JUDGMENT : P.D. Desai, J. An interesting and important question as to the interpretation of Fundamental Rule 56 (c) arises in this petition and the question has to be resolved in the context of facts set out hereunder. 2. The petitioner joined service in the erstwhile princely State of Morvi as a temporary clerk with effect from October 1, 1934. His appointment was in the Customs Department of the said Slate. He was then appointed as Accountant and made permanent as such on and from October 1, 1935. He continued to serve on the said post till March 31, 1948. On April 1, 1948, the United State of Saurashtra was formed by various covenanting princely States and the services of the petitioner were taken over by the new part B State. With effect from the date of the taking over of his services by the new State, he was appointed as Head Accountant and continued to work in the said capacity till April 1, 1949 when the Central Government took over the charge of the Customs Department from the United State of Saurasthra. The petitioner was thereupon absorbed in the service of the Central Government in the Central Excise and Customs Department and he was posted as a lower division clerk in the erstwhile Jamnagar Customs Collectorate and made permanent on the said post with effect from April 1, 1949. On and with effect from June 4, 1957, the petitioner was appointed to officiate as upper division clerk and he was made permanent as such with effect from April 21, 1962. He continued to work in the said capacity till November 27, 1971 and was retired on superannuation pension with effect from November 28, 1971 on his attaining the age of 58 years. At the time of his retirement, the petitioner was working in the Collectorate of Central Excise at Baroda and the order dated October 5, 1971 retiring the petitioner from service a aforesaid, which is at Annexure 'C', was passed by the Headquarters Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Baroda. 3. The petitioner felt aggrieved by the order of retirement and he made representation to the Collector of Central Excise, Baroda requesting him to allow the petitioner to continue in service up to the age of sixty years since, according to the petitioner, that was the age for his superannuation under the relevant service regulations. 3. The petitioner felt aggrieved by the order of retirement and he made representation to the Collector of Central Excise, Baroda requesting him to allow the petitioner to continue in service up to the age of sixty years since, according to the petitioner, that was the age for his superannuation under the relevant service regulations. The said representation was made on April 6, 1972 and it was followed up by another representation made on June 25, 1972. The Chief Accounts Officer, Central Excise, Baroda informed the petitioner by his letter dated August 14, 1972, which is at Annexure 'A', that the Collector of Central Excise having carefully considered the petitioner's representations for extension of service beyond 58 years of age regretted his inability to accede to the petitioner's request. 4. The petitioner thereupon preferred an appeal to the Central Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi on August 21, 1972. By a letter dated February 2, 1973, which is at Annexure 'B'. The Collector of Central Excise, Baroda informed the petitioner that after careful consideration of his representation, the Board had rejected the same. The petitioner thereupon filed the present petition challenging the decision of the appropriate authority retiring him from service on the attainment of age of 58 years. 5. Two contentions were urged in the main at the hearing of the petition. It was contended, in the first place, that the petitioner was governed in the matter of his retirement by Fundamental Rule 56(c) and that on a true interpretation of the said Rule, be could not have been retired until he attained the age of 60 years. 5. Two contentions were urged in the main at the hearing of the petition. It was contended, in the first place, that the petitioner was governed in the matter of his retirement by Fundamental Rule 56(c) and that on a true interpretation of the said Rule, be could not have been retired until he attained the age of 60 years. In the next place, it was urged that if on a true interpretation of the said Rule, the petitioner was not entitled to be continued in service till the attainment of the age of 60 years on account of the fact that he could not be said to have entered Government service on or before the 31st March, 1938 since he was until April i, 1948 in the service of a Princely State, the said Rule 56(c) was violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 inasmuch as it created an invidious classification between Central Government servants who, before the material date, had initially joined Central Government service or Provincial Government service on the one hand and those who had initially joined the service of the erstwhile Princely States on the other. Such a distinction, submitted the petitioner, bat ed on the source of recruitment in the case of an integrated Central Government servant in the matter oi the age of retirement was not rational and it had no nexus with the object underlying Rule 56(c) and it clearly violated the principle of equality of opportunity in the matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State specifically enshrined in Article 16. 6. The petition is seriously contested by the respondents and M. N. Mandviwala, Headquarters Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Baroda has filed a return disputing the validity of the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. Briefly stated, the stand of the respondents is that the petitioner, who was in the service of an ex-princely State, was absorbed in the service of the Central Government under the scheme of Federal Financial Integration which was up to a certain point of time regulated by various executive orders issued by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Those orders were subsequently codified into the Central Civil Services (Part B States Transferred Employees) Rules, 1953. Those orders were subsequently codified into the Central Civil Services (Part B States Transferred Employees) Rules, 1953. The said Rules provided for the giving of an option to every transferred employee to elect on or before a specified date to be governed either by the State rules or the Central rules. The said rules further provided that a transferred employee who failed to exercise any option by the specified date will be treated as an optee for the Centra rules. So far as the determination of age of retirement for the transferred ministerial Government servants was concerned, rule 9 (4) of the said rules specifically provided that an optee for the Central Rules will be governed by the provisions of the fundamental Rule 56 (b) (ii), which inter alia provided that a ministerial Government servant who entered Government service on or after the 1st April, 1938 or who being in Government service on the 31st March, 1938 did not hold a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post on that date, shall ordinarily be require or retire at the age of 55 years and that such servant must not be retained after that age except on public grounds to be recorded in writing and with the sanction of the local Government and further that he must rot be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. According to the respondents, therefore, the petitioner, who was an ex-princely State employee governed by the said rules, had to retire from Central Government service on