( 1 ) THESE two petitions can be disposed of by a common order as they arise out of a common order made on I. As 4 and 5 in OS. 198 of 1972 on the file of the First Additional Munsiff at Chikodi. ( 2 ) THESE interlocutory applications were filed by the plaintiff. I. A. 5 was for re-opening the proceedings for the specific purpose of examining the defendant. I. A. 4 is for an order from the Court granting permission to the plaintiff to examine the defendant as his witness. The learned Munsiff allowed both the applications and ordered the summoning of the defendant as a witness of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by this order, the defendant has approached this Court. ( 3 ) IT is to be remembered that in interlocutory matters of this nature, a Court is required to exercise its discretion judicially. I have been taken through the decisions of the Privy Council and a decision of this Court, which clearly condemn the practice of a party summoning the opponent as his witness. I shall presently advert to them. It is contended by Sri reddy that cases of this nature should be examined with reference to all the facts and surrounding circumstances and no hard and fast rule can be laid down preventing a party from summoning the opposite party as his witness. Without deciding the question raised by Sri Reddy, it seems to me that the discretion exercised by the learned Munsiff in the case on hand cannot at all be said to be judicial. The case of the parties had been concluded at the stage these, interlocutory applications cama to be filed and apparently the defendant had not stepped into the witness box. Perhaps being vexed by the fact of the defendant staying away from the witness box, the plaintiff has chosen to have recourse to this procedure. It is fairly conceded by Sri Reddy that if the plaintiff has made out some case which required an answer from the defendant and if he fails to answer the same with reference to documentary or oral evidence adduced on oath, it is always open to the Court to draw an adverse inference against a party who was required to answer such a case. This no doubt is the true position, but it is a matter which has to be taken into account when ultimately the Court proceeds to prepare the judgment and decide the issues arising in the case. In such a situation, there is no occasion for the plaintiff to summon the defendant and also for the Court to accede to such a request in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which is undoubtedly discretionary. That such is the position is clarly evident from the decisions cited before me by Sri G. D. Shirgurkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner I need therefore do no more than refer to the relevant enunciations in those cases before concluding this order. ( 4 ) THE first case is of the Privy Council in Kishori Lal v. Chuni lal, ILR. 31 All. 116, PC. It is enunciated therein thus :" As to this last matter, it would appear from the judgment of the high Court that in India it is one of the artifices of a weak and somewhat paltry kind of advocacy for each litigant to cause his opponent to be summoned as a witness, with the design that each party shall be forced to produce the opponent to be summoned as witness, and thus give the Counsel for each litigant the opportunity of cross-examining his own client. It is a practice which their Lordships cannot help thinking all judicial tribunals ought to set themselves to render as abortive as it is objectionable. It ought never to be permitted in the result to embarrass judicial investigation as it has done in this instance. " ( 5 ) THE next decision of the Privy Council is in Mahuntt Shatrugan Das v. Bawa Sham Das, AIR. 1938 PC. 59. It is observed therein :". . . . . . He adopted instead the tactics of calling Sham Das, defendant 1, as a witness for the plaintiff, with the usual result that important features of his case are denied by his own witness. Their Lordships have on previous occasions condemned this practice and approve of the course taken by the High Court in treating the plaintiff as a person who put dffendant 1 forward' as a witness of truth. . . . " ( 6 ) THE last decision is of this Court in Mallangouda v. Gavisiddagowda, AIR. 1959 Mys. 194=1959 Mys. L. J. 261. . . . " ( 6 ) THE last decision is of this Court in Mallangouda v. Gavisiddagowda, AIR. 1959 Mys. 194=1959 Mys. L. J. 261. The relevant enunciation occurs in para 7 of the above report. It reads thus :"plaintiff himsalf has been examined as a witness, no doubt, on behalf of the defendant. We have, in unmistakable terms, stated in this Court previously that this practice of calling the opposite party as a witness on his side should not be countenanced as it is not in the interests of justice. " ( 7 ) THE above enunciations do not at all leave the matter in any manner of doubt and need no further comment. The common order of the learned munsiff is therefore erroneous. ( 8 ) IN the result, these petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. The order impugned herein is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .