JUDGMENT R.B. Misra, J. - The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 8th October, 1975, by a learned Single Judge dismissing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. Janki Prasad Jain, respondent No. 5, is the landlord of house No. 296, situate in Mohalla Shekh Sarai, Bulandshahr, occupied by the appellant Shyam Sunder Sharma and Shree Gopal Bansal, respondent No. 6, as tenants. The landlord applied under section 3 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 for permission to sue the tenants for their eviction on the ground that he was going to retire from service and he required the said house for his personal occupation, as he did not own any other house where he could settle after retirement. The application was resisted by the tenants on the ground that the landlord did not genuinely need the house and that he would not settle at Buldandshahr after his retirement. He had all along been out of Bulandshahr. The application had been filed only with an oblique motive to get the same vacated and thereupon to let it out to some other person on enhanced rent. 3. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The landlord preferred a revision against that order, but that was also dismissed by the revisional authority. He, therefore, made a representation under section 7-F of the said Act, which was allowed and the requisite permission was granted to the landlord. The appellant feeling aggrieved by the order filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the order of the State Government, but the writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge by his order dated 8th October, 1975. The appellant has now come up in appeal against that order. 4. Sri B. D. Madhyan, appearing for the appellant, reiterated the same old points which he raised before the learned Single Judge. His contention, in the main, was that the need of the tenants has not been compared with that of the landlord. We have perused the order of the State Government passed on the representation made by the landlord and we find that the contention of the appellant has no force. His contention, in the main, was that the need of the tenants has not been compared with that of the landlord. We have perused the order of the State Government passed on the representation made by the landlord and we find that the contention of the appellant has no force. The State Government had taken into consideration the needs of the landlord as well as of the tenants and it had compared the same and found the need of the landlord to be a genuine one. He, therefore, granted him the requisite permission. 5. It was next contended that the order of the State Government is cryptic and it had not met with the points which had been taken into consideration by the two authorities below. It is true that the order is a cryptic one, but, all the same, the State Government had complied with the requirements of law. It had compared the needs of the landlord and the tenants and had come to the conclusion that the landlord wanted to settle at Bulandshahr to which place be belonged and, therefore, his need could not be sacrificed to the need of the tenants. Obviously, this finding only means that it was satisfied with the genuine need of the landlord. 6. In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is not for this Court to make a fresh appraisal of the materials and came to its won conclusion. If the order passed by the State Government on the representation made by a landlord, the State Government, which was the last authority on the question of fact, was satisfied with the genuine need of the landlord, this Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion of the State Government. The mere fact, that the other, co-owner of the house in dispute has already transferred his share in the house, is hardly a ground for holding that the landlord respondent, in this case also, wanted to transfer the house to somebody else. The Court was satisfied with the allegation of the landlord that he wanted to settle at Bulandshahr after his retirement. 7. For the foregoing discussion, we find no force in this appeal we, accordingly, dismiss the same. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.