D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application raises a question whether a claim of a third party arising out of the use of motor vehicle alone lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal constituted under sec. 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereafter referred to as the Act in view of the amendments carried out in sec. 110 by Act No. 56 of 1969 which admittedly came into force with effect from March 2 1970 The accident in the present case took place on September 21 1973 and the claim made in this case relates to damage to the motor car of the petitioner alone. The petitioner was not bodily injured in that accident. According to the interpretation of sec. 110-A (1) (a) by this High Court in FARSUBHAI V. DURLABHAI 1973 ACCIDENTS CLAIMS JOURNAL 149 (13 GUJARAT LAW REPORTER 674) such sort of a claim would not be entertainable by the Tribunal. This would follow from the interpretation of sec. 110-A (1) (a) laying down that only three categories of persons can make an application contemplated by sec. 110a; and they are (a) by the person who has sus- tained the injury; or (b) where death has resulted from the accident by the legal representatives of the deceased or (c) by any agent duly autho- rised by the person injured or the legal representatives of the deceased as the case may be. The question is whether any difference is made in this view as a result of the amendment of sec. 110 of the Act even though no further amendment was carried out in sec. 110-A by amending Act 56 of 1969. The learned Judge acting as the Tribunal was struck by the fact that inspite of the amendment of sec. 110 further amendment was not carried out in sec. 110-A. He therefore preferred to follow the decision in Farsubhais case (supra) as regards interpretation of sec. 110a. On that basis he found that the petitioner not having been injured and his vehicle only having been damaged cannot make a claim to damages on that count before the Tribunal. The result was that on this sole ground he dismissed the application for compensation leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Being aggrieved by this order the original petitioner has come in revision to this Court. The result was that on this sole ground he dismissed the application for compensation leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Being aggrieved by this order the original petitioner has come in revision to this Court. ( 2 ) THE relevant provisions of the Act should be set out first. In doing so the amended portions of sec 110 and 110-A would be put in paren- thesis showing thereby that those portions were brought in by way of amendment by Act No. 56 of 1969. 110 Claims Tribunals: (1) A State Government may by notification in the official Gazette constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (herein- after referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the noti- fication for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of [ motor vehicles or damage to any property of a third party so arising or both;provided that where such claims includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand the claimant may at his option refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication and where a reference is so made the Claims Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. ]110 Application for compensation:- (1) And application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 110 may be made: (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) where death has resulted from the accident by [ all or any of the legal represent atives. ] (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured [ or all or any of the legal representatives] of the deceased as the case may be: (Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application ). (2) x x x (3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within [ six months ] of the occurrence of the accident : 110 Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:-Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for com- pensation shall be granted by the Civil Court. ( 3 ) SO far as the amendments in sec. 110-A brought about by the bracketed portions mentioned above are concerned the original words for which the bracketed portion was substituted in clause (b) were by the legal representatives and in clause (c) or the legal representatives and in sub-sec. (3) the said words were sixty days. ( 4 ) THE contention on behalf of the petitioner was that sec. 110 (1) as amended brings the present case within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under sec. 110-F in the present case also. It was also urged that in view of this amendment the provisions of sec 110-A (1) (a) should be construed in such a manner that in a case like the present the party suffering damage to property but who is not bodily injured should not be left without a remedy. In this connection the meaning of the words sustain and injury were pointed out which in the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner would cover the case of a person who has not sustained bodily injury. As against this the learned advocate for the opposite party pointed out that clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 110-A was not amended even though the amendments in other part of that clause were carried out by the same Amending Act No. 56 of 1969. He therefore submitted that the meaning given to clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) by our High Court in Farsubhais case (supra) should not be changed even after the amendment. (1) of sec. 110-A was not amended even though the amendments in other part of that clause were carried out by the same Amending Act No. 56 of 1969. He therefore submitted that the meaning given to clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) by our High Court in Farsubhais case (supra) should not be changed even after the amendment. With regard to the amendment the contention of the learned advocate for the opposite party was that it was intended to cover only the case of a composite application where a claim by a third party suffering damage to his pro- perty alone is joined with the claim made by the party bodily injured or by the legal representatives of the person who died as a result of the accident. It was also pointed out that sec. 1 110-A contains the words who sustains and injury. So far as the word injury was concerned it was submitted that as interpreted in Farsubhais case it must be confined to bodily injury only and that it would not be legitimate to introduce the concept of damage to the property in clause (a) of sec. 110-A Emphasis was also laid on the word sustains which according to the learned advocate for opposite party indicates the person sustaining bodily injury and not damage to property. Lastly it was urged that word who refers to a human being; and therefore clause (a) cannot be construed to include damage to property. In view of these contentions it was urged that the claim like the present can be filed in a Civil Court and sec. 110-F will be no bar. ( 5 ) THE provisions of sec. 110 may be considered first. Prior to the amendment the following requirements had to be satisfied for founding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under sec 110 : (1) There must be a claim to compensation in respect of an accident. (2) The accident must arise out of use of motor vehicle (3) The accident must involve bodily injury or death of a person; the Amending Act No. 56 of 1969 purports to widen the scope of the third requirement mentioned above. (2) The accident must arise out of use of motor vehicle (3) The accident must involve bodily injury or death of a person; the Amending Act No. 56 of 1969 purports to widen the scope of the third requirement mentioned above. In view of this the third requirement may be restated as under : (3) The accident must involve bodily injury or death of a person; or the accident must involve damage to any property of a third party; or the accident must involve both bodily injury or death of a person and damage to any property of a third party. A question arose on the section as it stood prior to the amendment It was: Whether in case of an accident involving composite injuries i. e. death or bodily injury coupled with loss or damage to the property of the deceased or person who suffers bodily injury the claim to Compensation will be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal Madhya Pradesh High Court in OM PRAKASH MISHRA V. NATIONAL FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED A. I R 1962 M. P. 19 took the view that such a claim would be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This view was followed by this Court in case of an accident prior to the amendment. (Farsubhas case-supra ). Madhya Pradesh High Court also laid down that claim for compensation in respect of loss or damage to property alone in a case where no death or personal injury results would not be entertainable by the Tribunal and would lie before the Civil Court. It is clear on a bare reading of the amended section that such a claim for loss or damage to property alone would now be entertainable by the Tribunal. This is clear from the phrase or damages to any property of a third party so arising. This amendment in terms deals with the proposition of Madhya Pradesh High Court that where no death or bodily injury results in an accident arising out of use of motor vehicle and only loss or damage to property occurs the claim is not entertainable by the Tribunal. This amendment in terms deals with the proposition of Madhya Pradesh High Court that where no death or bodily injury results in an accident arising out of use of motor vehicle and only loss or damage to property occurs the claim is not entertainable by the Tribunal. The Legislature has stepped in to say that such a claim if it involves loss or damage to the property to the extent of rupees two thousand is exclusively triable by the Tribunal If it involves loss or damage exceeding rupees two thousand it is entertainable by the Civil Court at the option of the claimant as laid down by the proviso. The Legislature did not stop there. It also brought within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (subject to the proviso) cases of accidents where death of one person occurs bodily injury is suffered by another person and a third person though not sustaining any bodily injury suffers loss or damage to his property. This is clear from the word both occurring in the amended portion. ( 6 ) WE have seen the extent of extended jurisdiction of the Tribunal pursuant to the amendment. We have seen that claim for loss or damage to property alone of a third party is also within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In the context the word third party in the amended provi- sion would mean a person who does not sustain bodily injury or whose death is not caused in the accident. The question would then arise what would be the position of a person who has sustained both the bodily injury and loss or damage to the property ? As per the amended provi- sion an accident: (1) may involve bodily injury to or death of a person; or (2) may involve loss or damage to any property of a third party or (c) may involve both category Nos. (1) and (2) above. We have already seen earlier that this word both would take in an accident resulting in bodily injury to one person death of another and loss of or damage to the property of a third person. Case of a composite injury i. e. bodily injury coupled with loss of or damage to any property of the injured or death coupled with loss or damage to any property of the deceased would also be covered by the word both. Case of a composite injury i. e. bodily injury coupled with loss of or damage to any property of the injured or death coupled with loss or damage to any property of the deceased would also be covered by the word both. Assuming that this word both cannot be given two meanings it is clear that the aforesaid case of com- posite injuries would fall under category No. I mentioned above on the interpretation of the phrase accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles as interpreted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and this High Court. Even after the said interpretation the Legislature while amending sec. 110 has not changed the aforesaid phraseology. It has enlarged the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal by the amendment. Looking to this object of enlarging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal there is no reason why the case of composite injuries should fall outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. ( 7 ) IF this is the correct interpretation of sec. 110 then it is clear that in respect of the aforesaid claims the jurisdiction of the Civil Court will be barred under sec. 110-F except in a case where the proviso is rightly resorted to by the claimant. The proviso gives an option to the claimant of the second category to go to the Civil Court even if the damage to his property exceeds Rs. 2000/-; and in the present case the petitioner has not exercised the option of going to the Civil Court even though his claim on account of damage to his vehicle exceeds Rs. 2 0 Now as observed above if the claim falling in the second category can lie only before the Tribunal as it certainly does when the extent of damage in respect of the property does not exceed Rs. 2 0 the person suffering this damage or loss of less than Rs. 2 0 cannot go to a Civil Court in view of the provisions of sec. 110-A. In this context we now come to the interpretation of sec. 110-A (1) (a) of the Act. If we interprete the said provision as entitling only the person sustaining bodily injury to approach the Tribunal under sec. 110 (1) the person suffering damage of less than Rs. 2 0 falling in the second category would be without a remedy. 110-A. In this context we now come to the interpretation of sec. 110-A (1) (a) of the Act. If we interprete the said provision as entitling only the person sustaining bodily injury to approach the Tribunal under sec. 110 (1) the person suffering damage of less than Rs. 2 0 falling in the second category would be without a remedy. It is this context and consideration which calls for renewed approach to sec. 110-A (1) (a) in the matter of interpretation so as to see that the aforesaid person is not without a remedy. ( 8 ) NOW the first thing to be noticed is that clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) does not use the word bodily between the words the and injury. The clause only speaks of the person who has sustained the injury. What meaning should we therefore give to the word injury in view of the amendment carried out by the Legislature in sec. 110 ? It is true that this High Court in Farsubhais case (supra) which arose prior to the amend- ment limited this clause to the person bodily injured only in the following observations at page 152:it will be seen that an application before the Claims Tribunal can be made only by the person who has sustained the bodily injury or the legal representatives of the person who has died or his or their agent. The right to make an application for compensation is conferred only on this limited class of persons. The person who has suffered damage to his property as a result of the accident is not given the right to make an application for compensation. Though therefore it might appear on reading sec. 110 (1) alone and in isolation that a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property caused by the accident would be within the jurisdi- ction of the Claims Tribunal sec. 110-A makes it clear that such a claim for compensation is not intended to be made before the Claims Tribunal. It is indeed difficult to see how such a claim for compensation can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal when the person who makes such a claim for compensation is denied the right of preferring an application for compensation It is plain and incontrovertible on a combined reading of sec. 110 (1) and sec. It is indeed difficult to see how such a claim for compensation can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal when the person who makes such a claim for compensation is denied the right of preferring an application for compensation It is plain and incontrovertible on a combined reading of sec. 110 (1) and sec. 110 that a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property caused by an accident of the nature specified in sec. 110 (1) was not within the contemplation of the Legislature as being a claim triable by the Claims Tribunal. It must of course be made clear that where a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property caused by the accident is made by a person who has also sustained bodily injury or by the legal representatives of a person who has died as a result of the accident such a claim for compensation would be within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal. THESE observations were made in the context of sec. 110 (1) as it existed then. In fact the aforesaid conclusion was arrived at by the learned Judge on a combined reading of sec. 110 (1) and sec. 110-A. We may adopt the same approach after the amendment and try to solve the question posed before us on a combined reading of sec. 110 (1) and sec. 110a as amended. It is quite clear that in view of the amended sec. 110 (1) the third person who is not bodily injured or whose death does not occur in an accident but whose property is damaged is a person who has sus- tained the injury (not necessarily a bodily injury) as contemplated by clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1 ). Websters Dictionary defines injury as wrong an injury an unjust act and gives four categories as under;1. physical harm or damage to a person property etc. 2 unjust treatment; violation of rights; offence 3 an injurious act. 4 insult. THE first category will show that injury does not mean physical harm alone but also includes damage to property. The other word which is used in clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) has sustained. Websters Dictionary defines sustain to mean inter alia to endure; to bear up against; withstand. . . 