Judgment :- 1. The appellant filed a suit O.S. 867 of 1966 of the Munsiff's Court, Irinjalakuda for recovery of the amount due in respect of a possessory mortgage executed by the first defendant in his favour for an amount of Rs. 350/-. Under the terms of the mortgage, the plaintiff was to take the income and appropriate the same towards the interest of the mortgage debt after paying Rs. 212 9 as land tax. The mortgage deed stipulated that the mortgagee should surrender possession of the property on payment of the mortgage money and that the mortgagor should pay the mortgage amount if and when a demand was made by the mortgagee. There was a lease back executed by the first respondent on the same date under which the first respondent undertook to pay an yearly rent of Rs. 4412 9 inclusive of the land tax and deliver the receipt to the appellant. The balance rent was to be paid before the 8th of December every year. Since the first respondent did not pay any amount as per the lease deed, the appellant filed O.S. No. 87 of 1965 for eviction and recovery of possession of the property. But in view of Acts 31 of 1958, 2 of 1961 and 1 of 1964, the suit was dismissed as not maintainable without prejudice to the right of the appellant to recover the mortgage amount, treating the mortgage and lease back as a simple mortgage. The suit O.S. No. 867 of 1966 was filed accordingly. Respondents 2 to 13 were impleaded in the suit as persons residing in the plaint schedule property along with the first respondent. Respondents 1 and 2 contested the suit and contended that it was barred by limitation. There is also a plea that the mortgage was not supported by consideration which is not relevant for the purpose of this appeal. 2. The trial court held that the suit was barred by limitation and therefore non-suited the plaintiff. In appeal, the finding was confirmed. The Second Appeal is preferred against the appellate decree. 3. The only point arising in the appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. There is no dispute that the relevant provision in the Limitation Act, which is applicable, is Art.62, which corresponds to Art.132 of the Limitation Act of 1908. In appeal, the finding was confirmed. The Second Appeal is preferred against the appellate decree. 3. The only point arising in the appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. There is no dispute that the relevant provision in the Limitation Act, which is applicable, is Art.62, which corresponds to Art.132 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Under the said Article, a suit to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property is to be filed within 12 years of the date when the money suit becomes due. Both the trial court as also the lower appellate court held that the money became due in the instant case on 8 21950 the date when the mortgage was executed. This finding is challenged by the appellant. 4. Under the terms of Ext. P-1 the appellant got the right to be in possession of the properties and also to demand the mortgage money on the basis of the additional undertaking by the mortgagor to pay. As a person who was put in possession of the property, it was open to him to remain in possession, take income of the property and appropriate the same towards interest on the mortgage amount. It was in pursuance of his right to possession that he granted the lease in favour of the mortgagor and allowed the mortgagor to be in possession of the property as a lessee. When the mortgagor failed to pay the rent on the basis of the lease the appellant filed O. S. No. 85 of 1965. But for the intervention of Act 31 of 1958 and Act 1 of 1964 he would have got possession of the property. The point for consideration is whether he should be deprived of the remedy of a suit to recover the mortgage money on the ground that his right is barred by limitation. Needless to say that the mortgagee would not have filed the present suit if he had been successful in getting possession of the property as mortgagee without intervention of a suit and he was allowed to remain in possession till he was redeemed by the mortgagor. 5. S.11 of Act 31 of 1958 is a special provision in respect of usufructuary mortgages by agriculturists. The relevant portion of the above provision reads as follows: "S 11(1). 5. S.11 of Act 31 of 1958 is a special provision in respect of usufructuary mortgages by agriculturists. The relevant portion of the above provision reads as follows: "S 11(1). Subject to the provisions of S.25, this section applies to all subsisting mortgages executed by an agriculturist at any time before the commencement of this Act and by virtue of which the mortgagee is in possession of the property mortgaged to him or any portion thereof. Explanation: A mortgagee shall be deemed to be in possession of the property mortgaged to him or any portion thereof, notwithstanding that he has leased it to any person other than the mortgagor. Sub-s (6): Nothing contained in sub-ss. (2) to (S) shall apply to mortgages where the property mortgaged has been leased back to the mortgagor by the mortgagee and to such mortgages the following provisions shall apply: (a) the mortgage shall be deemed to be a simple mortgage from the date of the lease back and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the debt covered by the mortgage; (b) the interest payable on the mortgage amount after the commencement of this Act shall be at five per cent per annum." It was basing on the above provision that the trial court and the lower appellate court held that the mortgage money became due on the date when the lease back was executed which in this case was the date of the mortgage itself. The appellant's learned counsel would, however, argue that the mortgage money became due in the instant case not on the date when the mortgage deed was executed but