Judgment 1. The petitioners are partners of a firm, M/s. Bihar Small Arms. The firm was granted a manufacturing licence No, 3/61 in Form No. IX for locating a manufacturing unit of gun factory at Monghyr. The licence was renewed from time to time as required by law. The manufacturing unit of the petitioners is located in a very small space at gun factory within Jail compound at Monghyr, and they could not get extra space there in spite of all efforts by them. Accordingly, the petitioners approached the authorities for location of their unit (within the same manufacturing limit as shown in the licence) outside the jail campus (at Monghyr). On the 16th September, 1970, they applied for an additional manufacturing unit at Bakhtiarpur. By a letter dated the 20th February, 1970 (Annexure 18), the Under-Secretary to the Government of India had intimated to the Secretary to the State Government that the Government of India (respondent No. 1) had no objection to any change in respect of such place of business, factory or shop being allowed by the State Government to any licensed unit within their State. The State Government (respondent No. 2) approved the addition of Bakhtiarpur as a place of business/factory of the petitioners, and, accordingly, on the 15th December, 1972, Bakhtiarpur was added in column No. 3 of the licence in Form IX meant for the place of business, factory or shop. By letter No. 4573 dated the 19th October, 1974 (Annexure 5) the District Magistrate, Patna (respondent No. 3) informed the petitioners that by the order of the Government all the permissions and facilities granted to the petitioners for the manufacturing unit at Bakhtiarpur were cancelled with effect from the 11th October, 1974. By the said letter, the petitioners were also directed to produce their licence in Form IX for necessary amendment. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners want quashing of the order and directions contained in Annexure 5. Their case is that after their licence was amended and they were allowed to have a manufacturing unit at Bakhtiarpur, they spent a huge amount to the tune of lacs over erection of Sheds, constriction of factory, purchasing modern machines, tools and equipment, etc. and advance payment to the labourers, etc. They further claim that they were not heard before the letter (Annexure 5) was issued. and advance payment to the labourers, etc. They further claim that they were not heard before the letter (Annexure 5) was issued. It has been urged on their behalf in the circumstances, the order contained in Annexure 5 is bad for two reasons: firstly, that there has been a violation of the rule of natural justice in passing the order without hearing the petitioners, and, secondly, that respondent No. 1 having intimated by Annexure 18 that the State Government could permit a change in respect of the place of business and the State Government (respondent No. 2) having allowed such a change, they cannot be allowed to resile from the approval accorded to the petitioners earlier. Reliance is placed on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 2. A lengthy rejoinder has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 2. The sum and substance of the rejoinder is that there has been no illegality in issuing the order and direction contained in Annexure 5. A letter dated the 22nd April, 1972 from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Secretary to the Government of Bihar, Political (Police) Department has been made Annexure A to the rejoinder. It is stated in the said letter with reference to the earlier letter dated the 20th February, 1970 (Annexure 18) that the Government of India have no objection to the shifting of the factory of the petitioners unit to the proposed industrial estate which the Bihar Government was intending to establish subject to the condition that this Firm shifts along with all other firms together, to the proposed industrial estate, where proper security arrangement could be made. The case of respondent No. 2 is that the licence of the petitioners was amended by mistake in ignorance of this direction of respondent No. 1. Another letter of the said Deputy Secretary to the Government of India written to the said Secretary of the State Government which is dated the 16th May, 1973, has been made Annexure B to the rejoinder. From this letter, it appears that respondent No. 2 was not prepared to shift all the manufacturing units located at Monghyr to the proposed industrial estate at Bakhtiarpur, and, in the circumstances, respondent No. 1 was agreeable to the shifting of the manufacturing unit of the petitioners only to Bakhtiarpur either in whole or in part. From this letter, it appears that respondent No. 2 was not prepared to shift all the manufacturing units located at Monghyr to the proposed industrial estate at Bakhtiarpur, and, in the circumstances, respondent No. 1 was agreeable to the shifting of the manufacturing unit of the petitioners only to Bakhtiarpur either in whole or in part. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that under the law the respondent No. 2 had no power to amend the licence and, therefore, the amendment allowed was without jurisdiction. It has further been contended that as the matter is governed by statutes and statutory rules, no question of promissory estoppel would arise in the case and that remanding the matter to the authorities for giving a hearing to the petitioners on the question of cancellation will be a futile exercise inasmuch as respondents 2 and 3 cannot amend the licence as to the place of manufacture. 3. The real question, therefore, which arises for decision in the case is whether it was within the power of the State Government (respondent No. 2) to amend the licence of the petitioners and thereby permit them to have a manufacturing unit at Bakhtiarpur. 4. Sec.2 (1) (f) of the Arms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) defines licensing authority to mean "an officer or authority empowered to grant or renew licences under rules made under this Act, and includes the Government". The main part of Sec. 5 lays down that "no person shall- (a) manufacture, sell, transfer, convert, repair, test or prove, or (b) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof any fire-arm or any other of such class or description as may be prescribed or any ammunition, unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder:" Sec.15 of the Act confers power on the licensing authority to renew a licence. Sec.17 of the Act authorises the licensing authority to vary the conditions thereof. Sec. 44 authorises the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act by notification in the Official Gazette. Rules were framed by the Central Government in the year 1962 and are known as the Arms Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Sec. 44 authorises the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act by notification in the Official Gazette. Rules were framed by the Central Government in the year 1962 and are known as the Arms Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 4 of the Rules says that "licences under Chapter II of the Act may be granted or renewed for such purposes, by such authorities, in such Forms and to be valid for such period and in such areas as are specified in Schedule II, subject to such conditions as are specified in that Schedule and in the licence". Item No. 9 (a) of Schedule II is relevant for the purpose of this case and is quoted hereunder : (TABLE) 9(a) Manufacture, conversion, shortening, repair, test other than proof-test, sales transfer, keeping for sale, transfer conversion or test of arms and ammunition. All Throughout India. Central Government. Within the premiss to be specified in the licence. State Government. IX Rule 53 (1) of the Rules lays down that "on application from a licence-holder, a licensing authority may extend the area of validity specified in his licence, if he is satisfied about the need of such extension, subject to the condition that the licensing authority has the power to grant a licence in relation to the area to which extension is sought. As it appears from Item No. 9 (a) of Schedule II, quoted above, the licence for manufacture, etc, is to be granted in Form IX. The Form mentions a number of conditions. Condition No. 5 thereof reads as follows. "He shall not manufacture fire-arms of any category or description other than those allowed to be manufactured under column 4; nor expand his business, except with the prior permission of the Central Government and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Central Government." 5. Relying upon the provisions of the Act and the Rules, referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the learned Advocate General, appearing for respondent No. 2 and learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the Union of India have contended that the change as to the place of manufacture in the licence could be allowed by the Central Government only. Mr. Relying upon the provisions of the Act and the Rules, referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the learned Advocate General, appearing for respondent No. 2 and learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the Union of India have contended that the change as to the place of manufacture in the licence could be allowed by the Central Government only. Mr. B.C. Ghose, appearing for the petitioners, has contended that the variation in the terms and conditions of the licence can be allowed under Sec.17 of the Act by the licensing authority, and, according to the definition of the expression licensing authority as given in Sec.2 (1) (f), it also includes the Government which term, according to Sec.3 (23) of the Central General Clauses Act includes any State Government. No doubt, the State Government is also the licensing authority, but it could not vary the conditions of the licence and allow the petitioners to have any manufacturing unit at Bakhtiarpur. In my opinion, the expression "and includes the Government" in Sec.2 (1) (f) does not indicate that the State Governments are the licensing authority for all purposes. The first part of the definition shows that an officer or authority powered to grant or renew licence under the Rules made under the Act, is licensing authority. The expression and includes the Government was added to the definition to remove the doubt and make it clear that even the Government, that is, the Central Government or any State Government could be the licensing authority if they are so empowered under the rules made under the Act. If the construction sought to be put by Mr. Ghose is accepted, then a State Government will be the licensing authority under the Act concerning any part of India even not lying within that State for the purpose of manufacture, etc. Such a construction will make the working of the Act impossible. Therefore, for the purpose of Sec.17 also, on which Mr. Ghose has put strong reliance, the licensing authority for making a variation in the conditions of the licence will be as prescribed in the Rules. We have already referred to Rule 53; according to which, the area of validity specified in the licence may be extended by the authority which has got power to grant a licence. Ghose has put strong reliance, the licensing authority for making a variation in the conditions of the licence will be as prescribed in the Rules. We have already referred to Rule 53; according to which, the area of validity specified in the licence may be extended by the authority which has got power to grant a licence. In Schedule II to the Rules, the heading of column No. 5 is licensing authority and the heading of column No. 7 is renewing authority. Undoubtedly., according to the definition of the term `licensing authority in S. 2 (1) (f) of the Act, it includes both, namely, the authority which can grant a licence and the authority which can renew it; but in relation to the heading of column No. 5 in Schedule II licensing authority means the authority which can grant the licence, and in relation to the heading of column No. 5 the licensing authority means the authority which can renew the licence. So far as item No. 9 (a) of that Schedule is concerned, the Central Government is the licensing authority which can grant the licence and the State Government is the licensing authority which can renew it. In view of the provisions of Rule 53, therefore, the State Government, that is, respondent No. 2, is not competent to extend the area of validity of the licence of the petitioners. 6. It has been contended by Mr. B.C. Ghose that really it is not a case of extending the area of validity as contemplated by Rule 53, and, therefore, that rule has no application to the present case. According to him, the area of validity means such area which is covered by the licence, for instance, if the licence is granted originally for one or two districts only, and subsequently, it is extended to other districts of the State; or, the licence is originally granted for one State and then it is extended to other States or to the whole of India. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention of Mr. Ghose either. The heading of column No. 6 of Schedule II is "Areas for which the licence can be granted". As against item No. 9 (a), the entry in column No. 6 is "within the premises to be specified in the licence". In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention of Mr. Ghose either. The heading of column No. 6 of Schedule II is "Areas for which the licence can be granted". As against item No. 9 (a), the entry in column No. 6 is "within the premises to be specified in the licence". In Form No. IX in which the licence is granted, the premises as required by column No. 6 of Schedule II is to be specified in column No. 3 of that Form, the heading whereof is "Place of business, factory or shop". In the original licence, as granted to the petitioners, the place of business was specified in column No. 3 as gun-factory, Monghyr. By the amendment allowed by respondent No. 2, the words "and Bakhtairpur" were added. In our opinion, this amounts to an extension of the area of validity within the meaning of Sec. 53 which could be done only by the Central Government, that is, respondent No. 1, which had power to grant a licence. This is also manifest from condition No. 5 of Form IX which has already been referred to earlier. 7. It was suggested in the course of argument that by the letter (Annexure 18), respondent No.1 delegated its power to respondent No. 2, and therefore, respondent No. 2 could vary a condition of the licence as to the place of business. The power to delegate is to be found in Sec. 43 of the Act. The power can be delegated under that section by the Central Government to a State Government, but only by a notification which must be published in the Official Gazette. There can be no delegation by a letter like Annexure 18. Further, even if there was any delegation of power to respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 1 by Annexure 18, that was modified and made conditional by the letter (Annexure A). The State Government, even if it be assumed that the power was delegated to it, could vary the condition of the licence only if the condition as specified in Annexure A was fulfilled. In that view of the matter also the State Government (respondent No. 2) could not make an amendment in the licence of the petitioners, thereby permitting them to manufacture fire-arms at a place other than mentioned in the licence as originally granted by the Central Government (respondent No. 1). 8. In that view of the matter also the State Government (respondent No. 2) could not make an amendment in the licence of the petitioners, thereby permitting them to manufacture fire-arms at a place other than mentioned in the licence as originally granted by the Central Government (respondent No. 1). 8. Since the powers of the respondents are derived from the statute and the rules framed thereunder, there can be no question of any promissory estoppel in favour of the petitioners as against the respondents. The writ also cannot be allowed on the ground that there is any violation of the principle of natural justice in the case, for the petitioners were not heard before the amendment was allowed, because even if the case is sent back to respondents 2 and 3 for giving a chance of hearing to the petitioners, they cannot allow the amendment to continue for it was without jurisdiction and the remand will be useless. It is well established that no writ should be issued which would ultimately prove to be useless and ineffective. 9. Great emphasis has been laid by the petitioners on the fact that hardship would be caused to them by the cancellation. That is not a matter to be considered by us. It is a matter which can be considered only by respondent No. 1. 10. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case without costs.