4 insult. THE first category will show that injury does not mean physical harm alone but also includes damage to property. The other word which is used in clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) has sustained. Websters Dictionary defines sustain to mean inter alia to endure; to bear up against; withstand. . . to undergo; to experience; to suffer as an injury or loss Therefore the word sustain can be interpreted to mean suffering or undergoing. In this view clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) contemplates an application by a person who has suffered an injury i. e. damage to pro- perty. In view of the amendment in sec. 110 (1) a person who has suffered damage to his property alone in an accident arising out of use of motor vehicle has the right to apply to the Tribunal under sec. 110a (1) (a ). It is not necessary as held in Farsubhais case (supra) that he must have sustained bodily injury also. In the context of the amendment in sec. 110 (1) it would not be possible now to act upon the former interpretation of clause (a) of see. 110-A (1) by this High Court. At that time also as observed earlier it was so interpreted on a combined reading of secs. 110 (1) and 110-A. It was so interpreted because at that time the juris- diction of the Claims Tribunal did not extend to claims to damage to any property of a third party arising out of an accident but was confined to accidents involving death of or bodily injuries to persons. It is therefore not possible to agree with the submission of the opposite party that it would not be legitimate to include concept of damage to the property in clause (a) of sec. 110-A (1) and depart from the former insterpretation. Similarly the contention of the other side that the words has sustained would mean bodily injury cannot be accepted in view of the meaning of that word given above. The emphasis on the pronoun who by the other side is misplaced. This pronoun only qualifies the person who is entitled to make an application; that person must be a person who has sustained injury under clause (a ). The emphasis on the pronoun who by the other side is misplaced. This pronoun only qualifies the person who is entitled to make an application; that person must be a person who has sustained injury under clause (a ). It is quite clear that a person who has not sustained any bodily injury but whose property is damaged as a result of the acci- dent is equally a person who has sustained injury because the accident has resulted in loss or damage to his property and also because the accident arises out of a wrongful act violating his right to property. ( 9 ) THEN we come to the contention of the other side that the Legis- lature while amending sec. 110 did not amend sec. 110-A suitably. Great emphasis was placed on this aspect; and it was further pointed out that notwithstanding the amendment of certain parts of sec. 110-A clause (a) thereof was kept intact. In my opinion in view of the meaning of the word injury occurring in clause (a) as mentioned above the Legislature thought it unnecessary to amend clause (a ). This contention is therefore not tenable. ( 10 ) IT was also contended that the amended sec. 110 (1) was limited to cases in which there are persons who suffer bodily injury and apart from that there is a person who suffers damage to the property only. The submission was that a composite application by these persons could be brought under sec. 110 (1) in such a case but not when the accident has resulted only in damage to the property of a third party. It is not possible to give such a restricted meaning to the amendments carried out sec. 110. The disjunctive or between the first and the second categories of cases mentioned in sec. 110 would clearly show that the Claims Tribunal will have jurisdiction also in respect of accidents which resulted in damage to any property of a third party and did not result in bodily injury or death. ( 11 ) IN the result it is clear that the learned Judge of the claims Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error in coming to the conclusion that he has no jurisdiction to entertain this claim. This finding has to be interfered with in revision in exercise of revisional powers of this Court under sec. ( 11 ) IN the result it is clear that the learned Judge of the claims Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error in coming to the conclusion that he has no jurisdiction to entertain this claim. This finding has to be interfered with in revision in exercise of revisional powers of this Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 12 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned Judge of the Claims Tribunal is set aside; and the matter is remitted back to him with a direction to dispose it off in accordance with law. Rule made absolute in these terms. Looking to the question of interpretation involved it would be just and fair to leave each part to bear its own costs of this revisional application. .