JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for rectification, possession and mesne profits. The trial Court has passed a preliminary decree accepting the plaintiffs claim and it is against the said decree that the present appeal has been filed. ( 2. ) THE material facts are that the plaintiff, Sanstha Sonabai Sarvakshram, khurai, is a registered society formed for religious and charitable purposes. The society, apart from other properties, owns agricultural lands in village korasa, tahsil Khurai. On 14th June 1960 the Society (acting through its sarvarakara Seth Rishavkumar and Sethani Sukhrani Bahu) and some other persons entered into a contract (Ex. P-4) with defendants 1 to 4, Shankar Singh, khet Singh, Bhagwan Singh and Gopal Singh who are sons of defendant No. 5 thakur Kishan Singh, and with some other persons for sale of certain lands including Khasra No. 55 of village Korasa. In pursuance of this agreement, eleven sale-deeds were executed by the vendors in favour of the vendees. We are concerned in this suit only with four sale-deeds, Exs. P-5, P-6, P-9 and P-10, which relate to Khasra No. 55. These sale-deeds were all executed on 11th august 1961. The plaintiffs case is that Khasra No. 55 comprises of more than 200 acres of land out of which only 33. 50 acres were agreed to be sold under the contract of 14th June 1960 and the location of this area and the manner in which it was to be carved out was also indicated in the contract. The sale-deeds mention the area of Khasra No. 55 included in each. In Ex. P-5 the area of Khasra No. 55 is mentioned as 3. 50 acres and in Exs. P. 6, P-9 and p-10 the area mentioned is 10 acres in each. Thus, the sale-deeds also cover an area of 33. 50 acres out of which No. 55 which was agreed to be sold, but the defendants taking the benefit of some mistake in the boundaries mentioned in the sale-deeds, have taken possession of a larger area out of Khasra No. 55. On these allegations the plaintiff initially sued only for possession and mesne profits of the excess area shown in the plaint map. On defendants objection in the written statement the plaint was amended and a relief by way of rectification of the sale-deeds was also claimed. On these allegations the plaintiff initially sued only for possession and mesne profits of the excess area shown in the plaint map. On defendants objection in the written statement the plaint was amended and a relief by way of rectification of the sale-deeds was also claimed. The defendants case is that there was inaccuracy in the contract as also in the sale-deeds in mentioning the area of that part of Khasra No. 55 which was agreed to be sold. According to them, the boundaries given in the sale-deeds correctly covered the area which was agreed to be sold. Thus, the defendants plea is that the whole of the area which is in their possession was agreed to be sold under Ex. P-4 and the same was conveyed to them by the four sale-deeds. The defendants have also pleaded that there was to fraud or mistake and that the suit is barred by limitation. They have further pleaded that as the plaintiff society was not registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1952, the suit was not maintainable under section 62 of the Act. As already stated, the trial Court substantially accepted the plaintiffs case and passed a preliminary decree on the following terms: "1. (A) Land in possession of defendants be demarcated to the extent of 33. 50 acres as shown in Ex. P-4, sale-deeds, Ex. P-29-A and Ex. P-30, starting from south from Bina river up to Chanda and on west from Khasra No. 56 and on east Khasra Nos. 321 and 320 to the North up to which area 33. 50 acres may go in Khasra No. 55. (B) After this demarcation, the sale-deeds be suitably amended about the boundaries and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 shall retain possession according to demarcation of only 33. 50 acres and shall deliver possession of remaining land in their possession to plaintiff from Khasra No. 55. (C) Mesne profits shall be calculated after it is found out as to in what extra area the defendants are in possession as a grass land and cultivation as per evidence that may be produced by the parties. 2. And it is further ordered and decreed that the Revenue Inspector shall be appointed a Commissioner for ascertaining the above and demarcating boundaries after getting orders of Tahsildar of the area. " ( 3. 2. And it is further ordered and decreed that the Revenue Inspector shall be appointed a Commissioner for ascertaining the above and demarcating boundaries after getting orders of Tahsildar of the area. " ( 3. ) THE first question argued in this appeal by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants is that the suit was not maintainable in view of section 32 of the Public Trusts Act. The expression "public Trust" as defined in section 2 (4) of the Act means "an express or constructive trust for a public, religious or charitable purpose and includes a temple, a math, a mosque, a church, a wakf or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed for a religious or charitable purpose. " Chapter 11 of this Act deals with the registration of public trusts with the Registrar of Public Trusts. Chapter IV deals with the maintenance of accounts and auditing of accounts. Chapter V provides for control of the Registrar over the affairs of a public trust. Section 32 which occurs