Judgment :- 1. The defendant is the appellant. The plaintiff is the daughter-in-law of the appellant. The suit was for recovery of the dowry amount of Rs. 3,591/-with interest, paid to the appellant on 13-2-1968 in connection with the marriage of the respondent-plaintiff with the son of the appellant. The marriage took place on 5 11 1967. The suit was instituted without any earlier demand by the issuance of a notice. The defendant deposited the whole dowry amount in Court on getting summons from Court and pleaded that he was not liable for costs and interest. This case was repelled by the trial Court and the trial Court decreed the suit making the defendant-appellant liable to pay interest and costs amounting to Rs. 400/-. In appeal, the appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court since the appellant and counsel were absent. 2. Counsel for the appellant contended that he had paid the amount immediately on receipt of summons from Court and that if he had received a notice from the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, he would have readily paid the amount. In fact, he did not seriously contest his liability to pay the amount. However, the appellant raised a new plea that the suit itself is not maintainable since the amount involved in the suit is covered by the expression 'dowry' as defined in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Act 28 of 1961 for short the Act. 3. The expression'dowry' is defined in S.2 of the Act, which reads as follows: "2. Definition of 'dowry'. In this Act, 'dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to the marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personnel Law (Shariet) applies." S. 3 of the Act makes, giving and taking dowry an "offence punishable, with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 500/-...". 500/-...". S.4 of the Act makes demanding of dowry after the commencement of the Act punishable as above. S.5 makes any agreement for the giving or taking of dowry void. Thus, the Act prohibits the very concept of dowry and therefore a suit for recovery of an amount, the giving of which is made unlawful in law, is not maintainable. 4. I hold that the Streedhanam which is the subject-matter of the suit falls within the expression 'dowry' occurring in the Act since it takes in any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. The amount in question, it cannot be said, comes outside the definition. Since the giving or receiving of the amount in question is opposed to law, a suit for recovery of the said amount is not maintainable and therefore interest on the amount cannot be decreed. Nor can costs be awarded. 5. Counsel for the appellant incidentally raised an alternative argument based on S.6 (1) (b) of the Act, which reads thus: "6. (1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in question with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman, (b) if the dowry was received at the time of after the marriage, within one year after the date of its receipt" According to the appellant, the marriage took place on 5111967 and the suit was filed on 27th August, 1968, that is, before the expiry of one year mentioned in the above sub-section. I do not think it necessary to consider this question since I have already held that the appellant is entitled to succeed in this second appeal as the suit for recovery of the amount is bad in law. 6. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, perhaps now adorns the statute book and there it stops. A well-intentioned place of legislation has not achieved its object at all. This is one of the many social legislations which, though enacted to prevent a malady, has only aggravated the same. Till this Act was passed, payment of dowry was open and was even evidenced by records. A well-intentioned place of legislation has not achieved its object at all. This is one of the many social legislations which, though enacted to prevent a malady, has only aggravated the same. Till this Act was passed, payment of dowry was open and was even evidenced by records. After the coming into force of the Act also dowry system continued with unabated vigour and with impunity the amount increasing progressively all traces of receipt of the amount deliberately avoided to escape the provisions of the Act. That the dowry system is a scourge in society which has to be successfully combated cannot be disputed. But the Act has failed miserably in achieving its object. It is respected now more in its breach than in its observances. 7. It is true that the Christian community in Kerala have not considered 'Streedhanam' payable at the time of the marriage as coming within the mischief of 'dowry' contained under the Act. They have reconciled themselves to the custom prevalent among them inasmuch as the Streedhanam payable was in lieu of a share which the daughter could inherit. 8. I do not think it necessary to go into the inequities perpetrated by the Christian Succession Acts applicable to Travancore and Cochin Christian Community, wherein Christian women are discriminated against in the matter of inheritance. The conscience of the community has to assert itself to get justice in the matter of inheritance to daughters. The maximum limit of Rs. 5000/- to a daughter from the property of her father in the Travancore Act is alarming, though at the time when the Act was passed such an amount might have been appreciable and sufficient to satisfy the share of a daughter. That the daughter of a millionaire Christian is entitled under law today also to a maximum of only Rs. 5000/- in his assets, after his death, is something unthinkable at present. It is the representatives of the people, who have to come to the rescue of the female section of the community to give them legitimate share over the properties of their father. Perhaps, these observations may not be out of place in the International Women's Year, which is being celebrated. In the result, the second appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. I direct the parties to suffer their respective costs. Allowed.