Judgment S.K.JHA, J. 1. This is a defendants second appeal. A cross-objection by the plaintiff has also been filed. The plaintiff respondent had. instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 4.494/11/5. as detailed in the schedule of claim appended to the plaint, on a declaration that the entire amount of debits raised against him and the orders demanding debits from him by the appellant and the withholding of his salary and dearness allowance and rendering him surplus for the period from 1-2-1951 to 8-3-1951 and from 1-4-1951 to 15-9-1951 were illegal and ultra vires the principles of natural justice and the mandatory provisions of the Indian Railways Establishment Code (hereinafter to be referred to as the Establishment Code). The plaintiff respondents, accordingly, claimed that such orders and the consequential deductions were not binding as against him. 2. Shortly stated, the case of the respondent was that he had been appointed as a Clerk in the Railway Reserved Store Depot, Samastipur. on the 20th of October, 1943, in the then Oudh Tirhut Railway. He was posted in different capacities from place to place as a Clerk, a Manager and a Depot Store Keeper from the date of his appointment to February, 1951. Thereafter he was declared surplus from the Food Department, to be more precise the Grain Shop Department, and was employed as a Clerk in the General Managers Office at Gorakhpur from March, 1951 to April, 1951. During this period he was declared surplus from the 1st of February, 1951 to the 8th of March, 1951. At the time of the appointment of the plaintiff-respondent or even after his posting to the Grain Shop Department either in the capacity of a Manager, a Clerk or a Depot Store Keeper no agreement was entered into between him and the Railway Administration regarding any debit or regarding the percentage beyond which he would be liable to compensate the Railway Administration or that any sums would be debited from his account on charges of wastage, dryage. leaking, meltage, weighing, storage, loss and so on and so forth of the commodities which might be issued to him in his capacity as the Shop Manager or the Depot Store Keeper. The Railway Administration issued letters to the plaintiff from, time to time intimating to him that huge amount of debit had been raised against him. leaking, meltage, weighing, storage, loss and so on and so forth of the commodities which might be issued to him in his capacity as the Shop Manager or the Depot Store Keeper. The Railway Administration issued letters to the plaintiff from, time to time intimating to him that huge amount of debit had been raised against him. The details of those items have been given in Schedule 1 of the plaint. On proper. scrutiny of the debit orders, it transpired that no set principle or basis for raising such debits was adhered to by the officers of the Food Department of the Railway. It was alleged that they acted according to. their whims following no fixed principle. As such the decision of raising the different debit items also varied from one officer to another from time to time. The percentage of debits was also alleged to be not uniform in the cases of different employees and as such the actions of the officers were dubbed as discriminatory and as being in violation of the principles of natural justice. The debits were raised arbitrarily as the plaintiff had not been given reasonable opportunity nor, for that matter, any opportunity to show cause against the debits raised against him. The orders regarding debits were accordingly alleged to be in utter violation of the rules framed under the Establishment Code. It was further alleged that the condition of the godowns in which the goods were stored was also far from being satisfactory. The goods stored therein were liable to dryage, wastage, leakage and other damages and in spite of the fact that the attention of the authorities was drawn from time to time not only by the plaintiff respondent but also other officers of the Department, no adequate step was taken by the Railway Administration for either repair of the godowns or for making any suitable arrangement for safe storage of the goods. It was also asserted that quite a number of consignments received by the plaintiff were so received in damaged condition, of which he had made reports from time to time to the authorities concerned. The plaintiff took shortage certificate concerning short delivery to him but at the time of raising the debits against him the discrepancies in weights were absolutely not taken into consideration by the authorities. The plaintiff took shortage certificate concerning short delivery to him but at the time of raising the debits against him the discrepancies in weights were absolutely not taken into consideration by the authorities. Although the lass was occasioned in course of the transit of consignments, the responsibility for losses arising from such items was fastened on the plaintiff. Certain items of goods were despatched to the plaintiff on the basis of "surrendered weight accepted condition mentioned in the Railway receipt but in fact, lesser auantity of goods was delivered to him on actual weighment. In such cases also the Railway Administration, while saddling the plaintiff with the responsibility for the same, did not take into account the actual weight of the goods that were delivered to him. The further grievance of the respondent was that under the Circular of the Railway Administration he being an employee who camp into service prior to the year 1945 and was classified as category A employee, he was bound to be absorbed by the Railway Administration even after he was declared surplus from the Food