attaining the age of 55 years. The age of retirement was however subsequently raised to 58 years under the amended Fundamental Rule 56(a) and accordingly the petitioner was rightly retired on attaining the said age. The respondents contended that the petitioner was not governed by the provisions of fundamental Rule 56 (c) since he could not be said to have entered Government service on or before the 31st March 1938. The expression "Government service", according to the respondents, meant and included only services rendered in the Central or in a former provincial Government and since the petitioner was on the relevant date, neither in the employment of the Central Government nor of a former provincial Government, he could not qualify for the extended period of retirement provided for in Fundamental Rule 56 (c). The respondents admitted that services rendered by the petitioner in the former princely State of Morvi and then under the Government of the United State of Saurashtra were counted for the purpose of pension as qualifying service. However, having regard to the orders issued by the Ministry of Finance on December 10, 1951 and November 8, 1961 (Annexures A and B to the affidavit), the Ministerial servants of ex-princely State or of Part B States were governed by the provisions of the old Fundamental Rule 56 (b) (ii) according to which the age of retirement was 55 years and which age was subsequently raised to 58 years on enactment of new Fundamental Rule 56(a). On the question of constitutional validity, the stand of the respondents was that the relevant Fundamental Rule made applicable to the petitioner was not ultra vires Article 14 or Article 16. No discrimination, much less invidious discrimination, was involved inasmuch as all employees of the former princely States who were absorbed in the Central Government service were treated alike. Ever since the date of their absorption in the matter of the determination of the age of their retirement, such employees formed a class by themselves and they were governed by a different set of rules and they could not legitimately make any grievance if they were denied the benefit of the extended period of retirement conferred on those employees who entered Central Government service or the service of the former Provincial Government on or before the date prescribed in Fundamental Rule 56(c). These were the main contentions raised in the affidavit-in-reply and reiterated at the hearing on behalf of the respondents. 7. In order to appreciate the merit of the rival contentions and to determine the dispute, it would be necessary to refer to the historical background as well as to the relevant executive directions and statutory provisions. In many of the former princely States there were certain departments such as customs and excise which looked after matters which in British India were under the administrative control of the Central Government. Upon the merger of the princely States with the Union of India, in course of time, the administration of such departments was taken over by the Central Government. The employees of the former princely States in such departments were absorbed in the services of the Central Government under the scheme of Federal Financial Integration. Upon the merger of the princely States with the Union of India, in course of time, the administration of such departments was taken over by the Central Government. The employees of the former princely States in such departments were absorbed in the services of the Central Government under the scheme of Federal Financial Integration. The matters relating to absorption were, in the first instance, regulated by various executive orders issued from time to time by the Ministry of Finance. Ultimately, the Central Civil Services (Part B States Transferred Employees) Rules. 1953 were framed and they came into force with affect from April 1, 1950 in the case of all transferred employees except those from the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union and those from the State of Jammu and Kashmir Rule 3 of the said Rules provided that they applied to persons other than those mentioned in Rule 10 who were taken over by the Government from any of the States either on the 1st April, 1950 or any later date in consequence of Constitutional charges and extension of the executive authority of the Government to those States. Rule 10 refers to certain classes of employees but it is not necessary to allude to the same in the present case since the petitioner is not covered in any of the categories mentioned in the said rule. The rules made provision for absorption of the transferred employees in an appropriate grade under the Government as well as for leave and pension amongst other things. Rule 6 provided for an option being exercised by the transferred employees in the matter of being governed by the State Rules or the Central Rules. So far the question of pension is concerned, rule 9(4) of the said rules provided that for the purpose of determining the age of retirement for ministerial Government servants, the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56(b)(ii) shall apply. It would thus appear that those of the transferred employees who were governed by these rules were accordingly to be retired from service in accordance with the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56(b)(ii). It is not necessary for us in the present case to pursue this point further for two reasons. It would thus appear that those of the transferred employees who were governed by these rules were accordingly to be retired from service in accordance with the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56(b)(ii). It is not necessary for us in the present case to pursue this point further for two reasons. First, under rule 3 of the said rules, as already pointed out, the rules in question apply only to those transferred employees who were taken over by the Government from any of the States either on the 1st April 1950 or on any later date. The petitioner was admittedly taken over and absorbed in the service of the Government of India with effect from April 1, 1949 and was made permanent on a substantive post with effect from the said date The rules in question would not, therefore, apply to him. In the next place, rule 6 provides for an option being exercised by the permanent transferred employee before a specified date as to whether he elects to be governed by the State Rules or by the Central Rules, and it further provides that if the election is not made before the specified date or the exercise of option is ambiguous the concerned employee shall be treated as an optee for the Central Rules. There is nothing on the record of this case to show that the petitioner had exercise his option in favour of the Central Rules or that he had failed to exercise any option by the date specified by the Central Government or that the exercise of option on his part was ambiguous. Therefore, it would not be possible to hold on the material on record that the petitioner was governed by the rules in question and that in the matter of the determination of the age of his retirement, rule 9(4) will be the relevant provision. We might mention that though in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents it was contended that the petitioner is governed by the said rules and even at the hearing such a contention was sought to be faintly urged on behalf of the respondents, the attempt was ultimately given up when the above mentioned facts were pointed out to the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 8. 8. Once the ground is cleared to this extent, the conclusion which must inevitably follow is that the petitioner, after his absorption in the service of the Central Government, would be ordinarily governed (like any other Central Government servant) in all matters relating to his conditions of service including the determination of the date of his retirement by such relevant rules as may be framed from time to time by the Central Government. That apart, this matter appears to have been put beyond the pale of controversy by an executive order issued by the Central Government. On December 10, 1951, the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, issued an office memorandum regarding grant of Central scales of pay, dearness allowance, compensatory allowance and house rent allowance to the permanent staff of the part B states fitted into appropriate grades in various departments under the Government of India. Under the said office memorandum, a copy of which is annexed as annexure 'A' to the affidavit-in-reply tiled on behalf of the respondents herein, it was clarified that "for the purpose of determining the age of retirement for ministerial Government servants, the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56 (b)(ii) will apply". It is thus clear that the petitioner being member of the permanent staff of one of the Part B States whose set vices were taken over by rite Government of India, and it being not in dispute that he was a ministerial servant, for the purpose of determining the age of his retirement, Rule 56(b)(ii) was to be applied. Rule 56(b) may be reproduced at this stage : "56. (a) x x x (b) (i) x x x (ii) A ministerial servant - (1) who enters Government service on or after the 1st April, 1938, or (2) who being in Government service on the 31st March, 1938, did not hold a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post on that date, shall ordinarily be required to retire at the age of 55 years. He must not be retained after that age except on public grounds which must be recorded in writing, and with the sanction of the Local Government and he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. He must not be retained after that age except on public grounds which must be recorded in writing, and with the sanction of the Local Government and he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. (c) x x x" It would appear on a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions that ministerial servants were divided into two classes under two different sub-clauses, namely those who entered Government service on or after 1st April 1938 and those who, being in Government service on March 31, 1938, did not hold a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post on that date and that in the case of both those classes of ministerial servants the age of retirement ordinarily was 55 years. Retention in service beyond that age could only be on public grounds which were required to be recorded in writing and with the sanction of the local Government. Except in very special circumstances, such ministerial servant could not be retained in service after the age of 60 years. At this stage, one aspect of the matter may be emphasised. For the purpose of determining as to whether a particular ministerial servant fell in the first category or the second, the date of his entry into "Government service" was one of the factors which was relevant, Prior to 1938 and even thereafter until 1948 when most of the native States covenanted amongst themselves and part B States came into existence, the "Government service" could only have been with the ex-princely States. Therefore, it is clear that while making Rule 56(b) (ii) applicable to the permanent staff of the Part B States, whose services were taken over by the Government of India, for the purpose of determining the age of retirement of ministerial servants, whose services were taken over, the Central Government intended to take into account the services rendered by such servants in ex-princely States as "Government service" within the meaning of Rule 56(b) (ii) This is an extremely relevant factor which will have to be borne in mind and to which we shall make a reference at a little later stage in the course of this judgment. 9. Reference may be made next to two other office memorandums issued by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 9. Reference may be made next to two other office memorandums issued by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. The first memorandum was dated December 12, 1958 and it was issued to clarify the meaning of the expression "Government service" in the context of sub-clause (i) of Fundamental Rule 56(b), which governed a ministerial servant not covered by sub-clause (ii), such as a ministerial servant who being in Government service on the 31st March 1938 held a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post on that date. Paragraph 2 of the said memorandum pointed out that a question had arisen whether the expression "Government service" occurring in the aforesaid rule included service under a State Government also, that is, whether a person who held a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post under a State Government on the 31st March 1938 and was later on confirmed under the Central Government would be governed by Fundamental Rule 56(b) (i) for the purpose of determining the date of his retirement. To clarify this doubt, in paragraph 3 of the said memorandum the following direction was given : "3. The matter has been carefully considered by the Government of India and it has been decided that a person of the type mentioned in the preceding paragraph would be governed by F.R. 56(b) (i), or a rule similar thereto, before permanent transfer to the service of the Central Government. However, the above decision would not be applicable in the cases of the employees of ex-princely States for whom separate orders have already been issued, vide this Ministry's Office Memorandum No. F. 5(14)-E. III/51, dated the 10th December, 1951, and office memorandum of even number, dated the 8th November, 1951." It would thus appear that the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56 (b) (i) were made applicable to a ministerial servant who held a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post under a State Government on the 31st March 1938 and who was later on confirmed under the Central Government only if he was governed by Fundamental Rule 56(b) (i) or a rule similar thereto before permanent transfer to the service of the Central Government. The said decision was, however, not made applicable in the case of the employees of ex-princely States in view of the fact that for them separate orders had already been issued, one of such orders being the order dated December 10, 1951 to which reference has been made earlier. What is important to be noted in this connection, however, is that even services of such employees who were taken over from a State Government, under such Government were treated as "Government service" within the meaning of Fundamental Rule 56 (b) (i) and it is on that basis alone that the said Rule was made applicable to them. 10. On December 16, 1960 the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, issued another memorandum making certain further concessions in favour of employees drawn from former State Government service. Since the rules governing the age of compulsory retirement of a few of such employees prior to their permanent transfer to the Central Government service did not contain provisions corresponding to Fundamental Rule 56 (b)(i) the directions given in the previous memorandum dated December 12, 1958 operated harshly in the case of such employees. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the said notification dated December 16, 1960 which gave suitable directions to meet such cases, are relevant and they may be reproduced: "2. The President is pleased to decide that a person who held a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post under a State Government on the 31st March, 1938, and was permanently transferred to the service of he Central Government subsequently, shall be governed by F. R. 56 (b) (i) for the purpose of determining the age of compulsory retirement. "4. The decision contained in para 2 above shall, however, not apply in the cases of the employees of the ex-princely States for whom separate orders have been issued vide this Ministry's Office Memorandum No.F(14)-E. III/51, dated 10th December, 1951 and office memorandum of even number, dated the 8th November, 1951." The effect of the issuance of this memorandum was that Fundamental Rule 56 (b) (i) became applicable to all ministerial servants who held a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post under a State Government on or before the 31st March 1938 and were permanently transferred to the service of the Central Government subsequently. This subsequent notification was also not made applicable to the employees of the ex-princely States in view of the fact that separate orders were already made earlier with regard to them. 11. The position which was prevailing until July 21, 1965 when new Fundamental Rule 56 came into existence, therefore, was that Ministerial servants who were employees of the ex-princely States were governed by one set of orders and employees who were formerly employed under the State Governments were governed by another set of orders. However, one thing is clear and it is that in the case of both these categories of ministerial servants drawn from the different sources, the service rendered by them prior to their being absorbed in the Central Government service was treated as "Government service" within the meaning of relevant sub-clauses of Fundamental Rule 56(b). They were treated as it were in "Government service" and it is on that basis that fundamental Rule 56(b) was made applicable to them. 12. On July 21, 1965 the old Fundamental Rule 56 was substituted by a new Rule and the material clauses of the new Rule may be set out. "F.P. 56 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, every Government servant shall retire on the day he attain the age of fifty-eight years, (b) A workman who is governed by these rules shall be retained in service till the day he attains the age of sixty years. XXX XXX XXX (c) A ministerial Government servant who entered Government service on or before the 31st March 1938, and held on that date: - (i) a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post, or (ii) a permanent post in a provisional substantive capacity under clause (d) of rule 14 and continued to hold the same without interruption until he was confirmed in that post, shall be retained in service till the day he attains the age of sixty years. Note: - For the purpose of this clause, the expression "Government service" includes service rendered in a former Provincial Government. (cc) A workman referred to in clause (b) or a ministerial Government servant referred to in clause (c) may be granted extension of service, under very special circumstances to be recorded in writing, after he attains the age of sixty years with the sanction of the appropriate authority. (cc) A workman referred to in clause (b) or a ministerial Government servant referred to in clause (c) may be granted extension of service, under very special circumstances to be recorded in writing, after he attains the age of sixty years with the sanction of the appropriate authority. (d) A Government servant to whom clause (a) applies, other than a workman referred to in clause (b) or a ministerial Government servant referred to in clause (c), may be granted extension of service after he attains the age of fifty-eight years with the sanction of the appropriate authority if such extension is in the public interest and the grounds therefor are recorded in writing: Provided that no extension under this clause shall be granted beyond the age of sixty years except in very special circumstances. xxx It would appear on a perusal of the new Fundamental Rule 56 that except in stated cases the date of retirement for every Government servant was determined to be 58 years. However, in case of a workman governed by the Fundamental Rules and that of a ministerial Government servant who entered Government service on or before 31st March, 1938 and held on that date : (a) a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post, (b) a permanent post in a provisional substantive capacity and continued to hold the same without interruption until he was confirmed in that post, the age of retirement was fixed at 60 years. A note was added to Fundamental Rule 56 (c) and it was clarified mat the expression "Government service" included service rendered in a former Provincial Government for the purpose of the said clause. This note, which has to be treated as a part of the rule, since it was promulgated with the rules in the exercise of the legislative powers, gave effect to the decision of the Government of India in relation to ministerial servants who were formerly in the employment of State Governments as contained in the two office memorandums issued by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, to which reference has been made earlier. The object of fundamental Rule 56 (b) and (c) was to provide a different age of retirement fora workman and a ministerial servant, belonging to either of the two categories mentioned in clause (c) having regard presumably to certain historical background and exigencies of situation. The object of fundamental Rule 56 (b) and (c) was to provide a different age of retirement fora workman and a ministerial servant, belonging to either of the two categories mentioned in clause (c) having regard presumably to certain historical background and exigencies of situation. Clauses (cc) and (d) of Fundamental Rule 56 deal with extension of service and we are not concerned in the present case with those two clauses and need not dealate upon the same." 13. Reverting back to Fundamental Rule 56 (c), which is the only part of the relevant rule with which we are concerned, it would appear that it applies to a ministerial Government servant who entered Government service on or before a particular date and satisfied the conditions laid down in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c). So far as the petitioner is concerned, it is not in dispute that he was a ministerial Government servant. It is also not in dispute that he held a lien on a permanent post in a former princely State on March 31, 193g. The dispute between the parties centres round a narrow question, namely, whether it could be said that he had entered "Government service" on or before the 31st March, 1938 or other words, whether, when he entered the service of the former princely State of Morvi, he could be said to have entered "Government service" within the meaning of Fundamental Rule 56 c). The resolution of this dispute depends upon the true interpretation of the expression 'Government service." 14. Now, the expression in question has not been defined m the Fundamental Rules and, therefore, it will have to be construed in its ordinary sense. It is capable of both a wide as well as a narrow meaning depending upon its setting in the scheme of the statute. Widely construed it would take in service rendered under any Government including the former princely Slate Governments. Narrowly construed, it would be referable only to services rendered under the Central Government. In our opinion, having regard to the subject and context, historical background and other relevant considerations the expression must be construed as having been used in the wider sense in Fundamental Rule 56 (c) and the reasons therefor are as follows. 15. Narrowly construed, it would be referable only to services rendered under the Central Government. In our opinion, having regard to the subject and context, historical background and other relevant considerations the expression must be construed as having been used in the wider sense in Fundamental Rule 56 (c) and the reasons therefor are as follows. 15. First, as pointed out earlier, ever since 1951, in the matter of determining the age of retirement of ministerial servants borne on the permanent staff of the former Part B States which was later absorbed in the various departments under the Government of India, the service rendered in by them under the former princely states was treated as "Government service" within the meaning of Fundamental Rule 56(b) (ii). The new Fundamental Rule, 56, which came into force with effect from July 21, 1965, uses the same expression "Government service" and there is no reason to presume that a departure was intended to be made and that in the context of the new rule such service of such ministerial employees was not intended to be counted as "Government service". Secondly, the note appended below Fundamental Rule 56 (c), which besides being in the nature of an inclusive definition is illustrative in character, clearly indicates that a wider meaning was intended to be given to the expression "Government service". The very fact that service rendered in a former Provincial Government is included in the expression "Government service" shows that a broad meaning was intended to be given to the said expression. We are u table to see how. if service rendered in a former Provincial Government is to be included in the expression "Government service", the service rendered under a former princely State or under a former Part B State can be excluded from the ambit of the said expression. Thirdly, it cannot be overlooked that the ministerial servants drawn from different sources such as ex-princely States, ex-Part B States and former Provincial Governments were all absorbed aid assimilated into the Central Government services. It is not in dispute that for all purposes their services were treated as continuous and services rendered by them with their erstwhile employer were taken into account for all other benefits enjoyable by them. It is not in dispute that for all purposes their services were treated as continuous and services rendered by them with their erstwhile employer were taken into account for all other benefits enjoyable by them. The object of Fundamental Rule 56 (c), as pointed out earlier, is to fix the age of retirement in cases of ministerial Government servants who entered into Government service before a particular date in such a manner as to give them a longer innings. There is no reason as to why by narrowly construing the expression "Government service" such benefit should be denied to persons who had in fact entered into service before the designated date in a former princely State. Such a construction would deprive a section of the Central Government employees of the benefit which is otherwise available to all other similarly situated Central Government servants merely on the ground that by a fortuitous circumstance they had joined service under a former princely State. Such could not have been the intention of the framers of the rule who have clearly indicated by appending a note to clause (c) that wider meaning was intended to be given to the relevant expression. 16. Mr. K. G. Vakharia, learned standing Counsel for the Central Government, however, contended that the relevant expression was required to be narrowly construed and for that purpose he relied mainly upon three grounds. First, that the expression occurred in a set of rules governing service conditions of Central Government employees and, therefore, in the context the expression "Government service" must be construed as service under the Central Government; secondly, that the word "Government" occurs in both the expressions "Government service" and "ministerial Government servant" in clause (c) and that since the word "Government" in the latter expression could only refer to Central Government, the same meaning should be given to the said word in the former expression; and, thirdly, that the note appended below clause (c) clearly indicated that the relevant expression was used in the narrow sense and that services under the former provincial Government which could not ordinarily have been included within the meaning of the said expression were, as it were, by a fiction required to be treated as service under the Central Government. Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by Mr. Vakharia, we are unable to accept the same. 17. Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by Mr. Vakharia, we are unable to accept the same. 17. It is true that the expression "Government service" has to be construed in a set of rules dealing with service conditions of Central Government employees However, it is a well-known fact of which judicial notice can be taken that the Central Government servants who are governed by these Rules have been drawn from various sources. On account of integration of States, several persons formerly employed in ex-princely States and then in Part B States were absorbed in the Central Government service and after their absorption they are governed either by special set of rules or by the Fundamental Rules. In the context of this historical background, merely because the expression "Government service" occurs in rules prescribing service conditions of Central Government employees, it cannot be said that the said expression should be narrowly construed. 18. It is also true that the word "Government" occurs in two expressions which find place in clause (c), namely, "ministerial Government servant" and "Government service" and that ordinarily the said word should be construed in the same sense. The expression "ministerial Government servant" only refers to a Central Government ministerial servant and, therefore, it may be possible to contend that the expression "Government service" must also be construed as meaning Central Government service. However, it is well settled that the presumption that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same word in every part of a statutory instrument is only one element in deciding what the true import of the enactment is. In order to ascertain the true import, it is necessary to have regard also to the purpose behind the particular provision and its setting in the scheme of the Statute. The presumption that the same words are used in the same meaning is very slight and it is proper if sufficient reason can be assigned to construe a word in one part of an enactment in a different sense from that which it bears in another part. The presumption is not of much weight. The same word may be used in a different sense in the same statute and even in the same section (see S. V. Parulekar v. D. M. Thana, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 23). The presumption is not of much weight. The same word may be used in a different sense in the same statute and even in the same section (see S. V. Parulekar v. D. M. Thana, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 23). Now, in the present case, there are two reasons why it could be said that the word "Government" is not used in the same sense in the two different expressions occurring in clause (c). First, one must have regard to the fact which has already been mentioned earlier, namely, that the class of Central Government ministerial servants comprises of persons drawn from different sources whose initial appointment, though it might have been under some Government, need not necessarily have been in the Central Government. It is inconceivable that even after the fusion of such persons drawn from different Governments into the Central Government service, the benefit of the Central Government service conditions could have been intended to be extended only to those who had initially joined service in the Central Government itself. Secondly, the word "Government" occurs in two different expressions in clause (c) which refer to two different points of time. When the said clause speaks of a ministerial Government servant it refers to such servant at the date of his retirement. In other words, a person in order to claim the benefit of clause (c), must be a ministerial Central Government servant on the date on which he claims the benefit thereof. The expression "Government service" in which the word "Government" occurs refers to a much different point of time which is identified by reference to the date 31st March, 1938. Having regard to the two different points of time to which the two different expressions are referable, the presumption which could normally be raised with regard to the same meaning being assigned to the same word in a statutory instrument cannot be invoked. 19. The note appended below clause (c), as pointed out earlier, is illustrative and it is in the nature of an inclusive definition. It would be wrong to construe such a note as cutting down the ordinary meaning of the expression "Government service". It is well-settled that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and that they cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. It would be wrong to construe such a note as cutting down the ordinary meaning of the expression "Government service". It is well-settled that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and that they cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. When the Court is concerned with an inclusive definition, it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation (see State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, A.I. R. 1960 S.C 610). The word "includes" is often used in order to enlarge the meaning of the words and phrase occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used, the concerned words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declare that they shall include. The very fact that those things are included shows that the meaning intended to be given was wide, (see I.T. Commissioner, A.P. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 168). In Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, at page 214 it has been pointed out that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of the word does not take away its ordinary meaning. In the commentary the learned author referred to the decision of Blackburn, J. in Ex. P. Fergusen (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 280 where the learned Judge was called upon to consider the question as to what was the meaning of the enactment in which the word "ship" was defined to include "every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars". The argument before the learned Judge was that a fishing-boat fitted inter alia with four oars, was not a ship within the meaning of the Act, because it was propellable by oars. The argument was negatived in the following words : "The argument against the proposition that this is a ship is one which I have heard very frequently, viz., that, when an Act says that certain words shall include certain things, the words must apply exclusively to that which they are to include. The argument was negatived in the following words : "The argument against the proposition that this is a ship is one which I have heard very frequently, viz., that, when an Act says that certain words shall include certain things, the words must apply exclusively to that which they are to include. That is not so; the definition given of a ship is in order that the word 'ship' may have a more extensive meaning, and the words 'not propelled by oars' are not intended to exclude all vessels that are ever propelled by oars." It would thus appear that what might appear to have been excluded by any inclusive definition might still be considered as falling within the natural meaning of the expression defined if in its ordinary, popular and natural sense such a thing can be said to fall within the meaning of that word. Therefore, if the expression "Government service" is capable of a wider construction and it is in fact required to be construed widely having regard to its object and purpose, merely because in the note appended below clause (c), which is in the nature of an inclusive definition, service rendered in a former provincial Government alone is included within the meaning of he said expression, it cannot be said that service rendered under any other Government is intended to be excluded. It cannot be overlooked that some times such a note is appended merely ex abundanti cautela, that is to say, to prevent the possibility of a particular class of persons normally comprised within the ordinary meaning of the terms escaping notice. In our opinion, therefore, much emphasis cannot be laid upon the note appended to clause (c). It is indeed not a deeming provision as is sought to be contended on behalf of the respondents. The framers of the rules have adopted the formula of an inclusive definition and the expression cannot be construed as a deeming provision. 20. In our opinion, having regard to the foregoing discussion, on a true and proper interpretation of clause (c) of Fundamental Rule 56, the benefit thereof would be available to a ministerial Government servant who entered service of any Government including the Government of an ex-princely State on or before 31st March, 1938 and who satisfied either of the two other conditions laid down in the said clause. To give any other meaning to the said clause would be to ignore a stark reality and to obliterate a historical fact, namely, that the ministerial Government servants in the employment of the Central Government drawn from various sources have since been integrated and must be treated alike. 21. There is another way in which the problem can be looked at. It is not in dispute, as stated earlier, that after their absorption in the Central Government service, all employees of the former princely states and part B States have became employees of the Central Government. They have joined the main stream with continuity of service and have been treated alike in all other matters Fundamental Rule 56 (c) covers a ministerial Government servant entering Government service on or before 31st March. 1938 and satisfying one of the two conditions laid down therein and confers upon such a servant the benefit of retirement at a higher age. There is no indication whatsoever that any further distinction inter se is intended to be made amongst the ministerial servants of that category. The respondents, however, seek to make such a distinction in the application of the said Fundamental Rule on the basis of the source from which such servants have been drawn. There would be no justification for making such a distinction based on the source of recruitment which has been lost in oblivion or at any rate, erased in the process of integration. Any distinction made on such a basis must amount to denial of equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment which is guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution. 22. In Roshanlal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1889 it was held that once recruits from two different sources were integrated into one class, no discrimination could be made thereafter in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to a higher grade. The principle laid down in the said decision was explained and reiterated in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. T. N. Khosa, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1 and it was observed that the true ratio of the decision in the case of Roshanlal was that no favoured treatment could be given to recruits from one source as against the recruits from another source after recruits from both the sources were integrated into one class. The recruits from two different sources lose their birth-marks on fusion into a common stream of service and they cannot thereafter be treated differently by reference to the consideration that they were recruited from different source. Their genetic blemishes disappear once they are integrated into a common class and cannot be revived so as to make equals unequals once again. The classification, if any, could thereafter be on a basis other than the one that they were drawn from different sources To the similar effect are the observations in G.M.S.C. Railway v. A.V.R. Siddhanti, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1755 in which again reference was made to the decision in Roshanlal's case and it was observed that once the persons coming into or recruited to the service from the two different sources are absorbed in o one integrated class with identical service conditions, they cannot be discriminated again with reference to the original source for the purpose of absorption and seniority. 23. An appropriate illustration of the application of this principle in the matter of determination of age of retirement is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Railway Board v. A. Pitchumahi, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 508. The respondent in that case was originally an employee of a private Railway Company which was later on amalgamated with the Indian Railway Administration. Upon amalgamation, the respondent became the employee of the Indian Railway Administration and he came within the classification of a "ministerial railway servant." Rule 2046 of the Railway Establishment Code deals with the retirement of a railway servant and at the time of amalgamation, under clause (1) of the said rule, the date of retirement of a railway servant other than a ministerial railway servant was the date on which he attained the age of 55 years. The services of such a servant could be extended, however, on certain conditions mentioned in the said clause. Under clause (2) of the said rule, which dealt with a ministerial railway servant, separate provision was made for a ministerial Railway servant who was ordinarily required to retire at the age of 55 years. In 1962. this was raised to 58 years subject to certain exceptions. In 1967, rule 2046 as amended in 1962 was substituted by a new rule. In 1962. this was raised to 58 years subject to certain exceptions. In 1967, rule 2046 as amended in 1962 was substituted by a new rule. Under clause (a) of the new rule, except as otherwise provided, the age of retirement of every railway servant was raised to 58 years Clause (b) of the said rule was substantially similar to clause (c) of Fundamental Rule 58 with which we are concerned in the present case and under that clause the retirement age of a ministerial railway servant who fulfilled the conditions therein laid down was fixed at 60 years. There was a note appended below the said rule which stated that for the purpose of clause (b) the expression "Government service" included service rendered in ex-company and ex-state Railways and in former Provincial Government. In the later part of 1967 this note was substituted and according to the new note "Government service" included service rendered in a former Provincial Government and in ex-company and ex-State Railways, "if the rules of the company or the State had a provision similar to clause (b) above." It appears that in the rules of the Company in which the respondent originally served, there was no provision similar to clause (b) of Rule 2046 and, therefore, applying the provisions of clause (a) the petitioner was sought to be retired at the age of 58 although he was otherwise qualified to continue in service up to 60 years by virtue of clause (b). The respondent filed a writ petition in the Mysore High Court and inter alia attacked the new Note to clause (b) as discriminatory and violative of Article 14. The High Court upheld the challenge and struck down the note. The Railway administration carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court and the question before the Supreme Court was whether the said note could be said to be violative of the guarantee of equal treatment enshrined in Articles 14 and 16. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the question, observed as under :- "Therefore, from what is slated above, it is clear that upto and inclusive of January 11, 1968, no distinction inter se apart from that made by clauses (a) and (b), between the officers of the Indian Railway Administration, from whatever source they may have come, was made. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the question, observed as under :- "Therefore, from what is slated above, it is clear that upto and inclusive of January 11, 1968, no distinction inter se apart from that made by clauses (a) and (b), between the officers of the Indian Railway Administration, from whatever source they may have come, was made. Even at the risk of repetition, we may state that under clause (b) of rule 2046, as introduced on January 11, 1967, the original employees of the Indian Railway Administration, as well as persons, like the respondent, who came into the Indian Railway Administration in 1947, were both entitled, as of right, to continue in service till they attained the age of 60 years. This position admittedly has been changed, by altering the definition of the expression "Government service" by the new Note to clause (b) introduced on December 23, 1967. Under that Note, it cannot be gain-said, that a distinction has been made between the original employees of the Indian Railway Administration, and the new employees, who were amalgamated with the Indian Railway Administration in 1947, but who had their previous service, with either a former provincial Government or an Ex-Company or Ex-State Railways. In the case of such employees, the benefit of the extended age of retirement, that has been given to the other employees of the Indian Railway Administration, was made available only if the new employees had the same benefit under their previous employers. Therefore, the position is that on and after December 23, 1967, though all the employees are under the Indian Railway Administration, there will be two sets of rules relating to the age of retirement, depending upon the fact whether they were in the original employment of the Indian Railway Administration or on the fact of their coining from one or the other of the employers mentioned in the new Note (Para 22). ....In our opinion, such a rule, which makes a distinction between the employees working under the same Indian