( 1 ) THE petitioner in the above writ petition is the 1st respondent in MA. 37 of 1972 on the file of the Dist Judge, Belgaum. The said appeal was preferred by respondents 1 and 2 herein before the Dist Judge, Belgaum, against the order d. 25-4-1972 passed by the Asst Commr, Bailhongal, in wtn/ap/9/1971 in favour of the petitioner under the provisions of S. 3 (1) cf the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The appeal was filed on 19-10-1972. Along with the appeal, an application was filed by the appellants therein under S. 5 of the Limitation act requesting the Dist Judge to condone the delay in preferring it. It was also pleaded that as the appellants before the Dist Judge did not have knowledge of the order passed by the Asst Commr till 26-9-1972, the appeal filed on 19-10-1972 was in time. In support of the latter contention, the appellants before the Dist Judge produced an affidavit sworn to by their Counsel Shri D. H. Nyamsgoudar who had appeared on their behalf before the Asst Commr. In that affidavit Sri D. H. Nayamagoudar stated that the case was heard by the Asst, Commr on 25-4-1972 and the order was not prounounced in his presence. No date was given in his presence by the asst Commr for the pronouncement of the order. It was further stated that after the arguments in the case were over, the Asst Commr took up another case for hearng. Thinking that the order would be pronounced on a subsequent date and the communication of the same would be sent to him or to his clients, he left the Court Hall of the Asst Commr. As he was not able to know the result of the case before the Assst Commr till 10-9-1972, he wrote a letter to the Asst Commr to intimate him the result of the case. In reply to the said latter, the Asst Commr wrote a letter on 26-9-1972 stating that the appeal had been disposed of on 25-4-1972 itself. On the basis of the above statements made by the learned Counsel in the affidavit, it was contended before the Dist Judge that prior to 26-9-1972 neither the petitioner nor his Counsel had notice of the pronouncement of the order which was under appeal. On the basis of the above statements made by the learned Counsel in the affidavit, it was contended before the Dist Judge that prior to 26-9-1972 neither the petitioner nor his Counsel had notice of the pronouncement of the order which was under appeal. The learned Dist Judge on the basis of the material placed before him came to the conclusion that the appellants before, him neither knew that an order had been passed against them nor had any opportunity to know that such an order had been passed until 26-9-1972. He therefore held that the appeal was in time. In view of that finding, the question of considering the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, did not arise. This writ petition is presented against the order passed by the dist Judge holding that the appeal was in time. ( 2 ) SHRI W. K. Joshi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the appeal which had been filed beyond 90 days from 25-4-1972 on which date the order was passed by the Asst Commr, should have been held to be barred by time. In support of his contention, he relied on sub-sec (2) of S. 3 of the Act which stated that a person aggrieved by any decision given under sub-sec (1) might file an appeal to the Dist, Judge of the Dist within 90 days of such decision He argued that the time would begin to run from the date of the order and not from the date on which the party against whom it was pronounced came to know of the existence of the order. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Majali Group grama Vividha Udeshagala Sahakari Sangh v. Viswanath Vamanrao Kulkarni, WP. 1440 71 d. 9-10-73, in which, it was held that under the provisions of the Co-operative societies Act and the Rules made thereunder, the time for preferring the appeal would begin to run from the date on which it was delivered and not from the date on which the party was informed about pronouncement of the order cr had an opportunity to know that such an order had been passed. Another decision on which reliance was placed by Mr W. K. Joshi was tho decision in G. R. Nanjundaswami v. MSTAT, (1971) 2 Myslj. Another decision on which reliance was placed by Mr W. K. Joshi was tho decision in G. R. Nanjundaswami v. MSTAT, (1971) 2 Myslj. 315 , (2), in which it had been held by a Divn Bench of this Court that under S 64a of the Motor vehicles Act, a revision petition had to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order was passed by the authority below and not from the date on which the aggrieved party came to know of the existence of such order. The latter decision is distinguishable from the facts of the present case, on two grounds. First, S G4a deals with the rcvisional power of a superior authority but not with the right of appeal of a party. Secondly in that case the Divn Bench relied upon the decision in Municipal Board, pushkar v. State Transport Authority, AIR. 1965 SC. 458, in which, on a consideration of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Supreme Court had held that the time for filing a revision petition under S 61a of the Act began to run iron the date on which the order was passed by the lower authority. We do not have in the Act provisions similar to the provisions in the Motor vehicles Act. Hence no assistance can be derived by the petitioner from the above decision. ( 3 ) I am of the view that the case on hand is governed by the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, in Raja Harish. Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR. 1961 SC. 1500. In para 6 of the said decision, P. B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed as follows :"there is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair-play and natural justice the expression " the date of the award " used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words " from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to S. 18 in a literal or mechanical way. " ( 4 ) FOLLOWING the above decision, a Divn Bench of this Court in Venkakaramaiah v. Narayana Sastry, (1969) 2 Myslj. 204, has held in a case arising under the provisions of the Karnataka (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, that in so far as an appeal filed under S. 28 (l) of that Act was concerned, the time for filing the appeal had to be reckoned from the date on which the appellant came to know of the order appealed against or had opportunity to know that such an order had been passed and not from the date on which it was signed by the Officer who made it. In reaching the said conclusion, the Divn Bench also relied upon another decision of the supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jhan Begum, AIR, 1963 SC. 1604. In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court and in Venkataramaiah's case (5), it has to be held that the decision in the case of Majali Group Grama Vididha udeshagaia Sahakari Sangha (1) on the question of limitation is no[ good law. In interpreting the provision of the Act relating to limitation as explained by the Supreme Court in Raja Harishchandra's case (4), the Court will not be exposed to the criticism that it is doing so on equitable considerations. The Legislature could not have intended whilej enacting S. 3 (2) of the Act that time wo-uld begin to run against a party although he had neither the knowledge nor an opportunity to know that an order had been passed against him. The interpretation placed by the Dist Judge is strictly in accordance with law. ( 5 ) THE learned Dist Judge was therefore right in holding that in the case before him the time for preferring the appeal under S. 3 (2) of the Act commenced to run from 26-9-1972 and that the appeal was in time. The writ petition therefore fails and it is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .