JUDGMENT : C.V. Rane, J. Respondent No. 1 Narendrajit Singh Sant Singh hereinafter referred to as accused No. 1 is dealing in ice-cream at Baroda. The petitioner is the manager of Pure Ice Cream Company (1967) Private Limited, hereinafter referred to as the company. Accused No. 1 Narendrajit Singh sold 900 Gms. of Kwality Ice-cream to H.T. Bhatt, who is the Food Inspector of the Baroda Municipal Corporation on 4-5-1973, at about p.m. for Rs. 15.25. The ice-cream purchased by the Food Inspector was divided into three parts, one of which was given to accused No.1 and one was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis. According to the report of the Public Analyst the sample of the icecream sent to him did not conform to the standard prescribed under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the rules framed thereunder. The Food Inspector, therefore, lodged a complaint against accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7(i) of the Act. In response to the summons issued to accused No. 1, he appeared in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Baroda and on 5-12-1972 he informed the trial Court by his application, Ex. 10 that he had purchased the ice-cream which was sold to the Food Inspector from the company. It was further submitted by him that the ice-cream was purchased by him from the company under a warranty. Along with the above application, he produced the warranty given by the company. Acting on the above application, the learned Magistrate impleaded the company as accused No. 2 and a summons was duly issued to the company. 2. After some evidence was adduced by the prosecution the charge was framed against both the accused. Before the charge was framed, certain objections were raised by the petitioner. One of the contentions raised by him was that no prima facie case was made out to frame the charge against him. The second contention was that according to section 20-A of the Act, the company could be joined as a co-accused only during the trial, that is, after the charge was framed and not at the stage of the inquiry. The third contention was that section 20-A of the Act was ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution of India. The second contention was that according to section 20-A of the Act, the company could be joined as a co-accused only during the trial, that is, after the charge was framed and not at the stage of the inquiry. The third contention was that section 20-A of the Act was ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution of India. None of the contentions was accepted by the learned Magistrate and he proceeded to frame the charge for the offence in question. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Magistrate in this connection, the petitioner had preferred an application in revision to the Sessions Court at Baroda. The learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the above application and being aggrieved by his order the petitioner-accused No. 2 has come in revision to this Court. 3. At this stage, it may be clarified that accused No. 2 is the manager of the company. Even in this court, the main contention raised by Mr. R.D. Hattangadi, learned Advocate for the petitioner, is that according to section 20-A of the Act, a manufacturer, distributor or dealer, as the case may be, can be impleaded as a co-accused only during the trial of the offence under the Act, and not at the stage of inquiry. Section 20-A of the Act provides- "Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in section 20, proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20". It is argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that in the present case accused No. 2 was impleaded as a co-accused before the charge was framed He has also submitted that according to section 20-A before any manufacturer distributor or dealer can be impleaded as a co-accused, the court should be satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence. In the present case it is submitted by Mr. In the present case it is submitted by Mr. Hattangadi that the order to issue process against the petitioner was passed merely on the basis of the application given by accused No. 1 and hence it is difficult to say that before the petitioner was impleaded as a co-accused, the court was satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that he was also concerned with the offence. In this connection, both the courts below have taken the view that the terms "trial" has been used in section 20-A in the general sense and that merely from the use of the word "trial" in that section, it cannot be said that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, as the case may be, may be joined as a co-accused at the stages of the inquiry. 4. The above view of the courts below seems to be correct. The word "trial" has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that ordinarily the word "trial" connotes "proceedings" after the charge is framed. But, for the purpose of interpretation of section 20-A of the Act, the above meaning attached to the word "trial" cannot be taken into consideration. The object of section 20-A of the Act is to make the provisions for the trial of the manufacturer, distributor or dealer along with the other person alleged to have committed an offence under the Act. The above object can be achieved even if the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is impleaded as a co-accused even at the stage of the inquiry. Mr. Hattangadi has not been able to show as to how the object of the above section would be better served by impleading the., manufacturer, distributor or dealer only at the stage of the trial. He has, however, submitted that if a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is, joined as a co-accused in a pending proceeding at the initial trial stage, he would be deprived of the right given to him under section 19(3) of the Act, which provides- "19(3). Any person by whom a warranty as is referred to in section 14 is alleged to have been given shall be entitled to appear at the hearing and give evidence." According to Mr. Any person by whom a warranty as is referred to in section 14 is alleged to have been given shall be entitled to appear at the hearing and give evidence." According to Mr. Hattangadi, if a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is impleaded as a co-accused at the stage of the inquiry, he would not have any opportunity to appear at the hearing and give evidence as contemplated by section 19(3) of the Act. The above reasoning does not seem to be sound as would be evident from the fact that irrespective of the stage at which the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is impleaded as a co-accused u is open to him to give evidence. It is hardly necessary to mention that the accused No. 2 is entitled to lead evidence in his defence. Moreover, according to section 342(A) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, it is open to anybody accused of an offence to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him or any person charged together with him at the same trial. In view of the above clear provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is difficult to say that the right conferred on the manufacturer, distributor or dealer by section 19(3) of the Act is in any way prejudiced. In the present case, it is open to the petitioner to adduce evidence in disproof of the charge framed against him. 5. There is nothing in the Act to show that the word "trial" has been used in section 20-A to suggest the stage of proceedings only after the charge is framed. In this connection, it may be pointed out that, even in certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, the word 'trial" has not been used in that sense. If any authority is needed on the point, it is provided by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey and another, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 389. The main question to be decided in the above case was as to the inter pretation of section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. In the above case, an application for withdrawal as against one of the accused was made when the matter was pending before the Magistrate in the committal stage and before any evidence was actually taken. The main question to be decided in the above case was as to the inter pretation of section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. In the above case, an application for withdrawal as against one of the accused was made when the matter was pending before the Magistrate in the committal stage and before any evidence was actually taken. It was submitted by the prosecutor that as there was no evidence against the accused in question, it was necessary to withdraw the case against him. The above request was accepted by the Magistrate and the accused was discharged. The said order was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge on a revision petition. The High Court, however, took a contrary view. The accused appealed the Supreme Court which allowed the appeal and restored the order of the Magistrate. One of the contentions raised in the Supreme Court on behalf of the respondent was that in a case triable by a court of Sessions an application by live public prosecutor for withdrawal with the consent of the court does not lie in the committal stage. In support of this contention emphasis was laid on the wording of section 494 which say that "in cases tried by jury, any public prosecutor may, with the consent of the court, withdraw from the prosecution of any person before the eturn of the verdict". According to the learned Counsel for the respondent, such withdrawal cannot be made until the case reaches the stage of trial in the Sessions Court. He also relied on the further phrase in the section "either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried". The use of the word "tried" according to him, confirmed his contention that it was only when the case reached the stage of trial that section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code could be availed of. While negativing the above contention, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the phrase "in other cases before the judgment is pronounced" in S. 494 Criminal P.C. would, in the context, clearly apply to all cases other than those tried by jury. While negativing the above contention, it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the phrase "in other cases before the judgment is pronounced" in S. 494 Criminal P.C. would, in the context, clearly apply to all cases other than those tried by jury. Now, there can be no doubt that at least as regards these o her cases, when the consent for withdrawal is given by the court, the result is either a discharge or an acquittal, according to the stage to which that cue has reached, having regard to the two alternatives (a) and (b) of section 494. Criminal P.C. It follows that at least in every- class of cases other than those tried by jury, the withdrawal can be at any stage of the entire proceedings, this would include also the stage of preliminary inquiry in a session case triable without a jury. But if the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents is accepted, that power cannot be exercised at the preliminary inquiry stage, only as regards cases which must lead to a jury trial. We can find, no conceivable reason for any such discrimination having been intended and prescribed by the Code. We are unable to construe S. 494, Criminal P.C. as involving any such limitation. The wording is perfectly wide and general and would apply to all classes of cases which are capable of terminating either in a discharge or hi an acquittal, according to the stage at which the section is invoked. The whole argument of the learned Counsel .is based upon the use of the word 'tried' and he emphasises the well known distinction between 'inquiry' and 'trial' in the scheme of the Code. Our attention has also been drawn to the definition of the word 'Inquiry' in S. 4(k) of the Code which runs as follows :- "'Inquiry' includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court". There is hardly anything in this definition which throw light on the question whether the word 'trial' is used in the relevant section in a limited sense as excluding an inquiry. The word "Trial" is not defined in the Code. 'Trail' according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary means "the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal" (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. vol. The word "Trial" is not defined in the Code. 'Trail' according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary means "the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal" (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. vol. 5, p. 3092), and according to Whatton's Law Lexicon means "the hearing of a case, civil criminal, before a Judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land" (Whatton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 1011). The words tried' and 'trial' appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words 'tried' and 'trial' have been used in the sense of preference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the context in which they are used. There it no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration. It has been pointed out in the above case that there is no reason why where the words 'tried' and 'trial' are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. If the above words occurring in certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be limited in their connotation and significance, there cannot be any justification in construing the word 'trial' in section 20-A of the Act so as to mean only tin stage of a proceeding after the charge is framed. I am, therefore, unable to accept the above argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in impleading the petitioner as accused No. 2 at the stage of the inquiry. 