J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filled by the petitioners who are the partners of defendant No. 1-firm named M/s Sagar Talkies against the plaintiffs-opponents Nos. 1 to 3 and opponent No. 4 (original defen- dant No. 2) and opponent No. 5 who is also a partner of defendant No. 1 firm against the order passed by the learned 2ad Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Baroda dated 23 1973 dismissing application Ex. 26 filed by defendant No. 1 firm stating that Regular Suit No. 45 of 1973 is virtually to dispossess the defendant who is in possession of the suit pre- mises and who is actually running the cinema The valuation of the suit property is definitely more than Rs. 25 0 and the suit will fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge Sen or Division. The plaint- iffs have wrongly undervalued the suit in order to escape the Court fees and bring the suit within the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division. The question of jurisdiction and suit valuation should therefore be taken up first. ( 2 ) THE learned trial Judge found that this was a suit by a licensor against a licensee as the plaint reveals and it is averred in the plaint that the plaintiff-licensor is in possession of the suit property. Question regard- ing jurisdiction can be decided only from the averments and pleading made in the plaint. He therefore found that it was not a case of undervalua- tion and dismissed the application. ( 3 ) MR. L. R. Shah appearing for the petitioner (who will be hereinafter referred to as defendant No. 1-firm) has contended that it is the sub- stantial nature of the suit that is to be taken into account. It is the sub- stance of the plaint and not the mere form that has got to be taken into account for the purpose or determining the question regarding the adequacy of Court-fees and question regarding jurisdiction. Merely because the plaint is cleverly drafted and instead of asking for possession mand- atory injunction and permanent injunction are asked for the Court cannot omit to consider the substantial nature of the suit and decide about the adequacy of the Court-fees. Mr. Merely because the plaint is cleverly drafted and instead of asking for possession mand- atory injunction and permanent injunction are asked for the Court cannot omit to consider the substantial nature of the suit and decide about the adequacy of the Court-fees. Mr. Shah has submitted that if one refers to the substantial nature of the suit on taking into account the averments made in the plaint and the terms of the agreement of licence there is no escape from the conclusion that it is defendant No. 1 who is in possession of the suit property and the plaintiffs by asking a relief for mandatory injunction really want to get a relief for possession. When a suit is filed for recovery of possession by a licensor from a licensee assuming for the sake of argument submitted Mr. Shah that relationship between the parties was that of a licensor and licensee and not that of a landlord and tenant as claimed by defen- dant. No. 1-firm the court-fees have to be paid on the basis of the market value of the subject matter of the suit and the subject-matter of the suit in the instant case is the theatre property and the fixtures etc. attached to it. ( 4 ) TO appreciate the rival contentions urged at the Bar. I first propose to refer to the material averments made in the plaint itself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) IT is significant to note that the plaintiffs claim in the plaint itself is that the terms and conditions agreed upon and executed by the parties were more or less similar to these terms. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that the theatre furniture fans fixtures etc. were handed-over by the licensors to the licensee and the licensee was in their possession. That appears to be the reason why in the plaint mandatory injunction is asked for by the plaintiffs praying that a mandatory injunction may be granted direct- ing the defendants to withdraw themselves with their men from the property licensed to defendant No. 1 firm. As said earlier by me it is the substance of the plaint and not the mere form that is to be taken into account. ( 6 ) IN BAI RADHABAI VASUDEO JETHABHOY V. NANDLAL LAKHMICHAND CHANANA 59 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 127 Tendolkar. As said earlier by me it is the substance of the plaint and not the mere form that is to be taken into account. ( 6 ) IN BAI RADHABAI VASUDEO JETHABHOY V. NANDLAL LAKHMICHAND CHANANA 59 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 127 Tendolkar. J. has observed:the plaintiff cannot by merely so drafting his prayer as to exclude or include reliefs which can or cannot be granted by a Court confer on the Court jurisdiction to try the suit. It is necessary to consider what the cause of action in the plaint is and what is the substantive relief which the plaintiff will be entitled to if he succeeds in the suit in order to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction irrespective of what prayers the draftsman has thought fit to put in the plaint. Therefore what would be a normal suit for possession cannot be converted at the will of the dra- ftsman of the plaint into a suit for injunction by asking for a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to remove himself from the premises instead of inserting a prayer for possessionat page 128 it is observed:i have therefore to look at the plaint to discover what is the true nature of the suit. It is obvious that upon the averments in the plaint the defendant is in possession and since it is alleged that he is a trespasser obviously the appropriate prayer is a prayer for possession and that is the relief to which the plaintiff would be entitled if she succeeds. There can be little doubt that the ingenuity of the dra- ftsman of the plaint has been utilised in an attempt to give this Court jurisdiction by excluding such a prayer which is the proper prayer and by including a prayer for injunction. No precedent from any of the recognised text books on pleadings has been produced that in a suit of this nature the proper relief to be prayed for is not a prayer for possession but a prayer for a mandatory injunction. ( 7 ) A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in BURJOR PESTONJI SETHNA V. NARIMAN MINOO TODIWALLA 55 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 418 has at pages 423 and 424 observed:. . . ( 7 ) A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in BURJOR PESTONJI SETHNA V. NARIMAN MINOO TODIWALLA 55 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 418 has at pages 423 and 424 observed:. . . WHEN the plaintiff succeeded in getting that lock removed and again obtained access to the terrace and the terrace room according to the plaintiff the defendants barricaded the door which led to the terrace from outside and thus prevented the plaintiff from having access to the terrace and the terrace room. Under these circums- tances the plaintiff sought for a declaration that the terrace and the room thereon were comprised in the plaintiffs tenancy for a mandatory injunction against the defendants for removing the barricade and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing or interfering with the plaintiffs exclusive use and enjoyment of the terrace and the terrace room. THE learned Judge below has taken the view that the suit falls under sec. 7 (xi) (e) of the Court-fees Act and according to him the suit should be valued as laid down in that section according to the amount of the rent of the property to which the suit refers payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint and on that valuation clearly the value of the suit is far below Rs. 25 0 So the first question we have to consider is whether the learned Judge below was right in coming to the conclusion that the suit fell under sec. 7 (xi) (e) of the Court-fees Act. In order that the suit should fall under that sub-section the tenant must be illegally ejected by the landlord and the tenant must be suing to recover the occupancy of the property from which he has been ejected. In other words it must be a suit for possession by a tenant against his landlord. In order to decide whether this is a suit for possession the question is whether on the averments in the plaint it could be said that the plaintiff was not in possession at the date when he filed the suit. If the plaintiff was not in possession then the only substantial relief he can obtain in the suit is the relief of possession. We agree with Mr. If the plaintiff was not in possession then the only substantial relief he can obtain in the suit is the relief of possession. We agree with Mr. K. T. Desai when he contends that what we must look at is not the form of the plaint but its substance and if in substance the plaintiff was not in possession at the date of the institution of the suit he cannot convert a suit for possession into a suit for a declaration and injunction merely by giving to the plaint the necessary form and inserting in it the necessary averments. It is further observed:. . . NOWHERE in the plaint does the plaintiff allege that he was deprived of his possession. Nowhere in the plaint does he contend that he was ejected by the land- lord. His whole case is that he was throughout in possession that he was entitled to possession and that his possession was interfered with by the barricading of the door leading to the terrace which deprived him of his access to the terrace and deprived him of the use and enjoyment of the terrace. It is rather significant that it is not even the defendants case in the written statement that the plaintiff was not in possession at the date of the filing of the suit. IT was on those facts and circumstances found that the plaintiffs suit was not for possession even looking to the substantial nature of the plaint. The aforesaid observations made in that decision which are in the nature of obiter dicta lend support to my conclusion that it is the substance of the plaint and not the mere form that has to be looked into ( 8 ) IN RATILAL MANILAL V. CHANDULAL CHOTALAL 49 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 552 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has in terms laid down:in a suit for possession of a house where the plaintiff claims that the defendant in possession is his licensee the court-fee is payable according to the market value of the house under sec. 7 (v) (e) of the Court-fees Act. 1870. SEVERAL decisions of different High Courts have been taken into account by Macklin J. speaking for the Division Bench and observed at pages 553 and 554:. . . 7 (v) (e) of the Court-fees Act. 1870. SEVERAL decisions of different High Courts have been taken into account by Macklin J. speaking for the Division Bench and observed at pages 553 and 554:. . . IN the licensee case before the Patna High Court the Court thought that the subject-matter of the suit was the right to eject the defendants and the value of that right was the value at which the defendants right to remain in the house under the licence of the plaintiff might be valued. In neither case did the Court treat the subject matter as being the property itself although it was of the property itself that the possession was sought. In defence of the order of the lower Court it is argued that this is the correct way to look at the question since the subject- matter in a case of this kind ought not to be regarded as the entire house with all the rights involved therein but merely one aspect of the house. But with all respect to the learned Judges who decided the two eases cited I think that they are entirely wrong. In plain English the subject matter of a suit is what the suit is about. It is not the same thing as the object of the suit. The object of the suit is the claim in other words possession of the house. The subject of the suit is the house. That this is the correct view to take is I think clear also from the wording of sec. 7 (v) itself. The section says that suits for the possession of land houses or gardens are to be valued according to the subject-matter. and the sub-sec. goes on to say that where the subject-matter is land the value shall be determined according to clause (a) (b) (c) or (d) and where the subject-matter is a house or garden the value shall be deemed to be the market value of the house or garden. and the sub-sec. goes on to say that where the subject-matter is land the value shall be determined according to clause (a) (b) (c) or (d) and where the subject-matter is a house or garden the value shall be deemed to be the market value of the house or garden. In other words the section contemplates the subject-matter of a suit for the possession of the land as being the land and the subject matter of a suit for possession of a garden as being the garden and the subject-matter of a suit for the possession of a house as being the house and there is no suggestion to be derived from the section itself or so far as I know from anywhere else that the subject-matter ought to be taken to be anything else. I can imagine hard cases arising out of this provision. I can imagine cases where paying the Court-fee on the value of a house might in all the circumstances be an unduly heavy price to pay in the event of the suit being lost. But we cannot do anything about that. The law seems to be as I have said; and if the law is harsh it can always be amended. IT is significant to note that Macklin J. had to consider the provisions of the Central Act Court-fees Act 1870 which was then applicable in the State of Bombay also. Thereafter the Act of 1959 was made applicable and that Act also applies to the State of Gujarat. 24 Sec. 6 (v) of the Act states:in suits for the possession of land houses and gardens according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be where the subject-matter is a house or garden-according to the market value of the house or garden and where the subject matter is lands. and -. . . IT is thus evident that even after the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court the legislature did not make any changes in this behalf. and -. . . IT is thus evident that even after the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court the legislature did not make any changes in this behalf. If really the legislature did no; agree with the view taken by the Courts hat the subject-matter in such cases will be house and garden Court-fees have to be paid according to the market value they would have made necessary changes when a licensor brought a suit for recovery of possession from the licensee as has been done in case of a suit filed by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession. ( 9 ) IN LAKHIRAM RAMDAS V. M/s. VIDYUT CABLE AND RUBBER INDUSTRIES 65 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 604 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had to deal with a case similar to our case. It is stated therein:where a licensee is in exclusive possession the plaintiff must ask for possession and not injunction. In every case the Court which is called upon to hear a suit must initially consider the relationship of the parties. It is not as if that in every case the licensor must ask for possession There are a large number of cases where the licensor continues to remain not only in juridical possession but in physical posses- ssion along with the licensee and in such a case in terms of sec. 63 of the Indian Easements Act 1882 it is sufficient if he asks for removal of the licensee and a permanent injunction against him restraining him from re-entering the premises. But the same considerations cannot apply where he is not in physical possession of the property but is in mere juridical possession as any other owner with subsisting title is. If the Court comes to the conclusion on reading the cause of action that the plaintiff has only asked for a mere injunction to which he is entitled it must reject the plaint or dismiss the suit as required by the provisions of the Civil Pro- cedure Code 1908 In some cases the Court may find that the prayer clause is clev- erly worded but in effect it amounts to a prayer for possession in which case it is its duty to see that the requisite Court-fees are paid and if not to call upon the plaintiff under the Court-fees Act to pay the Court-fees. THE aforesaid earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court have been followed and the decision of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court in BAI SIRINBAI RAHIM V. NARAYANDAS 55 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 481 has been dissented from It is further stated therein:in a suit for possession of licensed premises the plaintiff must pay ad valorem Court-fees as in a suit for possession on the market value of the property. DECISION In RATILAL MANILAL V. CHANDULAL CHHOTALAL (SUPRA) to which I have already made reference has been followed. At page 607 it is observed:as we stated above the plaintiff has asked for three reliefs: The first is a decla- ration of the relationship and of the fact that that relationship has come to an end and the two other reliefs are a mandatory injunction for their removal from the premises and a preventive injunction restraining them from re-entering or interfering with the plaintiffs possession. It is undoubtedly true as has been often said that no person is bound to so adjust his affairs as to pay the maximun taxes. Nonethe less it is the duty of the Court to see that by clever wording of documents legiti- mate duties are not avoided. IN BURJOR PESTONJI V. NARIMAN MINOO 55 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 418. (to which I have already made reference earlier) Chagla. C J. said (p. 424):. . . IF in substance the plaintiff was not in possession at the date of the insti- tution of the suit he cannot convert a suit for possession into a suit for a decl- aration and injunction merely by giving to the plaint the necessary form and inserting in it the necessary averments. AT pages 607 and 608 the decision of S. T. Desai J. in BAI SHIRINBAI RAHIM V. NARAYANDAS 55 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 481 which has been relied upon by the learned trial Judge in his judgment has been referred to and the observations made therein are quoted in these terms:in a suit against a trespasser and a licensee in occupation of the premises after the expiration of the period of the grant is no different than a trespasser in unlaw- ful occupation the proper relief to be asked for is by way of an injunction. AFTER quoting those observations made by S. T. Desai J. the pertinent observations made are;the proposition is not with respect wholly correct. AFTER quoting those observations made by S. T. Desai J. the pertinent observations made are;the proposition is not with respect wholly correct. It depends upon the nature of trespass. Where a trespasser does not hold possession of the property but comits sporadic acts of trespass prayer for injunction is the proper relief. But if the tres- passer is in physical occupation of the property then possession is the only proper remedy. It is further observed therein:. . . . The test is not what relief has been asked but what ought to be asked. In our view where a licensee is in exclusive possession the plaintiff must ask for posses- sion and not injunction. It is the only efficacious relief which the licensor is enti- tled to. IN every case therefore the Court who is called upon to hear a suit must initially consider the relationship of the parties. It is not as if that in every case the licen- sor must ask for possession. There are a large number of cases where the licensor continues to remain in not only juridical possession but in physical possession long with the licensee and in such a case in terms of sec. 63 of the Indian Ease- ments Act it is sufficient if he asks for removal of the licensee and a permanent injunction against him restraining him from rentering the premises. because in that case there is no question of his asking for equally efficacious relief But the same considerations cannot apply where he is not in physical possession of the property. but is in mere juridical possession as any other owner with subsisting title is. If the Court comes to the conclusion on reading the cause of action that the plaintiff has only asked for a mere injunction to which he is entitled it must reject the plaint or dismiss the suit as required by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In some cases the Court may find that the prayer clause is cleverly worded as in the present case but in effect it amounts to a prayer for possession in which case it is its duty to see that the requisite Court-fees are paid and if not to call upon the plaintiff under the Court-fees Act to pay the Court-fees. IN my opinion this decision lays down the correct ratio and I am in respectful agreement with it. IN my opinion this decision lays down the correct ratio and I am in respectful agreement with it. The present case is more or less a case which stands on the same footing. ( 10 ) IN BAI SHIRINBAI RAHIM VALIMAHOMED V. NARAYANDAS KARAMCH AND 55 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 481 S. T. Desai J. had to deal with a primary question as regards the connotation of the expression a Suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent (Bombay ). It was only in that connection that at page 434 it is observed:. . . WHETHER a suit is a suit for land cannot be decided merely by having regard to the frame of the suit. Question is not one of applying merely a formal test; regard must be had to the substance of the suit. The reliefs however bought in the present suit appear to me to be quite in order. In a suit against a trespasser and a licensee in occupation of the premises after the expiration of the period of the grant is no different than a trespasser in unlawful occupation the proper relief to be asked for is by way of an injunction. In such a case a