A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IT is difficult to get premises on rent but it is also extremely difficult to retain the possession of the rented premises for there is no limit to the ingenuity of people who can afford to adopt means fair or foul for securing vacant possession of the rented premises. The case on hand shows now difficult it was for tenant to protect his possession. ( 2 ) BOTH the Civil Revision Applications pertain to the dispute in respect of the property situated at Rampura Main Road Surat bearing Survey No. 76 Ward No. 12. The petitioner of Civil Revision Application No. 235/78 is the landlord while the petitioner of C. R. A. No. 476/78 is the tenant. The landlord filed Civil Suit No. 665/75 in the Small Causes Court at Surat under the provisions of the Rent Act and prayed for eviction of the tenant from the suit premises which consisted of one room and open wada on the ground-floor and one room on the first floor. The rent of the suit premises was Rs. 10/- per month. The plaintiff purchased this property by a sale deed dated February 18 1970 Exh. 91 and 1 hereafter he served a notice upon the Defendant No. 1 tenant claiming arrears of rent and also the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises. The Defendant No. 1 i. e. the tenant replied to the notice vide Exh. 87 dated March 28 1970 The landlord filed the suit for recovery of possession on July 6 1970 The landlord advanced the grounds of bonafide personal requirement; nuisance and annoyance caused by the tenant and also alleged that part of the suit premises was sub-let to Defendant No. 2 at a monthly rent of Rs. 30/- per month and that the defendant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and that he failed to pay the entire amount of arrears despite one months notice. Therefore on the aforesaid grounds and allegations made by the plaintiff landlord it was prayed that the tenant was required to be evicted from the suit premises. Therefore on the aforesaid grounds and allegations made by the plaintiff landlord it was prayed that the tenant was required to be evicted from the suit premises. ( 3 ) ON the other hand the tenant filed Civil Suit No. 147/76 and prayed that he was the tenant of southern portion of Wada land over and above the portion of the premises which were admittedly in the possession of the tenant i. e. Defendant No. 1. The Trial Court consolidated both the suits with the consent of the parties. Further the evidence that has been led is also common. Both the parties advanced their argument on the common question of law and facts that arose in the matter. By a common judgment the Trial Court disposed of both the matters and ordered to dismiss the suit filed by the respective plaintiff. Both of them felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. There-fore both of them preferred appeals before the appellate court under the provisions of the Rent Act. Eventually both the appeals have also been dismissed and the appellate court has confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Both the parties i. e. plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 665/75 and the plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 147/76 have preferred revision application in this High Court and that is how Civil Revision Application No. 235/78 (filed by the original landlord) and Civil Revision Application No. 476/ 78 (filed by original tenant) have come up before this High Court. C. R. A. No. 235/78 ( 4 ) THE counsel for the petitioner land-lord fairly conceded that as far as the bonafide personal requirement of the plaintiff was concerned he was not in a position to substantiate his case. He has further submitted that it was difficult to assail the finding on facts arrived at by the lower Court in respect of nuisance and annoyance. Therefore it is clear that there is no substance in the case sought to be placed by the petitioner as far as the issues regarding bonafide requirement and annoyance and nuisance are concerned. Hence it is not necessary to discuss these issues in any further details. It will be sufficient to note that the finding arrived at by the lower courts in respect of the issues of bonafide personal requirement and annoyance and nuisance is a con-current finding of fact. Hence it is not necessary to discuss these issues in any further details. It will be sufficient to note that the finding arrived at by the lower courts in respect of the issues of bonafide personal requirement and annoyance and nuisance is a con-current finding of fact. The Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to assail the reasons given by and the conclusion arrived at by the lower courts. Therefore the finding arrived at by the lower courts in respect of the aforesaid issues is hereby confirmed. ( 5 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner submitted that the lower courts have materially erred in not passing a decree of eviction on the ground of sub-letting and on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. According to the petitioner the Respondent No. 1 i. e. Nagindas Uttamram Dudhwala the original Defendant No. 1 who died during the pendency of the revision application in this High Court had inducted the defendant No. 2 i. e. Bhikhabhai Vanmalidas as sub-tenant in the premises and he had been staying in the premises during the period commencing from October 1969 to May 1970 There-fore the tenant original Defendant No. 1 should he directed to be evicted from the premises. ( 6 ) IT may be noted that on this point there is concurrent finding of fact by both the lower courts. The lower courts have appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence and have come to the conclusion that the evidence both in the shape of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the plaintiff landlord was not believable and that he had failed to prove that the premises in question were sub-let to the Defendant No. 2. The lower courts did not believe the evidence of the husband of the plaintiff i. e. Babubhai Kapadia Exh. 70 and the evidence of Bhikhabhai Vanmalidas Defendant No. 2 Exh 120. The lower courts did not give much credence to the entire oral evidence led by the plaintiff. It is therefore submitted that apart from the oral evidence led by the plaintiff the lower courts have seriously erred in not accepting the domentary evidence on record. The documentary evidence is in the shape of public documents and the same is coming from Municipality Revenue Office and Civil Supply Office and the Office of the Prohibition and Excise Department. It is therefore submitted that apart from the oral evidence led by the plaintiff the lower courts have seriously erred in not accepting the domentary evidence on record. The documentary evidence is in the shape of public documents and the same is coming from Municipality Revenue Office and Civil Supply Office and the Office of the Prohibition and Excise Department. The documentary evidence also consists of the letters received by the Defendant No. 2 at the address of the premises in question. There are rent receipts alleged to have been is sued by the Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 2. It is submitted that coupled with the aforesaid documents if correct approach for appreciation of evidence is adopted the conclusion will be irresistible that the defendant-tenant had sublet the premises to the Defendant No. 2 and hence he was liable to be evicted from the suit premises. In support of this contention it is further submitted that the defendant-tenant had not put up a specific case in his reply to the notice or in his written statement that when the plaintiff met him in the month of August 1969 the plaintiff had asked him as to whether the defendant would hand over vacant possession of the premises as the plaintiff was going to purchase the property in question. This case according to the plaintiff has been put forth for the first time in the examination-in-chief of the defendant-tenant. It is contended that this case having not been placed in the reply to the notice dated April 30 1970 and the same having not been pleaded in the written statement the defence that the documents are got up and not genuine should not be believed and on the basis of the documents referred to herein-above the decree for eviction should be passed. ( 7 ) BEFORE examining the contentions raised hereinabove it will be profitable to keep in mind the restricted scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court to be exercised under Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. There is a well recognized distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and the revisional jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing on facts as well as re-hearing on law points. There is a well recognized distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and the revisional jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing on facts as well as re-hearing on law points. The appellate jurisdiction may be restricted by the statute concerned just as it has been done in the case of second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act. On the other hand revisional jurisdiction is in the nature of superintendence and may some time be exercised even suo motu without the same being invoked by either party. Ordinarily the extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The purpose of revisional jurisdiction would ordinarily be (1) to keep the subordinate Tribunals within the bounds of their authority; (2) to see that the subordinate Tribunals act according to law; (3) to ensure that the subordinate Tribunals act according to the procedure established by law and according to the well-defined principles of justice. The revisional jurisdiction is ordinarily included in the appellate jurisdiction but not vice versa that is to say in revisional jurisdiction the appellate jurisdiction is not included. While dealing with a case arising under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960) in the case of M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar reported in A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 1253 the Supreme Court has observed that merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. The Supreme Court has further observed that despite the wide language employed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not have interfered with findings of fact merely because it did not agree with the finding of the sub-ordinate authority. The Supreme Court has further observed that revisional power of the High Court may not be as narrow under the Rent Act as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal. The Supreme Court has further observed that revisional power of the High Court may not be as narrow under the Rent Act as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal. In a case arising out of Bombay Rent Act in the case of Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishanker Tribhovan reported in 22 GLR 1063 while dealing with the scope of revision under Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act the Supreme Court has observed to the effect that though the High Court has a wider jurisdiction under the Rent Act than the revisional powers u/s 115 of the CP. Code its revisional jurisdiction could only be exercised for a limited purpose with a view to satisfying itself that the decision was according to law. The Supreme Court further observed that the finding arrived at by the lower courts regarding requirement and hardship was neither manifestly perverse nor erroneous and therefore it was not open to the High Court to substitute its own finding for the one reached by the courts below on a reappraisal of evidence. In view of the settled legal position as stated above the task of the High Court is to find out as to whether the finding arrived at by the lower courts is according to law or not that is to say is it manifestly perverse or manifestly erroneous ? ( 8 ) THE Counsel for the petitioner submits that the finding arrived at by the lower courts in the instant case cannot be said to be perverse but it is manifestly erroneous. In his submission the lower courts ought to have taken into consideration the fact that the tenant had not put up the case in the reply to the notice or in the written statement that the plaintiff had met him in the month of August 1969 and had asked him that in case the plaintiff purchased the property in question he would vacate the same or not. Therefore it is submitted that the entire evidence should be appreciated on the basis that the theory put forth by the defendant that documents are not genuine is an after-thought and subsequently got-up story. Therefore it is submitted that the entire evidence should be appreciated on the basis that the theory put forth by the defendant that documents are not genuine is an after-thought and subsequently got-up story. Hence as submitted by the petitioner the defence based on such it theory should be rejected. The aforesaid argument is advanced on the basis of the premise that the evidence should be in conformity with the pleadings of the party. ( 9 ) FIRST of all it is difficult to agree with the counsel for the petitioner that the evidence led by the defendant-tenant is contrary to the pleadings. Absence or omission of specific pleading on a particular point and adducing evidence on that particular point is one thing and to lead evidence contrary to the pleading is altogether another thing. In the instant ease at the most what can be said is that there was absence or omission of these particular facts in the pleadings. The defendant-tenant did not specifically place these facts in reply to the notice Exh. 138 given by him. Similarly these details have not been given in the written statement filed by the defendant-tenant. He could have stated in the reply to the notice and in the written statement that when the plaintiff met him in the month of August 1969 the plaintiff had asked him that in case the plaintiff purchased the property in question whether he (defendant) would vacate the same or not. But the omission to state these facts would not preclude him from showing that the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs were not genuine and that they were got up. Omission is such that it would not amount to contradiction. This plea if taken at the earlier stage could have stayed together with the evidence lcd in the case. The defendant-tenant has not given a go-by to the case but in the reply to the notice or in the written statement. The defendant-tenant has only tried to support the case put up by him in his pleadings by plaintiff; out additional circumstances. True this circumstance has not been specifically mentioned either in the reply to the notice or in the written statement but that would not amount to leading evidence contrary to the pleadings. The defendant-tenant has only tried to support the case put up by him in his pleadings by plaintiff; out additional circumstances. True this circumstance has not been specifically mentioned either in the reply to the notice or in the written statement but that would not amount to leading evidence contrary to the pleadings. There-fore the very premise on the basis of which the argument is sought to be built is very weak in foundation and hence the same has got to be rejected. ( 10 ) IT may also be nested that in this case the trial court as well as the lower appellate court has given reasons by referring to ends and every document as to why the same was not reliable. the reasons given by the lower courts for holding that the documents relied upon by the plaintiff were not genuine and/or at any rate not believable are such that they are capable of being adopted by any reasonable person. Therefore it cannot he said that the reasoning adopted by the lower courts is not in accordance with law. Whether a particular plea is taken right from the inception of the ease or at later stage pales into insignificance once the document relied upon by the plaintiff is held to he not genuine or not worthy of credence. Simply because a particular pleading is not made at an earlier stage of the case that would not determine the character of documentary evidence sought to be relied upon by the plaintiff. Let us take this very argument from another angle. Assuming for a moment that in reply to the notice (Exh. 138) and in the written statement the defendant has specifically averred that the plaintiff had met him in the month of August 1969 and had asked the defendant that in case the plaintiff purchases the property whether he (defendant) would vacate the premises or not. Would this circumstance by itself lead to the conclusion that the documents sought to be relied upon by the plaintiff were all fabricated and therefore not reliable. Certainly on the basis of this circumstance alone the documents relied upon by the plaintiff could not have been discarded. Applying the same logic absence of such pleading right from the inception would not have titled the balance either way. Certainly on the basis of this circumstance alone the documents relied upon by the plaintiff could not have been discarded. Applying the same logic absence of such pleading right from the inception would not have titled the balance either way. In the result in the facts and circumstances of this this case absence of pleading on this particular point as stated by the Counsel per the plaintiff is an irrelevant cicumstance. The genuineness of otherwise of the documents should have been judged without referring to the pleading and that what has been done in this case by the lower Courts. ( 11 ) IT is next contended that the documents referred upon by the plaintiff consist of the following material:i. (A) Exh. 97 copy of cut book of Surat Municipal Corporation showing the name of defendant No. 2 as sub-tenant and the amount of rent realised from the property sublet. (b) Exh. 96 Special Notice issued by the Municipality in respect of the property tax. II. Carbon copy of application for surrendering the ration card Exh. 115 showing that ration cards were surrenderd by Defendant No. 2 on August 10 1970iii. Deposition of Clerk in Prohibition and Excise Department Shri Jasabhai Raviabhai Exh. 116 who spoke regarding licence of spirit issued by the Prohibition and Excise Department and the document in that connection Exh. 117 dated January 30 1970 is produced. IV. Rent receipts Exh. 83 to 86 alleged to have been issued by Defendant tenant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 V. Letters Exhs. 121 to 124 and Exh. 12 and Exhs. 126 to 127 addressed to the Defendant No. 2; the letters are from October 1969 to February 1970. VI. Summons of the Court showing the address of the defendant No. 2 of the suit premises. VII. Notice Exhs. 87 dated March 28 1970 addressed to Defendant No. 2 showing the address of the disputed premises. ( 12 ) PRIME facie one may be impressed by the documentary evidence coming from various sources. One may be tempted to believe that it would not be possible for any one to concoct or fabricate document involving different public offices. However as it is many a time told facts are stranger than fiction. That is what appears to have happened in this case also. One may be tempted to believe that it would not be possible for any one to concoct or fabricate document involving different public offices. However as it is many a time told facts are stranger than fiction. That is what appears to have happened in this case also. In the instant case right from the beginning i. e. immediately after the purchase of the premises by the plaintiff at every stage whenever the defendant No. 2 (the sub-tenant)is alleged to have done something his action sought to be supported by some document. But at all these stages special care is taken to see that defendant-tenant does not come to know about the actions which were being taken of which were being alleged to have been taken by the defendant No. 2. Notice Exh. 80 has been issue to the defendant-tenant where in sub-letting is alleged but the name of the Defendant No. 2 is not written. Moreover no copy of this notice has been sent to the Defendant No. 2 The notice dated March 28 1970 Ex. 87 is alleged to have been sent to the defendant No. 2 (the sub-tenant ). A copy of this notice is also not sent to the defendant tenant. So when this action is taken by the plaintiff he has taken meticulous care to see that the defendant-tenant does not come in picture at all or that he has no chance to know about this notice correspondence. ( 13 ) ANOTHER silent feature of all these documents and the story put forth by the plaintiff is that the entire case is sought to be made fool-proof Ordinary a sub-tenant would not come forward to help the landlord. This is an unusual feature. In this case the sub-tenant is openly and unequivocally helping the plaintiff-landlord. It may even be said that the Defendant No. 2 is almost in collusion with the plaintiff. Exhs. 96 and 97 are documents pertaining to the assessment notice and the extract of the cut book of the Municipal Corporation. In these documents at one place it is written that Bhikhabhai Vanmalidas is the sub-tenant of tenant Indumati Babubhai Kapadia. Ordinarily the clerks or employees of the Municipality writing the cut book or special notice would never inquire about the nature of the tenancy. It is something unusual that such an endorsement is made in these documents. In these documents at one place it is written that Bhikhabhai Vanmalidas is the sub-tenant of tenant Indumati Babubhai Kapadia. Ordinarily the clerks or employees of the Municipality writing the cut book or special notice would never inquire about the nature of the tenancy. It is something unusual that such an endorsement is made in these documents. Similarly the carbon copy of the application surrendering the ration card is produced and one Nirmalaben Motisinh Exh. 114 is examined to support the story of the plaintiff and that of the Defendant No. 2 that the ration card was surrendered by the Defendant No. 2. As far as the ration cards are concerned. the best evidence would have been of the shop owner from where articles of ration were being purchased. More-over the original of Exh. 115 is not forthcoming. Therefore the best evidence which could have been produced having been kept back or suppressed the lower courts were certainly justified in not accepting the same. Similarly the reasoning given by the lower courts with regard to the unusual story regarding the licence of spirit and/or purchase of the spirit is also quite convincing and reasonable. ( 14 ) AT the request of the Counsel for the petitioner I myself took over the task of comparing the admitted signatures of Exhs. 6 9 24 and 141 with the disputed signatures on rent receipts Exhs. 83 84 85 and 86. I am of the opinion that the disputed signatures on Exhs. 83 to 86 the rent receipts alleged to have been passed by the defendant-tenant in favour of the Defendant No. 2 sub-tenant are not by the person who has has put the signatures on Exh. 6 9 21 and 141. Both are strikingly dissimilar. It must be said in fairness to the Counsel for the petitioner that when I expressed this opinion he has immediately conceded that he would not argue further on this point and he would not like to rely upon these documents in support of his case. The fair attitude adopted by the Counsel for the petitioner is certainly laudable; but at the same time this circumstance cannot be brushed aside. This circumstance leads to an irresistible inference that false documents have been created in order to support the case put forth by the plaintiff. The fair attitude adopted by the Counsel for the petitioner is certainly laudable; but at the same time this circumstance cannot be brushed aside. This circumstance leads to an irresistible inference that false documents have been created in order to support the case put forth by the plaintiff. This circumstance alone would be sufficient to doubt the genuineness and veracity of all other documents produced by the plaintiff. ( 15 ) AS for letters alleged to have been received by the Defendant No. 2 at the address of the disputed premises it may be noted that both the lower courts have examined the contents of the letters and have come to the conclusion that the contents of the same indicate that the letters have been subsequently got up and they are not in conformily with the facts stated by the Defendant No. 2. However it was not necessary for the lower Courts to examine the contents in view of the settled legal position that whenever the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue the proof of the hand writing or proof of the signatures would not amount to the proof of the contents of the documents. (See Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import reported in A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 2085 ). In the instant case it is an admitted position that none of the persons who are alleged to have written the aforesaid letters is examined in the case. Therefore it cannot be said that the contents of the letters have been proved. In this view of the matter I do not propose to examine the contents of these letters. However it may also be stated that I do not find any reason to disagree with the view taken by the lower courts. ( 16 ) AS far as the service of summons of the Court upon the Defendant No. 2 is concerned the view taken by the lower courts and the deposition of the bailiff that he had not in fact served the summons at the address in question is quite reasonable and there is no reason to deviate from the conclusion arrived at by the lower courts. ( 17 ) IN the above view of the matter for the reasons stated hereinabove and for the reasons given by the lower courts it is not possible to take a contrary view. Even if one is to go beyond the scope of the revisional jurisdiction and reappreciate the documentary evidence which has been referred to hereinabove it is not possible to come to a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the lower courts. Therefore the finding arrived at by both the lower courts that the plaintiff has failed to prove subletting is not required to be disturbed ( 18 ) THE Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the lower courts ought to have held that the defendant was not ready and willing to pay the rent and that he failed to make the payment within one month from the date of receipt of the notice by him. On this point the evidence of the defendant is that he had gone to tender the amount of arrears of rent before the Advocate of the plaintiff. As the Advocate of the plaintiff refused to take the amount he sent the amount by Money order. Exh. 139 is the receipt issued by the post office and Exh. 140 is the refused money order coupon. It is submitted that Exh. 139 does not contain anything except the name of the plaintiff i. e. Indumati Babubhai Kapadia. In the absence of full particulars describing the plaintiff and in the absence of the address of the plaintiff in the aforesaid document the argument proceeds further it should have been held that the defendant-tenant had not tendered the amount to the plaintiff. The argument is based on the premise that the defendant-tenant after having received the notice must tender the amount of arrears demanded from him to the plaintiff. This argument may be examined. The relevant part of Sections 12 (1) and 12 (3) (a) reads as follows:"12 (1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases. if any and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. if any and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. 12 Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2) the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. THE rest of the part of the Section is not relevant for the purpose of determination of the question raised before me. Hence the same is not reproduced. All that the tenant is required to do is the pays or is ready and willing to pay. He should not neglect to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month. The neglect in the context would mean intentional failure to take necessary precaution. It would mean omission to take certain steps without reasonable excuse. If the tenant who has received a notice demanding arrears of rent goes to the post office within the specified time limit and hands over the entire amount of arrears to the Post-master or postal clerk and obtains a receipt from the post office in token of the fact that he has paid the amount to the money order clerk for being paid to a particular person and shows that he in fact took steps to pay the amount it question it can never be said that he has neglected to pay the amount of arrears. ( 19 ) IN the instant case Exh. 139 reads as follows which is the receipt issued by the money order clerk:no. 3209 Received Rupees (in words) 593. 50 Rs. (Five hundred ninety three Ps. Fifty) being amount of money order payable to (Payees name)INDUMATI Babubhai Kapadiapost STAMP Commission Rs. 9. 95 ( 20 ) A question was raised as to whether once the amount is tendered and is handed over to the postal clerk for being paid to the plaintiff the post office would become an agent of the remittee or would be considered to be the agent of the remitter i. e. the tenant in this case. 9. 95 ( 20 ) A question was raised as to whether once the amount is tendered and is handed over to the postal clerk for being paid to the plaintiff the post office would become an agent of the remittee or would be considered to be the agent of the remitter i. e. the tenant in this case. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay South Bombay v. M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. reported in A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 429 and a decision in the case of Bhikhalal and others v. Munna Lal reported in A. I. R. 1974 Allahabad 366 it is contended that whenever there was instruction by the payee to send the amount it should be held that the post office should become the agent of the remittee i. e. the plaintiff in this case. As against this the Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in the case of Union of India and another v. Jagwant Sing A. I. R. 1982 Punjab and Haryana 23. It is difficult to agree with he principles laid down in the case of Punjab and Haryana High Court. In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax (supra) it has got to be held that whenever re is an instruction by the plaintiff (payee) to send the amount and in response to the demand of the plaintiff for payment if the amount is sent through the post office it should be held that the post office would become the agent of the plaintiff i. e. payee. In this view of the matter also in the instant case it is clearly shown that the amount was handed over to the money order clerk as payable to Indumati Babubhai Kapadia i. e. the plaintiff. On this basis also it can be said that the defendant tenant has not neglected to make the payment inasmuch as the amount was placed in the hands of the Agents of the plaintiff. In the above view of the matter both the contentions raised by the Counsel for the petitioner are required to be rejected. Hence the Civil Revision Application No. 235/79 filed by the plaintiff landlord fails and the same is hereby rejected. C. R. A. No. 476/78 . In the above view of the matter both the contentions raised by the Counsel for the petitioner are required to be rejected. Hence the Civil Revision Application No. 235/79 filed by the plaintiff landlord fails and the same is hereby rejected. C. R. A. No. 476/78 . ( 21 ) CIVIL Revision Application No. 476/78 arises out of the suit filed by the defendant-tenant. The defendant-tenant filed the suit for a declaration that he was the tenant of the open land of Wada in front of the room on the ground floor and which is admittedly in his occupation as tenant. Both the Courts below on appreciation a of evidence came to the conclusion that the tenant was not in occupation of the disputed wada land and he was not tenant of this part of the suit premises. There is no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding Counsel for the defendant-tenant has not been able to show as to how the finding of the lower Courts was in any way contrary to law. Hence this civil revision application is required to be rejected. Civil application No. 2045/84 ( 22 ) IN view of the decision in the aforesaid main matter this civil application does not survive and the same is required to be rejected. This civil application has been filed by the tenant praying that the landlord be restrained from carrying out construction on the land of which he claims to be the tenant. As the Civil Revision Application is rejected no order is required to be passed on this Civil Application. The Civil Application also stands rejected. 23 In the above view of the matter both the Civil Revision Applications are rejected and the rule discharged with no order as to costs. The civil application is also rejected. Rule discharged. .