in Chapter VI enacts that "no suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act shall be heard or decided by any Court. " Section 36 in the same chapter contains exceptions from the operation of the Act. Section 36 (1) (b) which is relevant for our purpose provides that "nothing contained in this Act shall apply to a public trust administered under any enactment for the time being in force. " learned counsel for the plaintiff society has not disputed before us that the plaintiff being a society formed for religious and charitable purposes, comes within the definition of "public trust" under section 2 (4 ). His argument however, is that the society is a registered society and is being administered under the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, and, therefore, it falls under the exemption contained in section 30 of the Public Trusts Act. ( 4. ) EXHIBIT P-l is a certificate of registration of the plaintiff society. It reads as follows: "i HEREBY CERTIFY THAT "shri SONABAI DIGAMBAR JAIN SARVKASH-RAM KHURAI" DISTT. SAGAR HAS THIS day been registered under the Societies registration Act, XXI of 1860. Given under my hand at NAGPUR this Twenty First day of May One Thousand Nine hundred and Fifty Four. " sd/-Illegible assistant Registrar for Registrar of Joint Stock companies. It reads as follows: "i HEREBY CERTIFY THAT "shri SONABAI DIGAMBAR JAIN SARVKASH-RAM KHURAI" DISTT. SAGAR HAS THIS day been registered under the Societies registration Act, XXI of 1860. Given under my hand at NAGPUR this Twenty First day of May One Thousand Nine hundred and Fifty Four. " sd/-Illegible assistant Registrar for Registrar of Joint Stock companies. " ( 5. ) THE certificate of registration of the plaintiff society shows that it was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. This Act was repealed and replaced in Madhya Pradesh by the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration act, 1959. Section 6 (2) of this 1959 Act provides that "a society registered before the commencement of this Act under any of the enactments repealed shall be deemed to have been registered under this Act." Section 33 (2) further provides that in all certificates of registration and in all rules, regulations and bye laws of societies issued or made before the commencement of this Act "any reference to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies or the Registrar of companies shall be deemed to be and be construed as a reference to the Regis-trar of Societies. " As a result of these provisions, the plaintiff society was deemed to be registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1959. This Act contains provisions similar to those contained in the Central Act of 1860. But there are two material provisions in the Madhya Pradesh Act which do not find place in the Central Act. These two provisions are contained in sections 24 and 32. Section 24 provides for audit and inspection. At the end of every year a registered society is to send the statements of income and expenditure with full particulars duly audited by the auditors to the Registrar. The Registrar is to verify these statements and he is empowered to issue instruction to the society as he may deem fit. The Registrar is also empowered to cause a special audit of the accounts of a registered society. Section 32 empowers the Registrar to institute such enquiry or make such investigation in respect of any matter as may be necessary for the proper performance of his duties and the administration of the Act or for the settlement of any dispute. ( 6. ) THE Madhya Pradesh Societies Registation Act, 1959, was repealed and replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. ( 6. ) THE Madhya Pradesh Societies Registation Act, 1959, was repealed and replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. This 1973 Act in section 3 (e) defines a society to mean "a society registered or deemed to have been registered under this Act. " This Act, however, does not contain any provision that the societies registered under the earlier Acts would be deemed to be registered under this Act. The 1973 Act contains many provisions which give extensive powers of control to the Registrar over the affairs of a society. Section 11 empowers the Registrar to amend memorandum, regulations and bye laws of a society if he considers that the amendment is necessary in the interest of the society. Section 21 provides that a society cannot acquire or transfer any immovable property without the prior permission of the Registrar. Section 25 provides as to what books of account are to be kept by a society. Section 26 empowers the Registrar to seize records, registers or the books of account of a society. The Registrar can also take possession of funds and property of the society through a duly authorised person. Section 28 authorises the Registrar to order a special audit. Section 32 empowers the Registrar to hold an enquiry into the constitution, working, the financial position of a society. The decision of the Registrar is binding on the society. The Act also authorises the State Government under section 33 to supersede society in case mismanagement and to remove the Governing Body and appoint a person to manage the affairs of a society. ( 7. ) FROM the above narration it is clear that a registered society in Madhya pradesh is now governed by the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, which is the Act currently in force. This Act, apart from providing for those matters for which provisions were made in the Central Act and in the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1959, contains many provisions which confer extensive powers upon the Registrar and the State Government over the affairs of the society. If the provisions of the 1973 Act are compared with the provisions contained in the Public Trusts Act, it will be seen that the Registrar and the state Government exercise more powers of control over a registered society than exercised by the Registrar under the Public Trusts Act over a registered public trust. If the provisions of the 1973 Act are compared with the provisions contained in the Public Trusts Act, it will be seen that the Registrar and the state Government exercise more powers of control over a registered society than exercised by the Registrar under the Public Trusts Act over a registered public trust. The object of the Public Trusts Act was to provide for control over the affairs of a Public Trust. The same object is achieved in case of societies by the drastic provisions contained in the 1973 Act. It is, therefore, correct to say that just as a registered public trust is administered under the Public Trusts Act, a registered society is administered under the 1973 Act. A registered society formed for religious and charitable purpose is no doubt a public trust, but as it is administered under the Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, it is "a public trust administered under any enactment for the time being in force" within the exemption contained in section 36 (1) (b) of the Public Trusts Act. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the exemption under section 36 (1) (b)would apply only to a public trust administration of which is covered by a separate enactment. As an example, the learned counsel cited Shri Mahakaleshwar temple at Ujjain, the administration of which is governed by Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple Act, Samvat 2009. In our opinion, the language of section 36 (1) (b)which is quite general cannot be limited in the manner submitted by the learned counsel. The enquiry to be made for applying the exemption is whether the public Trust concerned is administered under any enactment, other than the public Trusts Act, for the time being in force. If there is any enactment which provides for the management and control over affairs of a public trust, the public trust would come within the exemption irrespective of the fact that the same enactment covers management and control of other public trusts of the same nature. Having regard to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, it is quite clear that the affairs and the properties of a registered society are administered under that Act and, therefore, a registered society will fall within the exemption contained in section 36 (1) (b) of the Public Trusts Act. ( 8. Having regard to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, it is quite clear that the affairs and the properties of a registered society are administered under that Act and, therefore, a registered society will fall within the exemption contained in section 36 (1) (b) of the Public Trusts Act. ( 8. ) IT is, however, argued by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff society is not registered under the Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, and cannot also be deemed to be registered under the said Act as there is no provision in it that a society registered under the predecessor Act shall be deemed to be registered under it. We have already referred to the certificate of registration Ex. P -l, which was issued to the society when it was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. We have also stated that under section 6 (2)of the 1959 Act the society was deemed to be registered under that Act. We have further said that in view of section 33 (2) of the 1959 Act reference to the registrar of Joint Stock Companies in the certificate of registration issued under the Central Act of 1860 has to be construed as a reference to the Registrar of societies under the Madhya Pradesh Act. Further, section 13 of the Madhya pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957, provides that "where any Madhya Pradesh act repeals and re-enacts, without modification, any provision of a former enactment then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. This section corresponds to section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 8 of the Central Act has been construed to apply also to a case when the Union Parliament repeals a State Act on the reasoning that the word enactment is quite general and covers both Central and State Acts : [see State of Punjab v. S. D. S. Gupta (A I R 1970 SC 1641.)]. It has further been held that the word instrument in the context of section 8 of the Central Act will include "a formal legal writing like an order made under a statute or subordinate legislation or any document of a formal character made under constitutional or statutory authority" ; [see Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commr. It has further been held that the word instrument in the context of section 8 of the Central Act will include "a formal legal writing like an order made under a statute or subordinate legislation or any document of a formal character made under constitutional or statutory authority" ; [see Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commr. , Tripura (A I R 1964 SC 173. ). Section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act must be construed in the light of these decisions of the Supreme Court. This section is, therefore, applicable when a Madhya Pradesh Act repeals so far as Madhya Pradesh is concerned any Central Act. Further, in the light of the decision of the supreme Court in Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commr. , Tripura (supra), a certificate of registration issued under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, will amount to an instrument within the meaning of section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh general Clauses Act. As a result of this provision, the certificate of registration of the Society (Ex. P -l) which was issued under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and which refers to the said Act had to be read after the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Societies Act, 1959, as issued under this Act and as referring to it. On the same reasoning, after the Madhya Pradesh Societies registration Act, 1959, was repealed and replaced by the Madhya Pradesh society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, the certificate of registration would be read as issued under and referring to the 1973 Act. Thus, the certificate of registration of the plaintiff society must be deemed to have been issued under the 1973 Act and the society must be deemed to have been registered under this act, although there is no specific provision to that effect contained in this Act. The definition of society contained in the 1973 Act includes "societies which are deemed to be registered under this Act". This definition itself shows that the legislature contemplated cases where a society would be deemed to be registered. Although the legislature has failed to say expressly as to what are the societies which would be deemed to be registered under the 1973 Act, we are clear that the intention was to refer to the societies which were registered under the predecessor Acts. Although the legislature has failed to say expressly as to what are the societies which would be deemed to be registered under the 1973 Act, we are clear that the intention was to refer to the societies which were registered under the predecessor Acts. We have already shown that the plaintiff society, although initially registered under the Central Act of 1860, was deemed to be registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1959 when that Act came into force and after its repeal it must be deemed to be registered under the 1973 Act. ( 9. ) AS the plaintiff society is registered society and is administered under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1939, is not applicable to it and the suit is not barred under section 32 of the said Act. ( 10. ) LEARNED counsel for the defendants referred to the decision of the bombay High Court in Servants of India Society v. Charity Commr. ( AIR 1962 Bom. 12 .) for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is included as a Public Trust under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts act, 1950. This case is, however, distinguishable, because under the Bombay act a society formed for religious or charitable purpose and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is expressly included in the definition of public trust and there is no general exemption in that Act as we have in section 36 (1) (b) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act. It may be noticed that under the Madhya Pradesh Act what is included in the definition of public trust is a society formed for religious or charitable purpose. The definition of public trust in the Madhya Pradesh Act does not expressly include a registered society. As earlier stated, a registered society in Madhya Pradesh would be governed by the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, and would be administered under it and for that reason would fall within the exemption contained in section 36 (1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh public Trusts Act. ( 11. ) SECTION 32 of the Public Trusts Act does not bar the institution of a suit but only its hearing and decision. The usual practice is to stay the hearing of the suit until the trust gets registered. ( 11. ) SECTION 32 of the Public Trusts Act does not bar the institution of a suit but only its hearing and decision. The usual practice is to stay the hearing of the suit until the trust gets registered. At the time when the suit was instituted and decided the plaintiff society was deemed to be registered under the madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 1959. The society is now deemed to be registered under the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. Even assuming that the society was not within the exemption contained in the Public Trusts Act when it was deemed to be registered under the 1959 Act as the control of the Registrar under that Act was not as extensive as in the 1973 Act it would be an exercise in futility in sending back the case for re-trial when the society is now deemed to be registered under the 1973 Act and for that reason exemption from the provisions of the Public Trusts Act. For this reason, we have not thought it necessary to consider the question whether a society registered under the 1959 Act was exempt from the provisions of the Public trusts Act. ( 12. ) COMING to the merits, the main question that arises in this appeal, is as to what portion of Khasra No. 55 was agreed to be sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. Ex. D-18 is a copy of the survey map of village Korasa. It shows that the southern boundary of Khasra No. 55 is throughout a river. The map further shows that Khasra No. 55 is divided into two parts. One part of this Khasra lies towards the east of Khasra No. 56, and the other part towards the west. Khasra No. 56, which divides Khasra No. 55, is a field known as sirsa belonging to the plaintiff. Sirsa we understand is a field which though in the shape of a nala dries up and becomes fit for cultivation. The total area of khasra No. 55 is 201. 73 acres. There is no dispute between the parties that no portion of Khasra No. 55 which lies towards the west of Khasra No. 56 was agreed to be sold or sold to the defendants by the plaintiff. The dispute between the parties relates to that portion of Khasra No. 55 which lies towards the east of Khasra No. 56. 73 acres. There is no dispute between the parties that no portion of Khasra No. 55 which lies towards the west of Khasra No. 56 was agreed to be sold or sold to the defendants by the plaintiff. The dispute between the parties relates to that portion of Khasra No. 55 which lies towards the east of Khasra No. 56. According to the defendants, the plaintiff agreed to sell the entire Khasra No. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56 and this entire portion was sold by the four sale-deeds to them. The plaintiffs case on the other hand is that only an area of 33. 50 acres out of Khasra No. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56 was agreed to be sold and was actually sold to the defendants, but by mistake the boundaries in some of the sale-deeds were somewhat wrongly described. The defendants have admitted in their evidence that the total area of Khasra No. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56, which they claim to have purchased and of which they have taken possession is 67 acres. The crucial question that has first to be decided is as to what was agreed to be sold. It is not disputed that the contract for sale was recorded in ex. P-4 and that it was in pursuance of this contract that the four sale-deeds in relation to Khasra No. 55 were later executed. The relevant description of the property sold occurs at the bottom of Ex. P-4. Translated into English the description will read as follows : "33. 50 acres Padti (including land brought under cultivation) out of Khasra No. 55; adjacent to Khasra No. 56 towards the east of Sirsa; upto river and survey marks in the south. " There is no dispute now before us that Khasra No. 56 itself is a sirsa as is admitted by defendant Kishan Singh (D. W. 8) in his statement in paragraph 13. It is also not disputed that adjacent to the river in the south there are certain survey marks. " There is no dispute now before us that Khasra No. 56 itself is a sirsa as is admitted by defendant Kishan Singh (D. W. 8) in his statement in paragraph 13. It is also not disputed that adjacent to the river in the south there are certain survey marks. So the description given in Ex P-4 correctly read means that what was agreed to be sold was an area of 33 50 acres out of Khasra No. 55 which was adjoining to and lay towards the east of Khasra No. 56 and the southern boundary of which was the river and the survey marks. It will be seen that the description did not give either the northern boundary or the eastern boundary. After mentioning the area which was agreed to be sold, the description indicates as to how that area has to be separated out. It fixes the southern and western boundaries and it impliedly directs that 33. 50 acres have to be carved out by proceeding towards the east of Khasra No. 56. When it is kept in view that the area of that part of Khasra No. 55 which lies towards the east of Khasra No. 56 is near about 67 acres, there is no difficulty in understanding the intention of the parties in describing the property in Ex. P-4. It is clear that the parties did not intend to sell or purchase the whole of Khasra no. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56. If that had been the intention, it would have been very easy to say that the whole of Khasra No. 55 lying towards the cast of Khasra No. 56 was agreed to be sold. The clear intention as evidenced by the description in Ex. P-4 was to sell and purchase only 33. 50 acres of that part of Khasra No. 55 which lies towards the east of Khasra no. 55. This area, as the description shows, was intended to be carved out from the eastern portion of Khasra No. 55 retaining river and survey marks as southern boundary and Khasra No. 56 as the western boundary. ( 13. ) THE oral evidence examined by the defendants consists of Shanker singh (D. W. 2), defendant No. 1, Amar Singh (D. W. 6) and Manik Chand (D. W. 7 ). ( 13. ) THE oral evidence examined by the defendants consists of Shanker singh (D. W. 2), defendant No. 1, Amar Singh (D. W. 6) and Manik Chand (D. W. 7 ). These witnesses state that Dunda Khet was agreed to be sold and thereafter Babulal Patwari (D. W. 1) was asked to show the boundary of this field. It is also the case of the defendants that after the agreement was executed on 14th June 1960 they were given possession on 15th June 1960 of the entire area of Khasra No. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56. In our opinion, the evidence of the defendants witnesses about the sale of Dunda Khet as also of delivery of possession on 15th June 1960 is entirely false. If the whole of khasra No. 55 which lies towards east of khasra No. 56 is called as Dunda Khet and if this Khet was intended to be sold, the agreement Ex. P-4 would have referred to Dunda Khet. There is no reference whatsoever to Dunda Khet in p-4. As has already been stated, the whole of Khasra No. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56 approximately covers 67 acres. If the intention was to sell all this area, the parties would not have made such a glaring mistake of writing only 33. 50 acres out of Khasra No. 55 in P-4, more so when, according to the defendants, Babulal (D. W. 1), was also consulted before the execution of the agreement. It is highly improbable that the parties intended to sell and purchase an area of about 67 acres still they wrongly recorded only an area of 33. 50 acres. Again, as earlier stated, the northern boundary and the eastern boundary of that part of Khasra No. 55 which was agreed to be sold are not mentioned in Ex. P-4. This is for the obvious reason that 33. 50 acres were to be carved out in the manner stated in the agreement out of a larger area. The northern and the eastern boundaries would have been fixed after the area was carved out. Had the intention been to include the whole of Khasra No. 55, lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56, it was easy to described the northern and the eastern boundaries or to mention that the whole of the said Khasra number was being sold. Had the intention been to include the whole of Khasra No. 55, lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56, it was easy to described the northern and the eastern boundaries or to mention that the whole of the said Khasra number was being sold. As regards the evidence of delivery of possession on 15th June 1960, it is clear that this evidence is also false being contrary to the terms of the agreement. According to the agreement the purchasers (defendants) were to receive possession after paying Rs. 11,451 as the first instalment of the purchase price by Sawan Sudi 15, Samvat 2017, corresponding to 14th august 1960. The endorsement made on the reverse of Ex. P-4 will show that the purchasers paid Rs. 8,800 on 4th June 1960 and Rs. 2,651 on 2nd August 1960. Thus the instalment of Rs. 11,451 was paid on 2nd August 1960 and it was then that the defendants became entitled to take possession under the terms of the agreement. It is highly improbable that although on 14th June 1960 it was agreed that the defendants would get possession after they paid this instalment of price, on the very next day the plaintiff delivered possession without receiving the payment against the terms of the agreement. In our opinion, the description given in Ex. P-4 of that part of Khasra No. 55 which was intended to be sold is quite clear and there is no difficulty in finding the intention of the parties from the document that there was no agreement for the sale of the whole of Khasra No. 55 lying towards the east of Khasra No. 56 and only a part of it, i. e. 33. 50 acres, was agreed to be sold. ( 14. ) LEARNED counsel for the defendants has conceded before us that there was no variation in the contract for sale regarding the extent of the property that was intended to be sold between the date of contract and the date when the sale-deeds Exs. P-5, P-6, P-9 and P-10 were executed and that the sale-deeds were executed in terms of the contract Ex. P-4. We have already said that the total area of Khasra No. 55 expressed to be covered by those sale-deeds is only 33. 50 acres which is the area mentioned in Ex. P 4. The boundaries, however, given in Exs. P-5, P-6, P-9 and P-10 were executed and that the sale-deeds were executed in terms of the contract Ex. P-4. We have already said that the total area of Khasra No. 55 expressed to be covered by those sale-deeds is only 33. 50 acres which is the area mentioned in Ex. P 4. The boundaries, however, given in Exs. P-5, P- 6 and P-10 are somewhat misleading and if these boundaries are strictly adhered to, the defendants are likely to get a larger area. It is, however, clear that the agreement was only for sale of 33. 50 acres which were to be carved out from the eastern portion of Khasra No. 55 in the manner described in Ex. P-4 and this intention of the parties continued till the end. By common mistake the boundaries in the aforesaid sale-deeds were somewhat wrongly described. ( 15. ) THE fact that the intention throughout was to sell only 33. 50 acres is further proved by two documents, Ex. P-22 and Ex. P-29, Ex. P-22 is a tractor demand register of the plaintiff. This register shows the charges which the plaintiff was liable to pay to the Government for factorisation of its lands. There is a note in this register in the hand-writing of defendant Kishan Singh, who was then a Karinda of the plaintiff, that 41 acres of Khasra No. 55 and khasra No. 57 were sold to Sharker Singh and others and the area of Khasra no. 57 was 7. 50 acres. This endorsement clearly shows that only an area of 33. 50 acres of Khasra No. 55 was sold to the defendants Shanker Singh and others. The importance to this endorsement is that it was made by Kishan singh, who is the father of purchasers, soon after the sale when there was no dispute. Another similar endorsement was made by Kishan Singh in Ex. P-29 which is a village-wise register maintained by the plaintiff of its lands. In this register also there is a clear endorsement made by Kishan Singh that out of khasra No. 55 an area of 33. 50 acres was sold to the defendants Shanker Singh, khet Singh, Bhagwan Singh and Gopal Singh by sale-deeds dated 11th August 1961. The endorsement further shows that out of 33. 50 acres Shanker Singh, khet Singh and Bhagwan Singh purchased 10 acres each and Gopal Singh 23. 50 acres. 50 acres was sold to the defendants Shanker Singh, khet Singh, Bhagwan Singh and Gopal Singh by sale-deeds dated 11th August 1961. The endorsement further shows that out of 33. 50 acres Shanker Singh, khet Singh and Bhagwan Singh purchased 10 acres each and Gopal Singh 23. 50 acres. These endorsements made by defendants Kishan Singh after the sale in the register of the plaintiff clearly go to show that throughout upto the sale the intention of the parties was only to sell and purchase 33. 50 acres of land out of Khasra No. 55. ( 16. ) LEARNED counsel for the defendants submitted that when there is a conflict between the area and the boundaries given in a document, the boundaries are taken to be the criteria for determining the extent of the property conveyed. In support of this submission the learned counsel referred to us the case of P. K. A. B. Co-op. Society v. Govt. of Palestine (AIR 1948 PC 207. ). In this case it was held that in construing a grant of land a description fixed by boundaries is to be preferred to a conflicting description given by area. This rule, however, is not universal application. Where the boundaries given are vague and area is exactly specified, the property conveyed will be taken as that described by the area and not by the boundaries; [see the Transfer of Property Act, A. I. R. Commentaries (1968 edition), Vol. 1, pp. 356, 357]. An example where area as mentioned in acres prevailed over the area as included in the boundaries is furnished by the Privy Council case of Watch am v. East Africa Protectorate (1919 AC 533. ). In the instant case, as earlier stated, the northern and the eastern boundaries of that part of Khasra No. 55 which was sought to be conveyed are not specified in Ex. P-4. The area in acres is clearly specified and the manner of separating that area is also specified by fixing the southern and the western boundaries. This is a case where the description of the boundaries was not complete and, therefore, the area mentioned in acres must prevail. ( 17. ) SECTION 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, permits rectification when through fraud or mutual mistake of the parties a contract or other instrument in writing does not express the real intention. This is a case where the description of the boundaries was not complete and, therefore, the area mentioned in acres must prevail. ( 17. ) SECTION 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, permits rectification when through fraud or mutual mistake of the parties a contract or other instrument in writing does not express the real intention. In order to get rectification it has to be shown that the parties were in complete agreement on terms of their contract, but by some error the terms were wrongly recorded. Oral evidence is admissible under proviso (1) to section 92 of the Evidence Act to prove the mistake. However, when plaintiffs case depends merely on oral evidence, the difficulty lies in convincing the Court about the true intention of the parties, for clear and strong evidence is needed to make out a case of mistake ; See Fowler v. Fowler (45 R R 97.) and Rajaram v. Manik (1954 NLJ 12=air 1952 Nag. 90. ). But when there is a previous agreement in writing which is unambiguous and clear and when it is admitted or proved that the terms of that agreement were not varied at any time before writing down the document sought to be rectified, the task of plaintiff is comparatively easier. In the instant case there is a previous written contract for sale in pursuance of which the sale-deeds were executed. The contract for sale, in our opinion, is unambiguous and it clearly describes that part of Khasra No. 55 which was intended to be sold. As already stated, it has been conceded that there was no change in the terms of the contract in so far as they related to the extent of khasra No. 55 intended to be sold between the date of contract and the date of execution of sale-deeds. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to get the relief of rectification. ( 18. ) LEARNED counsel for the defendants contended that the plaintiffs claim for rectification was barred by limitation. There is no specific article in the Limitation Act, 1963 dealing with the relief of rectification and the matter would be governed by the residuary Article 113. The period of Limitation starts running under this article from the date when the right to sue accrues. There is no specific article in the Limitation Act, 1963 dealing with the relief of rectification and the matter would be governed by the residuary Article 113. The period of Limitation starts running under this article from the date when the right to sue accrues. But in case of rectification which is a relief founded on fraud or mistake, section 17 of the Act has to be taken into account and the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or mistake or could with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. In the instant case that part of Khasra No. 55 (in excess of 33. 