ORDER Gopi Nath, J. - This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It challenges a Notification No. 2804 (ST) XXXVI-1-47 (ST)-74, dated 26th April, 1974, issued by the State Govt. under Rule 119 (1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971, and an order passed under R. 119 (4) dated 3rd of May, 1974. The notification dated 26th April 1974 is Annexure `A' and the order dated 3rd May, 1974 is Annexure `S-1', to the petition. Annexure A declares the employment of all workmen under the Eveready Flash Light Co. - a division of M/s. Union Carbide India Ltd., petitioner No. 1, to be an employment to which the provisions of R. 119 apply. Annexure S-1 cancels the suspension orders passed against the workmen of the concerned factory and issued directions regarding the domestic enquiry instituted against them. Annexure A is challenged, inter alia, on the grounds that it has been issued in colourable exercise of power and for a collateral purpose and that it is tainted with male fides and is also hit by Art. 14. Annexure S-1 is challenged on the grounds (1) that the order is beyond the scope of R. 119 (4) and (2) that it has been passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. The two notifications are as follows : The Notification dated 26-4-74 Annexure A reads: "In exercise of the powers under sub-rule (1) of Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971, the Governor, being of opinion that such employment or class of employment is essential for securing the maintenance of public order and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of community, is pleased to declare the employment of all workmen as defined in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 under the Eveready Flash Light Company, Lucknow, a division of M/s. Union Carbide India, Ltd., to be employment to which the provisions of the said rule apply." Annexure S-1 states: "Whereas the employment of all workmen as defined in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under the Eveready Flash Light Company Limited, Lucknow, a division of Messrs. Union Carbide India Ltd., has been declared by notification No. 2804 (S. T.)/ 36-1-47 (S. T.)-74 dated April 26, 1974, to be employment to which the provisions of Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 apply; And whereas on account of disputes between the employer and the workmen of this Company which have been going on for some time, due to which the production in the factory is at a stand-still, and during the course of the said disputes the employer has placed under suspension 26 workmen as mentioned in their notices Nos. F/T) 3/74, dated April 18, 1974 and F/T/4/74 dated April 19, 1974 and have prohibited them from entering the factory which is causing further discontent among the entire workmen of the Company, And whereas the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary for maintaining supplies essential to the life of the community so to do; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (4) of the said R. 119, the Governor is pleased to regulate the conditions of services of the workmen who have been placed under suspension as aforesaid, to the following extent, namely: 1. The disciplinary inquiry against the said 26 workmen shall be conduct ed by a public officer nominated by the Labour Commissioner, U.P. instead of by a nominee of the employer. 2. The enquiry shall be concluded of expeditiously as possible. 3. The employer as well as the workmen shall be bound by the findings and recommendations of the said inquiring officer, The aforesaid suspension shall stand revoked immediately". 2. The Union Carbide India Ltd., petitioner No. 1, is the proprietor of the Eveready Flash Light Company, which is engaged in the manufacture of flash light cases, commonly known as torches. Petitioner No. 2 is its works manager. The factory employs a large number of workmen. A long term settlement, it appears, was entered into between the petitioner Company and its hourly rated workmen through their Union in July, 1969, which was to continue up to 25th Dec. 1973 On 22nd December, 1973 it is stated another charter of demands was put forward by the workmen to the employers and before any discussion could take place, the workmen started agitation for the fulfilment of their demands. The Assistant Labour Commissioner intervened and a Conciliation Board was formed. July 15, 1974 was fixed for conciliation proceedings. 1973 On 22nd December, 1973 it is stated another charter of demands was put forward by the workmen to the employers and before any discussion could take place, the workmen started agitation for the fulfilment of their demands. The Assistant Labour Commissioner intervened and a Conciliation Board was formed. July 15, 1974 was fixed for conciliation proceedings. Paragraph 2 (k) of the petition states that before the conciliation proceedings could take place the workmen started indulging in subversive activities by stopping ingress and egress of the staff to the factory premises and giving threats of violence to them. These threats were further intensified from 26th March, 1974. Serious acts of misconduct are alleged to have been committed by a large number of workmen but it is stated that only two of them were charge-sheeted and suspended. They were Sri A. K. S. Rana and Sri Shiva Kailash. Sri Rana it is alleged physically assaulted a foreman of the factory inside its premises and made attempts to lead a group of workmen to the production office for assaulting the supervisory staff. He was suspended on 31st March 1974. The workmen in protest struck work and launched an agitation and threatened the supervisory and managerial staff with dire consequences. The counter-affidavit gives a counter version of the incident but admits that there was a great agitation prevailing in the factory on that date due to the suspension of the two employees. The petition states that the factory lights were switched off and telephone connections were cut and the supervisory staff was assaulted. The staff took refuge in a room and managed to contact the police authorities somehow, The police arrived on the scene and rescued them by opening fire on the agitators. This fact finds corroboration from a statement made by respondent No. 2 in the Legislative Assembly in connection with a query regarding opening of fire by police on the workmen of the Eveready Flash Light Company. A copy of the statement is filed as Annexure R-1 to the second rejoinder affidavit. 3. It is clear from the statement as also from the allegations in the petition that the situation in the Everready Flash Light Company on the 31st March, 1974 was very tense on account of the agitation of the workmen against the employers. A copy of the statement is filed as Annexure R-1 to the second rejoinder affidavit. 3. It is clear from the statement as also from the allegations in the petition that the situation in the Everready Flash Light Company on the 31st March, 1974 was very tense on account of the agitation of the workmen against the employers. A lock-out was declared the next day and a press conference was called by the Works Manager of the Company on April 3, 1974 at 6 p.m. After he had finished his address, the police arrived on the scene, and arrested three of the Company's Officers who were sent to the court of a Magistrate next morning. The agitation continued and the work-men, it is stated committed grave and serious acts of indiscipline and misconduct between the 1st and 17th of April, 1974. Twenty four workmen were suspended during this period. The number of suspended and charge-sheeted work-men thus now totalled to 26. A domestic enquiry was initiated against them. The suspended workmen are respondents Nos. 4 to 29 to the petition. It was in this state of industrial unrest that the notification dated 26th April, 1974 was issued. Paragraph 4E of the petition states that on 23rd April, 1974 a meeting was held at the residence of respondent No. 2. He asked the management to revoke the suspension orders and withdraw the charge-sheets otherwise R. 119 of the Defence of India Rules may have to be invoked. In reply the counter-affidavit of Sri Vishnu Prahash, filed on behalf of the State states that in the meeting referred to above respondent No. 2 impressed upon the Management the desirability of restoring industrial peace so that production of torches, articles essential to the life of the community may not be disrupted. He further tried to impress upon the management the necessity of bringing about normalcy so that the agitation might not engulf other areas causing danger to public order and in this connection pointed out that in case no amicable settlement was forthcoming the Government might have to take suitable action under R. 119 of the De fence of India Rules. The lock-out, it appears, was partially lifted but the situation continued to be explosive and no settlement being in sight the Government, it is stated, was left with no option but to issue the impugned notifications. The lock-out, it appears, was partially lifted but the situation continued to be explosive and no settlement being in sight the Government, it is stated, was left with no option but to issue the impugned notifications. It is clear from these averments that the impugned orders were passed on account of the industrial unrest and the serious law and order situation existing in the factory. It is further clear that the orders were issued with a view to controlling the disorder and preventing its spreading over to other areas as also to bringing about industrial peace. The counter-affidavit of Sri Vishnu Prakesh has made it very plain that the declaration under sub-rule (1) of R. 119 "for securing the maintenance of public order" was made not because of the essential character of the employment being closely connected to that purpose but because of the conditions developing in the undertaking requiring immediate control. The averments are clear that the issue of the notification was necessitated so that the agitation may not engulf the industrial areas causing danger to public order. The question is whether this approach of the Government for the invocation of the rule as regards the purpose of securing maintenance of public order was correct. 4. Rule 119 (1) reads: "This rule applies to all employment under the Central Government or the State Government and to any employment or class of employment which the Central Government or the State Government, being of opinion that such employment or class of employment is essential for securing the Defence of India and Civil Defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services, essential to the life of the community may, by notification declare to be an employment or class of employment to which this rule applies". 5. It declares what are essential services and provides that in addition to the employments under the Central Govt. or the State Govt., any employment or class of employment which such Government considers essential for the various purposes mentioned in the rule may be declared an employment to which the rule applies. Thus before a declaration can be made under sub-rule (1) the Government is required to apply its mind to the fact whether the employment or class of employment is connected with the purposes mentioned in the rule. Thus before a declaration can be made under sub-rule (1) the Government is required to apply its mind to the fact whether the employment or class of employment is connected with the purposes mentioned in the rule. In other words the nature of the employment and its connection with the purposes mentioned as also its potentialities in that direction are the relevant factors which have to be taken into consideration for applying the rule to the employment. A situation developed in an employment cannot alter its basic character, and relate it to a purpose to which, it may not be related on its own. Happening of events may have the effect of producing conditions which in their turn may be touching on matters mentioned in the sub-rule but by this process the employment cannot be said to be one for that purpose. As soon as the conditions disappear the touch with the purposes vanishes. If a declaration depended on condition created, its nature of being essential service will cease on the disappearance of those conditions and may re-appear on the reoccurence of the same or another condition. The rule, to my mind, does not envisage such a construction. An employment or class of employment is either essential service or it is not. Conditions or situations cannot control its basic character. It will not become an essential service if by its nature it has no connection with it. 6. The scope of the rule was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd., ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ). That case was concerned with Rule 126AA of the Defence of India Rules 1962 which corresponds to the present R. 119. Rule 126AA was applied by the Govt. of Assam to a large number of employments as they were considered essential for securing public safety and maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Their Lordships held that the matter had to be viewed from the angle whether considering the nature of the employment it was impossible for any reasonable man to come to the opinion that the employment was essential for the purposes mentioned in the notification. Their Lordships held that the matter had to be viewed from the angle whether considering the nature of the employment it was impossible for any reasonable man to come to the opinion that the employment was essential for the purposes mentioned in the notification. It was held that if the nature of the employment had a nexus with the purposes specified then the formation of the Government's opinion could not be questioned as it depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. Thus the nature of the employment had to have a nexus with the purposes mentioned in the rule. On the own showing of the Government "securing the maintenance of the public order" was not a matter connected with the nature of the employment but was related to the situation developed in the factory. Thus the Government did not apply itself correctly to the rule for securing the maintenance of public order. 7. Of the two purposes mentioned in the notification, namely (i) securing the maintenance of public order; and (ii) maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it seems to me that the Government misdirected itself on the first and misconceived its power. The declaration was made (sic) (not?) on the ground that the employment was concerned with securing the maintenance of public order but because the disorder arising in the factory had to be controlled and industrial peace restored. The various sub-clauses of Rule 119 suggest that the notification is intended to prevent disruption of essential services which the employment by its nature is capable of securing or maintaining. Sub-rule (1) declares what are essential services in the context of emergency. Sub-rule (2) prevents persons engaged in the employment to which sub-rule (1) is applied from leaving the area or areas specified in the order. Sub-rule (3) makes illegal abandonment of employment or closing down of establishments. Sub-rule (4) regulates wages and other conditions of service of persons engaged in an employment notified under sub-rule (1). R. 119 is thus not essentially concerned with preventing or prohibiting strikes and lock-outs or managing an essential undertaking on the ground of its unsatisfactory working. There are other provisions under the Defence of India Rules which directly deal with such matters. 8. Thus one of the two purposes mentioned in the notification, viz, securing the maintenance of public peace appears to be misconceived. 9. There are other provisions under the Defence of India Rules which directly deal with such matters. 8. Thus one of the two purposes mentioned in the notification, viz, securing the maintenance of public peace appears to be misconceived. 