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1975 DIGILAW 95 (KER)

VELAYUDHAN v. NEELAKANTA IYYAN

1975-04-04

G.VISWANATHA.IYER

body1975
Judgment :- 1. This is a revision petition filed by the defendant against a decree for possession granted to the plaintiff under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act. With the defendant on the party array and after considering all his objections to the plaintiff's claim for recovery of certain sum of money charged on the property, a decree for money was given to the plaintiff in O. S.338 of 1963. The claim put forward by the defendant in that suit was that he is a varamdar entitled to protection and that the plaintiff's claim for recovery of money charged on the property can only be subject to his 'varam' right. In the preliminary judgment dated 9-12-1964 that claim was negatived. Before the final decree was passed on 10-3-1970,Act XXXV of 1969 had come into force and the defendant again pressed his claim for tenancy in the final decree proceedings. That was again negatived and final decree was granted to the plaintiff as stated above. The plaintiff brought the property for sale and purchased it. Ext. A-3 dated 9 21973 is the sale certificate. That shows that the rights of the defendants including the present defendant was proclaimed for sale and sold. Pursuant to the sale certificate the plaintiff took delivery of the property under Ext. A-4 dated 23-3-1973. The present suit for recovery was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the defendant trespassed into the plaint property on 1-5-1973. The defendant again contended that he is a tenant and that there was no actual recovery of possession of the property from him in execution of the earlier decree. This contention was repelled and the plaintiff was granted a decree for recovery of possession. The revision petition is filed in these circumstances. 2. The main point pressed by the petitioner's counsel is that the court below acted without jurisdiction in passing the decree for possession. According to him, since the defendant had put forward a claim for tenancy the civil court should have stayed the suit and referred the matter to the Land Tribunal under S.125 (3) of Act I of 1964 and got a decision from that Tribunal before passing the decree. The failure to comply with this statutory requirement, according to the revision petitioner's counsel, vitiates the decree of the lower court. 3. The failure to comply with this statutory requirement, according to the revision petitioner's counsel, vitiates the decree of the lower court. 3. S.125(3) provides that the Civil Court shall stay the suit or other proceeding if any question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including the question as to whether the person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, and refer such question to the Land Tribunal for the decision of that question. The Land Tribunal shall decide that question and return the records together with its decision to the civil court. The civil court shall then proceed to decide the suit or other proceeding accepting the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it. For the purpose of appeal the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question shall be deemed to be finding of the civil court. The point to be considered here is whether in this suit under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act any question regarding the rights of a tenant or whether the defendant is a tenant arises for consideration. S.6 of the Specific Relief Act is in the following terms: (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property, otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession, or against the Government." The only point to be looked into as per this Section is whether the plaintiff was dispossessed without his consent of any immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. That means, irrespective of any title to the property which may be claimed by either party, if the plaintiff has been dispossessed without his consent otherwise than in due course of law, he can recover possession. So the only question that would arise in such a suit will be whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed. A final decision one way or other of the suit will depend on a finding on this question alone. So the question whether the defendant is a tenant does not arise for consideration. So the only question that would arise in such a suit will be whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed. A final decision one way or other of the suit will depend on a finding on this question alone. So the question whether the defendant is a tenant does not arise for consideration. Even if he is a tenant, if he has trespassed into the property, the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act. So it cannot be said that in this suit the defendant's right as a tenant arises for consideration. The petitioner's counsel referred to the decision of the Division Bench in Sankaran v. Rajammal (1974 KLT 488) and urged that the principle of that decision applies to this case. In that case a suit for recovery of possession on the basis of title was being contested on a claim of tenancy. The question whether the defendant in that case is a tenant or not naturally arose for consideration and so Their Lordships held that S.125(3) is a bar for the civil court to consider that question without calling for a decision of the Land Tribunal. In a suit on title even if the defendant had trespassed into the property if he can show a better title he can non-suit the plaintiff. So a decision whether the defendant has got a right to be in possession as a tenant will have to be considered and decided before a decree is granted to the plaintiff. That is not the case in a suit under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act. As stated earlier, the only point to be considered is whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed without his consent by the defendant otherwise than in due course of law. If that is found against the defendant, even if he has got any title or right to be in possession, he cannot resist the plaintiff's suit. The facts of this case come under the latter category. Therefore the principle of the Division Bench decision referred to above does not apply. 4. On the facts the finding of the lower court seems to be not open to challenge. Ext. A-3 sale certificate shows that all the rights of the defendants were sold in court auction and purchased by the plaintiff. Ext. A-4 is the delivery list evidencing recovery of possession of the property from the defendant. 4. On the facts the finding of the lower court seems to be not open to challenge. Ext. A-3 sale certificate shows that all the rights of the defendants were sold in court auction and purchased by the plaintiff. Ext. A-4 is the delivery list evidencing recovery of possession of the property from the defendant. The Amin who went to effect delivery to the plaintiff is examined as P. W. 2 and he has categorically stated that he put the plaintiff in possession of the property. The other witnesses and documents referred to by the learned Munsiff clearly support the conclusion of the lower court. In the result, there is no merit in this revision petition. It is dismissed with costs.