JUDGMENT On February 3, 1975 the petitioner, Murari Mohan Dutta obtained the present Rule. The Court was-'pleased to grant an interim order of injunction in terms of prayer(f) for a period of eight weeks with liberty to apply for extension of interim orders upon notice to the respondents. The petitioner by prayer (f) has prayed that an interim order be granted restraining respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 from passing any order of detention under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974) on the strength of searches and seizures dated 17th and 18th January, 1975. 2. The respondent No. 1, Union of India has filed the instant application for vacating the said interim order dated February 3, 1975. 3. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties at length I am of the view that the interim order passed on 3rd February, 1975 ought to be vacated. 4. There is no strength in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioner in the main Rule that the respondent No.1 has no lucus standi to make the instant application for vacating interim order inasmuch as the interim order has been granted only against respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 from passing any order of detention under the above Act. The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 is a Central Act which has been enacted to provide for preventive detention in certain cases for the purposes of conservation and argumentation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities and for matters connected therewith. Section 3 confers power upon the Central Government, the State Government, and. the officers of the Central Government and the State Government, specially empowered for the purpose of the said section to make orders detaining certain persons. Mr. Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the State of West Bengal, placed before me Order No. 21846 H.S. dated the 18th December, 1974 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, which is follows: "In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (I) of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), the Governor is pleased hereby to specially empower the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Home Department, for the purposes of the said Section. This order shall come into force on the 19th day of December 1974." In the instant case the petitioner himself has stated that on 17th January, 1975 certain officers of the Income Tax Department. Government of India, had searched his residential premises at 9, Girish Avenue and pad effected seizure of articles described in annexure B to the writ petition. According to the petitioner subsequently the authorities of the Customs Department of the Government of India purported to seize certain items of gold under the provisions of the Custom Act. The said proceedings are stated to be pending. The respondent No.1 in paragraph 10 of its application had stated that the Customs and the Central Excise Department after collecting materials decided to place the same before the appropriate authority for consideration and for its satisfaction, if any: as to whether on the basis of the said facts the appropriate authority would be satisfied that an order of detention should be passed under section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from smuggling or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. According to the applicant, because of the issue of the interim order it could not proceed any further in the matter and place the materials before the appropriate authority. 5. In view of these facts I hold that the respondent No.1 is entitled to file the present application. It nay be also recorded that although the Government of West Bengal has not filed any substantive application... it bas appeared and supported the prayer of the respondent No.1 for vacating the interim order. 6. The petitioner himself has stated that no order under Section 3 of the above Act has yet been made but he had allegedly received telephone case from alleged well-wishers including calls allegedly coming from the Customs House threatening the petitioner and cautioning and/or warning him that attempts were being made to detain him in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Ex-change and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (Act 52 of 1974). The petitioner has further alleged that his relatives were also told by various people that order of detention was in the offing on account of search seizure and recovery from his residence on 17th January, 1975 by the Income Tax Officers and seizure of a portion by the Customs Officers on 18th January, 1975. In my view, upon allegations of apprehension of this kind the petitioner in the main Rule cannot get an interim order to prevent the respondents 2. 3 and 4 from passing any order of detention. The same would have the effect of preventing them from exercising powers conferred upon them by the statute in question. In the first place, having regard to the vague nature of the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of the writ- petition the court may well refuse to rely upon these statements even for passing an interim order. Since no order for detention has as yet been passed it cannot be postulated in advocate that the respondents concerned intend to pass an invalid order. If ultimately any detention order is made, it would be open to the petitioner to challenge the same in appropriate proceedings. But Mr. Banerjee has failed to convince me that the interim order should be maintained in order to restrain the respondents from even considering whether any order under section 3 should be made against the petitioner. Mr. Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal, rightly submitted that the foundation of a writ application is existence of a legal right. If the petitioner has any legal right in the matter he may move a writ application against threatened injury to such right. But in the instant case, since no detention order has been made and the materials do not even show that the respondents have finally made up their mind to detain the petitioner by making an order under section 3, there could be no question even of apprehension of infraction of petitioner's legal rights. The petitioner's legal right$ might be infringed only if the detention order is made illegally or mala fide. 7. The learned Advocate for the respondents rightly pointed out that apart from making averments in paragraph 26 of the writ petition the petitioner has not taken any specific ground in paragraph 28 regarding vires of Act 52 of 1974. The petitioner's legal right$ might be infringed only if the detention order is made illegally or mala fide. 7. The learned Advocate for the respondents rightly pointed out that apart from making averments in paragraph 26 of the writ petition the petitioner has not taken any specific ground in paragraph 28 regarding vires of Act 52 of 1974. Further the question whether the Court should make a declaration in terms of prayer (a) can be considered only at the time of disposal of the main Rule. The Act in question is in force. The said Act prima fade confers power to make orders detaining certain persons. In the instant case, no such order has been yet made. I find no reason therefore, why the respondents should be even prevented from considering materials and from deciding whether the provisions-of Section 3 should be invoked. 8. The learned Advocate for the respondents also correctly pointed out that even in an application for writ of Habeas Corpus against detention made under a law of preventive detention, the detenu is not entitled as of right to get interim bail and the court's discretion in the matter of granting bail is regulated by the well-settled principle that the detenu should establish that prima facie his case would succeed. In the instant case, as already stated, since no detention order has been made I cannot Hazard a guess if the detention order is ultimately made and the petitioner challenges that the same would be bound to succeed. It cannot be now anticipated whether detention order if passed would be valid or invalid. 9. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner, addressed me at length regarding the various proceedings under the Income Tax Act and the Customs Act against the petitioner. He also advanced a submission that a Division Bench of this Court had granted the petitioner bail subject to conditions which Mr. Banerjee described as very rigorous. In my view, these facts are not at all material for considering whether the interim order should be maintained. Act 52 of 1974 is preventive and not punitive. Therefore, I do not agree with the submission of Mr. Banerjee described as very rigorous. In my view, these facts are not at all material for considering whether the interim order should be maintained. Act 52 of 1974 is preventive and not punitive. Therefore, I do not agree with the submission of Mr. Banerjee that if the respondents proceed to invoke their power under Section 3 of Act 52 of 1974 the same would even prima facie have the effect of depriving the right of the petitioner to make representations and to show cause in the matter of proceedings under the Income Tax Act and the Customs Act against him. It is not correct to contend that the Income Tax authorities and the Customs authorities would go into the same questions which might arise before the detaining authority under section 3 Under section 3 the appropriate authority has been conferred power to make an order for detention in order to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or to prevent him from doing the acts mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) of sub• section (1) of Section 3. When Mr. Banerjee himself did not dispute different provisions of Jaw would not be per se bad, I am unable to see even any prima facie point in the submission of the petitioner in the main Rule that any order, if made under Section 3 of the Act, shall have the effect of denying the right of the petitioner to contest the proceedings in the Income Tax and the Customs Act cases. I may also note that the petitioner in prayer (f) of his application has prayed for interim orders to restrain the respondents 2, 3 and 4 from parsing any order of detention on the strength of searches and seizures dated 17th January, 1975 and 18th January, 1975. I fail to see how it can be even prima facie contended that an order of detention under Section 3 can be made only on the strength of search or seizure made under the Income Tax Act or under the Customs Act. I fail to see how it can be even prima facie contended that an order of detention under Section 3 can be made only on the strength of search or seizure made under the Income Tax Act or under the Customs Act. The same may at best furnish materials or grounds for deciding that it is necessary to make an order to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to prevent him from doing the acts mentioned in Section 3. It has been also pointed our before that the description of the respondent No.4, to say the least, appears to be vague and meaningless inasmuch as no particular officer has been specified as respondent No.4 in the cause title of the petition. 10. In the circumstances, I allow the application and vacate the interim order made on 6th February, 1975, It is, however, made clear that in case any detention order is ultimately passed against the petitioner it would be open to him to challenge the said order in any appropriate proceeding according to law. 11. There will be no order as to costs. There will be a stay of the operation of this order till one week after the Easter holidays. This order will not prevent the respondents or any of them form considering materials if for the purpose of making up their mind as to whether the provisions of Section 3 should be invoked or not.