Railway Administration is not valid. ....In our opinion, such a rule, which makes a distinction between the employees working under the same Indian Railway Administration is not valid. The position, after the new Note was added, is that the employee who had throughout been under the Indian Railway Administration is entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years; whereas the persons, like the respondent, who are also the employees of the Indian Railway Administration, what whose previous services were with the company, will have to retire at the age of 58 years, because a provision similar to clause (b) did not exist in the service conditions of the Company. Discrimination, on the face of it, is writ large in the new Note, which is under challenge. (Para 23). Mr. Setalvad, no doubt, urged that the ministerial railway servant, who was originally employee of a Company, Ex-State Railway or former Provincial Government dealt with under the new Note are a class by themselves, and, therefore, there is a reasonable classification. Once the employees dealt with under the new Note, have taken up service under the Indian Railway Administration and have been treated alike upto January 11, 1967, it follows, in our opinion that they cannot again be classified separately from the other employees of the Indian Railway Administration. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the contention that the classification of these officers under the new Note is a reasonable classification and satisfies one of the essential requisites of Art. 14 of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court. (Para 24) We will assume, that in dealing with the types of employees under the new Note, there is a reasonable classification. Nevertheless, the further question arises whether the reasonable classification, with the added condition in the Note incorporated on December 23, 1967, can be said to have a nexus ora relation to the object sought to be achieved by clause (b) of rule 2046? The object of rule 2046 itself is to provide for the age of retirement of the two types of officers coming under clauses (a) and (b). The object of rule 2046 itself is to provide for the age of retirement of the two types of officers coming under clauses (a) and (b). Where there is no indication that any further distinction inter se is sought to be made amongst the officers mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) and when a uniform age of retirement has also been fixed in respect of the officers coming under these two classes, the classification carving out the ex-employees of the their authorities mentioned therein with the added condition that the rules of the Company or the State should have a provision similar to clause (b), has, in our opinion, no nexus or relation to the object of the rule." (Para 25) It would thus appear that the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court in that case both on the ground that the classification of ministerial railway servants who were treated alike up to a point of time into two different categories for the purpose of determining their age of retirement was not reasonable and that at any rate there was no nexus between the classification and the object of the rule. This decision is very much in the point so far as the present controversy is concerned. Here also there was a fusion of all servants who were absorbed in the Central Government service. They were treated alike and as the historical background which we have set out earlier shows the services of the ex-princely State servants were in fact treated as service in the Central Government under the Ministry of Finance, Government of India Notification dated December 10, 1951 and continuously thereafter. To make any distinction at this stage, as is sought to be done by the respondents, on the basis of the source of recruitment, would be clearly violative of the guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The question is whether such a construction could be placed on clause (c) of Fundamental Rule 56 which would render it open to challenge on the ground of denial of equal opportunity. 24. The question is whether such a construction could be placed on clause (c) of Fundamental Rule 56 which would render it open to challenge on the ground of denial of equal opportunity. 24. It is well-settled that if on one construction a given provision becomes ultra vires the powers of the enacting authority, whereas on the other construction which may be open, the statute remains effective and operative, the Court will prefer the latter on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of its jurisdiction. In compliance with this principle general words are sometimes read down and construed in a limited sense to avoid a statute becoming unconstitutional (see, for example, K.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1230, New India Sugar Mills v. Commissioner Sales Tax, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1207, Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1838). Similarly, a wider construction and some times even strained construction of statutes has been adopted in order to uphold the constitutionality of the enactment (see Express Newspaper Ltd v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1968 S.C. 578 and S. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1146). In the present case, therefore, we would be completely justified in putting upon the expression "Government service" a wider meaning and to assign to that expression the connotation that it would include not only service rendered under the Central Government and the former Provincial Government but also that rendered under the ex-princely State. Such a construction which is open and permissible having regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words "Government service" and which is even otherwise preferable having regard to the object and purpose of the rule and its historical background, would be all the more preferable in order to save the rule or any part thereof from being exposed to challenge on the ground that it violates Articles 14 and 16. This is yet another consideration which weighs with us in giving a liberal meaning to the expression "Government service" as indicated earlier. 25. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, it would appear that the stand of the respondents that the petitioner was not entitled to continue in service till he attained the age of sixty years was erroneous and contrary to the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56(c). 25. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, it would appear that the stand of the respondents that the petitioner was not entitled to continue in service till he attained the age of sixty years was erroneous and contrary to the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56(c). The result, therefore, is that the impugned order retiring the petitioner on attaining the age of 58 years will be quashed and the respondents will be directed to treat the petitioner as having continued in service till he attained the age of 60 years and to give him all consequential benefits on that basis. The respondents will carry out the writ issued within a period of three months from to-day. Rule made absolute with costs in terms aforesaid. 26. Mr. Vakharia, on behalf of the respondents, applies for a certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution. The decision given by us proceeds upon well-settled principles. In our opinion, the case does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The application, is therefore, rejected. Petition allowed.