Department. But the Railway Administration, instead of following the instructions contained in the Circular pursuant to the Establishment Code, acted arbitrarily and did not post the plaintiff to any other suitable post in any other department where he was entitled to be absorbed. The plaintiff had neither been discharged nor retrenched and he remained occupying peculiar and anomalous position for the periods from 1-2-1951 to 8-3-1951 and again from 1-4-1951 to 15-9-1951. During this period when he had been allegedly illegally declared surplus, the authorities of the Railway Administration refused to pay him any remuneration on the ground that he had been declared surplus from the Department. It was further asserted that the plaintiff was made to deposit a sum of Rs. 400/- and this amount he deposited under protest in the month of December, 1948, from his own pocket. The aforesaid amount of Rs. 400/- was said to have been illegally exacted from him and so he was entitled to claim a refund of this amount as well. Moreover, the salary of the plaintiff upto January, 1951, amounting to Rs. 1,375/4/- was withheld by the appellant, while the plaintiff was serving in the Food Department, on account of various debits raised against him and again from February, 1953 till March, 1954 a sum of Rs. Moreover, the salary of the plaintiff upto January, 1951, amounting to Rs. 1,375/4/- was withheld by the appellant, while the plaintiff was serving in the Food Department, on account of various debits raised against him and again from February, 1953 till March, 1954 a sum of Rs. 350/- was withheld by the defendant appellant besides the aforesaid sum of Rs. 400/- which the plaintiff had been compelled to pay to the Railway Administration. In all the plaintiff, therefore, claimed a sum of Rs. 4494/11/5. It may be mentioned here that the claim for the recovery of the aforesaid amount was added by amending the relief portion of the plaint subsequent to the institution of the suit. Originally the suit as framed merely claimed a relief in the shape of a declaration that all the orders relating to debits and the order compelling the plaintiff to deposit the sum of Rs. 400/- were wholly void and not binding on the plaintiff. Such a suit had been filed after due service of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code). Subsequent to the institution of the suit, however, the plaintiff was advised to amend the relief portion by adding a prayer for recovery of the aforesaid amount from the defendant appellant. That prayer for amendment of the plaint was allowed by the trial court. 3. The Railway Administration contested the suit on the grounds that (i) the plaintiff had no valid cause of action, (ii) the suit was barred by limitation, (iii) the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the cognizance of such suits was expressly barred under the provisions of Section 22 (d) of the Payment ot Wages Act. 1936 (Act 4 of 1936), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, and (iv) the notice under Section 80 of the Code was not properly served. The defence on merit was that there was a statutory liability on a railway servant to compensate the Railway Administration on account of negligence of the employee concerned and the Railway Administration was, therefore, perfectly justified in raising the debits in respect of items of money for which the plaintiff was found liable on account of negligence in duty and wilful misconduct. The further defence of the appellant was that the plaintiff respondent was made to pay Rs. The further defence of the appellant was that the plaintiff respondent was made to pay Rs. 400/- in accordance with law and it must be deemed to be a voluntary deposit made bv him. It was further averred that the plaintiff was holding a temporary post and the authorities concerned were fully entitled to render him surplus whenever the circumstances and the facts regarding his inefficiency afforded action to be taken. Accordingly, it was urged that the plaintiff had been declared surplus during the period as mentioned above wholly in accordance with law. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit of the respondent wholly. It found that the debits in question were properly raised against the plaintiff and further that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court also held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of the present nature in view of the bar imposed by Section 22 (d) of the Act. It was further held that the notice under Section 80 of the Code served on the defendant appellant was invalid. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court substantially decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The learned Additional District Judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for Rs. 4,074/8/5 only the rest of the amount claimed having been held to be barred by limitation. The findings of the Lower Appellate Court may be summarised thus. Section 22 (d) of the Act did not bar the cognizance of suits of the instant nature. The notice under Section 80 of the Code had been validly served. The amendment of the plaint by addition of a relief did not change the cause of action nor was it in any way contrary to what had been set out in the notice under Section 80 as served on the appellant. The entire set of facts and the reliefs which were sought by way of amendment in the plaint were already set out fully and in great detail in the notice served. As such, it could not be said that the notice under Section 80 was in any way invalid. The debits raised against the plaintiff were neither proper nor legal. Debit orders had been passed by the senior Food Control Officer. Gorakhpur, who had no jurisdiction or competence to do so. As such, it could not be said that the notice under Section 80 was in any way invalid. The debits raised against the plaintiff were neither proper nor legal. Debit orders had been passed by the senior Food Control Officer. Gorakhpur, who had no jurisdiction or competence to do so. Even treating the debits as penalties imposed under the Establishment Code, the lower appellate court held that neither was a charge sheet submitted against the plaintiff nor was any show cause notice issued nor were the mandatory requirements of the rules of the Establishments Code, followed in inflicting the so-called penalties. The entire procedure culminating in the debit entries with regard to the items in controversy were held to have been without jurisdiction. These being broadly the findings of the Lower Appellate Court, the railway adminstration had come up in appeal and, as already stated, a cross objection has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff respondent with regard to the claim which was not entertained by the Lower Appellate Court and in regard to which the suit was dismissed. 5. At the outset I must state that the cross-objection filed on behalf of the plaintiff respondent was not pressed by Mr. Prem Lall, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. He fairly conceded that he could not get over the bar of limitation in respect of the amount which had not been decreed by the Lower Appellate Court. Then remains for consideration only the appeal by the appellant. 6. Mr. S. K. Sarkar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, urged four points in support of this appeal: 1. That the cognizance of the suit was barred under the provisions of Section 22 (d) of the Act. 2. That the debits made or the debit orders passed were by way of penalty or punishment as against an employee of the railway administaration; therefore, the Civil Courts jurisdiction was barred. 3. That the alleged debit orders having merged in the appellate order and the appellate order having not been challenged, which could not be collaterally attacked, the suit ought to have been dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court. 4. 3. That the alleged debit orders having merged in the appellate order and the appellate order having not been challenged, which could not be collaterally attacked, the suit ought to have been dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court. 4. That since the notice under Section 80 of the Code mentioned that the plaintiff would seek a declaration only in the present suit and the suit actually having been originally filed for declaration only and the plaint having been amended on 27-11-1959 by addition of a relief for a decree for the amount claimed, a fresh notice under Section 80 was necessary and as such the original notice as served could not be held to be valid. I shall deal with each of these points seriatim. 7 Learned Counsel, for the appellant elaborated his first point by dividing his submissions into a number of incidental points. It was first submitted that the suit in effect was for recovery of various sums which had been deducted from the salary and so the delay in making payment was the cause of action. Learned Counsel next, submitted that the delay in making payments of. salary includes refusal to pay salary also. Lastly it was contended that even if it be held that the cognizance of the entire suit was not barred then only such of the claims which were not so barred by virtue of S. 22 of the Act could be entertained by a Civil Court, the plaintiff having been left with the only remedy under Sec. 15 of the Act with regard to such items which were cognizable by the Authority appointed under the latter section. I shall presently show that there is no substance in either of the contentions put forward on this main point of Mr. Sarkar. 8. It is well settled that there should be every presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and its exclusion cannot be readily inferred in the absence of either express statutory provisions or provisions clearly implied by necessary intendment. In the instant suit, before embarking upon the scope of S. 22 of the Act, I think it worthwhile to indicate the nature of the reliefs claimed. In the instant suit, before embarking upon the scope of S. 22 of the Act, I think it worthwhile to indicate the nature of the reliefs claimed. The reliefs claimed by the respondent are quite composite in nature involving consideration and adjudication of the claim in regard to refusal to pay the salary on the alleged plea of deductions, the relief for the refund of the amount of Rs. 400/- which the plaintiff respondent was compelled by orders , of higher authority to deposit from out of his own pocket with a further claim for a declaration that the order, under which the plaintiff was declared surplus, was illegal and the decree for the amount to which the plaintiff was legally entitled during the period he was declared surplus. These reliefs highly complex as they were in their turn entailed an enquiry into, and adjudication upon. the point as to whether the superior officers of the Food Department oi the railway administration had any authority to pass such orders when the plaintiff was no longer in the Grain Shop Establishment. It is worthwhile to recall here that the Grain Shop Establishment in which the respondent was serving at the time of his initial appointment was abolished on the 1st of February, 1951 and thereafter the plaintiff respondent was absorbed not in the Food Department of the railway administration but in another Department altogether. The reliefs as enumerated