Judgment B.D.SINGH, J. 1. The application in C W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the Motipur Sugar Factory (Private) Ltd. is directed against the order dated 5th April, 1971 (Annexure 1) passed by the Presiding Officer. Labour Court (respondent No. 2) whereby he held that dismissal of Rikhdeo Prasad (respondent No. 1) by the petitioner was illegal and, therefore, he ordered the petitioner to reinstate respondent No. 1 from the date of his dismissal with half of the wages for the idle period, without any break in his service. In the petition the petitioner has, therefore prayed for quashing the impugned order contained under Annexure T. The application in C. W. J. C. No. 986 of 1971 by Rikhdeo Prasad (respondent No. 1) in C. W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the portion of the same order dated 5th April, 1971, which has been passed by the said Presiding Officer, Labour Court, wherein he held that Rikhdeo Prasad though ordered to be reinstated would be entitled only to half of the wages for the idle period. It should be made clear that in this application the petitioner is aggrieved only with this portion of the order. According to the petitioner if he was ordered to be reinstated, he was entitled to the full salary and by the said order he ought to have held that he was entitled to all privileges as if he was not dismissed. In this application, the Presiding Officer has been impleaded as respondent No. 1 whereas the Motipur Sugar Factory (Private) Ltd., has been impleaded as respondent No. 2. It may be noticed that respondent No. 2 is the petitioner in the other case referred to above. Since both these applications have arisen out of the same order, and parties being the same both the applications were heard together and this common judgment will govern both of them. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved it would be necessary to state some relevant facts out of the application in C. W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved it would be necessary to state some relevant facts out of the application in C. W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971. The petitioner In that case is a private limited company incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 (hereinafter to be called petitioners company for the sake of brevity) and owns a Sugar Factory at Motipur, where it is engaged in the business of manufacturing white crystal sugar through vacuum pan process from crushing of sugar-cane boiling and clarifying the juice, subjecting it to double sulphitation and corboonation etc., till white crystal sugar is obtained and bagged which is thereafter marketed. The petitioner company requires every year about forty to fifty lac maunds of sugar-cane and for the purpose of its supply maintains a farm of its own and also purchases it from about thirty thousand cultivators. To ensure regular and sufficient supply to sugarcane of good quality the company encourages local cultivators to raise sugarcane. through a system of making advance in cash or kind of the value of over ten lakhs rupees a year. The advance in kind is comprised of sugarcane seed, manure, fertilizer insecticides etc. The sugarcane seed is supplied to a cultivator either from the companys own farm or through a grower of sugarcane seed of the requisite quality. To obtain an advance of sugar-cane seed a cultivator has to make an application to the petitionercompanys cane ineharge (also called centre incharge). The application of such cultivators is enquired into by the companys purji distributor for the area concerned who, if he finds the application in order puts his signature on it in token of it. The application thus after having been checked by the purji distributor is put up before the cane incharge who prepares an order slip in the form prescribed by petitioners company naming and directing a grower to supply the stated quantity of sugarcane seed on companys account to the cultivator named in the order slip The cane incharge simultaneously enters the details of the order slip in a register called Kind Advance Distribution Register. The order slip is signed either by the cane ineharge or the companys cane development Officer and is delivered to the cultivator against his signature or thumb mark on the Kind Advance Distribution Register. The order slip is signed either by the cane ineharge or the companys cane development Officer and is delivered to the cultivator against his signature or thumb mark on the Kind Advance Distribution Register. The cultivator obtains his supplies from the grower concerned and endorses a receipt thereof, and puts his signature or thumb mark at the back of the order-slip, and hands over the order slip to the grower. The grower in due course presents the order slip for encashment to the cane ineharge. who either himself, or through the agency of the purji distributor, verifies whether the seed was actually planted by the cultivator or not. If the verification is by the purji distributor he puts his signature on the orderslip to signify that he has checked and found it in order. Thereafter the cane incharge puts his signature on the orderslip in token of everything being in order, and forwards it to the cane development officer, who then endorses it to the Cane Acountant to check and pay. In case of a number of order slips on the cane grower presented in a bunch the cane development officer usually makes this endorsement only on the topmost slip indicating the number of slips in the bunch. The Account Office maintains a register called Kind Advance Payment Register. The Cane Accountant checks the order slip, directs one of his ledger clerks to draw up the account of the concerned grower in respect of the order slips presented and to make the necessary postings in the kind advance payment register. The register thus posted is brought before the cane accountant, and he after satisfying himself that everything was in order obtains the signature or thumb impression as the case may be of the supplier in token of receipt of payment, and there after payment is got made through one of his subordinates. The amount thus paid to the grower is debited to the account of the cultivator, who has taken the kind advance and in due course is adjusted against the price of sugar-cane supplied by him during the crushing season. 3. Rikhdeo Prasad respondent No. 1 and petitioner in C. W. J. C. No. 986 of 1971. The amount thus paid to the grower is debited to the account of the cultivator, who has taken the kind advance and in due course is adjusted against the price of sugar-cane supplied by him during the crushing season. 3. Rikhdeo Prasad respondent No. 1 and petitioner in C. W. J. C. No. 986 of 1971. during the relevant period was working as oane accountant of the petitioners company and shortly before he was charge-sheeted for having committed some irregularities and he was transferred to the account section of the head office. During the season 1965-66 it came to the notice of the management of the petitioners company that large amounts on account of the kind advance, were not getting adjusted, as normally they were expected to and this feature induced the management to probe into the working of the kind advance section and, in course of the said probe several cases of acts of fraud and dishonesty as alleged by the petitioners companv in paragraph 7 of the application on the part of some employees or other connected with the kind of advance including misappropriation of the companys fund amounting to Rupees 2,000/- in respect of three specific order slips came to light. The said order slips referred to above were: 1. Order slip No. 1159 dated 25-9-1963 (Ext. 5/B). 2. Order slip No. 12347 dated 28/30-1- 1964 (Ext. 5). 3. Order slip No. 1347 dated 6-2-1964 (Ext. 5/A). 4. In so far as Ext. 5/B is concerned it purported to be in the name of one Lalbihari Singh to supply cane seed to the extent of 200 maunds valued at Rs. 400/- to one Bankey Tiwary of Sadanpura. As only a measure cane supply appeared in the books the management suspected some foul play and. the first step that was taken was to enquire of Lal Bihari Singh as to how much cane seed he had supplied to Banke Tiwary and if so how was it that the order slip did not bear the signature of the concerned purji distributor in token of his having verified about the cane seed supplied. Lal Bihari Singh denied to have supplied any cane seed to Bankey Tiwary and also denied having received anv amount in respect thereof. He characterised his purported signature in the kind advance payment register in token of having received money as a forgery. Lal Bihari Singh denied to have supplied any cane seed to Bankey Tiwary and also denied having received anv amount in respect thereof. He characterised his purported signature in the kind advance payment register in token of having received money as a forgery. Enquiries made from Nageshwar Pd. the relevant ledger clerk revealed that it was respondent No. 1 the cane accountant who had handed over to him the offending order slip as also the kind advance payment register to draw up account in respect of the order slip in the name of Lal Bihari Singh, and there after made posting in the payment register. On clarification being sought from Rikhdeo Prasad he denied all connection with the withdrawing or misappropriating a sum of Rs. 400/- in respect of the order slip standing in the. name of Lal Bihari Singh. Further enquiry made during the domestic inquiry against respondent No. 1 brought out that Bankey Tiwary had no land on which he could have grown sugar-cane and he had never taken any seed from Lal Bihari Singh and that the actual cash was collected by a clever strategem through one Bhuneshwar ar agent of respondent No. 1 and one Moti Singh. According to the cane development officer the final authority to order payment in respect of the seed supplies orders for payment without going through any formalities used to be made by him whenever respondent No. 1 personally approached with his recommendation. Order slip No. 12347 dated 28/30-th January, 1964 was in the name of Bijoy Kumar Pd. Sahi one of the big suppliers of the cane seed in respect of 400 mds. of cane seed on companys account to one Parasnath Tiwary of village Bankat. Corresponding entries in the kind advance payment register showed that Bijoy Kumar Pd. Sahi had been paid a sum of Rs. 800/- in respect of this order slip. When Parasnath supplied no cane and the entire value of the kind advanced to him under the aforesaid order slip remained outstanding, the management started enquiries. Jagarnath Singh the purji distributor of the area which included Bankat, disclosed that no such person as Parasnath Tiwary existed in the village, and that he had put his signature on the relative application at the instance of respondent No. 1. At the departmental enquiry against respondent No. 1 one Parasnath Tiwary of village Sadanpur was examined. Jagarnath Singh the purji distributor of the area which included Bankat, disclosed that no such person as Parasnath Tiwary existed in the village, and that he had put his signature on the relative application at the instance of respondent No. 1. At the departmental enquiry against respondent No. 1 one Parasnath Tiwary of village Sadanpur was examined. He has stated that he had no land and that he had never applied for any 6eed advance and there was no occasion for the same. The order slip No. 13473, dated the 6th February, 1964, was also not in the name of Vijaya Kumar Pd. Sahi for supply of cane seed to Bindeshwari Tiwary of village Nanha. Corresponding entries in the kind advance payment register showed payment in respect of Rs. 800/- of this order slip. When no cane supply was made by Bindeshwari Tiwary the management started probing into the matter, and enquiries made either before the commencement of the departmental enquiry or at the departmental enquiry itself, revealed that that there was no such person called Bindeshwari Tiwary in village Nanha, and no such person had ever applied for advance, and that the order slip on the face of it showed that it had not been subjected to the usual checking before payment was made. The management of the petitioner company ultimately came to the conclusion that it was a fit case in which respondent No. 1 Rikhdeo Pd. should be formally called upon to explain the allegations against him and accordingly following charge- sheet dated 18th April, 1967, was served upon him. "It has come to the notice of the management that you Shri Rikhdeo Pd. a cane accountant of the Motipur Sugar Factory alone and/or in combination with certain employees of the factory and/or others have fraudulently and dishonestly misappropriated or caused to be misappropriated by false and fraudulent recommendation and devices and/or otherwise various sums of money belonging to the company amounting to Rs. 2,000/-. a cane accountant of the Motipur Sugar Factory alone and/or in combination with certain employees of the factory and/or others have fraudulently and dishonestly misappropriated or caused to be misappropriated by false and fraudulent recommendation and devices and/or otherwise various sums of money belonging to the company amounting to Rs. 2,000/-. You are hereby called upon to explain in writing within one week of the receipt of this charge-sheet by you why strict disciplinary action under the companys certified standing orders should not be taken against you." The explanation submitted by respondent No. 1 having been found unsatisfactory a departmental enquiry was instituted under the provision of the standing order of the petitioner-company and the enquiry officer after having held a full and fair enquiry found Rikhdeo Pd. guilty of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, the petitioner-company dismissed him from service with effect from 22nd July, 1968. Thereafter he preferred an appeal to the management as provided for under the certified standing order of the petitioner- company, and on the failure of the said appeal Rikhdeo Pd. filed a complaint petition before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Muzaffarpur, respondent No. 2 on the 12th August, 1968, under Section 26 (21 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act. 1953 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The complaint application was registered as B. S. E. Case No. 16 of 1968. The petitioner-company on the other hand challenged the maintainability of the complaint petition filed by Rikhdeo Pd. mainly on the ground that he being a worker within the meaning of the term in Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 , was excluded from the category of an "employee" as defined in Section 2 (4) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953. The objection to the maintainability of the complaint was however rejected by respondent No. 2 by his order dated the 10th December, 1968. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner moved this court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the said application in this court I was registered as C. W. J. C. No. 10 of 1969, which was disposed of by an order dated the 21st March, 1969. This Court was pleased to set aside the order dated the 10th December, 1968. This Court was pleased to set aside the order dated the 10th December, 1968. and remand the case to the Labour Court to decide all the questions involved in the case, either on merits or in relation to the question whether respondent No. 1 was or was not a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. On remand, the petitioner-company filed their written statement, on the merits of the case reiterating therein their earlier objection to the maintainability of the complaint petition. During the course of hearing in the light of the evidence oral and documentary produced by the parties relevant to the charges levelled against Rikhdeo Pd. the petitioner-company further produced before respondent No. 2 some additional facts in order to establish the irregularities committed by Rikhdeo Pd. and in order to show that there were additional grounds or reasons for his dismissal. Those additional three grounds are stated in paragraph 22 of the application under sub-heads fal. (b) and (c) which read thus "(a) Though neither respondent No. 1 nor his son Sashibhusan had any land in village Bhariahi, the former by adopting fraudulent means has been persistently taking kind advances in the name of his son in respect of non-existent lands and was thereby deliberately jeopardising the interest of the company. (b) In several instances with a view to obtain illegal payments in the name of his son respondent No. 1. had forged his sons signature on the Kind Advance Distribution Register as also on the Kind Advance Payment Register. (c) His own lands situate in village Sadanpura were allowed by him to be measured in the name of different persons wholly unconnected with the land for the purpose of obtaining as large a share of kind advance as possible without undertaking any responsibility for repayment and thereby jeopardising the interest of the company." 5. (c) His own lands situate in village Sadanpura were allowed by him to be measured in the name of different persons wholly unconnected with the land for the purpose of obtaining as large a share of kind advance as possible without undertaking any responsibility for repayment and thereby jeopardising the interest of the company." 5. In paragraph 24 of the application it was stated that as cane accountant the duties of respondent No. 1 inter alia were to keep and supervise the accounts in relation to the supply of sugar cane to the factory, and in relation to the advance in cash or kind to the grower, with a view to ensure adequate and regular supply of cane, and he was thus a person who was employed in work which was necessarily incidental to or connected with sugarcane, which formed the subject of manufacturing process in the petitioners factory. Even while working in the account section respondent No. 1 continued to hold the designation of Cane accountant and the duties performed by him there also continued to be connected with or incidental to the subject of manufacturing process though at higher level. After hearing the parties, the complaint petition of respondent No. 4 was allowed by the Labour Court by its order dated the 5th April. 1971 and Rikhdeo Pd. was ordered to be reinstated with half wages for the idle period. 6. Mr. K. D. Chatterji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-company in C. W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971 and on behalf of the respondent No. 2 in C. W. J. C. No. 986 of 1971 has assailed the impugned order in its entirety and contended on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that no order should have been passed by the Presiding Officer directing Rikhdeo Pd. to be reinstated and therefore according to him any order regarding the payment of back salary for the idle period was equally bad. Mr. Chatterji has raised the following points for consideration by this court. (i) Rikhdeo Pd. was not an employee within the* definition of Section 2 (4) of the Act. According to him he was a worker within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 . Mr. Chatterji has raised the following points for consideration by this court. (i) Rikhdeo Pd. was not an employee within the* definition of Section 2 (4) of the Act. According to him he was a worker within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 . (ii) The Labour Court has failed to decide the relevant issue for the purpose of determining whether there was reasonable cause within the meaning of Section 26 of the Act. According to him under the law of master and servant reasonable cause is not confined only to the grounds known to the employee at the time of taking action, but also discovered subsequently. Learned counsel emphasised that Section 26 of the Act did not abrogate the law of master and servant. (iii) Reasonable cause not having been defined it does not mean proved to the hilt as in a criminal charge. If the materials before the employers are sufficient then he has reasonable cause to discharge the workman. (iv) Reinstatement must not be ordered mechanically. The question of loss of confidence of the employer is a very material factor. 7. It will be convenient to take up point No. 1 first. Mr. Chatterji in this connection drew our attention to Section 2 (4) of the Act which reads thus: " employee means a person wholly or partially employed for his wages including salary or commission in, and in connection with any establishment and includes apprentice but does not include a member of the employers family. It also includes persons employed in a factory who are not workers within the meaning of the Factory Act (LXII of 1948) and who are not working in managerial capacity and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act includes an employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched for any reason whatsoever." 8. In order to establish that Rikhdeo Pd, was a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. learned counsel referred to Section 2 (11 of the Factories Act which is to this effect: " Worker means a person employed directly or through an agency whether for wages or not in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of manufacturing process." Mr. Chatterji emphasised that since Rikhdeo Pd. was a worker as per definition of Section 2 (11 of the Factories Act any order passed by the Presiding Officer under Section 26 of the Act was without his jurisdiction and thus the complaint petition of Rikhdeo Pd. was not maintainable. 9. In our opinion the main question to be decided is as to whether Rikhdeo Pd. was performing his duties connected with manufacturing process or the subject of manufacturing process at the relevant time. Mr. Chatterji has drawn our attention to paragraph 72 of the impugned order where the finding of the Presiding Officer in this regard which reads thus: "............ The subject of manufacturing process in this particular case was sugar and not cane. Cane may be the object, but not the subject of manufacturing process. To substantiate this point reliance may be placed on a ruling reported in AIR 1961 Bom 184 wherein it has been held that definition of the "worker" which includes "work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process means work connected with the article which is produced while the process of manufacturing as defined in the act is going on in connection with that article. The subject of the manufacturing process, therefore is sugar and the cane department or the accountant of the cane department cannot be held to be performing any act incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process of the subject in question. Mr. Chatterji contended that the Presiding Officer has erred in holding that the subject-matter of the manufacturing process in the particular case was the sugar. In our opinion due to that error his entire order cannot be vitiated. The point to be decided in this case still remains as to whether the petitioners duties as mentioned above were connected with the manufacturing process or subject of manufacturing process. To answer that it will be necessary to find, as to when in the particular case the manufacturing process had begun, which according to us depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case as well as on the nature of the work which the particular company is performing and the duties entrusted to the worker at the time when charges were served on him. Mr. Mr. Chatterji in order to substantiatte his point that the subject-matter of manufacturing in the petitioners company was sugarcane and since Rikhdeo Pd was working within the precincts of the factory he was a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. M. P. Singh, ( AIR 1960 SC 569 ) wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Coutt observed that diverse provision of the Factories Act, 1948, are intended to benefit only workers employed in a factory i. e., in the precincts or premises of a factory. Field workers who are employed in guiding supervising and controlling the growth and supply of sugarcane to be used in a sugar factory are not employed either in the precincts of the factory or in the premises of the factory; and if these workers are not employed in a factory the provisions of the Factories Act 1948 do not apply to them and they fall within the definition of Commercial establishment in Section 2 (3). On the basis of the above observation he contended that the subject-matter of the petitioners company in the present case would be sugar-cane. No doubt in that case their Lordships held that the field workers would not be termed as workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and they were not working within the precincts of the company but he emphasised that in the present case Rikhdeo Pd. was working within the precincts of the company and the subjectmatter being sugarcane and not sugar he was also a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. In our opinion from that alone it cannot be held that Rikhdeo Pd. was a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. In order to establish the fact it has to be found in the instant case when the manufacturing process starts. Besides all the workers cannot be termed as workers even within the precincts unless it is established that they are incidental to or connected with manufacturing process or subject of manufacturing process. Therefore according to us the above observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is of no avail to decide the present issue, involved. No doubt broadly speaking the subject-matter will be sugarcane in the present case. Therefore according to us the above observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court is of no avail to decide the present issue, involved. No doubt broadly speaking the subject-matter will be sugarcane in the present case. As mentioned earlier the Presiding Officer has held that the subject-matter was sugar was not correct but none the less without deciding the issues referred to above it cannot be said that Rikhdeo Pd. was a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. 10. Mr. Chatterji also drew our attention to the observation made in the case of Abdul Latif v. Karmat Ali, (1962) 2 Lab LJ 335 (All) wherein Mithan Lal, J., of the Allahabad High Court observed that keeping of accounts of a factory is a work incidental to the manufacturing process and so an accountant or munim is definitely covered by the definition of "worker". Where services of such accountant were not terminated soon after the stoppage of the manufacturing process and till the date of transfer of factory to another person his status as a "worker" for the purposes of the Factories Act could not be taken away by the closure of the factory. It may be noticed that the above case was also cited before the Presiding Officer, namely respondent No. 2 as it appears from the impugned order. Reference may be made to paragraph 76 of the order. Respondent No. 2, in our opinion, has rightly distinguished that case on facts. As in the present case as found by the Presiding Officer respondent No. 1 was not a factory accountant and he did not keep accounts of the factory. He simply dealt with sugarcanes of the cane department. The register of the adult workers (Ext. 1) clearly indicated that another person was accountant of the factory. That other person was shri Sinha who did accounts work pertaining to manufacturing side and therefore it cannot be held that Rikhdeo Pd. was the worker as defined under the Factories Act. The finding of the Presiding Officer regarding the duties entrusted to Rikhdeo Pd. is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with by us in a writ jurisdiction. The duties entrusted to Rikhdeo Pd. was the worker as defined under the Factories Act. The finding of the Presiding Officer regarding the duties entrusted to Rikhdeo Pd. is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with by us in a writ jurisdiction. The duties entrusted to Rikhdeo Pd. even prior to his transfer to other department clearly indicated that they were not incidental to or connected with manufacturing process or subject of the manufacturing process much less after he was transferred to other department. 11. On behalf of the petitioner another case of the Supreme Court has been cited in Works Manager Central Rly. v. Bishwanath, ( AIR 1970 SC 488 ). corresponding ( (1969) 3 SCC 95 ). This case has also been referred to and distinguished in the impugned order. In our opinion the facts of that case were entirely different from the facts of the instant case, and there works entrusted were different from those entrusted to Rikhdeo Pd. It may be noticed that in that case the respondents, who were time keepers prepared paysheets of workshop staff maintained leave account, disposed of settlement cases, maintained records for statistical purposes, maintained attendance of staff, job card particulars of the various jobs under operation and time sheets of the staff working on various shops dealing with the production of the railway sparewparts and repairs etc. Some head time keepers were entrusted with the task of supervising the work of other respondents. Their Lordships had held that the definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, does not exclude employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fell within the definition of the word "worker", keeping in view the duties and function of the respondents the respondent of that case fell within the definition of the word "worker". It may be seen that in the instant case the duties which were entrusted to Rikhdeo Pd. could also be gathered from the statement of the petitioner company itself in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the application in this court. Besides, the Presiding Officer after perusing the evidence and hearing the parties has summarised the duties of Rikhdeo Pd. in paragraph 56 of his order. could also be gathered from the statement of the petitioner company itself in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the application in this court. Besides, the Presiding Officer after perusing the evidence and hearing the parties has summarised the duties of Rikhdeo Pd. in paragraph 56 of his order. It will be convenient to extract the passages which reads thus: "He was Cane Accountant and his duty was to prepare vouchers in the evening after the transactions were completed and payments were made." Further what duties he was entrusted with, could also be gathered from the charge-sheet, which has already been quoted. Besides, by reference to paragraph 3 of the impugned order it is clear that the petitioner also did not treat respondent No. 1 as a factory worker. Under Section 61 of the Factories Act every factory has to maintain a notice of periods of work for adults and under Section 62 they have to maintain a register of adult workers. Ext. 1 is the entry in the register of adult workers from 1966-67 to 1968-69, but the name of respondent No. 1 does not appear in it. Ext. 2 is the pay role for 1966-67 but in this document also the name of respondent No. 1 is missing. In this regard it will also be relevant to refer to the evidence of Shri Moti Singh, management witness No, 2. Obviously he was a witness of the company, who stated about the duties of respondent No. 1. He has stated the procedure how the cane growers are paid price of the cane seeds which they supplied to the cultivator on behalf of the petitioner-company. On the order slip the cane manager or the cane development officer puts his signature and thereafter the cashier of the company makes payment. The seed amount is recorded by him, in the kind advance register in the name of the cultivator, who was supplied with the seed by the registered grower on behalf of the company. In paragraph 8 he further stated that kind advance register was sent every evening to respondent No. 1 for preparation of payment voucher. Therefore from his evidence it is clear that the work of respondent No. 1 was much prior to manufacturing process. Besides his duties were not Incidental to or connected with facturing process or subject of manufacturing (process. 12. Therefore from his evidence it is clear that the work of respondent No. 1 was much prior to manufacturing process. Besides his duties were not Incidental to or connected with facturing process or subject of manufacturing (process. 12. On behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner however attention was drawn to para. 72 of the impugned order concerning the duties of respondent No. I. wherein it is stated that as cane accountant he used to write R. G. 4, cane account register, cash book journal, pay roll of cane department, monthly trial balance of the cane department and other registers relating to the cane department. In our opinion that would not make any difference as the Presiding Officer in the same paragraph 72 has clearly mentioned the fact that cane department is distinct and separate from the factory office is borne out from the document of the management. Ext. 3. Besides as mentioned earlier the accounts pertaining to manufacturing side was dealt with by another clerk Sanobarwalla as found by the Presiding Officer in paragraph 73 of the impugned order. Reference may also be made in this regard to paragraph 74 of the finding given by the Presiding Officer wherein it is mentioned that service cards Exts. E to H/23 purporting to the service of the employees working under Shops and Establishments Act are mentioned under the rules framed therein. Those cards were in the name of several employees but the service card of respondent No. 1 was not there. From that it cannot be inferred by any stretch of imagination that respondent No. 1 was a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. It might just be possible that the service card of respondent No. 1 was withheld by the management as there was no evidence to show that the service card of respondent No. 1 under the said Act was never prepared by the management. In order to ascertain as to when manufacturing process would begin in the instant case and whether the duties of respondent No. 1 was such as to treat him a worker within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act. Mr. In order to ascertain as to when manufacturing process would begin in the instant case and whether the duties of respondent No. 1 was such as to treat him a worker within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act. Mr. Chatterji, learned counsel for the petitioner-company contended that in the instant case the cultivators w ould grow sugarcane after obtaining seeds from the registered growers on behalf of the petitioner-company and after the sugar-cane were harvested and they were placed in a truck to be carried to the petitioner-company it would be deemed that manufacturing process has commenced, and in that view of the matter the work entrusted to respondent No. 1 for the preparation of payment vouchers with regard to the seeds supplied to the cultivators would be incidental to the manufacturing process and therefore respondent No. 1 would be a worker within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act. In our opinion this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner company is not tenable. Reference may be made to the case of Shree Gopal Paper Mills Ltd. v. Inspector of Factories, ( AIR 1969 All 547 = (1969 Lab IC 1323)), where their Lordships observed that packing in the widest sense means any kind of wrapping up or tying up of goods. But the packing referred to in Sectioa 2 (k) (i) is not meant to be interpreted so widely. The packing that is aimed at in S. 2 (k) (i) is the packing of the finished manufactured Article which is done to facilitate or make possible its sale or transport for sale to customers. The form of packing is in effect the last operation in the series of operations that taken together constitute the manufacture of the article for sale. Many kinds of raw materials have to be packed for delivery to the factory by being placed in sacks baskets or packing cases or by being tied into bundles, but it cannot foe said that the Legislature intended that such preliminary packing of the raw material should be treated as manufacturing process. Moreover the mere transport of the raw material to the factory is not in itself manufacturing process as defined in Section 2 (k) (i). Moreover the mere transport of the raw material to the factory is not in itself manufacturing process as defined in Section 2 (k) (i). The operation of bailing grass with the aid of manually operated bailing processes for being sent to a paper mill as raw material is not a manufacturing process" and hence the depot wherein this process is carried on is not "factory" within the meaning of Section 2 (m). Reference may also foe made to the case of Ramlanshan Jafeshar v. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1961 Bom 184 ), where Chainani and Tarkunde. JJ. observed that the words "work ........ connected with ......... the subject of the manufacturing process" in Section 2 (1) mean work connected with the article which was produced while any process of manufacture as defined in the Act was going on in connection with that article. Distribution or transport of an article after it was manufactured was not a manufacturing process. Such work could not also be said to foe incidental to or connected with a manufacturing process. Consequently, employment in such work would not bring the employee within the definition of "worker". The more appropriate case which throws some light on the issues involved, in the instant case, has to be found in A. M. Chinniah, 786 Sangu Soap Works, Kattumavadi Road Arantangi, ( AIR 1957 Mad 755 ) where his Lordship observed that it would depend upon the circumstance of each case whether a particular business carried on came within the definition of "manufacturing process". To constitute a manufacture there must foe transformation. Mere Labour bestowed on an article even if the labour was applied through machinery would not make it a manufacture unless it had progressed so far that transformation ensued and the article became commercially known as another, and different article, from that as which it began its existence. His Lordship further held that a person working in the soap works as a carpenter and preparing the packing cases could foe included as a worker because he might legitimately foe considered to be engaged in a kind of work incidental to or connected with the subject of the manufacturing process, viz.. packing of soaps for being sent out for sales. packing of soaps for being sent out for sales. The fact that he might have been a casual labourer would make no difference because to enable a person to be a worker, it might be that he might receive wages upon the basis of time work or it may be that he might receive remuneration upon the basis of piece work or he might even be apprentice or merely an honorary worker. The expression "worker" has a very wide import and would take in all those persons. But a boy found holding a tin containing paint would not come within the definition of a "worker". His being found there holding a tin of paint did not mean that he was there for the purpose of ornamentation of the packing for transport, which would come within the definition of "manufacturing process" because he was found standing outside which would certainly not be a case of doing a kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of manufacturing process. In the instant case in our opinion manufacturing process begins when the sugarcanes brought from the cultivators to the factory are placed on the cane carriers which carry them to the crushing machines. About the duties of respondent No. 1 We have already held that it cannot be said they were incidental or connected with manufacturing processes or subject of manufacturing process. After full deliberation, in our opinion Mr. Chatterjis contentions under point No. 1 fail. 13. Now we turn to consider points Nos. 2 and 3 together. In order to decide the contentions of the learned counsel under points Nos. 2 and 3 it would foe necessary to notice some of the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. Mr. Chatterji