Judgment 1. This application in revision is directed against an order dated 6-6-1970 passed in Miscellaneous case 40 of 1970 arising out of Execution Case 147 of 1958 pending in the Court of 1st Subordinate Judge, Arrah. The objector to the execution proceeding is the petitioner. 2. The short facts giving rise to this application may be stated thus. The decree-holders opposite parties 1 to 11 obtained a mortgage decree against opposite parties 12 to 14 in a suit on the basis of a mortgage bond dated the 18th of March, 1952. The mortgage decree passed by the trial Court was substantially affirmed by a Bench of this Court in First Appeal 398 of 1959 by a Judgment and decree dated the 9th of August, 1963 (Pat). The effect of the decree as it stood affirmed by this Court in aforesaid first appeal was that the properties mortgaged, namely, a two-storey brick-built house in mohalla Shivaganj and 20 karis of land with a mudbuilt house having tiled roof situate in the same Mohalla were, inter alia to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree. In the proceeding for execution of the decree levied by the decree-holders (O. P. 1 to 11), opposite parties 15 and 16 raised an objection that they were purchasers of a part of the mortgaged properties and that the decree holders should proceed against the house bearing Cadastral survey khasra No. 4499 and the land bearing Khasra No. 4500 and municipal survey plot No. 1223 situate in the same mohalla, which were covered by the mortgage decree but not covered by the sale deed executed by opposite parties 12 to 14 in their favour. If after the sale of such properties the mortgage dues were not satisfied, the decree-holders should proceed against the properties sold to opposite parties 15 and 16 according to the law of marshalling. This objection was allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge who was the executing Court. The petitioner purchased a part of the mortgaged properties, which was also covered by the decree, sometime in the year 1966 lone after execution case was started. This objection was allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge who was the executing Court. The petitioner purchased a part of the mortgaged properties, which was also covered by the decree, sometime in the year 1966 lone after execution case was started. After her purchase, she also filed objections under Sec. 47 read with Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) on the ground that she being a subsequent bona fide purchaser of one of the houses, namely, the two-storey brick-built house in mohalla Shivaganj aforementioned, the principle of marshalling should also be made applicable to her case. This objection was registered as Miscellaneous Case 40 of 1970 in Execution Case 147 of 1958. By the impugned order the executing Court has dismissed the objection. Being aggrieved by this order refusing marshalling in her case, the petitioner has come up to this Court under Sec.115 of the Code. 3. The sole ground taken in support of this revision application is that the executing Court had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in not applying the principle of marshalling in the petitioners case. A counter-affidiavit has been filed in this case on behalf of the decree-holders, in paragraph 3 of which it has been stated that the petitioner purchased the property from opposite parties 12 to 14 in 1966 during the pendency of the execution of the decree having knowledge of the same and hence she must be deemed to have purchased subject to the encumbrance and with obvious notice to her (petitioner) which is apparent from the fact that the purchase was made long after the execution was levied. It is also asserted that the decree having been confirmed by this Court in 1963, there could be absolutely no presumption in favour of the petitioner having been a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the decree in 1966. 4. Curiously enough, learned Counsel for both the parties placed reliance on two Bench decisions of this Court in Ramchandra Bhagat V/s. Mrs. Eva Mitra, AIR 1960 Pat 378 and Mt. Rajo Kuer V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad, AIR 1962 Pat 236 . In the case of Ramchandra Bhagat this Court has held that where no order of sale of the mortgaged properties has been prescribed by the mortgage decree, the executing Court has. Eva Mitra, AIR 1960 Pat 378 and Mt. Rajo Kuer V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad, AIR 1962 Pat 236 . In the case of Ramchandra Bhagat this Court has held that where no order of sale of the mortgaged properties has been prescribed by the mortgage decree, the executing Court has. in certain exceptional circumstances where equity demands it, a discretion to regulate the order in which the mortgaged properties ought to be sold. It has further been held that there are two limitations on the power of the executing Court. Where the Court passing the mortgage decree has definitely laid down the order in which the mortgaged properties ought to be sold, the executing Court cannot ignore the original decree and proceed to sell the properties, in a different order, Secondly, the executing Court has no power to exclude any of the properties decreed against and a decree-holder is entitled to execute his decree