above included recovery of the sum which the plaintiff had been compelled to deposit from put of his own pocket and which had nothing to do with the emoluments drawn by him but were by way of reimbursement for the payment which he had made from other sources. The question then arises as to whether in this state of affairs Section 22 of the Act can stand as a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The plea of such a bar to a civil suit has come up for consideration on quite a number of occasions before different High Courts. Learned Counsel for both the parties invited our attention to a large number of decisions of the various High Courts which I shall merely enumerate a little later. At the outset I must proceed upon the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Payment of Wages Inspector v. Surajmal Mehta, ( AIR 1969 SC 590 ). At the outset I must proceed upon the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Payment of Wages Inspector v. Surajmal Mehta, ( AIR 1969 SC 590 ). Although in that case the point involved was as to whether, in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, a claim which could be said to be covered by the provisions of Section 15 of that Act could be adjudicated upon and enquired into under the Industrial Disputes Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly laid down the scope of Section 15. In that case it has been held that Section 15 (21 of the Act postulates that the wages payable by the person responsible for payment under Section 3 are certain and such that they cannot be disputed. On a review of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, it was held in the case of Pavment of Wages Inspector that the only claims which could be entertained by the Authority were claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of the wages. In dealing with the claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the Authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to these matters. But in determining the scope of these incidental matters court must be keen to see that in the guise of deciding the incidental matters the limited jurisdiction wis not unreasonably or unduly expanded. While holding that there could not be any hard or fast rule "which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which could be legitimately considered by the Authority and facts which could not be so considered, the Supreme Court did emphasise that the jurisdiction under Section 15 of the Act is a special, summary jurisdiction. In view. of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is, to my mind, clear that questions relating to matters not of deduction or delay in payment of wages simpliciter and innovating a complex consideration of facts and of the jurisdiction of the authority under whose orders the so-called deductions have been made cannot be within the competence of the authority appointed under Section 15 of the Act. I may reinforce my view by a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in D. P. Kelkar v. Ambadas Keshav Bajaj, ( AIR 1971 Bom 124 ) and a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shri Kamal Prasanna Roy v. Shri Maurice Hyam, (1973) 77 Cal WN 64. In those cases it has been held that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act has a limited jurisdiction in deciding claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims. The limited jurisdiction of the Authority should not be unreasonably extended under the garb of deciding incidental matters. I fully and respectfully endorse the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in the case K. P. Roy: "But the limited jurisdiction of the authority should not be unreasonably extended under the garb of deciding incidental matters. In other . words, if a question involves a prolonged enquiry or enquiry into complicated questions of law and fact the authority under the Payment of Wages Act would refuse to exercise his jurisdiction." The cases relied upon by Mr. Sarkar in support of his contention that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred were Modern Mills Ltd v. Mangalvedhekar, ( AIR 1950 Bom 342 ), Bhagwat Rai v. Union of India, (AIR 1953 Nag 136), Anant Ram v. District Magistrate. ( AIR 1956 Raj 145 ), Jiwajirao Sugar Company Ltd. v. J. M. Banerji. (AIR 1962 Madh Pra 310), The Upper India Coupar Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. J. C. Mathur, ( AIR 1959 All 664 ) and Ram Prakash Agnihotri v. Union of India, ( AIR 1967 All 228 ). In none of these cases any case or matter of a prolonged enquiry or enquiry into complicated questions of law, and fact was involved. An observation in the case of Jiwajirao Sugar Company (Supra) to the effect that refusal of payment of salary was included in the term delayed payment must be cabined and confined to the special facts of that case. As has been held by Das, C. J., in the case of Sarangdhar Singh v. Lakshmi Narayan, ( AIR 1955 Pat 320 ), under Section 15 of the Act the Authority is only entitled to hear and decide claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of wages. As has been held by Das, C. J., in the case of Sarangdhar Singh v. Lakshmi Narayan, ( AIR 1955 Pat 320 ), under Section 15 of the Act the Authority is only entitled to hear and decide claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of wages. No other matter is really within the cognizance of the Authority. Whether refusal to pay wages rightlv or wrongly within the time allowed by law comes within the expression delay in payment of wages must depend on the facts of each case. It is not possible to lay down an inflexible rule that the Authority should try only cases of admitted