contended that "a reasonable cause" occurring in the provision of the section would also include the reasons for the dismissal of the employee which comes to light subsequent to the service of the charge-sheet on him, which have been enumerated in paragraph 22 of the application have already been mentioned above while stating the facts of the case. In this connection learned counsel contended that it is well established that the entire law of master and servant based on common law has not been abrogated, The abrogation in existence is provided by statute. In this connection learned counsel contended that it is well established that the entire law of master and servant based on common law has not been abrogated, The abrogation in existence is provided by statute. In order to find support to his contention he referred to Halsfourys Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 25 paragraph 939 at pages 487 and 488 which reads thus; "Grounds for dismissal discovered subsequently. It is not necessary that the master, dismissing a servant for good cause, should state the ground for such dismissal and provided good ground existed in fact, it is immaterial whether or not it was known to the employer at the time of the dismissal (m). Justification of dismissal can accordingly be shown by proof of facts ascertained subsequently to the dismissal (o), or on grounds differing from those alleged at the time (p)." Mr. Chatterji also drew our attention to the case of Secretary of State v. Bank of India, (AIR 1938 PC 191). The relevant portion relied upon is to be found at page 194 which is to the effect: "............ A statue is prima facie to be construed as stating the law to no greater extent than its words or necessary intendment require." Reliance was placed on a decision in Bhakata Shiromani v. Seetal Nath. (AIR 1925 All 680) where Suleiman. J., at page 681 observed: "In absence of statutory provision common law of England would prevail" The case of All India Reporter Ltd.. Bombay v. D. D. Datar, (AIR 1951 Nag 412) was also brought to our notice. In that case also similar argument was advanced relying on a passage of Halsburys Laws of England. It was stated at page 414 that it was not necessary that the matter dismissing a servant for good cause should state the ground for such dismissal and also that if good ground existed in fact it was immaterial whether or not it was known to the employer at the time of dismissal. Thus justification of dismissal can be shown by proof of facts ascertained subsequent to the date of dismissal or on grounds differing from those alleged at the time. The above contention of learned counsel of that case was accepted by the High Court. 14. Thus justification of dismissal can be shown by proof of facts ascertained subsequent to the date of dismissal or on grounds differing from those alleged at the time. The above contention of learned counsel of that case was accepted by the High Court. 14. In our opinion it is true that in absence of any statutory provision of law in India the law of master and servant based on common law would prevail. But according to us, Section 26 of the Act contains adequate provision for deciding the issue involved in the present case without reference to the law of master and servant based on common law. Reading the provision of the section it is apparent that the intention of the Legislature was to judge the reasonable cause at the time of dispensing with the service of the employee as it would be evident from Section 26 (2) (i). This is also clear from the opening sentence of clause (2) of Section 26 which reads thus: "Every employee, so dismissed or discharged may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manners to a prescribed authority within 30 days of the receipt of the order of dis missal or discharge." In other words the employee so dismissed means dismissed for the reasons stated in the charge so that he might get an opportunity of making complaint regarding his dismissal based on those charges. The employer therefore cannot be allowed to put any additional ground for his discharge after the service of the charge against him. as that would prevent the employee from making a complaint in writing. It may also be noticed that those cases on which reliance was placed were not dealing with the provision contained in Section 26 of the Act. Therefore those observations cannot be considered as relevant for construing the language used by the Legislature in Section 26 of the Act. 15. Mr. Chatterji however referred to the case of Jagdish Vastralaya v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1964 Pat 180 ). Our attention was drawn to paragraph 4 at pages 183 and 184. In that case it was submitted that expression "for a reasonable cause" in Section 26 (1) of the Act was vague and indefinite restriction imposed by that section must be held to be unreasonable from the substantive aspect of the law. Our attention was drawn to paragraph 4 at pages 183 and 184. In that case it was submitted that expression "for a reasonable cause" in Section 26 (1) of the Act was vague and indefinite restriction imposed by that section must be held to be unreasonable from the substantive aspect of the law. Therefore, obviously, according to us it has no relevancy to the instant case to serve as guideline for construing the provision of Section 26 of the Act. There argument advanced was that the provision was bad because it was vague. To that also Ramaswami, C. J., speaking for the Court observed as follows: "............ I see no warrant for this argument. In my opinion the language of Section 26 (1) must be construed to mean that the employer is empowered to discharge or dismiss an employee on grounds which are reasonable in the eye of law. In other words Section 26 (1) must be construed in the context of the existing law of master and servant, and if so construed it means that the section merely empowers an employer to discharge or dismiss an employee on lawful grounds". After due consideration therefore the contentions of Mr. Chatterji under points 2 and 3 also fail. 16 Now we advert to last point; namely point No. 4 urged by Mr. Chatterji. Under this head he emphasised that while ordering for reinstatement, the Presiding Officer ought to have taken into consideration that the petitioner has lost confidence in Rikhdeo Pd. In our opinion this cannot be laid down as general principle of law, as it may be seen that in almost all cases of dismissal or discharge the question of loss of confidence would arise. Unless the employer loses his confidence in the employee it is expected that he does not pass such order. Moreover in the instant case not much importance can be laid to the submission of Mr. Chatterji as it has been stated on behalf of the employee that he has already attained the age of superannuation. 