declaration that the defendant is in wrongful occupation may not be asked. It is not incumbent on the plaintiff to do so. Mr. Advani has strongly urged that the relief to be asked for in such a suit must be one to quit and vacate. I do not agree. Moreover as I have already observed it is not the ostensible form of the suit or the nature of the relief asked for that matters. I am principally concerned with the substance of the suit. Both in form as well as in substance the suit before me is one by a person claiming to be a licensor against the licensee after the expiration of the period of the part. NOW a licence is a purely personal privilege; it merely enables the licensee to do or continue to do in or upon the property of the grantor something which would in the absence of such right be unlawful. Such a right does not confer on the licensee any interest whatsoever in the property. It is a personal right and the grant only creates a personal relation. Such a right does not confer on the licensee any interest whatsoever in the property. It is a personal right and the grant only creates a personal relation. This being the essential nature of the right set up in the plaint and the Suit being of the nature stated by me I have no doubt that the suit is not substantially a suit relating to land. IT is thus evident that the aforesaid observations have been made in the context of the question posed whether the suit was really a suit relating to land falling within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. No doubt some observation made do support the view taken by the learned trial judge. They are in the nature of obiter dicta. In the later decisions referred to by me above this view has not been accepted as the correct view and rightly it has not been accepted as the correct view. The view taken by the Bombay High Court referred to by me above. in several decisions has also been accepted by several High Courts. I will refer to a few decisions of other High Courts ( 11 ) A Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of three Judges in SISIR KUMAR DUTTA V. SUSIL KUMAR DUTTA A. I. R. 1961 CALCUTTA 229 after reviewing several decisions of that Court and the decisions of other High Courts at pages 237 and 238 in para 34 noted the five different lines of opinion on this point. That para reads:it appears from the examination of case law that there are five different lines of opinion on this point namely. (I) The value of the subject-matter of a suit to object a licensee is the right of the licensee. Even viewed as a suit for recovery of possession the possession of the licensee is the subject-matter of the litigation and as such is of lesser value than the value of the property. This is the view to be found in the cases in 24 Cal 167 (Notes) A. I. R 1927 Patna 140. I. L. R. 5 Patna 631. The decision in 99 Cal L. J. 138 (A. I. R. 1958 Cal 179) inclines to this view though it does not decide the point. I. L. R. 15 All. 63 also supports the reasoning behind this view. I. L. R. 5 Patna 631. The decision in 99 Cal L. J. 138 (A. I. R. 1958 Cal 179) inclines to this view though it does not decide the point. I. L. R. 15 All. 63 also supports the reasoning behind this view. (II) In a suit for possession from a licensee sec. 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act applies and since the subject-matter cannot be valued precisely the valuation put by the plaintiff must be accepted. Alternatively if it be held to be governed by sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act the plaintiff would be entitled to put his own valuation because no objective stand of valuation is available. This is the view to be found in 63 Cal L. J. 380: A. I. R. 1959 Cal 531 ). (III) In such a suit Court-fee must be paid on the value of the property which is taken to be the subject-matter. This is the view to be found in Civil Revn. Case No. 880 of 1948 (Cal ). Civil Revn. Case No. 233 of 1949 (Cal) A. I. R. 1949 Cal. 621 64 Cal W N. 80: (A. I. R. 1960 Cal 420) A. I. R. 1947 Bom. 482 A. I. R. 1950 Nagpur 231 A. I. R. 1952 Madhya Bharat J23 and A. I. R. 1954 Madras 200. The decision in 98 Cal. L. J. I also inclines to this view. (IV) In such a suit the subject-matter of the suit is not the property in respect of which the plaintiff claims relief but the relief itself. The relief is that the licensee should leave the land and structures thereon. The value of this is obviously very less ordinarily than the value of the property over which the licence was said to have been given. For the purposes of jurisdiction the valuation need not be made on the basis of the market value of the property or the capitalised value of the profits thereof. This is the view we find in the case reported in 59 Cal. W. N. 606: A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 144 ). SEN J. is the strongest critic of this view point and his Lordships views are to be found in the cases in A. I. R. 1954 Cal 101 and Civil Revn. Case No. 1083 of 1958 (Cal. ). W. N. 606: A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 144 ). SEN J. is the strongest critic of this view point and his Lordships views are to be found in the cases in A. I. R. 1954 Cal 101 and Civil Revn. Case No. 1083 of 1958 (Cal. ). (V) The remaining point of view is that in such a suit Court-fees must be asse- ssed under Schedule 11 Article 17 because the value is indeterminate. This is the view to be found in the cases in A. I. R. 1934 Madras 714 and A. I. R. 1944 All 279. With this view I do not agree because in my opinion such suits are covered by sec. 