wages. But the jurisdiction of the Authority does not extend to a determination of the liability of an employee on account of acts of mismanagement, etc. Such a liability can only be determined by competent civil courts. If an employer refused to make payment of wages on account of such liability, the aggrieved person has the right to seek redress of his grievances in a competent Civil Court to claim his wages. In that connection his Lordship also observed as follows: "The expression delay is not a term of art; it should be taken in the ordinary dictionary sense; there is, I think, a well understood difference in meaning between delay in payment of money and refusal to make such payment, and I find it somewhat difficult to understand how the question of accounts or liability on the grounds of mismanagement etc. can be considered by an authority appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act." In that very case Banerji, J., also observed that a case where there was no question of either delay in pavment of, or deduction from, wages but the question Involved therein was a pure and simple question of refusal on the part of the employer to pay the wages on the grounds of negligence, misappropriation and mismanagement would not be covered by Section 15 of the Act. I, therefore, must overrule the contention of Mr. Sarkar that delay in making payment of wages necessarily included a case of refusal to make payment of such wages. 9. I, therefore, must overrule the contention of Mr. Sarkar that delay in making payment of wages necessarily included a case of refusal to make payment of such wages. 9. There is equally no substance in the submission of learned Counsel for the appellant that even in cases where the reliefs are of a composite character and the questions of fact and law require a protracted enquiry in spite of a portion of the claim being prima facie held to be barred, such portion of the relief claimed in the suit should not be allowed by the Civil Court. I fully agree with a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in C. V. Narayanaswami Iyer v. K. A. Vasudeva Iyer, ( AIR 1958 Mad 360 ). that the determination of the question whether the suit as framed is maintainable in a Civil Court or not is to be made with reference to the averments in the pleading and that, where the suit was of a composite character, the bar imposed by Section 22 of the Act did not apply and the Civil Court was not divested of its jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The decisions relied upon by Mr. Sarkar in support of his contention that reliefs could be bifurcated in such cases were the cases of Ruknuddaulah, Nawab Mohammad Saiiad Ali Khan v. Md. Umar Daraz Ali Khan. (AIR 1932 Lah 595) and Mohammad Mehdi v. Janki Das, (AIR 1943 Oudh 307). In these cases the Court was considering the question as to whether anv specific relief which could be specifically granted only by the revenue courts could be granted by a Civil Court also or not. One part of the claim was wholly distinct and severable from the other part of the claim. On the facts as are obtaining in the present case it is well-nigh impossible to dissect the enquiry into distinct parts, for the question of jurisdiction of the higher authorities of the Food Department of the railway administration is involved in each one. of the items of the relief claimed by the ,plaintiff. On the facts as are obtaining in the present case it is well-nigh impossible to dissect the enquiry into distinct parts, for the question of jurisdiction of the higher authorities of the Food Department of the railway administration is involved in each one. of the items of the relief claimed by the ,plaintiff. If, however, the Lahore and Oudh decisions referred to above be held to have laid down the law as saying that in all cases of composite character such reliefs as could be held to be prima facie covered by the provisions of any special enactment should be thrown out by the civil court irrespective of the fact that other reliefs were also claimed then I must hold those decisions as not laying down sound principles of law, for. as already observed above. I fully concur in the view of the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of C. V. Narayanswami Iyer. For these reasons, in my view, the Lower Appellate Court was fully justified in holding that the suit was not barred under Section 22 of the Act. 10. The second and the third points raised by Mr. Sarkar", namely, that the debit entries made and the debit orders passed were an imposition of penalty and that the alleged debit orders having merged in the appellate order and the appellate order not having been challenged in the suit, no relief could be granted to the plaintiff, involve common facts and points of law for determination.. Learned Counsel placed reliance upon paragraph 1702 of Chapter XVII of the Establishment Code relating to discipline and appeal rules for non-gazetted staff. Learned Counsel contended that the deductions made from the salary, order compelling the plaintiff to deposit Rs. 400/- from out of his own pocket, the periods during which the plaintiff was declared surplus all these points were covered within the term penalty as described in paragraph 1702. Learned Counsel further invited our attention to paragraph 1717 of the Establishment Code which provides for appellate forum in cases of penalty imposed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1702. It was submitted that since in the plaint the plaintiff himself had mentioned in paragraph 17 that the plaintiffs grievances were not redressed even by the appellate authority. it should be held that the competence of the Civil Court was barred. It was submitted that since in the plaint the plaintiff himself had mentioned in paragraph 17 that the plaintiffs grievances were not redressed even by the appellate authority. it should be held that the competence of the Civil Court was barred. The argument, though attractive in the first instance does not stand the test of scrutiny. The learned Additional District Judge has dwelt at length on this point. I need not recapitulate all that has been said in the Lower Appellate Courts judgment in paragraphs 31 to 54. Suffice it to say that the court of appeal below was seized with the relevant provisions of the Establishment Code. While taking notice of the provisions of paragraphs 1702, 1715. 