JUDGMENT S. K. Jha, J. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the four petitioners is directed against orders as contained in Annexure 1 and Annexure 3 to the petition and the proceeding initiated by Annexure 2 to the petition, The prayer made in the petition has been for issuance of an appropriate writ quashing the order as contained in Annexure 1 and 3 and the show cause notice issued against the petitioners, as contained in Annexure 2, 2. The facts involved in this writ petition are not at all in controversy. The four petitioners were at the material time posted as constables under the Bihar Military Police VI, Muzaffarpur. They were deputed to Kurhani police station in the district of Muzaffarpur in an anti-dacoity Patrolling duty in village Madhopur Sasta. On the 3rd of August 1967 a dacoity was committed in the aforesaid village only at a distance of about 100 yards from a Madarsa where the police party consisting of the petitioners was camping, Inspite of repeated requests of the villagers and the Dafadar asking them to come to the rescue of the villagers from the depredations of the dacoits the patrolling party did not stir out of their place and sat idle at only that distance allowing the dacoity to be committed in their presence. The Commandant, Bihar Military Police VI, charged the petitioners for their acts of cowardice and willful disregard of their duties. Charge sheets were duly submitted, departmental proceedings started in accordance with law, five witnesses were examined and the Commandant (respondent no. 4), who was the disciplinary authority, held the petitioners guilty of the charges framed against them, namely of cowardice and willful disregard of their duty in not coming to the rescue of the victim of the dacoity, Abdul Rahman, and standing by all the time while such a dacoity was going on. Having recorded such a finding and having also held that the delinquent petitioners were guilty of grave charges, the Commandant, taking a lenient view of the punishment to be imposed on them, merely awarded a black mark to each of the petitioners and passed an order for the stoppage of the increment in the salary of each of the petitioners for a period of one year. This order of the Commandant is incorporated in Annexure 1 to the petition. This order of the Commandant is incorporated in Annexure 1 to the petition. Admittedly, the appellate forum which was available under the relevant rules, to which I shall hereinafter refer at some length, was the Deputy Inspector General of the Range, but the petitioners were well-advised not to file any appeal before him. When the matter, however, came to the notice of the Inspector General of Police (respondent no. 2) he called for the records of the case and issued a notice against the petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be discharged from service. This order of the Inspector General asking the petitioners to show cause has been incorporated in Annexure 2 to the petition. The petitioners duly showed cause and ultimately on a perusal of the case record, the findings of the disciplinary authority and the show cause filed by each of the petitioners, the Inspector General found that grave allegations against the petitioners had been proved in so far as they had not only shown cowardice but also, in spite of repeated entreaties made by the villagers, the petitioners did not co-operate with them and chose not to protect the life and property of the villagers. Accordingly, keeping in view the gravity of the charges substantiated against the petitioners, the Inspector General passed an order under rule 853 of the Bihar Police Manual (hereinafter referred to as the Manual) discharging the petitioners from the police force with effect from the 8th of July 1971. This order of the Inspector General has been incorporated in Annexure 3 to the petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged two points in support of this petition. It was, firstly, urged that no reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioners for rebutting the materials as contained in the report of the Dafadar which formed the basis of the order of the Commandant as contained in Annexure 1 as also that of the Inspector General of Police as contained in Annexure 3. It was, firstly, urged that no reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioners for rebutting the materials as contained in the report of the Dafadar which formed the basis of the order of the Commandant as contained in Annexure 1 as also that of the Inspector General of Police as contained in Annexure 3. In this connection, it was submitted that since the allegations against the petitioners were mainly based upon the report of the Dafadar who is said to have gone to them and requested them to go to the village where the dacoity was being committed, it was incumbent on the disciplinary authority, before passing an adverse order against the petitioners, to examine the aforesaid Dafadar, so that the petitioners could have had a chance to cross-examine him and to test the veracity of his report. If this so-called report were the basis of the order as contained in Annexure 1, much could be said in support of the point raised by learned counsel for the petitioners. From Annexure 1, the order of the Commandant, it is clear that in order to arrive at his findings, five witnesses had been examined and the petitioners had been afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The Dafadar was not called as a witness in support of the Department in order to prove the allegations against the petitioners by those five witnesses, nor for that matter did any of the petitioners make any such request at their own initiative to the Commandant to call the aforesaid Dafadar for the purpose of the petitioner's eliciting something in their favour from him. As a matter of fact, neither from Annexure 1 nor from the order of the Inspector General as contained in Annexure 3 does it appear that the so-called report of the Dafadar had formed any basis for the finding arrived at against the petitioners. Indeed, learned counsel for the petitioners had nothing to suggest in so far as the five witnesses who had been examined by the Commandant were concerned. Indeed, learned counsel for the petitioners had nothing to suggest in so far as the five witnesses who had been examined by the Commandant were concerned. I, therefore, fail to see any validity in the argument, because at some stage a report may have been filed by the Dafadar but which did not form any part of the evidence in the departmental proceedings, on the basis of which the findings were arrived at against the petitioners, how the petitioners would have any grievance for non examination of the Dafadar whose report had not even been acted upon. There is thus no substance in the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners. 4. The second and the principal contention that was raised in support of this petition was that the Inspector General of Police, in exercise of his revisional power under rule 853 of the Manual, had no jurisdiction to enhance the punishment awarded against the petitioners by the disciplinary authority. In order to test the soundness of this contention notice will have to be taken of certain other provisions of the Manual as also the provisions of section 7 of the Police Act, 1861 (here in after referred to as the Act). Section 7 of the Act, reads thus:- “Appointment, dismissal, etc., of inferior officers-Subject to the provisions of Article 3 11 of the Constitution, and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector-General, Assistant Inspector-General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any Police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same....... It will thus be seen that the officers of the hierarchy mentioned in section 7 of the Act, have been given the power in suitable cases to dismiss, suspend or reduce any Police officer of the subordinate ranks. This power is of course hedged in and circumscribed by the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and such Rules as the State Government may from time to time make under the Act. This power is of course hedged in and circumscribed by the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and such Rules as the State Government may from time to time make under the Act. We are, therefore, to look into the provisions of some of the different rules of the Manual to find out how far the power conferred by section 7 of the Act, has been restricted or curtailed, to what extent and under what circumstances. 5. Before turning to the provisions regarding appeals and revisions it is worth while to notice, in the first instance, what types of departmental punishments have been prescribed in the rules and who are the officers empowered to impose such punishments. Rules 824 and 825 of the Manual are relevant in this connection. Rule 824 describes the different types of departmental punishments that can be inflicted on a police Officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent. They are enumerated as follows:- “(a) Dismissal, (b) removal, (c) reduction in rank, (d) reduction in grade, (e) forfeiture of last increment or increments, (f) withholding of grade promotion, for a specific offence, (g) withholding of next increment for a specific offence, with or without a corresponding postponement of subsequent increments, (h) black mark or marks, (i) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument, (j) forfeiture of privilege leave or leave on average pay, (k) censure, (l) confinement to quarters for a period not exceeding 15 days, (m) punishment drill, and (n) extra guard or other duty: Provided that the punishments mentioned in clauses (1), (m) and (n) shall not be imposed on any inspector or sub-inspector, nor the punishment mentioned in (m) on any assistant sub-inspector or havildar.” This was the list of departmental punishments which stood in the Manual before a clause was inserted in rule 824 by an amendment by notification dated 18th of August 1970 published in the Bihar Gazette of September 2, 1970. By that amendment clause (bb) was inserted after clause (b) and "compulsory retirement" was also included in the list of departmental punishments to be awarded under rule 824. Rule 825 enumerates the officers empowered to impose punishments. By that amendment clause (bb) was inserted after clause (b) and "compulsory retirement" was also included in the list of departmental punishments to be awarded under rule 824. Rule 825 enumerates the officers empowered to impose punishments. While rule 825 (a) prescribes that no police officer shall be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that which appointed him, clause (b) empowers the Inspector General to award to any police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent any one or wore of the punishments mentioned in rule 824. We are not concerned with the other clauses of this rule. It will thus be seen that notwithstanding the provision contained in clause (a) of rule 825 that no authority subordinate to the appointing authority shall be empowered to dismiss a police officer, the Inspector General has been expressly given the power to award any police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent any of the punishments mentioned in rule 824, including dismissal or removal. In the instant case, as I have already stated above, we are concerned with the case of discharge of the petitioners which is covered by the term 'removal' in clause (b) of rule 824. Admittedly, the appointing authority of the petitioners in the present case was the Commandant who had passed the initial order as contained in Annexure 1. Nothing can be seen in rule 825 which can be said to in any way curtail the power of the Inspector General to award a punishment of dismissal or discharge conferred on him by section 7 of the Act. 6. The next set of rules relevant for consideration arc rules 851, 852 and 853. It may be mentioned here that