processes can be issued either by the Magistrate who has taken cognizance or by his successor-in-office, either temporary or permanent. 7. Now the question which remains to be answered is as to whether a Judicial Magistrate can be deemed to be ''a Magistrate taking cognizance of an Offence." Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the Judicial Magistrate under the new Code cannot be said to be successor-in-office, temporary or permanent, of those executive Magistrates. Section 3 (1) (a) (i) of the new Code reads as follows: "3 (1) In this Code, (a) any reference, without any qualifying words, to a Magistrate, shall be construed, unless the context otherwise requires, (1) in relation to an area outside a metropolitan area, as a reference to a Judicial Magistrate." In this Section it is the mandate of Parliament that, whenever in the new Code, there is a reference to a Magistrate in relation to an area outside a metropolitan area, it has to mean a Judicial Magistrate Section 204 of the new Code, as I have already mentioned, says that "If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding", then he shall issue summons or warrant, as the case may be. By fiction of law, now a 'Magistrate' has to be read to mean a Judicial Magistrate. Now the power of issuance of process or warrant under Section 204 has to be exercised by the Judicial Magistrate. The effect of Section 3 (1) (a) (i) and sub-section (1) of Section 204 is that the power to issue process has been vested in the Judicial Magistrate and only they can exercise the said power. The result is that Judicial Magistrates have to exercise this power even in cases in' which the initial cognizance had been taken by the Executive Sub-divisional Magistrates under the old Code. The Judicial Magistrates will, therefore, be deemed to be successors-in-office of those executive Sub-divisional 'Magistrates by operation of the new Code. The result is that Judicial Magistrates have to exercise this power even in cases in' which the initial cognizance had been taken by the Executive Sub-divisional Magistrates under the old Code. The Judicial Magistrates will, therefore, be deemed to be successors-in-office of those executive Sub-divisional 'Magistrates by operation of the new Code. Once the Judicial Magistrates are held to be successors-in-office of the executive Sub-divisional Magistrates, who had exercised the powers under section 190 (1) (a) of the old Code, then it cannot be urged that the impugned order, having been passed by a Judicial Magistrate, is illegal and without jurisdiction, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court referred to above. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 8. Lastly it was contended that the learned Judicial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has given no cogent reasons for taking a view contrary to the view taken 'by the inquiring Magistrate inasmuch as the inquiring Magistrate had recommended that the complaint be dismissed. From the order under revision it appears that the learned Judicial Magistrate was quite conscious of the fact that the inquiring Magistrate had recommended for the dismissal of the complaint. From the impugned order it appears that- while directing issuance of proceeds against the petitioners, he has applied his mind to the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation as well as to the statements of the witnesses made during the inquiry for the purposes of coming to a finding that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused-petitioners. It is, always open to a Magistrate, before whom an inquiry report is placed, to examine the whole matter, and he is not bound to agree with the view expressed, by the inquiring officer. In that view of the matter there is no substance even in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. For the purpose of issuing process only a prima facie case has to be made out. The details and merits can be examined by the, trial court at different stages of the proceeding. At this stage I do not find any reason to interfere with the order in question. 9. In the result, there is no merit in the application. It is, accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.