Judgment 1. This application by Umesh Prasad Sharma under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order, dated 30th November, 1974 (Annexure 5) passed by the Assistant Development Commissioner-cum-Deputy Chief Executive Officer (respondent No.3) whereby the petitioner has been transferred from Sissai Panchayat Samiti to Khunti Panchavat Samiti. The said order is based on order, dated the 25th of November, 1974 (Annexure 4) passed by Shri Budhrarn Bhagat, Upadhyaksha, Zila Parishad (respondent No.7). In the application, therefore, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order contained under Annexure 5. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved in this case it will be necessary to state, briefly, the facts. The petitioner is the Head Clerk of the office of the Block Development Officer (Shri Sachidanand Prasad), Sasai, respondent No. 5; whereas Lal Arun Kumar Nath Sahdeo, respondent No. 6, is the Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad, Ranchi; Timber Orson, respondent No. 8, is the Pramukh of the Sissai Panchayat Samiti and respondent No. 7 is the Upadhyaksha. The petitioner being the Head Clerk is a ministerial officer of the non-gazetted rank of the State Government. The petitioner has further stated in paragraph 3 of this application that he is also the Adhyaksh of the Non-Gazetted Employees Federation at Sissai and he is joint-Secretary of the Non-Gazetted Employees Federation. Sub-divisional Branch, Gumla. In paragraph 4 of his application, he has stated that the petitioner being an important office-bearer of the Non-Gazetted Employees Federation at Sissai, he has been keeping a close watch over the entire Government machinery with a view to safeguard the interest of the Non-Gazetted employees, including all such officers deputed by the State Government to the Sissai Panchayat Samiti. It was also stated that the petitioner had been making reports regarding the several acts of corruption of respondent No. 5 and being satisfied with the reports, the Lokayukta. Anti-Corruption Department, and the State Government have started making enquiries against the conduct of respondent No. 5. The petitioner being in possession of some documentary evidence to substantiate the charges against respondent No. 5 was approached several times by respondent No. 5 to destroy those documentary evidence but the petitioner refused the request. With a view to have access to these documentary evidence, respondent No. 5 entered into a conspiracy with respondent no. 8 and through him under letter no. With a view to have access to these documentary evidence, respondent No. 5 entered into a conspiracy with respondent no. 8 and through him under letter no. 285, dated the 7th of November, 1974 (Annexure 1) respondent No. 8 complained to respondent No. 6 against the petitioner and levelled several charges against him. The said letter was received by respondent No. 6 who forwarded the same to respondent No. 4 with a direction to give his comments upon it after a shifting enquiry. The said letter was carried by respondent No. 5 and was given to respondent No. 4 who, at the persuation of respondent No. 5, recommended to Deputy Development Commissioner, respondent No. 2, to persuade respondent No. 6 to start departmental enquiry against the petitioner and prior to initiation of the departmental enquiry he recommended for the transfer of the petitioner. A copy of the comments of respondent No. 4 is marked as Annexure 2. When the comment of respondent No. 4 was received by respondent No. 6, the latter issued an order on the 23rd of November, 1974, that the charges against the petitioner be enquired into by the panel of officers named in his order and a true copy of the said order is enclosed as Annexure 3 to this application. The Asst. Development Commr.... of respondent No. 4, the petitioner stated was also persuaded by respondent No. 5 for the transfer of the petitioner. Respondent No. 4, therefore, managed to persuade respondent No. 7 for issuance of an order to transfer the petitioner forthwith. Respondent No. 7, thereafter, passed order contained under Annexure 4 and lastly, on its basis the impugned order contained under Annexure 5 was passed. A supplementary affidavit was also filed on behalf of the petitioner on the 6th of December, 1974, stating therein that respondent No. 6 had not delegated his powers to respondent No. 7. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 to 8 on the 18th of February, 1975, inter alia supporting the impugned order of transfer and denying the mala fide allegation against respondent No. 5. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 to 8 on the 18th of February, 1975, inter alia supporting the impugned order of transfer and denying the mala fide allegation against respondent No. 5. A supplementary counter-affidavit was separately filed by respondent No. 6 on the 5th of March, 1975, stating therein that respondent No. 7 had passed the order in accordance with the powers delegated to respondent No. 7 by respondent No. 6 under Sec. 47 (3) of the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act). Later, on behalf of the petitioner a reply to the counter-affidavit was filed on the 5th of March, 1975. A supplementary counter-affidavit in reply to the petitioners affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents on the 16th of March, 1975. Lastly, the petitioner filed reply to the said supplementary affidavit on the 24th of March, 1975. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order and has raised the following points for consideration by us. (i) Neither respondent No. 6, nor respondent No. 7 had the power to pass the impugned order of the transfer as their term of office had expired in view of the provisions contained under Sec.38 (2) of the Act. (ii) Respondent No. 7 had no power to modify the order passed by respondent No. 6 under Annexure 4. (iii) The impugned order contained under Annexure 5 is based on the direction issued under Annexure 4 by respondent No. 7 and the said order was mala fide. 5. It will be convenient to deal with point Nos. (i) and (ii) together. Learned Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to Sec. 38 clauses (1) and (2) and its proviso of the Act. The relevant portion of which reads thus:- "38. Election and term of office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Zilla Parishad and filling up of vacancies:- (1) There shall be an Adhyaksha and an Upadhvaksha for each Zila Parishad who shall be elected in the prescribed manner by the members of the Zila Parishad from amongst themselves. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. Election and term of office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Zilla Parishad and filling up of vacancies:- (1) There shall be an Adhyaksha and an Upadhvaksha for each Zila Parishad who shall be elected in the prescribed manner by the members of the Zila Parishad from amongst themselves. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) of Sec.37 but subject to the other provisions of this Act the term of office of Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall be three years from the date of his election and when a vacancy occurs in the office of the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha before the expiration of the term, the person elected in the prescribed manner as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, as the case may be, in that vacancy shall hold office for the residue of the term of his predecessor: "Provided that the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette for sufficient cause which shall be stated therein direct that the term of such office be extended for such period not exceeding twenty-four months as may be specified therein." Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were elected on the 10th of May, 1969, for a term of three years, i. e. up to the 10th of May, 1972. Learned counsel pointed out that no doubt, their term could have been extended from time to time but not exceeding twenty-four months. Therefore, according to him, neither respondent No. 6 nor respondent No. 7 had any power to pass the impugned order, after the expiry of the term of office. That apart, he submitted that the notification extending their term from time to time is also not in accordance with law as that notification did not contain specific reasons as to why their term was being extended. Lastly, in this connection, he had also raised a point as indicated earlier that respondent No. 7 had no delegated power from respondent No. 6 to transfer the petitioner at the relevant time, when the order contained under Annexure 4 was passed by respondent No. 7. On behalf of the respondents, supplementary counter-affidavit filed on the 16th of March, 1975, was referred to. In paragraph 4 it was stated that the first proviso to Sec.38 (clause (2) ) quoted above was substituted by a new proviso by ordinance dated the 29th of April, 1972. On behalf of the respondents, supplementary counter-affidavit filed on the 16th of March, 1975, was referred to. In paragraph 4 it was stated that the first proviso to Sec.38 (clause (2) ) quoted above was substituted by a new proviso by ordinance dated the 29th of April, 1972. The substituted new proviso reads thus:- The first Ordinance came into existence on the 29th of April, 1972. The second one is dated the 30th of June, 1972. The third one is dated the 23rd of September, 1972. The fourth one is dated the 21st of February, 1973. The fifth one is dated the 7th of May, 1973. The sixth one is dated the 25th August, 1974. The seventh one is dated the 16th January, 1974, The eighth one is dated the 26th of April, 1974. The ninth one is dated the 22nd of July, 1974, and, lastly, the tenth one is dated the 14th of January, 1975. Learned Standing Counsel No. II has placed before us a copy of those Ordinances. He also drew our attention to the statements made in paragraph 3 of the said supplementary counter-affidavit. It will be convenient to quote the said paragraph in extenso. "3. That the period of office was extended from time to time as follows:- Community Dev. and Panchayat Deptt. Notification No. and date Period of extension up to (a) 4772 G. P. dt. 28- 4-72 10-11-72 (b) 9611 G. P. dt. 18-11-72 30-3-73 (c) 2654 G. P. dt. 28- 3-73 30-6-73 (d) 6131 G. P. dt. 21- 6-73 31-12-73 (e) 11312 G. P. dt. 10-12-73 30-6-75 This shows that the Adhyaksh and Upadhyaksh held office continuously from 10-5-69 and they will hold office up to 30-6-1976 in view of the last extension." Therefore, it is evident that, by the Ordinance, dated the 29th of April, 1972, the said proviso to Sec.38 (2) of the Act has been amended and, therefore, the maximum period of extension by 24 months has now been deleted and the life of the Ordinance has been extended from time to time by various Ordinances referred to above. The present Ordinance is effective from the 14th of January, 1975. Therefore, the extension may now be for more than 24 months. No maximum period for extension is prescribed. The only requirement is that while extending the period reason have to be given for its extension. The present Ordinance is effective from the 14th of January, 1975. Therefore, the extension may now be for more than 24 months. No maximum period for extension is prescribed. The only requirement is that while extending the period reason have to be given for its extension. Therefore, we do not find any flaw in the Ordinance. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, pointed out that the various notifications issued by the State Government from time to time referred to above do not contain reasons as required in the Ordinance. The only reason, learned counsel submitted, given in the various notices is that the election of the Zila Parishad could not take place within time, and therefore, the period of the term of the office of the Adhyaksha and Up-Adhyaksha was extended. Learned counsel contended that this should not be considered as a valid reason. It is true that, in the instant case, the election ought to have taken place earlier. Under what circumstances the election could not take place is not mentioned in the various notices. Whether the circumstances were genuine or not cannot be investigated in the instant case, as no specific point was raised in this regard by the petitioner in his application. In that view of the matter, we cannot invalidate the notifications in the absence of good reasons for extension of the period of the term of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha, respondents 6 and 7, respectively. We, therefore, hold that the period of office has rightly been extended by the various notifications referred to above by the State Government in consonance with the Ordinance mentioned above. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that, by the first notification, dated the 28th of April, 1972, the period was extended up to the 10th of November, 1972. The second notification was published on the 18th of November, 1972, extending the period up to the 30th of March, 1973. He emphasises that, from the 11th to the 17th of Nov., 1972, therefore, those respondents, namely, respondents 6 and 7 had no power to hold their office. In our opinion, this submission also of the learned counsel is not tenable in view of the fact that the Ordinance clearly mentions that there may be extension of the period with retrospective effect by a notification. In our opinion, this submission also of the learned counsel is not tenable in view of the fact that the Ordinance clearly mentions that there may be extension of the period with retrospective effect by a notification. It may also be noticed that the notification, dated the 18th of November, 1972, has also clearly mentioned that it will take effect from the 10th of November, 1972. 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner also urged that as mentioned above that power of Adhyaksha was not delegated to respondent No. 7 by respondent No. 6. In this regard, he referred to the provisions contained under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act which read thus:- "3. The Upadhyaksha shall exercise such powers and perform such functions of the Adhyaksha as the Adhyaksha may from time to time delegate to him in writing." He pointed out that, in the instant case, the order passed by respondent No. 7 under Annexure 4 could have been passed only by Adhyaksha, i.e., respondent No. 6. It could have been passed by respondent No. 7 only if respondent No. 6 had delegated his power to respondent No. 7 under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act. He referred to paragraph 13 of the petition wherein it is stated that respondent No. 7 could not legally modify the order of respondent No. 6 and any order passed in the absence of Adhyaksha was void, being illegal and without jurisdiction. He also referred to the statement made in paragraph 10 wherein it was stated by the petitioner that in the matter of transfer and posting respondent No. 6 had the last word. There could be no transfer and posting without the consent and approval of the Adhyaksha. Learned counsel also referred to paragraph 1 of the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner on the 6th of December, 1974, where specific point was raised and it was stated that respondent No. 6 had not delegated any authority to respondent No. 7 in writing either to amend or pass any order of transfer. In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the delegation also is not tenable. Reference may be made to paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 to 8 on the 18th of February, 1975. In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the delegation also is not tenable. Reference may be made to paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 to 8 on the 18th of February, 1975. In the said paragraph it is clearly stated that respondent No.7 had full power and authority to pass order contained under Annexure 4 on the basis of which the impugned order contained under Annexure 5 was passed. It is also stated that, in the absence of Adhyaksha, Upadhyaksha had power to function and perform duties of Adhyaksha as provided under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act. The power was delegated by respondent No. 6 to respondent No. 7 under Memo No. 1009 dated the 11th of October, 1969. (Annexure B). Besides, respondent No.6 has himself sworn an affidavit being the counter-affidavit filed on the 5th of October, 1975. Paragraph 4 of the said counter-affidavit reads as hereunder: "4. That the action taken by respondent No. 7 are fully in accordance with the powers delegated to him under Sec. 47 (3) of the Bihar Panchayat Samitee and Zila Parishads Act 1961 and has got full sanction from me." Therefore, the point urged regarding absence of delegation also fails. 8 Now, we advert to deal with point No. (iii) urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Under this head, learned counsel has as mentioned earlier made certain allegations against respondent No. 5 (B. D. O.). He drew our attention to the statement made in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the application wherein it is stated that respondent No. 5 was annoyed with the petitioner and, therefore, respondent No. 5 had conspired with others to get the petitioner transferred. His transfer, it is also stated, was motivated because the petitioner was also Adhyaksha of the Non-Gazetted Employees Federation at Sissai and was Joint Secretary of the Non-Gazetted Employees Federation, Sub-divisional Branch, Gumla, and being an important office-bearer of the Non-Gazetted Employees Federation at Sissai, he had been keeping a close watch over the entire Government machinery with a view to safeguard the interest of the Non-Gazetted employees, including such officers deputed by the State Government to the Sissai Panchayat Samiti - Vide paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application. The question of mala fide, it is well settled, is a question of fact, and heavy onus lies upon the petitioner to establish mala fide. In the instant case, in the counter-affidavit, which was filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 8 in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, the fact alleged by the petitioner in his application regarding mala fide has been emphatically denied. It may be noticed that the said counter-affidavit was sworn by respondent No. 5 himself. Respondent No. 6 also in his separate supplementary counter-affidavit, which was filed on the 5th of March, 1975, has clearly stated in paragraph 2 that there was no mala fide on the part of respondent No.7 so far in passing the impugned order. Therefore, after due consideration, we do not find any merit under point No. 3 either. 9. Before we part with this judgment, we want to point out to the State Government, respondent No. 1, that, in the instant case, the election ought to have been held much earlier and there would not have been any occasion for issuance of Ordinance and Notification from time to time. It is desirable that in such cases, election should be held within a reasonable period. 10. In the result, the application is dismissed and the impugned order contained under Annexure 5 is affirmed. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs.