Judgment Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the new Code) for quashing an order, dated the 10th July, 1974, passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Latehar, directing issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused-petitioner, in exercise of powers conferred by section 204 of the Code, after consideration of an inquiry report submitted by Shree R. Chand, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Latehar, that a prima facie case under section 326, 307, 395 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code had been made out against the accused-petitioner. 2. From the statements made in the application filed in this Court it appears that the complainant-opposite party no. 1 filed a petition of complaint on the 29th April, 1974 before Shree A.C. Das, Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Latehar, against the petitioner and five unknown persons for their prosecution under sections 147, 326, 342, 395, 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On receipt of the complaint, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and passed an order saying that it was a fit case in which the issuance of process against the accused should be postponed and the Officer-in-charge, Latehar police-station should be directed to investigate into the case and submit the final form. From the order, dated the 11th June, 1974, it appears that a protest petition was filed on behalf of the complainant against the investigation by the Police and it was directed to be put up on the 24th June, 1974. On the 24th June, 1974, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate observed in his order that, by his order, dated the 29th April, 1974, he had directed the Officer-in-charge, Latehar police-station to investigate into the case; but the said Officer-in-charge, instead of investigating into the case, had sent a report after inquiry into the matter, which was perfunctory. He directed that the case be sent to Shree R. Chand, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, to hold inquiry into the matter and to submit his report. The relevant portion of the order in this regard runs as follows: "Now let this case is sent to Shri R. Chand, J.M. 1st class to hold enquiry into the matter and submit his report by 10-7-74." 3. The relevant portion of the order in this regard runs as follows: "Now let this case is sent to Shri R. Chand, J.M. 1st class to hold enquiry into the matter and submit his report by 10-7-74." 3. On the 8th July, 1974, the inquiry report of Shree R. Chand was received and it was ordered to be put up on the date fixed, i.e. 10th July, 1974. On the 10th July, 1974, after perusing the inquiry report, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate passed the impugned order directing issuance of a warrant of arrest against the petitioner, as indicated earlier. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order directing issuance of the warrant of arrest is vitiated due to an illegal procedure adopted by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate which is not sanctioned by the provision of the new Code. In that connection he has drawn my attention to subsection (i) of section 202 of the new Code, the relevant portion of which reads as follows : "202. (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Sec. 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police-officer or by such other person, as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding" Learned counsel has submitted that, in view of sub-section (1) of section 202 of the new Code, the Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been made over to him under section 192, may either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person, as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. According to learned counsel, neither the Magistrate who has received the complaint initially, nor the Magistrate to whom it has been made over in accordance with section 192, can send the same to any other Magistrate for inquiry and report, as it could have been done under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the 'old Code'). The relevant portion of sub-section (1) of section 202 of the old Code read as follows:- "202 (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself, or, if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate' of the third class, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police-officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint: 5. Under section 202 (I) of the new Code, the words "direct an inquiry by any Magistrate subordinate to him" have been omitted. Now, the.....question is as to whether the Magistrate receiving the complaint can direct any other Magistrate subordinate to him to hold an inquiry and to submit report in view of the fact that even in sub-section (1) of section 202 of the new Code the following words occur: "or direct an investigation to be made by a police-officer or by such other person as he thinks fit". According to learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party, the expression "such other person as he thinks fit" will also include any other Magistrate. In my opinion, such construction is not possible, because, if it is read that the Magistrate "on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under sec. 192, may either inquire into the case himself or by such other person as he thinks fit", it will be grammatically incorrect. Therefore, it has to be held that the words "by such other person as he thinks fit" refer only to an investigation. 192, may either inquire into the case himself or by such other person as he thinks fit", it will be grammatically incorrect. Therefore, it has to be held that the words "by such other person as he thinks fit" refer only to an investigation. That means that such Magistrate can direct investigation to be made either by a police-officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. 