17. After having considered the various submissions made on behalf of the petitioner under various heads we find that the order of reinstatement passed by the Presiding Officer was in accordance with law and we do not find any justification for interference with the portion of the order which relates to the order of reinstatement. 18. 17. After having considered the various submissions made on behalf of the petitioner under various heads we find that the order of reinstatement passed by the Presiding Officer was in accordance with law and we do not find any justification for interference with the portion of the order which relates to the order of reinstatement. 18. Lastly we advert to consider the case of the employee Rikhdeo Pd/, who is petitioner in C. W. J. C. No. 986 of 1971 and the contesting respondent is Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd.. respondent No. 2 who was petitioner in C W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971. As this case is the outcome of the same order passed by the Presiding Officer it would not be necessary to state the facts. The facts which We have stated above while dealing with C. W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971 are relevant for the purpose of this case as well. The only question to be decided in this case as pointed above, is whether Rikhdeo Pd., who got only half of the wages for the idle period, as ordered by the Presiding Officer even after he was ordered to be reinstated. Mr. Ranen Roy. learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that that part of the order is bad. According to him, when reinstatement was ordered on the facts and circumstances of the instant case it was incumbent on the Presiding Officer to restore the employee to his original position to make him entitle to full wages with all privilege which he could have got if he would not have been dismissed. On the other hand learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent company contended that even after passing the order of reinstatement it was within the discretion of the Presiding Officer to allow half of the wages as compensation. In order to find support reference was made to the case of Rakeshwar Dayal v. Labour Court, (1962) 1 Lab LJ 5 (All). The relevant portion reads thus: "............ The petitioner seems to think that he became entitled to full salary for the interim period as soon as the tribunal used the word "reinstatement". He now contends that the tribunal misconstrued the meaning of the word "reinstatement". The relevant portion reads thus: "............ The petitioner seems to think that he became entitled to full salary for the interim period as soon as the tribunal used the word "reinstatement". He now contends that the tribunal misconstrued the meaning of the word "reinstatement". No question of misconstruction arises as the tribunal did not interpret any statute of the legislature or document executed by another person but used the word "reinstatement" in pronouncing an award and used it in the sense of partial reinstatement. As stated above the award must be read as a whole and the word reinstatement used by the tribunal is qualified by the condition that he was to get fifty per cent of the wages for the interim period. Even if it used the word in a peculiar sense, it was entitled to do so." 19. In our opinion the above observation is not applicable to the instant case. S. S. Dhawan, J. while delivering the judgment has clearly stated in the extracted passage referred to above that the Presiding Officer in that case was not construing the word reinstatement occurring in the statute. In the present case word "reinstatement" occurs in Section 26 of the Act. Section 26 of the Act reads thus: "Notice of dismissal or discharge (1) No employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one months wages in lieu of; such notice. Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of such misconduct as may be prescribed by the State Government, supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose. (2) Every employee so dismissed or discharged may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to a prescribed authority within 30 days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge on one or more of the following grounds namely: (i) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his service, or (ii) no notice was served on him as required by sub-section (1), or (iii) he had not been guilty of any misconduct as held by the employer." Reference may foe made to Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 8 reprinted in 1961 at page 390 where reinstating means restoring of a person or thing to its former state or condition. It will be relevant to refer 1949 FC 111 where ("Western India Automobile Assn. v. Industrial Tribunal) it was observed at page 120: "............ This relief of reinstatement is on the same footing as a relief of restitution. Restitution can be granted in integrum in certain cases. All that is required is that the ex-employee should be restored to his previous position so far capacity status and emoluments are concerned and there is nothing extraordinary in such restoration being ordered when considered necessary in the interest of peaceful settlement of industrial dispute". Another relevant case on this point is to be found in S S. Shetty v Bharat Nidhi, Ltd., ( AIR 1958 SC 12 ). where it was held at page 17 paragraph 16 that whatever be the position in regard to, the terms and conditions of employment, varied in accordance with the terms of the award, the benefit of reinstatement awarded to a workman certainly could not be treated as part of the contract between him and the employer. The effect of an order of reinstatement was merely to set at naught the order of wrongful dismissal of the workman by the employer and to reinstate him in the service of the employer as if the contract of employment originally entered into had been continuing. 20 After careful consideration, therefore we find that the part of the order of the Presiding Officer, wherein he has ordered for awarding half of the wages for the idle period after passing of the order of reinstatement cannot be sustained. 21. In the result we modify that part of the order and direct that the petitioner of this case, is entitled to his full wages, and benefits, which might have occurred to him if he was in service there. 22. In the result the application in C. W. J. C. No. 629 of 1971 is dismiss ed, whereas the application in C W. J. C. No. 986 of 1971 is allowed. In the circumstances of the case however there will be no order as to costs in either of the case.