( 1 ) THE respondents are decree-holders. They as owners of non-residential premises situate in the Civil Station, Bangalore, filed a petition for eviction in HRC 188 of 1969 in the. Court of the Prl Munsiff, Civil Station, Bangalore, against 'm/s Jhamatmal Sons' under S. 21 Cl (1) sub-cl (h) of the karnataka Housa Rent Control Act, Alleging that the respondent to the petition above-said is a tenant under them. The eviction petition was contested by Devi Bai, the widow of Jhamatmal. Jhamatmal admittedly died in the year 1964. The HRC petition was filed on 11th April, 1969. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the firm she stated that they have been tenants since the year 1948, that they have been running business as photographers, that the said business is their only source of business, that jhamatmal Sons is a family business, it was set up in the year 1948 and that the firm has an established business in photography. The petition was dismissed by the trial Court. The appeal filed by the landlords was also dismissed. Thereupon, the landlords filed a revision petition in CRP 2753/72 in this Court which was allowed on 17-8-1973 and eviction was ordered granting one year's time to the tenant to vacate. Thereafter, the decree-holders filed Execution No. 584/74 after the expiry of the period of one year In the execution proceeding, the judgment-debtor filed objections on 23-8-1974. It was filed by Devi Bai. She stated that the judgment-debtor jhamatmal Sons is a single proprietaryship firm, that it is not a registered firm, that the decree has been obtained against the firm without proper representation, that the sole proprietor of the firm 'jhamatmal Sons' died long prior to the institution of the eviction proceedings, that no proceedings could have been brought in the name of the firm in the absence of all the legal representatives being made parties to the eviction proceedings and that therefore the decree is void in law. She also filed another statement of objections on 28-8-1974 to the effect that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree of eviction in respect of a non-residential premises against the legal representatives after the death of the original tenant. The executing Court overruled the objections and directed the execution to proceed. The lower appellate Court has confirmed that order. Devi Bai has come up in second appeal. The executing Court overruled the objections and directed the execution to proceed. The lower appellate Court has confirmed that order. Devi Bai has come up in second appeal. The appellant in this second appeal is described as 'm's Jhamatmal Sens, represented by Devi Bai". ( 2 ) THE only point urged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal is that the sole proprietor of the film Jhamatmal Sons died in 1964 and since he was dead on the date of the eviction proceedings under the Rent Control act, the order of eviction passed against the firm is a nullity. The objection statement filed by the judgment-debtor in the executing Court is to the effect that all the legal representatives of the sole proprietor jhamatmal were not impleaded in the HRC proceedings and that therefore the order passed therein is void. It is contended by Mr. Narayanappa on behalf of the respondents that Devi Bai contested the eviction petition in the HRC proceedings in her capacity as the sole proprietrix of the firm, that therefore the firm M s Jhamatmal Sons was adequately represented in hrc proceedings and that it is therefore not open to her now to raise the contention in the execution proceeding that the order obtained against the firm is void. He has relied on the contents of the Vakalath filed by her in the HRC proceedings on 9-6-1969. In the body of the Vakalath she is described as the proprietor of the respondent-firm. Under the left thumb mark on the Vakalath, she is described as the "proprietor 'm s Jhamatmal sons'". Mr. Narayanappa also relied on the statement of DW. 1 in the hrc proceeding in the course of his evidence. DW. 1 was the only witness examined on behalf of the tenant in the HRC proceeding. He is one of the sons cf Jhamatmal. In cross-examination, he has stated as follows : " There is a partition deed. I can produce it. This Jhamtmal Sons is of proprietoryship shop viz after my father's death it was given to my mother. It is not true to say that all my brothers still joint. " it is therefore clear that Devi Bai contested the eviction petition in the hrc proceedings as the sole proprietrix of Jhamatmal Sons, though it is not stated so in the objection statement filed by her in the HRC proceedings. It is not true to say that all my brothers still joint. " it is therefore clear that Devi Bai contested the eviction petition in the hrc proceedings as the sole proprietrix of Jhamatmal Sons, though it is not stated so in the objection statement filed by her in the HRC proceedings. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the appellant, Shri Satyanarayana, relied on the decision of the learned single Judge in Rampratab Brijmohandas v. Gavrishankar kashiram,. AIR, 1924 Bom. 109. In that case, the suit was filed against the firm beharilal Bishambhar Das for recovery of certain monies due from Kashiram who was carrying on the business under that name. On the date of the suit Kashiram was dead and the plain tiffs were aware of the fact. When objection was taken on behalf of the defendants that Kashiram was dead and only Gavrishankar can be sued, the plaintiffs prayed for and obtained an order from the Court for amendment of the plaint and substituted Gavrishankar's name in the place, of the firm. It was held the the suit against the firm was in reality a suit against a dead man and that the defect could not be cured by the amendment that was made, that Gavrishankar could not be brought on record except as a legal representatives of Kashiram, that he was in fact brought on record as the son and heir of Kashiram and that his liability would be in his character as legal representative of his father. As against this, Mr. Narayanappa relied on the decision of the Division bbnch of the same Court in Motilal Jasraj v. Chandmal Hindumal, AIR 1924 Bom. 155. The defendant in that case- was the firm of 'manmal Chandmal'. Chandmal had died prior to the date of the suit. An application to bring his heirs on record was made thereafter and an order was made directing two persons manmal Hindumal and Kesarimal Brijlal be brought on the record. It is held that though not in form, but in substance, the plaintiff sued the firth of 'manmal Chandmal', that if the defendant had been simply described as 'the firm of Manmal Chandmal' without mentioning the names of the owners or partners of the firm the description would have been sufficient, having regard to the provisions of Or. It is held that though not in form, but in substance, the plaintiff sued the firth of 'manmal Chandmal', that if the defendant had been simply described as 'the firm of Manmal Chandmal' without mentioning the names of the owners or partners of the firm the description would have been sufficient, having regard to the provisions of Or. 30 CPC, that the further description of the defendant Chandmal Hindumal as 'the manager and owner of the firm' may be treated as a mere surplusage, that the suit would have been good if the firm had been sued without any further description and that it was really unnecessary to have the heirs of Chandmal on the record as such. It was therefore held that the suit could have been treated as having been filed against the firm of 'manmal Chandmal' ( 4 ) THE scope of Or. 30, R. 10 of CPC was considered in Gambhir Mal pandiya v. J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ld, AIR. 1963 SC. 243, and it was observed as follows :" As we have pointed out, Or 30 of the Code permits suits to be brought against firms. The summons may be issued against the firm or against persons who are alleged to be partners individually. The suit, however, proceeds only against the firm. Any person who is summoned can appear, and prove that he is not a partner and never was; but if he raises that defence, he cannot defend the firm. Persons who admit that they are partners may defend the firm, take as many pleas as they like but not enter upon issues between themselves When the decree is passed, it is against the firm. Such a decree is capable of being executed against the property of the partnership and also against two classes of persons individually. They are (1) persons who appared in answer to summons served on them as partners and either admitted that they were partners or were found to be so and (2) persons who were summoned as partners but stayed away. The decree can also be executed against persons who were not summoned in the suit as partners, but R. 50 (2) of Or. 21 gives them an opportunity of showing cause and the plaintiff must prove their liability This enquiry does not entitle the person summoned to reopen the decree. The decree can also be executed against persons who were not summoned in the suit as partners, but R. 50 (2) of Or. 21 gives them an opportunity of showing cause and the plaintiff must prove their liability This enquiry does not entitle the person summoned to reopen the decree. He can only prove that the decree is the result of collusion, fraud or the like. But he cannot claim to have other matters tried, so to speak, between himself and his other partners. Once he admits that he is a partner and has no special defence of collusion, fraud etc the Court must give leave forthwith. In our opinion, of the three constructions suggested by the learned attorney-General, the widest meaning cannot be attributed to the word 'liability'. The proper meaning thus is that primarily the question to try would be whether the person against whom the decree is sought to be executed was a partner of the firm, when the cause of action accrued, but he may question the decree) on the ground of collusion, fraud or the like but so as not to have the suit tried over again or to raise issue between himself and his other partners. It is to be remembered that the leave that is sought is in respect of execution against the personal property of such partner and the leave that -is grantqd or refused affect only such property and not the property of the firm. Ordinarily, when thq