9. We shall now consider the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents of this part of the case. It was urged that the rule is applied not to an industry but to an employment or class of employment. Purposes mentioned in the rule have, therefore, to be referred to the employment and not to the industry. Even under this argument the employment or class of employment has to have a nexus to the purposes mentioned in the rule. The class of employment notified was the workmen of the Eveready Flash Light Company and one of the purposes referred was "securing the maintenance of public order". This class of employment thus had to have a nexus to the purpose mentioned. In other words the employment of this class had to be for securing the maintenance of public order in order to be covered under the rule. According to the facts found the class was not so employed. Because of its agitation its appeasement was considered connected with "securing the maintenance of public order." According to the counter-affidavit of the State the disorder arising on account of the industrial unrest needed immediate control. Restoration of industrial peace was thus connected with securing the maintenance of public order and not the class of employment notified. 10. In my opinion the declaration could only be made if the employment was connected with securing the maintenance of public order, and a hope that public disorder would be prevented or controlled by the declaration would not be a justification for attracting the rule. 11. It was then urged that employment in a torch factory could by its nature be deemed to be connected with securing the maintenance of public order. 11. It was then urged that employment in a torch factory could by its nature be deemed to be connected with securing the maintenance of public order. Reliance in this connection was placed on State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) where their Lordships observed that "where certain employments are essential for the maintenance of supply and services necessary to the life of the community the Governor may very well come to the conclusion that those employments are also necessary for securing public safety, for if supplies and services necessary to the life of the community are not maintained, there may be danger to public safety." This argument is negatived by the stand taken by the Govt. that the "public order" clause was attracted because the situation in the factory was explosive and the industrial unrest was likely to engulf the entire Aish Bagh industrial area. The observations of the Supreme Court cannot in the circumstances be applied to the instant case. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disorder prevailing was concerned only with law and order and not with public order. It was urged that it was a localised matter and did not concern the public at large. Learned counsel invited my attention to Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ) and Bhupal Chandra v. Arif Ali, ( AIR 1974 SC 255 ) where a distinction has been drawn between maintenance of public order and maintenance of law and order. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand invited my attention to Naresh Chandra Gangoli for Ram Prasad Das v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1959 SC 1335 ). Sushanta Goswami v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1969 SC 1004 ). Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ), Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1972 SC 1656 ) and Golam Hussain v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta ( AIR 1974 SC 1336 ) and urged that the instant case was a case of public disorder and not merely of "law and order." 13. It seems unnecessary to enter into this controversy as the purpose relating to "maintenance of public order" as required under the rule is not attracted to the case on the stand taken by the State. 14. It seems unnecessary to enter into this controversy as the purpose relating to "maintenance of public order" as required under the rule is not attracted to the case on the stand taken by the State. 14. It was then urged that the subjective satisfaction of the Government on the purposes set out could not be questioned. Reliance was placed on Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate Burdwan ( AIR 1964 SC 334 ), Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1966 SC 91 ), Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ) and M. A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala ( 1974 (2) SCC 687 ): ( AIR 1974 SC 2249 ). The subjective satisfaction of an authority is not open to question if it has formed the opinion within the four corners of the principles recognised for the formation of opinions in law. The authority has to call its attention to the matters it is required under the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication to consider and has to exclude matters from consideration which are irrelevant. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947 (2) All ER 680). See also State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan, ( AIR 1960 SC 1223 ). Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1966 SC 91 ). It has to apply its mind properly to the statute before making the order. Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1966 SC 1140 ), Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board ( AIR 1967 SC 295 ). An administrative discretion is reviewable for legal error, procedural defect or abuse. It is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for a belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purposes of the section. See Narayanappa v. Commr., Income-tax ( 1967 (1) SCR 590 ) : ( AIR 1967 SC 523 ). The opinion of the Government can also be challenged on the ground that no reasonable person would reach that opinion. See Narayanappa v. Commr., Income-tax ( 1967 (1) SCR 590 ) : ( AIR 1967 SC 523 ). The opinion of the Government can also be challenged on the ground that no reasonable person would reach that opinion. The Supreme Court struck down the notification under R. 126AA of the Defence of India Rules in State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) in respect of Veneering Mills on the ground that no reasonable person could consider the employment in that mill essential for the maintenance of sup plies and services necessary for the life of the community and for securing public safety. A person entrusted with discretion must direct himself properly on law. Lord Upjohn in Bed fields v. Minister of Agriculture 1968 (1) All ER 694. summarised the law on the subject thus: "The Minister in exercising his powers and duties conferred on him by statute can only be controlled by a prerogative order which will only issue if he acts unlawfully. Unlawful behaviour by the Minister may be stated with sufficient accuracy; (a) by an outright refusal to consider the relevant matter, or (b) by misdirecting himself in point of law. or (c) by taking into account some wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration, or (d) by wholly omitting to take into account a relevant consideration." In State of Assam (supra) the Supreme Court held that "it was open to a court to see whether the opinion was relevant and germane to the circumstances which fell to be considered under the rule whether they were such as can possibly and rationally support the conclusion drawn by the authorities. The subjective satisfaction of the Government can thus be examined on the principles set out above". We are satisfied that the Government's opinion on the purpose of securing maintenance of public order is vitiated on the ground that it misdirected itself on that purpose. 15. As regards the second purpose mentioned in the notification, namely, "maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of the community" it seems to me that no exception can be taken to the opinion of the Government on it. The employment was concerned with the manufacture, production and supplies of torches which, according to the counter-affidavit of Sri Vishnu Prakash, were articles of necessity for the common man and a commodity essential to the life of the community. The employment was concerned with the manufacture, production and supplies of torches which, according to the counter-affidavit of Sri Vishnu Prakash, were articles of necessity for the common man and a commodity essential to the life of the community. It cannot be held that no reasonable person would come to a conclusion that the employment was not essential for that purpose. The subjective satisfaction of the Government on that purpose is not vitiated by any error of law. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the production and manufacture of torches could not be covered by the term "supply and services." It could only be supply but not service. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1974 SC 911 ). It was held in that case that "the complex needs and amenities of modern life and multifarious obligations of a welfare State mingle supplies and services so much that concentric circle geometry becomes a misleading stroke of conceptualism in this jural area. For example, an essential commodity is at once a supply and a service." 17. The position which thus emerges is that of the two purposes mentioned in the notification, the one relating to the maintenance of public order is irrelevant. It was non-existent for the issue of the notification, in that, the employment, on the case set out by the State could not be said to be connected with it. The question then arises whether the notification can be upheld, on the other purpose mentioned in the notification. A notification under sub-rule (1) of R. 119 is issued on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. See State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra). It is well settled that if one of the grounds or reasons leading to the subjective satisfaction of an authority is found to be nonexistent or irrelevant or misconceived the order becomes invalid, and it would not avail the authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons are good and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is well settled that if one of the grounds or reasons leading to the subjective satisfaction of an authority is found to be nonexistent or irrelevant or misconceived the order becomes invalid, and it would not avail the authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons are good and do not suffer from any infirmity. See Dwarika Prasad v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1975 SC 134 ), Biram Chand v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1974 SC 1161 ), Prabhu Dayal v. District Magistrate, Kamrup, ( AIR 1974 SC 183 ), Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1974 SC 156 ), Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ), Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1966 SC 1140 ), Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ), Dwarka Das Bhatia v. State of Jammu and Kashmir ( AIR 1957 SC 164 ) and Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1954 SC 179 ). 18. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the order could be sustained for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, is negatived by the authorities cited above. To hold so would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective satisfaction of the executive authority which to my mind appears against the legislative policy underlying the statute. 19. It was then urged that a purpose is distinct from a ground. The various purposes mentioned in R. 119 are in the nature of reasons for declaring an employment an essential service. Before an order is issued the Government has to be satisfied that an employment or class of employment is essential for one or more purposes mentioned in the rule. If the Government issues a notification by forming an opinion on the combined effect of two purposes mentioned in the rule it could not be predicated whether it would have issued the notification if it was satisfied only in respect of one. Both the purposes, namely, securing the maintenance of public order and maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community are joined by the conjunction `and'. Both the purposes, namely, securing the maintenance of public order and maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community are joined by the conjunction `and'. In Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1974 SC 156 ) their Lordships emphasised the effect of this conjunction and held that in such a situation it is the combined effect of the two which can properly be regarded as having brought about the order. Absence of one may not have led to the passing of the order, In my opinion the rule laid down in the cases cited above fully applies, and one of the purposes being misconceived the order cannot be upheld. 20. It was then urged that the principle of irrelevant ground vitiating the order applies only in those cases where grounds are required to be given or communicated. Support was sought from Bhupal Chandra v. Arif Ali ( AIR 1974 SC 255 ). That case does not lay down this proposition at all, The principle relates to the exercise of statutory power and the order has to stand or fall on its own. I find no force in this contention. 21. It was lastly urged that the order had to be upheld if one out of the two grounds was found to be valid. Reliance was placed on State of Maharashtra v. Babu Lal Kriparam Takkamore ( AIR 1967 SC 1353 ) and Gajraj Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1973 SC 1285 ) as also on two unreported decisions of this Court, in Writ Petn. No. 5115 of 1973 decided on 6-3-1974 (All) and Special Appeal No. 150 of 1974 decided on 9-9-1974 (All). These were not cases of subjective satisfaction but were of opinions formed on objective tests. In State of Maharashtra (supra) as well as in the case of Gajraj Singh (supra) the Supreme Court itself laid down that orders required to be passed on objective tests stand on a different footing from those passed on subjective satisfaction. In the case of the former the order can be upheld if it can be sustained on any of the grounds mentioned in the order while in the case of the latter the order fails if even one out of the several grounds mentioned, is found to be irrelevant or non-existent. The distinction lies in the two kinds of satisfaction envisaged by law. The distinction lies in the two kinds of satisfaction envisaged by law. 22. Learned counsel submitted that R. 119 requires satisfaction on an objective basis. He drew a distinction between the expressions "is of opinion" and "is satisfied". The expression `is of opinion' according to him requires formation of opinion on objective tests. The rule laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Babu Lal Kriparam Takkamore ( AIR 1967 SC 1353 ) would according to learned counsel apply in the instant case. 23. In State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) it has been held that an order under R. 126AA corresponding to sub-rule (1) of R. 119 is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. 24. After the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court the argument of objective satisfaction is no longer open in this case. 25. The order dated 26-4-1973 cannot be upheld, one of the grounds being misconceived, and non-existent, the Government misdirected itself in the exercise of its power under the sub-rule. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the notification dated 26-4-1974 was issued in colourable exercise of power and for a collateral purpose. It was submitted that the order was passed to pressurise the petitioners to yield to the demands of the workmen. The order declared the employment an essential service with the object of controlling the disorder and restoring industrial peace. The motive cannot be said to be corrupt, the question only is about the exercise of power within the scope of the rule. 27. An order passed within authority primarily for a purpose for which the power has been conferred would not become colourable if other objects are also expected to be achieved through it. On the other hand an order passed in excess of the statutory power or under a misconception thereof for a purpose not covered by the statute will not become valid if a purpose under the statute is also expected to be fulfilled by way of a by-product. The power used for effectuating a purpose outside the law or the proper scope of the power would be an exercise for a collateral purpose. See State of Mysore v. P. R. Kulkarni, ( 1973 (3) SCC 597 ) : (1972 Lab IC 1280). The power used for effectuating a purpose outside the law or the proper scope of the power would be an exercise for a collateral purpose. See State of Mysore v. P. R. Kulkarni, ( 1973 (3) SCC 597 ) : (1972 Lab IC 1280). In a case of mixed purposes the dominant purpose has to be ascertained and if that is unlawful, the order fails. See Partap Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1964 SC 72 ). Fitzwilliamis (Earl) Wentworth Estates Co. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1951 (2) KB 284). Sadler v. Sheffield Corporation (1924 (1) Ch 483), Vatcher v. Paul (1915 AC 372). 28. In the instant case the State has stated its case in pares. 3C and 3L of the counter-affidavit of Sri Vishnu Prakash thus : "3C. That the Eveready Flash Light Company at Aishbagh, Lucknow, is situated in an area which is essentially industrial and where thousands of workmen and other industrial units work and reside. The explosive situation in the petitioner Company, was affecting the industrial peace and harmony in that area, Gate-meetings and processions with fiery speeches and demonstrations were taking pleace everyday since 1-4-1974, endangering the public order at Lucknow in general and in Aish Bagh in particular necessitating the deployment of police and other forces to maintain public order; while on the other hand, efforts at all levels were being made to bring together the parties for an amicable settlement of the dispute, lifting lock-out and restarting production in the factory." 3-L. That the petitioner No. 1 (Eveready Flash Light Company) did not take any action to bring about a settlement and the situation became explosive, Meetings were held by workmen of other undertakings and they were threatening to go on sympathetic strike in support of the Eveready Workmen. The situation became very tense and it was apprehended that because of the intransigent attitude of the officers of the petitioner No. 1, (the Eveready Flash Light Company) a situation may develop in which the production of the commodities essential to the life of the community may be disrupted and danger to public order may be caused. The State Government was, therefore, left with no option but to issue the impugned notifications." It is apparent from these statements that the Government was primarily concerned with controlling the law and order situation and restoring industrial peace. The State Government was, therefore, left with no option but to issue the impugned notifications." It is apparent from these statements that the Government was primarily concerned with controlling the law and order situation and restoring industrial peace. The declaration under R. 119 (1) was made primarily for this purpose. The production or supply of torches was to follow as a consequence. On the main purpose, the Government misconceived its power. The order, though not issued with any corrupt motive cannot be upheld. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the order was hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, in that, other factories like M/s. Geep Flash Light Industries and Modi Lantern Works, producing and manufacturing the same article had not been dealt with under the rule. The other factories were not faced with a situation like the one prevailing in the petitioner Company. They were thus not similarly situate. Art. 14, hence could not be attracted. 30. Learned counsel then urged that the action of the Government was mala fide. The argument is mainly based on allegation's of police actions. It is alleged that the police authorities acted in a high-handed manner and exceeded their limits. These allegations do not establish any male fides of the authorities passing the order. See Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1972 SC 873 ) : (1972 Lab IC 433). The contention has no force and is rejected. 31. We now come to the order dated 3-5-1974 (Annexure Si). The order was passed under R. 119 (4) as a consequence of the order passed under sub-rule (1). We have already held that the order under sub-rule (1) was invalid. The order under sub-rule (4) accordingly cannot survive. 32. The impugned order dated 3-5-1974 was further attacked on the grounds: (i) that it was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice, and (ii) that it was beyond the scope of the sub-rule. By the impugned order directions have been issued in connection with the domestic enquiry instituted against the workmen and the suspension orders passed against them have been revoked. In State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the power under sub-rule (4) has to be exercised on an objective basis. By the impugned order directions have been issued in connection with the domestic enquiry instituted against the workmen and the suspension orders passed against them have been revoked. In State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the power under sub-rule (4) has to be exercised on an objective basis. The power being of a far-reaching nature in the field of industrial relations cannot be exercised purely on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. The Government has to consult the interests concerned before taking any action thereunder. Their Lord-ships observed thus "some kind of public notice to the particular interests should be given as to what the Government intends to do and inviting representations from those interests and if necessary calling for data from them and also giving an oral hearing to the representatives of the interest concerned some kind of hearing or conference with the interests concerned seems to us to be the barest minimum necessary to enable the Govt. to exercise the power conferred under sub-rule (4)." 33. It is thus clear that no order under sub-rule (4) can be passed without allowing the interest concerned to put forward its point of view before the Government in respect of the order proposed. The impugned order was passed on 3-5-1974 after the writ petition had been filed in this court the same day. Para 31 of the supplementary affidavit states that it was passed in hurry and haste. The counter-affidavit of Sri Vishnu Prakash does not clearly deny this averment. By means of an application under S. 151, C.P.C. dated 9-9-1974 the petitioners have further clarified the averment and stated that the impugned order was passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause, explain or put forward their point of view before the Government. The application is supported by an affidavit of petitioner No. 2. It is clear from the materials on record that the impugned order was passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause to the order proposed to be passed or to explain or put forward their point of view before the Government. The order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on that ground as well. 34. The order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on that ground as well. 34. As regards the scope of power under sub-rule (4) it seems to me that though it is analogous to the powers of an Industrial Tribunal in regard to disputes between employers and employees, it is confined to regulating the wages and other conditions of service of persons or class of persons engaged in any employment or class of employment, to which the rule applies. Their Lordships in State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) laid down that sub-rule (4) has been enacted to see that there is a contented labour force during an emergency so that essential services are maintained. That case was concerned with the fixation of ad hoc living allowance to the workmen, and it was in that connection that their Lordships observed that sub-rule (4) being consequential to sub-rule (1) was intended to regulate wages and other conditions of service. The power was held to be analogous to the power of industrial tribunal to decide disputes between employers and employees and very contractual relations in regard to matters covered by the sub-rule. But what those matters were, their Lordships were not called upon to decide. The question involved in the instant case is about the scope of the expression "other conditions of service" and the construction of the word "regulate". Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that revocation of suspension orders is not "regulation" of a condition of service. 35. An industrial dispute is raised on two matters: (i) employment and non-employment, and (ii) regulation of wages and other conditions of service. 36. In State of Mysore v. Padmanabhacharya, ( AIR 1966 SC 602 ) a notification validating illegal retirement of Government servants was held not to amount to regulating their conditions of service, Their Lordships observed (at p. 605) : "But what this notification or rule does is to select certain Government servants who had been illegally required to retire and to say that even if the retirement had been illegal, that retirement should be deemed to have been properly and lawfully made. We are of opinion that such a declaration made by the Governor - and that is all the notification or the rule does - cannot in any sense be regarded as a rule made under the proviso to Art. 309 governing the conditions of service of persons appointed to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State." It was further observed that "it is certainly not a rule regulating recruitment of such persons, nor can it be said to be a rule regulating conditions of service of such persons." 37. In State of Assam ( AIR 1967 SC 1766 ) (supra) however, the Supreme Court pointed out that settled industrial relations whether under contracts or industrial awards can be disturbed by the Government in exercise of the power under R. 199 (4). In Himat Lal v. Police Commr. Ahmedabad ( AIR 1973 SC 87 ) it was observed that a power to `regulate' does not normally include a power to prohibit, and implies the continued existence of that which is to be regulated. See also Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. Ltd. v. Worcestershire County Council, (1967) 1 WLR 409. 38. The meaning of the word `regulate' in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is "to control govern, or direct by rule or regulations, to subject to guidance or restrictions." The question whether a suspension order can be revoked under R. 119 (4) is not free from doubt. It, however, seems unnecessary to express a concluded opinion on that question. The order being bad for the reasons mentioned earlier the discussion would only be academic. 39. The petition, in the result, succeeds and is allowed. The two orders dated 26-4-1974 and 3rd of May, 1979 (Annexures A and S-1) passed by the State Government are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to their Costs.