1716, etc., the Lower Appellate Court has recorded the following findings of fact: "Thus from the foregoing discussions it is apparent that the provisions laid down in the Railway Establishment Code for imposing punishment was not observed at all. A totally different procedure was followed and that also not uniformly or on any basis. No reasons were assigned for the orders. The relevant matters such as godown condition, were not considered at all. There was absolutely no material, any report or any other evidence that any shortage was due to negligence of the plaintiff. The assessment of debit was arbitrary, varying with the change of officers. It was discriminatory and changing from man to man. The orders for debits were passed long after the stock verifications. No investigation of any kind to ascertain the liability of the plaintiff was made. In almost all cases no charge sheet was issued. Good many orders were passed by the officers of the Food Department when the plaintiff was no longer under the disciplinary control of the officers of the food department and so the orders are bad for want of jurisdiction, non-observance of the procedure and being based on no materials, were, therefore, perverse." In this state of evidence, in my view, the learned Additional District Judge was perfectly justified in holding that none of these so-called penalties was under the provisions of paragraph 1702 of the Establishment Code, only more so for none of the formalities as mentioned n paragraph 1712 had been shown to have been complied with. The entire so-called disciplinary proceeding, if at all that term may be used in the instant case, was wholly void and without jurisdiction, The Court of Appeal below has further found on an examination of the evidence that admittedly the plaintiff ceased to be in the Food Department on and from the 1st of February, 1951. when he was rendered surplus. The officers of the Food Department ceased to have any authority to take any disciplinary action against him. Out of the twentyfive impugned debit items, orders in respect of fourteen were passed after the 1st of February, 1951. The Senior Food Control Officer who had purported to pass such orders had obviously no authority to impose any penalty upon the plaintiff after 1-2-1951. In view of these findings of fact, there is no substance in the point of Mr. Sarkar that the relief claimed in the suit in any way involved the correctness of the findings or orders of the disciplinary authority. As already observed above, and as held by the Lower Appellate Court since no formalities as enjoined by the provisions of paragraph 1712 of the Establishment Code were complied with by any of the authorities purporting to pass the orders of punishment, the orders actually could not be held to have been in pursuance of paragraph 1702 and they were void. There could thus be no question of any appeal from any such order of the disciplinary authority. As a matter of fact, Mr. Prem Lall, learned Counsel for the respondent, rightly submitted that since the plaintiff was crying hoarse from the house top from the very beginning against the refusal to make payments to him under the orders of persons who had no jurisdiction to do so and in pursuance of arbitrary and ultra vires orders officers next up in the hierarchy treated such a demand of the plaintiff as an appeal under paragraph 1717. Neither in fact nor in law had any appeal under paragraph 1717 been filed. But since the officials of the railway administration treated the objection of the plaintiff to the arbitrary deductions made from his salary as an appeal, the plaintiff merely repeated the language of the officers who had said that the plaintiffs appeal had not found any favour with them, although the initial orders themselves were void. 11. But since the officials of the railway administration treated the objection of the plaintiff to the arbitrary deductions made from his salary as an appeal, the plaintiff merely repeated the language of the officers who had said that the plaintiffs appeal had not found any favour with them, although the initial orders themselves were void. 11. That then brings us to the only remaining question as to the validity of the notice under Section 80 of the Code. To recapitulate the facts once more relevant to this point, the notice under Section 80 was duly served before the institution of the suit in 1954. The relevant portion of the notice has been quoted by the Lower Appellate Court in paragraph 24 of its judgment. It is useful to reproduce the relevant portion here. The last paragraph of the notice which was duly served ran as follows: "You may be pleased to order payment of the portion of the salary and dearness allowance that has been withheld, to order payment of the salary and dearness allowance from 1-2-1951 to 8-3-1951 and from 1-4-1951 to 15-9-1951 ...... that in case of non-compliance the notice giver shall seek his redress in the court In the plaint, as originally filed in the -suit, the only prayer made was for a declaration that the debit orders were illegal and void and that there was illegality in the withholding of the salary and dearness allowance for the period that the plaintiff was kept unabsorbed. The plaintiff was, however, subsequently advised to have the relief portion of the plaint amended only. Accordingly on 27-11-1959 an amendment in the relief portion only of the plaint was sought for and the trial Court after hearing the parties allowed the amendment. The only amendment in the relief portion that was brought about was an additional relief for a decree in respect of the amounts with regard to which the declarations had already been claimed. On these facts, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted, the amendment ought not to have been allowed at such a late stage when independently it would have been time-barred and any such amendment of relief also necessitated a fresh service of notice in pursuance of the mandatory provisions of Section 80 of the Code. I have no hesitation in overruling both these contentions of learned Counsel. I have no hesitation in overruling both these contentions of learned Counsel. It is now too well settled that where the entire cause of action is given in the notice as originally served under Section 80, the prayer of a mere amendment of relief does not necessitate a fresh notice to be given. The obvious reason for this is that the entire cause of action giving rise to the plaintiffs suit is already, in such cases, enumerated in the notice initially served. Where notice of a proposed suit is once given, it is not necessary to give a fresh notice of 2 months if the plaint has to be amended for adding further grounds for the cause of action already disclosed or for a new relief not introducing a new cause of action. In the case of Union of India v. Jeewan Ram, ( AIR 1958 SC 905 ), which co-incidentally was also a case of a railway servant involving consideration of paragraphs 1702 and 1717 of the Establishment Code it was held by the Supreme Court that where there was no substantial difference between the relief mentioned in the notice and the plaint, the notice under Section 80 could not be said to be invalid on that ground. 12. Coming to the next aspect of the point canvassed at the Bar, namely, that on the day when the amendment was permitted to be made the relief claimed for by way of monetary claims would already have been. barred suffice it to say that law on the subject has now been crystallised by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L. J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Jardine Skinner and Co., ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ). In the case of Leach and Company the Supreme Court held that it is no doubt true that the courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the court to order it if that is required in the interests of justice. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the court to order it if that is required in the interests of justice. There are cases where such technical considerations are outweighed by special circumstances, and the instant case, in my view, is one of such cases. That, however, is not the basic question on which the decision in the second appeal would really rest. For, that was a factor to be taken into consideration by the. trial Court when as far back as on 27th of November. 1959 the plaint was ordered to be amended. Once, however, the amendment was so ordered, to be allowed, the relief to be granted in the suit would not be on the basis of limitation being computed from the date of such amendment. For, it is also equally well settled that once an amendment is allowed, it takes effect from and relates back to the date when the plaint was initially filed. This technical ground of limitation for the purpose of rejecting an amendment which had been allowed in 1959 by the trial court cannot now be raised by the appellant in the second appeal here. 13. The vehemence with which the points regarding the validity of the notice under Section 80 of the Code and limitation were urged makes me tempted to make a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India, ( AIR 1974 SC 130 ) = (1974 Lab IC 149). From the concurring but supplementary judgment of Krishna Iyer, J, I may quote the following observation of his Lordship: "In this country the State is the largest litigant today and the huge expenditure involved makes a big draft on the public exchequer. In the context of expanding dimensions of State activity and responsibility, is it unfair to expect finer sense and sensibility in its litigation policy, the absence of which, in the present case, has led the Railway callously and cantankerously to resist an action by its own employee a small man, by urging a mere technical plea which has been pursued................" Such an attitude on behalf of either the State or railway administration has never received the approval, much less any acclamation, by the highest Court. Be that as it may, it is not on ground of public policy or equity that we are called upon to decide this case. I have arrived at the conclusions which in law I was called upon to do. And, merely in order to mitigate the rigour of taking of such technical pleas, I have felt tempted and have quoted from the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Jewrys case. 14 For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in any of the points raised on behalf of the appellant. I have already held that the cross-objection has not been pressed. As a result, both the appeal and the cross-objection fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. S.N.P.SINGH, J. 15 I agree.