JUDGMENT - N.B. Naik, J.:---This application is purported to have been filed under section 476 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 2. The facts giving rise to this application are briefly these: The petitioner is an Advocate practising at Poona. Kanchan is his daughter. After graduating in Ayurvedic medicine in 1970-, Kanchan took up an appointment as a Houseman in the Sion Ayurvedic Hospital on 22nd October, 1971. It appears that her Services were discontinued from 31st January, 1972. The respondent No. 1 is a Lecturer in Ayurvedic medicine and the other respondents are also Medical Practitioners and friends of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 is also the uncle of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 had married one Mohana, an Ayurvedic Medical Practitioner in 1964. A child was born of that marriage. The relations between the couple being strained, respondent 1 filed M.J. Petition No. 8658 of 1969 for a declaration for dissolution of marriage and judicial separation on the ground of cruelty. That petition was resisted by Mohana. After a long drawn out litigation that petition came to be dismissed by a contested judgment on 5th October, 1971. Thereafter Mohana herself filed a second M.J. Petition No. 3502 of 1972 alleging ill-treatment by respondent No. 12. Respondent No. 1 who had unsuccessfully filed the earlier marriage petition was only too glad not to contest that petition and that is why when he appeared he did not choose to cross-examine Mohana with the result the Court passed a decree on the unchallenged sworn testimony of Mohana. As regards the alimony part of the decree, the same was drawn on the consent of the parties. That decree for divorce was passed on 25th April, 1972. 3. It appears that respondent No. 1 and Kanchan, the daughter of the petitioner, fell in love with each other and with the result they were married on the 7th December, 1972 in the house of respondent No. 2 in the presence of among others all the other respondents. It is evident that the petitioner who is an Advocate was not consulted in the matter and he felt hurt when his doctor daughter went through the marriage without his knowledge and consent. He would not therefore allow Kanchan to leave the house, albeit Kanchan had a married respondent No. 1 . It is evident that the petitioner who is an Advocate was not consulted in the matter and he felt hurt when his doctor daughter went through the marriage without his knowledge and consent. He would not therefore allow Kanchan to leave the house, albeit Kanchan had a married respondent No. 1 . That is why respondent No. 1 was obliged to file an application under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, being Criminal Application No. 1022 of 1972 for getting the release of Kanchan from the hold of the petitioner by contending, inter alia, that the respondent No. 1 who was the petitioner therein being a divorcee had married Kanchan on the 7th December, 1972 and that the petitioner who was respondent therein having prevented Kanchan from leaving his house and confined her, respondent No. 1---the petitioner therein was obliged to approach this Court for relief under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. That petition was resisted by the present petitioner. He contended that even if the alleged marriage dated 7th December, 1972 between respondent No. 1 and Kanchan, had been performed by observing all the formalities of a normal marriage, the same would be void in view of the fact that by reason of section 30 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the marriage between Kanchan and respondent No. 1 having taken place within a year of the divorce between respondent No. 1 and Mohana the same was void. It is this submission which prevailed with this Court and this Court therefore refused to assist the respondent and discharge the rule. 5. It is as against this background that the petitioner has filed this petition purporting to be one under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner alleges that the decree for divorce passed in M.J. Petition No. 3502 of 1972 is a farce, null and void and that it was collusive. Therefore, says the petitioner that when the respondent No. 1 alleged that he was a divorcee, he committed an offence of perjury and giving false evidence in Court. The petitioner alleges that the decree for divorce passed in M.J. Petition No. 3502 of 1972 is a farce, null and void and that it was collusive. Therefore, says the petitioner that when the respondent No. 1 alleged that he was a divorcee, he committed an offence of perjury and giving false evidence in Court. The petitioner further alleges that although the other respondents knew that in view of the provisions of section 30 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the marriage between Kanchan and respondent No. 1 could not be valid since in the petition under section 497 filed by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner they stated that they were present to a marriage which was performed between respondent No. 1 and Kanchan, they have committed an offence of giving false evidence. Therefore, submits the petitioner that action should be taken under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 6. We find that there is no substance in this petition. Evidently the petitioner has missed the scope of the proceeding under section 476, both in fact and in law. Assuming for a moment that any offence of giving false evidence or fabrication of false evidence were committed by the respondents, it would appear that having regard to sub-section (6) of section 479-A, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no action could be taken under section 476 and since this Court has not chosen to proceed under section 479-A(1) it would appear that the remedy of the petitioner is misconceived. 7. Even otherwise we cannot appreciate how on earth it could be said that any false statements were made. The decree for divorce between Mohana and the respondent No. 1 is a valid decree and it stands for good unless it is got set aside. Therefore, when the respondent No. 1 alleged that he is a divorcee, it could not be said that he made any false statement. Even so when the other respondents stated that a marriage did take place between Kanchan and respondent No. 1 on 7th December, 1972 in the house of respondent No. 2, we fail to see how by reason of the subsequent discovery of that marriage being invalid by reason of the ban imposed by section 30 of the Special Marriage Act, they could be said to have intentionally fabricated false evidence. Judged from any point of view, therefore, there is no substance in this petition. Even otherwise we feel that this petitioner is out to abuse the process of the Court and he wants that his private grudge should be satisfied. In any event, there is no substance in this application and the result is, the petition is rejected with separate costs in favour of each of the respondents. Rule is discharged. ------