Rajani Kanto alias Madhusudan Ghose v. Nilima Dutta
1976-01-01
CHITTATOSH MOOKERJEE
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT The plaintiff opposite party has brought a suit for eviction against the defendant petitioner in the Sadar Munsif's court at Suri in respect of a premises situated at Sainthia, district Birbhum. The defendant petitioner after entering appearance in the aforesaid eviction suit brought by the opposite party filed a petitioner under section 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The learned Munsif, Suri, has rejected the said application under section 17(2) filed by the present petitioner on the ground that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act., 1956 does not extend to Sainthia Mouza as the same has not been constituted as a municipality under the provisions of the Benal Municipal Act, 1932. The petitioner obtained the present Rule against the said order. 2. Mr. Ganguly, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has submitted before me that Sainthia mouza has been admittedly declared to be a notified area by a notification under section 93A of the Bengal Municipal Act 1932. According to Mr. Ganguly the said area must be deemed to be within a municipality under Section 93C(2). Mr. Ganguly has submitted that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act therefore extend to Sainthia. 3. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter, I am unable to uphold the above submission of Mr. Ganguly. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 gives the extent of the said Act. Thus, it “extends to the whole of Calcutta and to al areas which have been or may hereafter be constituted municipalities under the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 : Provided…”. Part II, Ch. II, of the Bengal Municipal Act 1932 deals with the creation of municipalities. Section 6(1) inter alia provides for issue of notification by the State Government declaring its intention to constitute any town…a municipality or to abolish or alter limits of a municipality. Section 7 deals with consideration of objection. Section 8 confers powers upon the State Government to constitute, abolish or alter limits of a municipality by publication of notification. It is not disputed that in the instant case the State Government did not declare under section 6 its intention to constitute Sainthia a municipality and the said area under Section 8 has not been constituted a Municipality. But the State Government constituted Sainthia as a notified area under section 93A.
It is not disputed that in the instant case the State Government did not declare under section 6 its intention to constitute Sainthia a municipality and the said area under Section 8 has not been constituted a Municipality. But the State Government constituted Sainthia as a notified area under section 93A. Such constitution of a notified area is not equivalent to the constitution of a municipality under section 8 of the Act. Thus the Bengal Municipal Act creates a different procedure for constitution of notified areas. Sec. 93A(1)(i) itself provides that a notified area may be constituted in respect of any area which does not fulfil the conditions for being constituted a municipality under this Act.’ The State Government has been given power to constitute newly developing towns and areas in which new industries have been or are being established as notified areas. Section 93D(i) empowers the State government to convert a notified area into a municipality. Section 93 E contains consequential provisions in case of such conversion of a notified area into a full-fledged municipality. Section 93C provides for the consequences of the application of the Bengal Municipal Act to a notified area. The expression “…operate as if the notified area were a municipality were vested in the notified area Authority” are in the nature of deeming provisions and they also establish that except for such deeming provisions a notified area is not one and the same as a municipality constituted under section 8. I am not prepared to extend legal fiction in section 93C (2) except to the extent provided in the statute itself. When the statute clearly expresses an intention to treat a notified area as a municipality only to a limited extend the petitioner cannot contend that Sainthia has been constituted into a Municipality and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act has been extended to Sainthia. Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, drew my attention to the definition of ‘municipality’ in section 3(34) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 and correctly pointed out that section 3, which is in the nature of interpretation provision, begins by saying–“under there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,”. Chapter II of the Bengal Municipal Act clearly provides for the mode and manner of constitution of municipalities.
Chapter II of the Bengal Municipal Act clearly provides for the mode and manner of constitution of municipalities. Section 1(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act does not provide that the Act would extend to areas which are municipalities as defined in section 3(34) of the Bengal Municipal Act but the Act extends only to areas which have been constituted the language of section 1(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which uses the expression “…………….constituted municipalities under the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932”. I have already held that the constitution of a municipality can e made only by fulfilling the provisions of Chapter II of the Bengal Municipal Act. In the absence of such compliance with Ch. II of the Act a notified area constituted under Section 93A is not a municipality notwithstanding extension of some of the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act to the area concerned. Mr. Ganguly, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted before me that unless the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act be extended to Sainthia, the tenants occupying premises in the said area would suffer hardship. I am unable to consider the submission in view of the clear language of the statute. 4. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, submitted that the view I have taken in this case is in accord with the decision of Alak Chandra Gupta, J. (as he then was) in the case of (1) Banka Prosad v. Ukhra Forest & Fisheries Ltd., reported in 75 CWN 606. The learned Judge in his aforesaid decision relied upon an unreported decision of Chatterjee, J. in (2) CR no. 4342 of 1966, Hari Narayan Mukherjee v. Suresh Chandra Gupta and on another decision of Bijayesh Mukherji, J. in (3) S. R. Chatterjee v. Hindusthan Steel Ltd, reported in 73 CWN 228 (vide paragraph 7 of the Reports), I respectfully agree with the propositions laid down in the said decisions. 5. The rule is accordingly discharged. There will be no order as to costs.