on the date of coming into force of Act 31 of 1958. In support of the proposition that the date of mortgage need not be the date when the mortgage money becomes due, he has placed reliance on the decision in Seetharamayyar v. Munisamy Mudaliar,1919 M. W. N. 185. That was a case where a chit-bond permitting payment in instalments, provided that if there was default in payment of any instalment, the whole money would be payable on demand. That was a case where a chit-bond permitting payment in instalments, provided that if there was default in payment of any instalment, the whole money would be payable on demand. It was held that the words "on demand" when used in documents other than negotiable instruments, have a definite meaning, and that the parties deliberately used the expression because although there was a liability to pay each of the instalments separately, they intended to make it a condition precedent that a demand should be made, if the whole amount was to be asked to be paid at once. In Chimmar Thoma v. Ouseph, XVIII Cochin 312, the plaintiff to whom certain kuri money was due from a church and defendants 2 and 3 executed a kuri security bond securing the properties belonging to the defendants in favour of the church and obtained Rs. 900/-. On the same day, the defendants executed a mortgage deed securing the equity redemption of the plaint schedule property and obtained the Rs. 900/-, from the plaintiff. The mortgage deed provided that the defendants were to pay the kuri subscription due to the church and the balance interest annually to the plaintiff. The defendants were to inform the plaintiff of their intention to pay back the mortgage amount in which case the plaintiff was to provide alternate security for the kuri amount. The plaintiff could also demand in writing the mortgage money after releasing the properties from the security in favour of the church. If the defendants failed to pay back the mortgage money they were to pay enhanced interest at 12% after three months of such demand. The plaintiff made a demand for the amount and on default of the defendants instituted a suit more than 12 years after the date of mortgage. The defendants raised the bar of limitation. Relying on the decision Seetharamayyar v. Munisami Mudaliar 1919 Madras Weekly Notes, 185 and other decisions, it was held that the terms of the mortgage deed and the circumstances under which it was executed would not support the view that the parties intended immediate payment. It was also held that the meaning of the expression "on demand" and allied expressions found in documents other than negotiable instruments should be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. It was also held that the meaning of the expression "on demand" and allied expressions found in documents other than negotiable instruments should be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. The above decision was followed by a Full Bench of the Cochin High Court in Joseph v. George, XL Cochin 137. 6. I may also refer in this connection to the decision reported in Lal Narsingh v. Mohammed Yaqub Khan, 1929 P. C. 139. In that case the mortgage sued upon was a combination of a simple mortgage and a usufructuary mortgage. The mortgage money was promised to be paid within 35 years. The mortgagors failed to discharge their obligation of making over possession to the mortgagees and thereby deprived the mortgagees of their security. The mortgagee sued for recovery of the mortgage amount. The mortgagees contended that no suit would lie before the expiry of the period of 35 years. It was held that the money became payable under S.68 of the Transfer of Property Act and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the same. The Privy Council observed: "It would be indeed a startling result of the legislation if in such a case as this where a default has been made by the mortgagors of a kind which materially affects the mortgagee's security there existed no remedy for the immediate enforcement of the mortgage." 7. An analogous reasoning should apply in the instant case. The possession of the mortgagor on the basis of the lease back should be considered as possession on behalf of the mortgagee till the coming into force of Act 31 of '1958. From the date on which the Act came into force, the possession of the mortgagor became possession in his own right as owner. In other words the mortgagor lost his possession from that date. Though S.68 of the Transfer of Property Act does not in terms apply, the appellant could have sued for the mortgage money as a simple mortgagee only after the coming into force of the Act. The words "from the date of the lease back", could have reference only for the purpose of calculation of the quantum of the debt and have no application in computing the period of limitation. The words "from the date of the lease back", could have reference only for the purpose of calculation of the quantum of the debt and have no application in computing the period of limitation. To borrow the phrase of the Privy Council "it would be a startling result of the legislation" if the mortgagee is to be told that he lost the right, to sue for the mortgage money on the date of coming into force of Act 31 of 1958, on the ground that more than twelve years had elapsed after the lease back. On the facts and circumstances of the case the due date for the application of Art.62 of the Limitation Act should be taken to be the date when the mortgagee lost his right to possession of property on account of the intervention of the Statute. The suit filed by the appellant was therefore not barred by limitation. The Second Appeal is accordingly allowed. The suit will stand restored to the file of the Munsiff, Irinjalakuda who will dispose of it according to law. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this appeal. Allowed.