against any of the mortgaged properties where the decree is silent on the point. The judgment-debtor has no legal right to demand that the decree-holder should execute his decree in any particular manner to suit an individual judgment-debtor. The power of the executing Court in this regard is very limited and is intended only for the purpose of adjusting equities between the parties in exceptional cases. In the case of Mt. Rajo Kuer, while dealing with the principles of marshalling this Court held that Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) embodies the principle that a property which is equally liable with another property to pay a debt shall not escape because the creditor has been paid put of the other property alone. The principle of contribution is applicable where the property has been sold subject to the mortgage while marshalling arises under Sec. 56 of the Act where the property has been sold free from any encumbrance. It has further been held that the principle underlying Sec. 56 can be invoked by an auction-purchaser of a property in execution of a decree provided that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice or that there is a contract to the contrary. It is worthwhile to notice that whereas the case of Mt. It has further been held that the principle underlying Sec. 56 can be invoked by an auction-purchaser of a property in execution of a decree provided that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice or that there is a contract to the contrary. It is worthwhile to notice that whereas the case of Mt. Rajo Kuer had arisen in an appeal from an original decree (namely a first appeal) in a suit filed by the plaintiffs for contribution under Section 82 of the Act, the case of Ramehandra Bhagat arose out of an appeal from an original order (namely a miscellaneous first appeal). Learned Counsel for the decree-holders opposite parties contended that in both the aforementioned Bench decisions the matter had come to this Court in an appeal either from an original order or from an original decree. It was further contended that the principles decided in both the cases were against the point of view canvassed on behalf of the petitioner in the instant case. But even if it be held that there were any stray observations in those cases helpful to the petitioner, they cannot be availed of by the petitioner in an application in revision under Sec.115 of the Code. Learned Counsel for the petitioner realising the difficulty changed his stand and submitted that the impugned order in the instant case should be held to be an appealable order, appeal being directed against an order passed under Sec. 47 of the Code and that, therefore, this Court should treat the civil revision application as a miscellaneous first appeal and give relief to the petitioner by ordering the principle of marshalling to be applied in her favour. I am afraid there is no substance in the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner. On the facts as stated, the petitioner cannot be said to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and free from encumbrance. The impugned order, therefore must be treated to be one passed in exercise of the powers of the executing Court under Sec.151 of the Code. This being the position, no room is left for interference by this Court in exercise of its powers in revisional jurisdiction, for there is neither any illegality nor any material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court below. 5. This being the position, no room is left for interference by this Court in exercise of its powers in revisional jurisdiction, for there is neither any illegality nor any material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court below. 5. Let us assume for the sake of argument, however, that an appeal lay against the impugned order as being one passed in the purported exercise of powers under Sec. 47 of the Code, even so this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction would not be entitled to interfere with the impugned order in view of the principles laid down by the Bench in the case of Ramchandra Bhagat. A decree-holder is entitled to execute his decree against any of the mortgaged properties where the decree is silent on the point and the judgment-debtor has no legal right to demand that the decree-holder should execute his decree in any particular manner to suit an individual judgment-debtor. Assuming, therefore, that the petitioner stepped into shoes of the judgment-debtors, she has no legal right to demand the execution of the decree-holders decree, in any particular manner. Nor. in my view, is there any equity in favour of the petitioner, which would induce this Court to interfere even in its appellate jurisdiction in the discretion exercised by the executing Court which is not in any way illegal or inequi-table. I do not, therefore, find my way to treat as, or convert this civil revision application into, a miscellaneous first appeal and to interfere in the discretion exercised by the executing Court by the impugned order. 6. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any substance in this application. It is accordingly dismissed and the rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, however. I shall make no order as to cost.