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act. In para 35 after referring to those five different lines of opinion it is observed:from the above analysis it appears that there is a preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the point of view as in number (iii) referred to above. IT is thus evident that the special Bench of the Calcutta High Court has accepted the view taken by the Bombay High Court which view in my opinion is the correct view. At page 239 it is observed:i have already observed that the subject-matter of a suit for eviction against a licensee whose licence stands revoked and who thereupon becomes a trespasser is the property which is sought to be recovered. That being so the value of the relief must be the value of the subject-matter namely the property and that must be valued in accordance with sec. 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act. IT is further observed that for suit valuation also that will be the positi- on under sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. ( 12 ) A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in JAGDISH CHANDRA GHOSE V. BASANT KUMAR BOSE. A. I. R. 1963 PATNA 308 has also taken the same view observing:a suit for eviction of the licensee who continues to live in the licensed premises in spite of termination of his licence and for possession has to be valued under sec 7 (v) (e ). IF a licensee continues to be in possession of certain premises after expiry of a reasonable time from the date his licence is revoked he does so only as a trespasser. IF a licensee continues to be in possession of certain premises after expiry of a reasonable time from the date his licence is revoked he does so only as a trespasser. If therefore a suit is instituted for his eviction it is clearly a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser. The entire value of the property in question must be held to be the value of the subject-matter of the suit. (Bombay view has been accepted ). It is further observed therein:in a case falling under paragraph (v) of sec. 7 the valuation for Court-fee may be different from the valuation for jurisdiction. In all the cases falling under clauses (a) (b) and (c) of para (v) the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction will be the market value of the property in suit. Therefore the valuation for Court-fee will be different from the valuation for jurisdiction. When however the valuation for Court- fee is the market value of the property in question as in a case falling under para- graph (v) (e) the valuation for Court-fee must be the same as the valuation for jurisdiction and that valuation would be the market value of that portion of the house the possession of which the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendants. ( 13 ) IN NIDUGONDA RUDRAMANI V. CHADUVULA SRISAILAM. A. I. R. 1954 MADRAS 200 a single Judge of the Madras High Court has also taken a similar view observing:sec. 7 (xi) (cc) cannot have any application to a suit to recover possession of the property from a licensee. A licensee cannot be included in the term tenant. THE argument that such a suit in incapable of valuation and for that reason comes within the purview of Schedule IT Article 17 (B) (Mad) Court-fees Act is not cor- rect. It cannot be said that it is incapable of valuation as the relief asked for is the possession of a house which is covered by sec. 7 (v) of the Act. THE case is governed by sec. 7 (v) (e) Court-fees Act and Court-fee has to be paid on the market value of the house. A. I. R. 1947 Bombay 482 followed. 7 (v) of the Act. THE case is governed by sec. 7 (v) (e) Court-fees Act and Court-fee has to be paid on the market value of the house. A. I. R. 1947 Bombay 482 followed. IT thus appears that the consensus of opinion is that in such a suit whi- ch as I have found in view of the substantial nature of the suit that the relief for possession ought to have been asked for Court-fees have to be paid on the market value of the subject-matter and the subject- matter is the property itself. In a suit by a licensor from a licensee who is in possession of the immoveable property after the termination of the revocation of licence Court-fees have to be paid on the market value of the said immoveable property. In the instant case plaintiffs have paid only the fixed Court-fees for this purpose stating that it falls within Ar- ticle 23 (f) Schedule II of the Act. It will really not fall within that Article but it will fall within sec. 6 (v) of the Act. For moveables also the Court-fees have to be paid according to the market value of the moveables as contemplated by sec. 6 (iii) of the Act. ( 14 ) MR. Nanavati appearing for the plaintiff has contended that this Court cannot interfere with the impugned order passed by the trial Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as question regarding payment of Court-fees is a matter between the State and the plaintiffs. Defendants cannot challenge ally such valuation made by the plaintiffs. It is significant to note that the defendants have challenged this valuation not only for the purposes of Court-fees but if their contention is accep- ted the jurisdiction of the trial Court will be ousted. If the Court-fees have to be paid on the market value of the immoveable property in ques- tion and the market value of the moveables in question and the valuation exceeds Rs. 10 0 it will be the Court of Civil Judge Senior division which will have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. ( 15 ) MR. Nanavati has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in SRI RATHNAVARMARAJA V. SMT. VIMLA. 