D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) IN order to show that this entry birds defendant No. 4 reliance was placed on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant on sec. 32 (3) and 45 (i) of the Indian Partnership Act 1932 which read as under: ( 3 ) NOTWITHSTANDING the retirement of a partner from a firm he and the partners continue to be liable as partners to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the retire- ment until public notice is given of the retirement: provided that a retired partner is not liable to any third party who deals with the firm without knowing that he was a partner. (4) Notice under sub-sec. (3) may be given by the retired partner or by any partner of the reconstituted firm. ( 4 ) NOTWITHSTANDING the dissolution of a firm the partners continue to be liable as such to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the dissolution until public notice is given of the dissolution:provided that the estate of a partner who dies or who is adjudicated an insol- vent or of a partner who not having been known to the person dealing with the firm to be a partner retires from the firm is not liable under this section for acts done after the date on which he ceases to be a partner. (2) Notices under sub-sec. (i) may be given by any partner. Now the present case is not of retirement of a partner from a firm leaving the firm to continue as a firm. This is a case where the firm consisted of two partners only and as Ex. 143 shows the firm was diss- olved. Therefore the appropriate section applicable would be sec. 45 (1) and not sec. 32 (3 ). The language of these two provisions is very similar. The evidence on record shows that on May 9 1963 when the Hawala agreement took place the plaintiff firm was told that the defendant firm is being dissolved. In fact Natvarlal Shanabhai admitted in his evidence at Ex. 121 that he came to know on the date of the Havalas that defen- dant No. 1 firm was dissolved. The evidence on record shows that on May 9 1963 when the Hawala agreement took place the plaintiff firm was told that the defendant firm is being dissolved. In fact Natvarlal Shanabhai admitted in his evidence at Ex. 121 that he came to know on the date of the Havalas that defen- dant No. 1 firm was dissolved. Now the said firm was dissolved on 9th July 1962 and the aforesaid evidence of Natverlal Shanabhai Patel who is the son of one of the partners and who took active part in the Havala agreement shows that on 9th May 1963 he came to know about dissolution of defendant No. 1 firm. The debit entry on which reliance is placed was made thereafter i. e. on May 20 1963 On that day plain- tiff was very well aware that defendant No. 1 firm was dissolved. Thus the act of making that debit entry by a partner of defendant No. 1 Firm was done after the creditor (plaintiff) had actual notice of dissolution of this firm. Can such an act bind defendant No. 4 and operate to save limitation against him is the question which arises for determination. The evidence also shows that no public notice as contemplated by sec. 45 (i) read with sec. 72 of the Indian Partnership Act was given about dissolu- tion. We therefore proceed to examine the question on the basis that no public notice was given but the creditor who was the creditor prior to the dissolution of the firm was actually aware of the dissolution on the date the entry was made and therefore had actual notice of the dissolution. The contention of Mr. Oza for the appellant-plaintiff is that we must apply sec. 45 (i) to the facts of the present case and come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the dissolution of the firm and actual notice about dissolution which the plaintiff firm had the acknowle- dgment still binds defendant No. 4 for the simple reason that the proce- dure prescribed in sec. 45 (i) of the Partnership Act was not followed inasmuch as no public notice as contemplated by sec. 45 (i) read with sec. 72 (b) has been given. 45 (i) of the Partnership Act was not followed inasmuch as no public notice as contemplated by sec. 45 (i) read with sec. 72 (b) has been given. Sec. 72 (b) of the Indian Partnership Act contemplates publication of notice in the official Gazette and in at least one vernacular newspaper circulating in the district where the firm to which it relates has its place or principal place of business. Mr. Oza also submitted that the entry amounts to part payment of the debt. But in that case also in order to bind defendant No. 4 the same question will arise. ( 5 ) NOW a bare reading of sec. 45 (i) will show that the section has a two fold object. On the one hand it seeks to protect third parties dealing with a firm who had no notice of its prior dissolution on the other hand it seeks to protect partners of a dissolved firm from liability to third parties for acts done subsequent to the dissolution by other partners- and the manner in which this protection can be availed of by a partner or partners is laid down in this section. The object of the Legislature in enacting this provision was neither to confer a statutory right on a third party dealing with a firm with notice of its prior dissolution nor to penalise the partners of the firm for failure to give public notice by making them liable to third parties who deal with other partners subse- quent to the dissolution with actual knowledge of dissolution of the firm. In this context the use of the word until in the phrase until public notice is given of the dissolution is significant. The Legislature has not used the word unless. If that word was used there would have been some scope for the contention of Mr. Oza. Mr. Oza says that sec. 45 (i) lays down the manner in which partners of a dissolved firm can protect them from liability arising out of subsequent acts. And he contends that if the partners want to protect themselves they can do so in this manner only and in no other manner. This runs the argument is because the manner of doing an act is prescribed and it should be done in that manner or not at all. And he contends that if the partners want to protect themselves they can do so in this manner only and in no other manner. This runs the argument is because the manner of doing an act is prescribed and it should be done in that manner or not at all. We do not find any such principle governing acts of private persons as distinguished from public officials exercising powers under a statute. Sec. 45 (i) in our opinion provides for liability for post- dissolution acts to third parties who have no notice of dissolution altogether actual or constructive and not those who have actual notice of dissolution. ( 6 ) WE are supported in this view by decisions of two High Courts viz. CENTRAL UNITED BANK V. VENKATARAMA A. I. R. 1963 MADRAS 302 AND RAMA RAO V. VENKATESWARA RAO A. I. R. 1963. ANDHRA PRADESH 154 The Madras case dealt with sec. 32 (3) of the Partnership Act. It was held that public notice was intended to serve a purpose namely to bring home to the persons concerned the fact of retirement and that purpose would undoubtedly be served irs a better way by personal or actual notice. In that case public notice was not given by the retiring partner. The contention in the Madras High Court on behalf of the creditor was that even though the creditor was factually aware of the retirement before the suit transaction that partner would still be liable by virtue of sec. 32 (3) which as per the submission created statutory liability. This contention was negatived by the Madras High Court. ( 7 ) THE Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the rule that makes a retiring partner liable for acts done on behalf of the firm after retirement is based on estoppel because the persons dealing with the firm deal in the belief that all the partners of the firm still continue. The High Court further held that when some of the partners have retired from the partnership there is no scope for the application of the rule of estoppel to take the partners who had already retired liable for the subsequent acts on behalf of the firm. ( 8 ) NO decision to the contrary was pointed out on behalf of the appellant. ( 9 ) THE contention advanced on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff was that we should construe sec. ( 8 ) NO decision to the contrary was pointed out on behalf of the appellant. ( 9 ) THE contention advanced on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff was that we should construe sec. 45 (i) liberally and apply the same to the facts of the present case. There is no question of liberal construction of sec. 45. We have already set out the object of this provision in providing for constructive notice. The object of this provision is not to create any statutory liability apart from the liability arising out of dealing with the firm after dissolution. If statutory liability notwithstanding the retirement of the partner or dissolution of the firm for acts done subsequent to retirement was ever intended the appropriate word in sec. 45 (i) was unless in the place of until. We therefore hold that in case of dissolution of a firm the persons who cease to be partners would not be liable to third parties for acts done by other partners subsequent to the dissolution if the third party had actual notice of dissolution when the acts were done. This would be so notwithstanding omission to give public notice of dissolution as contemplated by sec 45 in such a case. Appeal allowed. .