in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and section 7 of the Act, in 1956 the Governor of Bihar was pleased to make certain amendments to rules 851 and 853 A new rule 853A was also added by the same amendment. These amendments were made by a notification of the Government of Bihar in the Political Department (Police Branch) dated the 20th of August 1956, being notification no. II/RI-101-56-PPR-341. I shall, therefore, refer to the relevant rules as amended by the notification aforesaid. After the amendments aforesaid rules 851 to 853A run as follows: “Appeals 851. These amendments were made by a notification of the Government of Bihar in the Political Department (Police Branch) dated the 20th of August 1956, being notification no. II/RI-101-56-PPR-341. I shall, therefore, refer to the relevant rules as amended by the notification aforesaid. After the amendments aforesaid rules 851 to 853A run as follows: “Appeals 851. (a) General rules as to appeals-No appeal shall lie against an order imposing anyone of the following punishments:-Forfeiture of leave, censure or reprimand, confinement to quarters, punishment drill, extra guard or other duty. (b) Against an order of dismissal, removal, reduction, withholding of promotion or periodical increment, suspension with loss of pay, removal from any office of distinction or special emolument or against an order awarding one or more black marks, there shall be one appeal in each case as follows :- Against an order passed by a Superintendent, to the Deputy Inspector-General, Against an original order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General to the Inspector General, Against an original order passed by the Inspector General to the Local Government. (c) Subject to the provisions of rules 853 and 853A, the order of the appellate authority on any such appeal shall be final. (d) An original order passed with the concurrence of any superior authority, other than the State Government, shall be considered to be an original order of such superior authority. 852. (a) Procedure in appeals.-petitions of appeal or for revision of an order, shall be presented to the officer against whose orders the appeal is preferred, within six months after the date on which the officer preferring the appeal was informed of the orders against which he appeals, provided that the appellate authority may, at his discretion, for good cause shown, extend the period to 12 months. (b) Every petition of appeal or for revision of an order shall be accompanied by certified copies of the charges, the defence and the order otherwise it will at once be rejected. Court fee stamps are not to be affixed to petitions and appeals submitted to departmental superiors. 853. (b) Every petition of appeal or for revision of an order shall be accompanied by certified copies of the charges, the defence and the order otherwise it will at once be rejected. Court fee stamps are not to be affixed to petitions and appeals submitted to departmental superiors. 853. Memorials and Revision.-No petition or memorial which is a representation against an order passed in a disciplinary case shall be submitted to any authority other than the authority which under the rule for the time being in force is empowered to entertain the appeal: Provided that an officer of the subordinate ranks not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector may, if a final order of dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank has been passed in appeal against him in a disciplinary case, submit to government, through the proper channel, a memorial against such order, within six months after the date on which the officer submitting the memorial was informed of the order : Provided further that the Inspector General shall submit quarterly to Government a statement of memorial from Police officers below the rank of sub-inspector which have been withheld by him under the provisions of these rules: Provided further that the Inspector General may call for the proceedings in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as be may deem fit. A Deputy Inspector General may call for and refer any proceedings to the Inspector General for orders. 853A. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the state Government may call for the proceedings in any disciplinary case even when no appeal or memorial lies, and pass such order as it may deem fit.” I may at once state that we are not in any way concerned with the provisions contained in rules 852 and 853A. The provisions relevant for consideration are those as contained in rules 851 and 853 only. And it was admitted at the Bar on both the sides that those two relevant rules, viz., 851 and 853, as in force are as I have quoted above. Learned counsel for both the parties addressed us on the provisions as contained and quoted in rules 851 and 853 above. 7. Actually, the most important question involved in this case is the correct interpretation of rule 853, especially, the third proviso thereto read with the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of rule 851. While Mr. Learned counsel for both the parties addressed us on the provisions as contained and quoted in rules 851 and 853 above. 7. Actually, the most important question involved in this case is the correct interpretation of rule 853, especially, the third proviso thereto read with the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of rule 851. While Mr. Jay Narain, learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that the rules, as quoted above, did not confer any power upon the Inspector General of Police, in exercise of his revisional authority, to pass any order enhancing the punishment, the learned standing Counsel I for the respondents contended on the basis of these very provisions that the third proviso to rule 853 read with the provisions of rule 851 in such a position to the provisions as contained in rules 824 and 825 (b) and section 7 of the Act, did confer in express terms such a power on the Inspector General. It will be noticed from the provisions quoted above that clause (a) of rule 851 does not confer any right of appeal on a delinquent in such cases of punishment as forfeiture of leave, censure or reprimand, confinement to quarters, Punishment drill, extra guard or other duty. Such orders are, therefore, non-appeal-able. With regard to other forms of punishment as described in rule 824 of the Manual, clause (b) of rule 851 confers on a punished delinquent the right of one appeal. Undoubtedly, in the instant case, the initial order of punishment was passed by the Commandant, who is equivalent in rank to the Superintendent of Police and as such the punishment awarded against the petitioners by the order as contained in Annexure 1 was appeal-able to the Deputy Inspector General, under rule 851 (b). Clause (c) of rule 851 lays down that subject to the provisions of rules 853 and 853A, which deal with the revisional powers, the order of the appellate authority passed in any such appeal shall be final. The finality of the appellate order has, therefore, been made subject only to the revisional jurisdiction of the authority vested with such powers under rules 853 and 853A. The finality of the appellate order has, therefore, been made subject only to the revisional jurisdiction of the authority vested with such powers under rules 853 and 853A. For the purpose of the instant case I may repeat once again that rule 853A has no bearing, since the revisional power of the Inspector General as conferred on him under rule 853 could only affect the finality of any appellate order passed under clause (b) of rule 851. This much has been admitted at the Bar. It is also not disputed that in the instant case the petitioners did not prefer any appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police so that there was no order within the meaning of clause (b) of rule 851. The only question that remains to be considered is as to whether the language of rule 853, either expressly or by necessary intendment, confers such a revisional power on the Inspector General as would entitle him to enhance the punishment as awarded to the petitioners by the Superintendent and as affirmed in the eye of law by the appellate authority under rule 851 (b). 8. Before embarking upon an investigation to find out the true meaning and purport of the third proviso to rule 853, I think it worthwhile to make clear some well established principles of law. The right of appeal is not inherent in any person against whom an order is passed in the first instance. Such a right has always been held to be a creature of the statute. And even where such a right has been conferred on a person against whom an adverse order has been conferred on a person against whom an adverse order has been passed, the power and jurisdiction of the appellate authority must be limited within the four corners of the express statutory provisions. If merely the provision of appeal is made with no further expression of the legislative or rule making authority with regard to the powers that can be exercised by the appellate authority, it is well settled that the general principles would apply to define the powers and limits of the appellate body. On general principle, an appellate authority in an appeal by an aggrieved party may either dismiss his appeal or allow it either wholly or partly and uphold, set aside or modify the order challenged in such appeal. On general principle, an appellate authority in an appeal by an aggrieved party may either dismiss his appeal or allow it either wholly or partly and uphold, set aside or modify the order challenged in such appeal. It cannot certainly impose on such an appellant a higher penalty and condemn him to a position worse than the one he would be in, if he had not hazarded to file an appeal. Reliance in this connection may be placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Makeshwar Nath Srivastava V. The State of Bihar AIR 1971 S.C 1106 But this does not in any way mean that even if there be an express statutory provision conferring a wider power upon an appellate body and vesting it with the jurisdiction to impose a greater punishment than what has been awarded by the order under challenge in appeal, the appellate authority would still be powerless. If the language of a statutory provision expressly confers wider powers on the appellate authority than those exercised by the authority passing the order in the first instance, certainly the appellate authority would be entitled in law to impose a more severe penalty than that awarded by the initial authority. So far as the provision of rule 851 (b) is concerned, it is clear that no such larger power has been conferred on the appellate authority. Therefore, in exercise of the appellate power under clause (b) of rule 851, this much is clear that the appellate authority could not in any way enhance the punishment awarded against the petitioners by the Superintendent. The very same principles, as I have discussed above with regard to the powers of an appellate authority, apply with equal force in judging the limits of the power and jurisdiction of a revisional authority. One thing is very clear and plain : that is this. In spite of the fact that the appellate authority exercising its power under rule 851 (b) has not been vested with the jurisdiction to enhance the punishment, yet if the language of the statutory provision so demands, the revisional authority may be held to have such a power. That then brings me to the revisional Powers of the Inspector General as contained in rule 853 of the Manual. That then brings me to the revisional Powers of the Inspector General as contained in rule 853 of the Manual. As can be noticed from the provisions of rule 853, a petition or memorial which is a representation against an order passed in a disciplinary case must be submitted to the authority which under the rule is empowered to entertain the appeal. This, however, has been qualified by the third proviso to that rule which says that the Inspector General may call for the proceedings in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as may seem fit to him. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the substantive portion of rule 853 which merely lays down the forum where the representation or memorial in the shape of a revision could be filed could not be said to be enlarged by applying the third proviso to the rule. In other words, the third proviso did not enlarge the revisional power of the Inspector General as it could merely operate upon and limit the general provisions of the substantive part of rule 853. I do not see any force in this contention. The whole of the statutory provision has to be read together and harmoniously construed The so-called substantive part of rule 853, if were to be construed in such a manner as would make the so-called third proviso a dead letter or otioss, I for one cannot construe it in that manner. The provisions as contained in the third proviso, though couched in the terms of a proviso, and really in the nature of a non obstante clause. The harmonious rule of construction impels me to hold that the true import and affect of it is that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the rules, the Inspector General shall have power even in any case where no appeal lies to call for the proceedings and pass such order as he deems fit. There is nothing in the language of the provision conferring the revisional power on the Inspect0r General, either expressly or by necessary intendment, to induce me to hold that the wide revisional powers conferred on him under the third proviso to rule 853 could in any way be cur tailed and restricted merely to equate such a power with that of the appellate authority under rule 851 (b). As I have already noticed earlier, section 7 of the Act, vests the Inspector General with the power to pass an order of dismissal, suspension reduction in rank, etc., if he thinks a personnel of the police force remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same. Again, the power to impose any of the punishments as enumerated in rule 824 has been conferred on the Inspector General by Clause (b) of rule 825. The third proviso to rule 853 again confers very wide powers on the Inspector General to pass in appropriate case any order which he thinks fit. The term "such order' as he may deem fit” extends the limits of his revisional power up to awarding any of the punishments enumerated in rule 824 read with section 7 of the Act. It is true, as was suggested by learned counsel for the petitioners, that, in exercise of the appellate power under rule 851 (b), the Inspector General's jurisdiction must be hedged in by the language conferring such an appellate power which in its turn, as I have already discussed above, does not permit him on general principle to award any higher punishment. But even in such cases, acting as a revisional authority and subject only to the compliance of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the principles of natural justice, he can pass any order which he could himself initially have passed. Such a power includes the power of removal and discharge. It cannot, therefore in my view, be contended that the order as contained in Annexure 3 awarding the punishment of removal against the petitioners, on substantiation of such grave charges, could in any way be beyond the jurisdiction conferred on the Inspector General in exercise of his revisional authority. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Makeshwar Nath Srivastava (supra) in support of the proposition that there was no revisional power in the State Government which could entitle it to pass an order to the prejudice of the delinquent in that case by awarding a greater punishment than that awarded by the Inspector General of Police. The facts of that case were quite distinct. The facts of that case were quite distinct. The delinquent Makeshwar Nath Srivastava had some adverse remarks against him, on the basis of which an order of reversion was passed. An appeal was filed by Srivastava before the State Government under rules 851 (b). The State Government, in that case, by an order dated January 31, 1963 passed an order of dismissal against the delinquent officer. When that order of dismissal was challenged the Supreme Court held that there was nothing in section 7 of the Act, empowering the State Government to pass any order of dismissal, etc. The language of rule 851 (b) did not permit of an enhanced punishment by the appellate authority and the general power of superintendence given to the State Government under section 3 of the Act, did not confer any such power on the State Government either. Rule 853A, which was sought to be resorted to by the State Government in support of the order of dismissal, was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as having not been in force in the absence of any proof of either notification or publication of rule 853A. It was further held that there was no revisional power whatsoever in the State Government by taking recourse to which it could enhance the punishment. The ratio of the Supreme Court decision aforesaid in no way militates against the view that I have taken of the correct interpretation of rule 853 of the Manual. Their Lordships were not considering the extent of the revisional powers under rule 853 at all nor was it the stand of the State Government that they had sought to exercise any power by virtue of the provisions of rule 853. 10. For the reasons stated above, I must hold that there is no substance in the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the revisional powers of the Inspector General under rule 853 did not vest him with the jurisdiction to award a greater punishment than what was awarded against the petitioners by the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Commandant. I thus find no merit in this application, it is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. S. N. P. Singh, C. J. I agree. Application dismissed.