10 0 it will be the Court of Civil Judge Senior division which will have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. ( 15 ) MR. Nanavati has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in SRI RATHNAVARMARAJA V. SMT. VIMLA. AIR 1961 SUPREME COURT 1299 wherein it is observed:whether proper Court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. IT is significant to note that in that very decision it has been stated in the last para of the judgment at page 1301:. . . In our view the High court grievously erred in entertaining revision applica- tion on questions of Court-fee at the instance of the defendant when no question of jurisdiction was involved. IN the instant case as said earlier question of jurisdiction is clearly involved. This Court therefore can interfere with the order passed by the learned trial Judge regarding Court-fees as it involves question of jurisdiction. IN SHAMSHER SINGH V. RAJINDER PRASHAD A. I. R. 1973 SUPREME COURT 2384 the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has been referred to at page 2386 and in that context it is observed:. . THE ratio of that decision was that no revision on a question of Court-fee lay where no question or jurisdiction was involved. This decision was correctly interpre- ted by the KARALA HIGH COURT IN VASU V. CHAKKI MANI A. I. R. 1962 KERALA 84 where it was pointed out that no revision will lie against the decision on the question of adequacy of Court-fee at the instance of the defendant. . . . unless the question of Court-fee involves also the question jurisdiction of the Court. ( 16 ) IN SANATKUMAR BHIKHABHAI PATEL V. THE STATE OF GUJARAT 8 GUJARAT LAW REPORTER 946 Sarela. J. has observed:when in the decision relating to the proper Court-fees the question of jurisdiction of Court to try the suit is involved the party affected by the decision would be an aggrieved party and would be entitled to approach the High Court in revision under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 17 ) IN CHANDRAKANT RATANSHI KOTHARI V. RATANSHI DAMJI KOTHARI A. I. R. 1971 GUJARAT 55 I had to deal with a converse case. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 17 ) IN CHANDRAKANT RATANSHI KOTHARI V. RATANSHI DAMJI KOTHARI A. I. R. 1971 GUJARAT 55 I had to deal with a converse case. I have observed therein:where the Court has wrongly decided that the plaintiff has not paid adequate Court-fees on his plaint and has demanded additional Court-fee the plaintiff can move the High Court which can interfere with the order in the exercise of its revi- sional jurisdiction under sec. 115 of the Code. At page 58 I have observed:. . . IF the plaintiff does not pay the deficit Court-fees ordered by the trial Court under order 7 Rule 11 clause (c) of the Civil Procedure Code the plaint can be rejected. In a case like the instant case where the plaint was not rejected on that ground and the Court had proceeded to a further stage and 11ad framed the issues if the proper Court-fees are not paid the suit will be liable to be dismissed. The consequence would be that by such a wrong decision of the Court. the plaintiff will not get the relief to which he may be entitled. The net result would therefore be that by such an order the Court would be refusing to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. It is thus evident that this objection taken by Mr. Nanavati is untenable. ( 18 ) MR. Y. B. Bhatt learned Assistant Government Pleader who appeared in response to the notice issued by this Court supported the submissions made by Mr. B. R. Shah for defendant No. 1-firm and further submitted that this Court should direct the trial Court to make an inquiry regarding the correct valuation as contemplated by sec. 8 of the Act. That sec. 8 of the Act reads:if the Court is of opinion that the subject matter of any suit has been wrongly valued or if an application is made to the Court for the revision of any valuation made the Court may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation and may hold such inquiry as it thinks fit for such purpose. MR. Bhatt has submitted that in case of dispute regarding the market value of the subject-matter of the suit an inquiry will have to be made as contemplated by sec. 5 of the Act. ( 19 ) REVISION petition therefore succeeds. ( 20 ) REVISION petition is allowed. MR. Bhatt has submitted that in case of dispute regarding the market value of the subject-matter of the suit an inquiry will have to be made as contemplated by sec. 5 of the Act. ( 19 ) REVISION petition therefore succeeds. ( 20 ) REVISION petition is allowed. The trial Courts order dismissing application. Ex. 26. is set aside and the trial Court is directed to make an inquiry regarding the correct valuation of the subject-matter of the suit which is to be made on the basis of the market value of the immoveable properly as contemplated by sec. 6 (v) of the Act and for the moveables as contemplated by sec. 6 (iii) of the Act. After determining the correct value take proper action in accordance with law on finding that the trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Plaintiffs opponents Nos. 1 to 3 are directed to pay the costs of the petitioner- defendant No. 1 in this revision petition and bear their own. Other parties are directed to bear their own costs in this revision petition. Rule is made absolute. .