person summoned admits that he is a partner, leave would be granted, unless he alleges collusion fraud or the like. No such question has been raised in this case, and the decision given by the High Court cannot be disturbed. "the above observations apply to the facts of this case, since the present appellant Devi Bai appeared and contested the HRC proceedings in her capacity as proprietrix of thq tenant-firm and in the present execution proceedings no objection has been raised on the ground that the order of eviction was obtained on thq basis of any fraud or collusion etc. ( 5 ) MR. NARAYANAPPA next relied on the decision in Firm Vijaya Nipani tobacco House v. Sarwan Kumar, AIR. 1974 Pat 117. ( 5 ) MR. NARAYANAPPA next relied on the decision in Firm Vijaya Nipani tobacco House v. Sarwan Kumar, AIR. 1974 Pat 117. In that case it was contended that the suit was not maintainable firstly, on account of the non-jojndetr of the proprietor of the defendant-firm J. K. Patel and, secondly, on account of the non-joinder of the other members of the joint family as plaintiffs. The suit was instituted against Firm Vijaya Nipani Tobacco House through B. K. Patel, Managing Director", It, was contended that J. K. Patel was the proprietor of the defendant-firm and the suit having been filed against the firm through B. K. Patel, who is merely a Manager, it was badly framed. It was held that Or. 30, R. 10 enables the partners of the firm to be sued in an assumed name i. e. , name of the firm, that the suit against that firm is really a suit agajnst the partners in an assumed name and that the suit is really against that person although he has been sued in the assumed name as if it were a firm name. It was therefore held that the suit was not bad as the description itself makes it clear that the suit was against the partners themselves under Rule 1 and against the particular person himself under Rule10. The mention of Sri B. K. Patel was really redundant. The decision in Motilal Jasraj (2) was followed. It was also noticed that it was the defendant-firm which appeared in the trial Court and again it was the defendant firm which filed the appeal before the lower appellate Court and it was the defendant firm again which had come up in second appeal and that the parities understood the suit to be one against the firm itself. In the present case also, it is the firm which was described as tenant in the HRC proceedings and the objections filed on behalf of the tenant by Devi Bai was also on the basis that the tenant was the firm Jhamatmal sons. In the eviction petition it was also alleged that notice had been issued terminating the tenancy to the tenant-firm. ( 6 ) IN Jamunadhar Poddar Firm v. Jamunaram Bhakat, AIR. 1944 Cal, 138, it was held that a single individual who carries on business under a firm name or an assumed name cannot sue. In the eviction petition it was also alleged that notice had been issued terminating the tenancy to the tenant-firm. ( 6 ) IN Jamunadhar Poddar Firm v. Jamunaram Bhakat, AIR. 1944 Cal, 138, it was held that a single individual who carries on business under a firm name or an assumed name cannot sue. as plaintiff in that assumed name but Or. 30, r. 10 enables a person to sue him as defendant in that assumed name. Accordingly, it was held that a Hindu joint family can be sued in the name cf the firm or the assumed name. ( 7 ) IT is further urged by Mr. Narayanappa that the-judgment-debtor is estopped from raising the objection which could have been agitated in the course of the suit for the first time in execution. He relied on the decision in Tatyagouda Ranoji Patil v. Mohodin Sultan Mullain, AIR. 1935 Bom. 95, which supports him. ( 8 ) IN Askaram Panchiram Firm v. Rabin Bros, AIR. 1952 Bom. 86, the suit was brought upon a hand-note executed by Rabindra Nath Sharma in the name of Rabin Bros. The plaintiff firm sued Rabin Bros in whose name the promissory-note was executed as well as Rabindra Nath Sharma. The person actually served in the suit was Rabindra Nath Sharma. It is held that when a person who has been served in a suit instituted under the provisions of or. 30, if hei is neither the Manager nor a partner, he must appear under protest. But far from do,ing so, Rabindra Nath Sharma filed a written statement contesting the suit on merits. In his evidence he did not say that he has nothing to do with Rabin Bros. It was therefore held, having regard to his written statement, that it is reasonable to assume that Rabindra Nath sharma was carrying on business in the name of Rabin Bros, that he was therefore personally liable and the question of taking proceedings under or. 21, R. 50 CPC did not arise. In the present case also the HRC proceedings were contested on merits by Devi Bai. Hence, it must be deemed that she contested and defended the eviction petition on behalf of the tenant-firm in the HRC proceedings. In Bank of Baroda v. Fisco, AIR. 1975 Cal. 21, R. 50 CPC did not arise. In the present case also the HRC proceedings were contested on merits by Devi Bai. Hence, it must be deemed that she contested and defended the eviction petition on behalf of the tenant-firm in the HRC proceedings. In Bank of Baroda v. Fisco, AIR. 1975 Cal. 225, it has been held, following the decision in AIR 1960 SC 941 , that when the matter on a question of fact or on a question of law has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision had become final, neither party will be allowed in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvas the same matter on the principles of res judicata. ( 9 ) THE eviction proceeding was instituted by the respondent on the basis that the tenant is the firm Jhamatmal Sons. Tt was defended also on the basis that the tenant is the firm Jhamatmal Sons. It is therefore not open to the judgment-debtor now to contend that the tenant was somebody else. ( 10 ) IN the lower appellate Court, a notice was sent by the learned counsel for the present respondents to the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor on 17th Feb 1975 stating that the respondents proposed to produce a certified copy of the plaint and affidavit dt. 8-10-3974 in SC. 152/74 on the file of the Civil Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore hied by Devi Bai, as well as another document, stating that Devi Bai was thereby required under Or. 12, R. 3 CPC to admit, execution of the said documents and further to admit the facts stated therein on the next date of hearing of the execution appeal. A copy of that notice was also filed bearing the signature, acknowledging the notice, of the learned Counsel for judgment-debtor d/. 17-2-1975. A certificate of posting showing that a letter has been addressed to Devi Bai and ported on 17-2-1975 was also filed. Both these documents were filed into the Court along with the memo d. 18-2-1975 filed on behalf of the respondents. The certified copy of the plaint in Ex. Case 152/74 was also produced in the lower appellate Court which shows that the suit was filed by Jhamatmal Sons for recovery of money against another person. Both these documents were filed into the Court along with the memo d. 18-2-1975 filed on behalf of the respondents. The certified copy of the plaint in Ex. Case 152/74 was also produced in the lower appellate Court which shows that the suit was filed by Jhamatmal Sons for recovery of money against another person. The verification describes Devi Bai as proprietrix of the plaintiff firm and that the original bore the left thumb mark of Devi Bai as plaintiff. The order sheet of the lower appellate Court does not show whether the judgment-debtor admitted or denied the facts alleged in the notice issued on behalf of the respondents referred to above. But the lower appellate Court observed as follows in its judgment :" The Advocate appearing for the respondents referred me to a copy of the plaint in' SC. 152/74 on the file of this Court in order to substantiate that Devi Bai who is served in HRC 188 j 69 and has taken the noitice on behalf of Jhamatmal Sons has described herself as proprietrix of Jhamatmal Sons. In my opinion this is an additional evidence which helps me to negative the contention of the appellants that the summons in HRC 188 69 were not served on the person and that Devi Bai could not have represented the firm Jhamatmal Sons in that proceedings. "these observations show that the judgment-debtor did not deny in the lower appellate Court the fact of having filed the plaint in SC. 152/74. In this Court, no ground has been urged in the Memorandum of Appeal objecting to the lower appellate Court having acted upon the certified copy of the plaint in SC. 152 74 as part of the evidence. Hence, it must be assumed that in the lower appellate Court the judgment-debtcr did not, deny the fact of having filed the plaint in the above suit. The description of the present judgment-debtor as the proprietor of Jhamatmal Sons in the plaint in the above suit filed in the year 1974 is consistent with the evidence of dw. 1, the son of the judgment-debtor in the HRC proceeding. It is also consistent with the description of the judgment-debtor in the, vakalat filed on her behalf in the HRC proceeding as the proprietor of Jhamatmal Sons. 1, the son of the judgment-debtor in the HRC proceeding. It is also consistent with the description of the judgment-debtor in the, vakalat filed on her behalf in the HRC proceeding as the proprietor of Jhamatmal Sons. ( 11 ) SECTION 30 of the Mysore Rent Control Act reads as follows :" Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of the tenant in any premises is determined for any reason whatsoever and any order is made by the Court under this Act for the recovery of possession of such premises, the order shall, subject to the provisions of S. 21, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting such persons therefrom : provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such premises. "this section also makes it clear that it is not open to the judgment-debtor to contend that the order of eviction is not binding on her. ( 12 ) THIS appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. The appellant prays for time to vacate and hand over possesion. The appellant is allowed ten days' time to vacate and give possession of the schedule premises to the respondents-decree holders. --- *** --- .