JUDGMENT - P.S. SHAH, J.:---The short question that arises in this special civil application is whether the two courts below were in error in law in not granting the petitioners application for amending the plaint. The facts in so far as they are material may be stated thus: The dispute relates to Flat No. 19 on the 4th floor, Ganga Vihar, 55, N. Subhash Road, Marine Drive. Respondent No. 1 was the landlord of both Flat Nos. 16 and 19 in the said premises and he had let out the two flats to respondent No. 2. According to the petitioner he was put in possession of both the flats by respondent No. 2 in the year 1968, and since then he is lawful possession as a sub-tenant thereof with the consent of the respondent No. 1-landlord. According to him, in the year 1969, he gave back possession of flat No. 16 to respondent No. 2 and continued to be in possession and occupation of falt No. 19 at the rent of Rs. 800/- p.m. On October 11, 1971, the respondent No. 1 filed R.A.E. Suit No. 865/4960 of 1971 against the respondent No. 2 for possession of both the said flats together with the garage on certain grounds. On December 20, 1971, respondents 1 and 2 filed consent terms under which the respondent No. 1 withdrew his suit relating to flat No. 16 and the garage, and as regards flat No. 19 he agreed to vacate the premises and hand them over to respondent No. 1. Pursuant to the consent terms, a decree for possession in favour of respondent No. 1 in respect of flat No. 19 was passed by the Court of Small Causes. Thereafter on January 18, 1971, respondent No. 1 sought to execute the decree for possession. However, the execution was then obstructed by the petitioners wife. The respondent No. 1 therefore, took out an obstructionist notice against the petitioner. This obstructionist notice was made absolute on January 18, 1973 by the executing Court. Aggrieved by this decision, on September 24, 1973, the petitioner filed Special Civil Application No. 2340 of 1973 in the High Court. However, the execution was then obstructed by the petitioners wife. The respondent No. 1 therefore, took out an obstructionist notice against the petitioner. This obstructionist notice was made absolute on January 18, 1973 by the executing Court. Aggrieved by this decision, on September 24, 1973, the petitioner filed Special Civil Application No. 2340 of 1973 in the High Court. During the pendency of the Special Civil Application, on December 21, 1973, the petitioner filed a declaratory suit, which has given rise to this petition, challenging the decree passed in favour of respondent No. 1 on the ground that the same was obtained by respondents 1 and 2 collusively with a view to defraud the petitioner of his legitimate rights in the flat. On November 21, 1975, the special civil application preferred by the petitioner was rejected. However, it was ordered that the execution of the decree should be stayed till the final disposal of the suit. It was also directed that the suit should be heard and disposed of by the trial Court before March 31, 1976. On February 16, 1976, issues were framed by the trial Court. Thereafter on February 19, 1976, the petitioner filed an application for amendment of the plaint. In substance, the amendment was to the effect that the petitioner was a protected licensee or a deemed tenant within the meaning of the Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 17 of 1973 to the Bombay Rent Act and was, therefore, entitled to protection from eviction. This application for amendment was opposed by respondent No. 1. On February 27, 1976, the trial Court rejected the application mainly on the ground that the amendment seeks to introduce a case which is inconsistent with the one already pleaded, and such an amendment cannot be granted. The petitioner preferred a Revisional Application before the Appellant Bench of the Court of Small causes challenging the order of rejection of the application for amendment passed by the trial Court. This Revisional Application was, however, rejected on March 26, 1976. The view taken by the Appellant Bench of the Court of Small Causes was that the amendment could not be allowed as the case made out by the amendment is totally inconsistent with the case as originally pleaded in the plaint, and secondly, the application for amendment was not bona fide. The view taken by the Appellant Bench of the Court of Small Causes was that the amendment could not be allowed as the case made out by the amendment is totally inconsistent with the case as originally pleaded in the plaint, and secondly, the application for amendment was not bona fide. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner has preferred this special civil application under Article No. 227 of the Constitution. The first question for consideration is whether the courts below were justified in holding that the case sought to be made out by the petitioner by the amendment is inconsistent with the original pleading. On a perusal of the plaint, it would, undoubtedly, appear that the petitioner has contended that he is a lawful tenant, or lawful sub-tenant in respect of flat No. 19, and that he is protected from eviction under the provisions of the Rent Act. The plaint also shows that the petitioner has challenged the consent decree as collusive and, therefore, not binding on him. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it is stated--- "The plaintiff in the alternative and in any event also says and submits that even if it is held that the said decree obtained by the defendant No. 1 against the defendant No. 2 in the said R.A.E. Suit No. 865/4960 of 1971 is valid and legal then in that event the plaintiff being a lawful sub-tenant in respect of the said flat No. 19 (in occupation of the plaintiff), the said decree is not binding upon the plaintiff and that in view of section 14 of the Bombay Rent Act the plaintiff is entitled to be recognised as lawful tenant of the defendant No. 1 directly in respect of the said flat No. 19 on account of the termination of title of the defendant No. 2 in respect of the said flat No. 19, and also because of the latest amendment in the Bombay Rent Act, the plaintiff in any event and in further alternative is protected licensee even if it is assumed that licence was granted to plaintiff." It would thus appear that the petitioner has also based his claim on the recent amendment in the Bombay Rent Act, and has specifically averred that he would be a protected licensee even if it is assumed that respondent No. 2 had granted licence to him. The above statement made in the plaint as well as the whole paragraph 8 would indicate that the petitioner did make out a case of protected licensee even in his original plaint. It is true that this alternative claim as made out in the plaint is not as clear as it should be. But it is difficult to uphold the view taken by the courts below that the amendment sought by the petitioner is wholly inconsistent with or foreign to the averments made in the original plaint. It is clear that the courts below have not given attention to the averments made by the petitioner in paragraph 8 of the plaint. It is well settled that all amendments to a plaint ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions : (a) of not working injustice to the other side; and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. In the present case, it cannot be said that the amendment sought by the plaintiff is foreign to the averments of the fase set up in the original plaint. On the other hand, there is a clear statement in the original plaint itself that the petitioner seeks to place reliance on the recent amendment made in the Rent Act which confers tenancy rights on a certain class of licensee. Having regard to the averments made in paragraph 8 of the plaint, it must be held that the petitioner by his amendment is merely trying to make his case more specific. The amendment sought is in the following term: "That in the event of this Honble Court holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he is a lawful sub-tenant then the plaintiff says that in any event the defendant No. 2 had granted him leave and licence to occupy the said flat No. 19, any event in 1968 or there about and the said leave and licence was in respect of the premises which are rooms within the meaning of the latest amendment to the Bombay Rent Act, being Maharashtra Amendment No. 17 of 1973 and the said licence granted to the plaintiff was subsistingand never terminated by any notice to quit or otherwise and the said licence could not have deemed to be terminated in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances more specifically stated in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 of the plaint and therefore the plaintiff says that he is in the alternative a protected, licensee or a deemed tenant within the meaning of the said Amendment No. 17 of 1973 to the Bombay Rent Act." The second part of the amendment is it prayer clause which is merely consequential. In the facts of this case, it would be clear that what is being done by the amendment is merely to clarify the alternative case set up by the petitioner in the original plaint. Such an amendment ought to have been granted by the Court. The revisional Court has observed that the application for amendment is not bona fide as the application has been given long after the amendment in the Rent Act giving protection to the licensees. In this connection, it must be noticed that the Special Civil Application No. 2340 of 1974 by the petitioner was pending since before the filing of the present suit. The Special Civil Application was disposal of only on November 21, 1975 with the direction that the suit should be disposed of before March 31, 1976. It was only thereafter that on February 16, 1976 issues were framed by the Court. Within three days after the framing of the issues the petitioner filed the application for amendment. It is therefore, difficult to see how the petitioners conduct lacks bona fide. It is true as urged by Mr. Abhyankar that in the original plaint, there are no specific averments as to how the petitioner became a protected licensees, but there was a general statement that the petitioner was entitled to take advantage of the amendment introduced in the Rent Act. But that is no reason for disallowing the amendment. It is precisely for clarifying the case made out in the original plaint that the petitioner has come out with the amendment. As this amendment sought is not wholly inconsistent with the original plaint, I see no reason to reject such a prayer. It is obvious that the courts below have ignored the averments made by the petitioner in paragraph 8 of the original plaint which clearly show that the amendment sought by the petitioner is not foreign to the original case of the petitioner. The contention of Mr. Abhyankar that the delay in making the application for amendment suggested lack of bona fide cannot be accepted. The contention of Mr. Abhyankar that the delay in making the application for amendment suggested lack of bona fide cannot be accepted. As pointed out above, the suit was filed in the pendency of the special civil application preferred by the petitioner challenging the orders passed against him in the obstructionist notice proceedings and the special civil application came to be disposed of only on November 21, 1975. The application for amendment was made before the date of hearing which was to commence on March 8, 1976. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it is impossible to hold that the application is not bona fide. It was lastly urged by Mr. Abhyankar that the courts below have concurrently held that the application for amendment should not be granted and that this was not a fit case where the application for amendment should be granted and such discretionary order should not be interfered with by this Court. I am unable to accept this submission. The basic assumption on which the petitioners application was rejected was that the case made out by the petitioner is wholly inconsistent with the original plaint. This assumption made by the courts below, and as pointed out by me above, is not correct. On the other hand, the original plaint itself refers to the petitioner claiming his rights of a protected licensee under the amendment Rent Act. Having regard to the facts of this case, and in the interests of justice and also to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings, in my view, it is necessary to set aside the orders of the courts below and grant the application for amendment. I therefore reject the contention of Mr. Abyankar that the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution should not be exercised in this case. In the result, the petitioner is allowed, the order dated February 2, 1976 passed by the trial Court and the order dated March 26, 1976 passed by the revisional Court are quashed and set aside, and the petitioners application for amendment of the plaint is granted. This Court has already directed in the earlier special civil application that the suit should be heard and disposed of expeditiously. By consent of parties, it is directed that the hearing of the suit should be commenced on April 26, 1976 and the suit be heard from day to day. Mr. This Court has already directed in the earlier special civil application that the suit should be heard and disposed of expeditiously. By consent of parties, it is directed that the hearing of the suit should be commenced on April 26, 1976 and the suit be heard from day to day. Mr. Abhyankar for respondent No. 1 states that the respondent No. 1 will file his written statement to the amendment plaint before April 23, 1976. Mr. Shah for the petitioner states that he would take necessary steps to serve respondent No. 2 with the amended plaint immediately. The petitioner shall pay to respondent No. 1 costs of this petition as well as in the trial Court. -----