6. In this connection, it is significant to note that the petitioner had not raised any objection to his having been impleaded as a co-accused at the stage of the inquiry at the earliest opportunity. But on the contrary, he participated in the proceedings of the case and the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined by the learned Advocate who represented the petitioner in the trial court. But on the contrary, he participated in the proceedings of the case and the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined by the learned Advocate who represented the petitioner in the trial court. The above contention was raised by him for the first time after the prosecution witnesses were examined. It should, further, be remembered that now the charge has already been framed against him and, as observed above no prejudice has been caused to his defence by impleading him at the earlier stage. 7. As regards the contention of Mr. Hattangadi that in the present case, the learned Magistrate was not justified in issuing process against accused No. 2 only on the basis of the application of accused No. 1, it may be pointed out that, along with the above application, accused No.1 had also produced the bill alleged to have been given by the company for the goods sold to him. The warranty is also printed on the bill. It reads : "We here by certify that foods mentioned in this invoice are warranted to be of the nature and quality which these purport to be". The learned Magistrate has taken into consideration the above warranty while deciding to issue process against accused No. 2. According to Mr. Hattangadi, there was no evidence before the court at that stage to show that the above bill was issued by the company. For the purpose of issuing process, it is difficult to say that the aforesaid bill cannot be treated as prima facie evidence. It is open to the petitioner to raise proper contentions at tin- subsequent stage of the trial to show that the warranty in question has not been proved. At this stage, however, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that process was issued against the petitioner in the absence of any evidence, as contemplated by section 20-A of the Act. 8. As regards the question whether section 20-A is ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution of India, the learned Advocate for the petitioner relies on the following grounds : 1. Section 20-A of the Act gives an opportunity to the co-accused to play a role of a prosecutor. 2. Even the court has to act in the capacity of prosecutor while taking action under section 20-A of the Act. Section 20-A of the Act gives an opportunity to the co-accused to play a role of a prosecutor. 2. Even the court has to act in the capacity of prosecutor while taking action under section 20-A of the Act. There is nothing in section 20-A to show that it is only one of the accused who can move the court for taking action as contemplated by that section. It may be that in the present case, it is accused No.1 who submitted the above application. According to the above application, the court has to act on the evidence on record and it is difficult to understand as to how accused No. 1 would be playing a role of a prosecutor merely because he has produced the evidence in his possession. According to section 19(2) of the Act : "2. A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves- (a) that he purchased the article of food- (i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licenced manufacturer, distributor or dealer; (ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same stage as he purchased it". In view of the above provisions, accused No.1 is entitled to show that he had purchased the ice-cream from the manufacturer under a written warranty in the prescribed form. Considering all these circumstances, it is difficult to say that by virtue of section 20-A of the Act, one of the accused is acting as a prosecutor during the trial. 9. The argument that while acting under section 20-A of the Act, the .court also plays the role of a prosecutor cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the court has to be satisfied on the basis of the evidence on record before taking any action as contemplated by section 20-A of the Act. 9. The argument that while acting under section 20-A of the Act, the .court also plays the role of a prosecutor cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the court has to be satisfied on the basis of the evidence on record before taking any action as contemplated by section 20-A of the Act. The above procedure is quite justified in view of the provisions of section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code according to which, once cognizance of an offence is taken, the Magistrate is entitled to proceed against the person other than those against whom a complaint was filed, if they appear to have been involved in the offence. Considering all those circumstances, it is difficult to say that the provisions of section 20-A are ultra vires. 10. The next submission made by Mr. Hattangadi is that there was no legal evidence before the court for the purpose of framing charge against the petitioner, in this connection, he has pointed out that one of the witnesses for the prosecation viz. Harshadbhai , who is the Food Inspector in Baroda Municipal Corporation, has deposed that accused No. 1 was the distributor of the ice-cream packets received from the petitioner-company. According to accused No. 1, he had purchased the ice-cream in question from the manufacturer with a written warranty, as contemplated by section 19(2) of the Act. In support of his above contention, he^ has produced the bill containing the warranty. According lo Mr. Hattangadi, there was no evidence on record to show that the bill in question was issued by accused No. 2. Under these circumstances, and especially in view of the evidence of the Food Inspector as to- the admission of accused No. 1 before him that he was the distributor, the learned Magistrate was not justified in framing the charge against accused No. 2. The defence of accused No. 1 is based mainly on the above warranty and he is not likely to fall to prove that the warranty in question was given by accused No. 2, for the purpose of framing charge. Looking to the above circumstances of the case, it is difficult to say that the bill in question purchased by accused No. 1 cannot be treated as prima facie evidence. Looking to the above circumstances of the case, it is difficult to say that the bill in question purchased by accused No. 1 cannot be treated as prima facie evidence. The learned Magistrate has thought fit to treat the above warranty as prima facie evidence for the purpose of disposing of the charge and in that view of the matter, it is difficult to say that he has committed any illegality while framing the charge. It is difficult to say at this stage that the charge is groundless. I, therefore, do not find any sufficient reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Magistrate. 11. In the result, the revision application fails and is dismissed. Revision dismissed.