6. It has also been faintly contended on behalf of the complainant that even a Magistrate, while submitting an inquiry report, will be deemed to have made the investigation. This interpretation cannot be accepted, because the words "inquiry" and "investigation" have been separately defined in the new Code. The word "inquiry" has been defined in section 2 (g) in these words :- "2. (g) 'inquiry' means every inquiry other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court;" "Investigation" has been defined as follows : "2 (h) 'investigation' includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;" From a bare reference to the definition of 'investigation' it is obvious that it includes all the proceedings for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person other than a Magistrate. As such, a Magistrate cannot be deemed to have investigated into the 'case while submitting his inquiry report. 7. It has been then submitted by learned Standing counsel on behalf of the opposite party that, in exercise of power under section 192 of the new Code, any Chief Judicial Magistrate or Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate can make over any case for inquiry under section 202 of the Code after taking cognizance and the Magistrate to whom the case is made over for inquiry can hold an inquiry and submit a report. It has also been pointed out that, in view of the words "make over" substituted for the word "transfer" in the old Code, now there is no transfer of the case for inquiry and the Magistrate who has taken cognizance remains in seisin of the case and, after inquiry, report, has to be submitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be. 8. 8. There is some change in the wordings of section 192 in the new Code from the wording of section 192 of the old Code. Section 192 (1) of the old Code read as follows: “192 (1) Any Chief Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may transfer any case, of which he has taken cognizance, for inquiry or trial to any Magistrate subordinate to him.” Section 192 (1) of the new Code reads thus :- "192 (1) Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him" In section 192 (1) of the old Code the word "transfer" had been used which has been substituted by the words "make over" in section 192 (1) of the new Code. 9. It is difficult to say as to why the word 'transfer' used in section 192 of the old Code has been substituted by the words "make over" in the new Code. However, in Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1964 edition, the words "make over" mean "to remake, reconstruct to transfer." In a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Radhabullav Roy VS. Benode Behari their Lordships, while interpreting the effect of an order of transfer under section 192 of the old Code, observed as follows : "We think that when once the District Magistrate made the case over for disposal to the Deputy Magistrate, it was out of his hands and he was not competent to pass any order relating to it other than an order such as might have been made by him under Ch. XXXII of the Code." Similarly, in the case of Hafizar Rahman v. Aminal Raque while construing the scope of section 192(1) of the old Code, it was observed : "This was the view adopted by this Court in Golapdy Sheikh v. Queen Empress (I.L.R. 27 Calcutta 979) in which it was held that, where cognizance had been taken of an offence on a police report and the case had been made over to a subordinate Magistrate, so long as the case connected with that offence remained with the subordinate Magistrate, no other Magistrate was competent to deal with it and applications for warrants against other persons concerned in that offence should be made to the Magistrate to whom the case had been transferred and to no other Magistrate." Again in Ram Barai Singh v. Ram Pratap Rai it was observed by Jawala Prasad, J. in respect of an order of transfer under section 192 as follows : "The inquiry was by the order of the Sessions Judge made over to the District Magistrate or to any other Subordinate Magistrate to whom the District Magistrate might make over the inquiry. The seisin of the entire case therefore vested in the District Magistrate, and in making over the inquiry to Mr. Kaviraj the entire case was made over to him, for there is no sanction in law for making over an intermediate judicial inquiry and retaining seisin of the case in one's self." From the aforesaid pronouncements it is obvious that their Lordships have interpreted the order of transfer in sub-section (1) of section 192 of the old Code to mean "to make over" a case for inquiry or trial. As such, the words "make over" used in section 192 or section 202 of the new Code do not make any difference and they mean transfer of the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate. 10. It was next contended on behalf of the opposite party that the order, dated the 24th June, 1974, sending the case to Shree R. Chand should be construed as an order under section 192 of the new Code making over the inquiry to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, on the other hand, submitted that the word "inquiry" mentioned in section 192 of the new Code as well as of the old Code refers to inquiry other than an inquiry under section 202. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, on the other hand, submitted that the word "inquiry" mentioned in section 192 of the new Code as well as of the old Code refers to inquiry other than an inquiry under section 202. He has urged that 'inquiry' in section 192 should mean an inquiry relating to proceedings under sections 107 etc. occurring in Chapter VIII, relating to proceedings under sections 145 etc. occurring in Chapter XII and that relating to commitment inquiries under Chapter XVIII of the old Code, which are now embodied in Chapter VIII, Chapter X and section 209 of Chapter XVI of the new Code. As such, a case cannot be transferred or made over for inquiry under section 202 to another Magistrate. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hajizar Rahman v. Aminal Haque and a Single Judge judgment of the Mysore High Court in A.N. Vedantha Iyengar v. H.S. Marigouda. In the case of Hajizar Rahman, it was observed: "I have already pointed out that the term 'inquiry' in S. 192(1) is used with special reference to such inquiries as are held in connation with proceedings under Chaps VIII, XII and XVIII of the Code. The inquiry which is contemplated by S. 202, on the other hand, is merely for the limited purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a complaint in order to enable the Magistrate to decide whether an accused person should be summoned or the complaint against him should be dismissed under S. 203.......It is clear that a Magistrate who orders an inquiry under S. 202 of the Code does not transfer the case at all. Ordinarily he merely retains the case in his own file and directs some suitable person to hold an inquiry and send the report to him. Ordinarily he merely retains the case in his own file and directs some suitable person to hold an inquiry and send the report to him. It follows therefore that an order for an inquiry under S. 202 of the Code can not operate as a transfer under S. 192 (1)." Those cases related to the old Code and in that context it was observed that sending for inquiry under section 202 to another Magistrate never meant transfer of the case in exercise of the powers under section 192 of the old Code; the Magistrate who had taken cognizance of the offence remained in seisin of the case and he simply called for an inquiry report from another Magistrate. I have already pointed out that under the scheme of the new a Magistrate, before whom the complaint is made, cannot send it to another Magistrate for inquiry and report under section 202. If he does not want to hold the inquiry himself, he has to make over the case for inquiry to another Magistrate in accordance with section 192. As such, in my opinion, now the word 'inquiry' under section 192 will also include an inquiry under section 202 of the new Code. 11. There is another reason for taking this view. Section 192 prescribes that any Chief Judicial Magistrate may, “after taking cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry". These words obviously cannot apply to inquiries relating proceedings under section 107 or 145. Now, there is no commitment inquiry like the one under Chapter XVIII of the old Code. In that view of the matter, if it is held that under the new Code the word 'inquiry' mentioned in section 192 is to mean inquiries relating to proceedings under sections 107 and 145 and commitment inquiries only then the words "after taking cognizance of an offence" will become redundant. 12. In that view of the matter, if it is held that under the new Code the word 'inquiry' mentioned in section 192 is to mean inquiries relating to proceedings under sections 107 and 145 and commitment inquiries only then the words "after taking cognizance of an offence" will become redundant. 12. On a proper construction of the different sections of the new Code, I am of the view that any Judicial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, may inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by any other person but he cannot get it inquired into by any other' Magistrate without passing an order under section 192 of the new Code, Once an order under section 192 is passed, such Magistrate, to whom the case is made over, can also inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police-officer or by any such other person, as he thinks fit. After the order under section 192, the Magistrate to whom the case is made over for inquiry is in seisin of the case and such transferee Magistrate can, on a consideration of the materials on record, including the result of the inquiry or investigation, pass an order under section 203 of the Code dismissing the complaint, or he can direct issuance of process under section 204 of the new Code. In the case of Sudama Singh Vs. Kavindra Narain Singh' a Bench of this Court has already held that the Magistrate to whom the case is transferred under section 192 of the old Code can also issue process under section 204 of that Code. 13. In the instant case from the records it does not appear that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate at any stage passed an order under section 192 of the new Code making over the case for inquiry to Shree R. Chand, Judicial Magistrate, First Class. 13. In the instant case from the records it does not appear that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate at any stage passed an order under section 192 of the new Code making over the case for inquiry to Shree R. Chand, Judicial Magistrate, First Class. The order, dated the 24th June, 1974, of the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate directing that the case be sent to Shree R. Chand will not be deemed to be an order under section 192 of the Dew Code, because the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate had directed Shree R. Chand to submit his report to him and actually Shree R. Chand submitted his report to the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, on the basis of which the impugned order, dated the 10th July, 1974, was passed. It has, therefore, to be held that the order of the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate directing issuance of the warrant of arrest against the petitioner, on the basis of the report submitted by Shree R. Chand is in contravention of the provisions of the new Code. 14. In the result, the application is allowed and the proceedings taken after the 24th June, 1974 are quashed. It will, however, be open to the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate if he thinks proper, to inquire into the case himself, or to pass an order under section 192 of the new Code, if he wants to get the matter inquired into by some other Magistrate. Application allowed.