50 acres) of which the defendants took wrongful possession was fallow land and was not under cultivation of the plaintiff. The defendants started encroachment from August 1961. The defendant Kishan Singh was in service of the plaintiff as a Karinda admittedly till 10th June 1963. It was not expected that this defendant or his sons, the purchasers would take over possession of any excess area of Khasra No. 55. The encroachment by the defendants of the excess area came to be known to the plaintiff only in 1965 when Dhannalal, Secretary of the plaintiff, went to the village Korasa in October or November 1965. Dhannalal has been examined as P. W. 1 and he has stated that he came to know of the encroachment in 1965. We accept the evidence of this witness. In our opinion, the plaintiff came to know of the mistake only in 1965. The suit was instituted on 26th October 1966 and, therefore, the relief for rectification is clearly within limitation. Even otherwise, the suit would be within limitation. It has been held that section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which corresponds to section 26 of the Specific relief Act, 1963, was an enabling provision and failure to sue for rectification does not affect title to the property; Rajaram v. Manik and Bala Prasad Asaram v. Asmabi (1954 NLJ 573=air 1954 Nag. 323. ). When the plaintiff claims a relief for possession, that is the primary relief and the relief for rectification is merely an ancillary one. Therefore, when the relief for possession is within limitation, ancillary relief for rectification cannot be held to be barred by limitation ; Tatali Rooraman v. Kovvuri Venkayya ( AIR 1938 Mad. 589 . ). 323. ). When the plaintiff claims a relief for possession, that is the primary relief and the relief for rectification is merely an ancillary one. Therefore, when the relief for possession is within limitation, ancillary relief for rectification cannot be held to be barred by limitation ; Tatali Rooraman v. Kovvuri Venkayya ( AIR 1938 Mad. 589 . ). In the instant case the suit was filed within five years from the date of taking over possession of the excess area of Khasra No. 55 by the defendants. Thus the main relief is clearly within limitation and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be held to be disentitled for the relief of rectification. ( 19. ) THERE is a cross-objection by the plaintiff on the question. The trial court has left the mesne profits to be determined by a final decree treating the excess area in possession as a grass-land. The defendants in their written statement admitted that in the three years preceding the suit i. e. in the years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66, they made a profit of Rs. 1261. 25 from that area of Khasra No. 55 for which the suit has been brought. In the absence of any better evidence, a decree for mesne profits ought to have been passed on the basis of this admission in the written statement. We are, therefore, of opinion that the grant of mesne profits should not have been left to the decided by the final decree. ( 20. ) THE plaint map produced by the plaintiff shows the area of 33. 50 acres of Khasra No. 55 which, according to Ex. P-4, was sold to the defendants. We have already stated that this area had to be carved out from a larger area as indicated in the contract Ex. P-4. Unfortunately, the plaintiff has not examined the person who prepared the plaint map. In view of this, the direction contained in the trial Courts decree for appointment of a commissioner to demarcate the area in accordance with Ex. P-4 appears to be proper. The Commissioner will make his report to the trial Court which will declare the excess area and direct the modification of the boundaries in the sale-deeds. We find that the reference to the sale-deeds and Exhibits P-29-A and P-30 in clause I (A) of the preliminary decree is unnecessary instead reference should be made to the plaint map. The Commissioner will make his report to the trial Court which will declare the excess area and direct the modification of the boundaries in the sale-deeds. We find that the reference to the sale-deeds and Exhibits P-29-A and P-30 in clause I (A) of the preliminary decree is unnecessary instead reference should be made to the plaint map. ( 21. ) THE appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The cross-objection is allowed to the extent of Rs. 1261 without any order as to costs. To clarify the decree under appeal, we order that in clause 1 (A) of the decree passed by the trial Court for the words "sale-deeds, Ex. P-29 "and plaint map" be substituted. We further order that and Ex. P-30" be omitted and in their place the words clause 4 (C) of the said decree be deleted and in its place a decree for Rs. 1262. 25 in plaintiffs favour against the defendants be substituted. We also order that a direction in clause 2 of the said decree be inserted to the effect that the Commissioner will submit its report to the trial Court and the court will pronounce upon the correctness of the report and declare the excess area and order the necessary amendment of the boundaries in the sale-deeds. Appeal dismissed.