JUDGMENT VAIDYA J.- The above Appeal from order was referred to Division Bench on January 21, 1976, by Naik: J. as he was of the view that there was a conflict of judgments of this Court on the question of the proper valuation for the purposes of Court fee of suit of the nature filed by the Appellant in the Bombay City Civil Court. 2. There is no dispute a bout the following facts: The plaintiff is the tenant of the suit premises, paying rent to his landlord, at the rate of the standard rent, fixed under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, i.e. Rs. 171-65. There is also no dispute that he gave part of the premises in the suit shop No. 19 Block B Cusrow Baug, Colaba-Causeway, Bombay 1, to the respondent-defendant by way of "leave and licence" in April 1955 for Rs. 325 p. m. as "licence fee or compensation", which was subsequently raised to Rs. 350 p. m. from February 1, 1958. 3. The appellant filed a suit in City Civil Court as far back as in the year 1961 alleging that he had terminated the leave and licence granted to the defendant in March 1958; but subsequently the defendant dispossessed him from some additional portion of the premises in possession of the plaintiff. 4. The suit was resisted on numerous grounds. Two preliminary issues were tried by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court relating to res judicata and pecuniary jurisdiction. The City Civil Court decided the issue of res judicata in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit as barred by res judicata. The appellant filed an appeal to this Court. The appeal was allowed by a single Judge and the suit was remanded for hearing on other issues. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed. The defendant carried an appeal against the said decision of this Court to the Supreme Court. 5. In the meanwhile, as no stay of the hearing of the suit was ordered the suit was taken up for hearing in the City Civil Court on the other preliminary issue with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction. The City Civil Court upheld the defendant's objection and ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. 5. In the meanwhile, as no stay of the hearing of the suit was ordered the suit was taken up for hearing in the City Civil Court on the other preliminary issue with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction. The City Civil Court upheld the defendant's objection and ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The plaintiff filed an Appeal against the said Order and the single Judge of this Court allowed the appeal. 6. The defendant filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision. The Letters Patent Appeal was pending when the Supreme Court heard the earlier appeal and by its judgment dated. September 18, 1975, set aside the decision of the City Civil Court, the decision of the single Judge of this Court and also of the Division Bench of this Court on the question of res judicata. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal before it with the following directions and observations :- "If finally the appellant does not succeed on the question of pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to try the Suit No. 2020 of 1961, then that Court will have to decide this issue of res judicata again, but, in the circumstances that Court is directed not to decide this issue as a preliminary issue but to decide it as at the trial of the suit along with other issues. If, however, the appellant Ultimately succeeds on the question of jurisdiction and the plaint stands returned from the Court of the City Civil Court Judge, in that event, it will be open to the Appellant to pray to the Court where the Plaint may be re-instituted to try the issue of res Judicata as a preliminary issue and it will be for that Court to accede to this prayer or not to accede to it." 7. On November 12, 1975, the Letters Patent Appeal No. 55 of 1975 pending in this Court came up for hearing before Hajarnavis and Mukhi JJ., who set aside the order passed by the single Judge, who had remanded the suit after setting aside the order passed by the City Civil Court directing the return of the plaint on the ground that the City Civil Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction; and sent the case to the single Judge for disposal of the appeal according to law on other points raised by the appellant. 8. 8. As a result of this order, the matter was heard by Naik J. on January 21, 1976. Before him it was contended on behalf of the defendant that the market value of the suit property was in excess of Rs. 25,000, in view of the judgment of Patel J. in First Appeal No. 170 of 1965 decided on October 3, 1969. 9. In that case the plaintiff was a tenant of a shop on the ground floor of Hamam House, Hamam Street, Bombay. The shop had a mezzanine floor, measuring 193 sq. ft. There was a staircase in the shop by which one could reach the mezzanine floor. On October 7, 1958, an agreement was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant, called "leave and licence agreement", on the basis of which some space was given to the defendant by clause 9. The defendant was to pay Rs. 116 as compensation for occupation of the said space. 10. The agreement was renewed from time to time and the last renewal agreement was executed on February 8, 1962. In the meantime, the compensation was increased to a sum of Rs. 150 p. m. The defendant was, under the terms of the agreement, entitled to the use of the telephone and electric power provided in the shop for which he had to pay separately. 11. As the plaintiff and the defendant quarreled, the plaintiff terminated the leave and licence agreement; and filed a suit in the City Civil Court from which the first appeal was heard by Patel J. It was contended that the suit was not properly valued by the plaintiff, who had paid fixed court-fees of Rs. 30 for the relief of injunction which he had claimed in the plaint stating that the same was not capable of monetary valuation. 12. 30 for the relief of injunction which he had claimed in the plaint stating that the same was not capable of monetary valuation. 12. Patel J. referred to section 6 (v) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959, which, in so far as it is material, runs as follows :- "In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens-according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be, where the subject-matter as a house or garden-according to the market value of the house or garden" Patel J. further referred to the case cited before him, viz., Lakhiram Ramdas v. M/s. Vidyut Cable and Rubber Industries1, following the earlier judgment of this Court in Ratilal Manilal v. Chandulal Chhotelal2., where it was held that;- "Where a licensee is in exclusive possession, the plaintiff must ask for possession and not injunction. In every case the Court which is called upon to hear a suit must initially consider the relationship of the parties. It is not as if that in every case the licensor must ask for possession. There are a large number of cases where the licensor continues to remain not only in juridical possession, but in physical possession along with the licensee and in such a case in terms of section 63 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, it is sufficient if he asks for removal of the licensee and a permanent injunction against him restraining him from re-entering the premises……" Referring further to the decision in Radhabai Vasudeo v. Nandlals, Patel J. came to the conclusion that in the facts of that case, in fact, the plaintiff was not entitled to the prayer for injunction only and must value the suit as one for possession. 13. Then the learned Judge dealt with the question of valuation under sub-clause (v) of section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, as follows :- "The question then comes to is, what should be the valuation for the purposes of the court-fees. Clause (V) of section 6 of the Court Fees Act speaks of the market value. Ordinarily, where thing8 are uncertain, an inquiry albeit a summary inquiry maybe called for. But, here is a case where the property is given by the plaintiff who is not the owner. He is ,a tenant. Clause (V) of section 6 of the Court Fees Act speaks of the market value. Ordinarily, where thing8 are uncertain, an inquiry albeit a summary inquiry maybe called for. But, here is a case where the property is given by the plaintiff who is not the owner. He is ,a tenant. The market value would be the value to the plaintiff, because it is the plaintiff who is seeking possession of the premises and it is he who is earning income from it. Admittedly, the plaintiff is charging Rs. 150 per month for these premises. There is some furniture in the premises which consists of three chairs, one table and one Diwan. A sum of Rs. 15 per month may as Well be deducted towards the charges for user of the furniture. A sum of Rs. 135 per month would, therefore, be the compensation which the plaintiff takes from the defendant for the User of these premises. Out of this, a portion of the rent which the plaintiff pays to his landlord must also be deducted. Admittedly, the plaintiff pays a sum of Rs. 200 per month for the entire premises which consists of 800 square feet of the ground floor and the mezzanine floor is the extra area. He would, therefore roughly pay a sum of Rs. 40 which is one fifth for this area. The net residue which the plaintiff keeps by these premises would come to Rs. 95 per month usually, in the City Civil Court, hundred months' value is taken as the market value of the property which comes to Rs. 9,500, The plaintiff must, therefore, pay the court-fees on this amount minus the court-fees which he has already paid on the footing that the suit is for an injunction. The plaintiff to pay the balance of the court-fees immediately and thereafter the defendant to pay the court-fees of this appeal accordingly." 14. Naik J. felt that this judgment of Patel J. was inconsistent with the judgment of Chandrachud J., as he then was, in Civil Revision Application No. 146 of 1969, decided on June 10,1969. In that case, the subject-matter in dispute was a shop in a building called "Rupam", situate at Sion Circle, Bombay. It was in possession of the defendant as a tenant on a monthly, rent of Rs.93-83. In that case, the subject-matter in dispute was a shop in a building called "Rupam", situate at Sion Circle, Bombay. It was in possession of the defendant as a tenant on a monthly, rent of Rs.93-83. The defendant had given the shop on leave and licence to the plaintiffs on monthly fee of Rs. 275. The plaintiffs had brought the suit from which the aforesaid revision application arose against the defendant under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act alleging that they were in possession of the shop as licensees of the defendant and they were wrongly dispossessed by the defendant. 15.' The subject-matter of the suit was valued by the plaintiffs at Rs. 5000 stating Rs. 4000 as the market value of the shop and Rs. 1000 as .the value of the furniture which was in the shop. The defendant objected that proper court-fees was not paid. The dispute was referred to the Registrar of the City Civil Court who took the view that the market value of the shop would be Rs. 12,550 on the basis of the monthly rent which the defendant was paying to his landlord, i.e, Rs. 93.83 and capitalising it 16? years minus for outgoing and taxes; the City Civil Court accepted the valuation and held that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. 16. The defendant filed a revision application before this Court contending that the monthly licence fee of Rs. 275 should be capitalised at 12½ years and the purchase value thus calculated would be the market value of the shop, that is, Rs.41,250; and hence the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 17. Chandrachud J. considered the provisions of section 6(v) of -the Bombay Court Fees Act and proceeded to decide the market value of the shop in question as follows:- "The true market value of house normally depends on what a willing a purchaser is ready to pay to a willing vendor. Now if the shop in question were to be pat to sale by the owner of the property (and it must be noted that the defendant is not the owner of the property), what will enter into the calculation of the purchaser is that he will be able to get a monthly rent of Rs.93.83 from the defendant and nothing more. The fact that the defendant recovers Rs. The fact that the defendant recovers Rs. 275 per month from his licensee is entirely irrelevant for the purposes of the purchaser, because the purchaser will step, not in the shoes of the defendant, but, in the shoes of the owner of the shop, What the purchaser will get by way of income is what the owner of the shop is getting and not what the tenant of the shop is getting from his licensee. In my opinion, therefore, tile trial Court was right in determining the market value of the shop on the basis of the return which the owner of the shop gets from the tenant of the shop and not on the basis of the return which the tenant gets from his licensee. Mr. Rajani, who appeals on behalf of the defendant, however, argued that while determining the market value of certain premises, a Division Bench of this Court (Miss Aninha D'Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur 4) took into consideration the licensee fee. That is undoubtedly true, but that was a case in which the owner of the house had himself given the house on leave and licence to the defendant. (Italics supplied). The owner filed a suit for a mandatory injunction calling upon the defendant to remove herself from the premises, alleging that the premises were given on leave and licence to the defendant and the licence had been revoked. The suit for mandatory injunction was held not maintainable and the plaintiff was called upon to pay court-fees which she would have been required to pay in a suit for possession. The question then arose as to what were the proper court-fees payable by the plaintiff and that question depended on what was the market value of the property. Following a previous decision in Letters Patent Appeal No. 13 of 1963 decided on the 3rd of April 1963, the Division Bench (Patel and Tulzapurkar JJ.), held that the market value of the property would be 12½ times the annual licence fee. (Italics supplied). In that case, if the owner of the flat who was the licensor were to put the flat to sale, a willing purchaser would have naturally taken into consideration that it would be possible to obtain a monthly fee of Rs. 225 from the licensee, which the owner himself was charging to his licensee. (Italics supplied). In that case, if the owner of the flat who was the licensor were to put the flat to sale, a willing purchaser would have naturally taken into consideration that it would be possible to obtain a monthly fee of Rs. 225 from the licensee, which the owner himself was charging to his licensee. There was no intermediate intervention of a tenant in that case and therefore, the licence fee could be taken as a basis for fixing the market value of the property. For reasons already indicated, the licence fee cannot in the present case be taken as proper basis for determining what a willing purchaser would pay for the shop, because the licence fee obtained by the tenant from his licensee is something which the purchaser will never get. The purchaser shall have to remain content with monthly rent of Rs. 93.83 which the tenant pays to the owner of the shop." 18. Naik J. referred the present matter to the Division Bench observing as follows: "The earlier decision of Chandrachud, J. was not cited before Patel, J. In my opinion it is not possible to reconcile the decision of Patel, J. with the earlier decision of Chandrachud, J. on the ground that in the case decided by Chandrachud, J. it was a suit filed by a dispossessed licensee against his licensor under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act as was sought to be done by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, inasmuch as even when the attention of the learned Judge was invited to the Division Bench decision in Miss Aninha D'Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai. M. Thakur, the learned Judge did not refer to any such distinction, but has proceeded to give elaborate reasons for his conclusion that when there is an intermediate intervention of a tenant who has given the premises on leave and licence, the licence fee could not be taken as a safe basis for fixing the market value of the property. If I am right in that view, it would appear that there is an apparent conflict between the decision of Chandrachud, J. in Civil Revision Application No. 149 of 1969 decided on June 10, 1969 and that of Patel, J. in First Appeal No. 170 of 1965 decided on October 3. 1969. If I am right in that view, it would appear that there is an apparent conflict between the decision of Chandrachud, J. in Civil Revision Application No. 149 of 1969 decided on June 10, 1969 and that of Patel, J. in First Appeal No. 170 of 1965 decided on October 3. 1969. Since this conflict is in respect of an important point of law about the court-fees payable in a suit for possession of premises tiled by a tenant-licensor against his ex-licensee. I think that it is desirable that the question should be decided by a Division Bench ... " 19. It is clear from the two judgments that both the learned Judges Chandrachud and Patel, JJ. were concerned with the proper interpretation and application of the provisions of section 6 (v) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959; and they determined the market value of the premises in dispute in the two suits respectively before them. With very great respect to Naik J., we find it difficult to see any conflict between the two judgments as the judgments determined the market value of the premises which was the subject-matter of the suit concerned in accordance with the well settled principles for determining the market value of the property for the purposes of Court-fees. 20. Those principles are stated by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Patel and Tulzapurkar, JJ. in Miss Aninha D'Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur. We find it unnecessary to add anything more to what has been stated on pages 459 to 460 as the law for determining the market value of the house which is the subject matter of the suit within the meaning of section 6 (v) of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959. 21. Chandrachud J. was concerned with the case where the tenant was in possession of the shop on the date of the suit; and the licensee wanted to recover possession from him. Chandrachud J., with respect, rightly observed that in such a case, the market value must be determined with reference to the return which the landlord would get from the tenant who was in possession. 22. Chandrachud J., with respect, rightly observed that in such a case, the market value must be determined with reference to the return which the landlord would get from the tenant who was in possession. 22. Patel J. was concerned with the premises sought to be recovered by a tenant who had given the premises on leave and licence to the defendant and in such a case Patel J., with respect, rightly held that the basis for determining the market value would be the compensation which the plaintiff was recovering from the tenant. 23. In other words, the question as to what is the market value of a house, which is the subject-matter of a suit, must be determined having regard to the averments in the plaint and the facts placed by the parties relevant to the valuation made in the plaint, such as the legal interests which may be existing in the house, whether the interests are interdependant or independant or joint or contractual or statutory. Such interests will have to be taken into consideration with due regard to the laws regarding the transfer of the said interest in the property. The price which a willing purchaser will pay to a willing vendor would be the agreed price as such willing purchasers or vendors will take such interest into consideration when determining prudently the fair or reasonable price of the property. 24. What we find is that these very principles have been taken into consideration by Chandrachud J. in dealing with the case before him and also by Patel J. in dealing with the case before him. With respect, we are in complete agreement with them as well as with the principles laid down by the Division Bench in Miss Aninha D'Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur. In this view of the matter, the question which is referred by Naiki J. cannot survive. It is also not necessary to refer to the other cases referred to by the appellant Ratilal v. Chandulal; Dr. Nadir Sethna v. Mrs. Dastoor5. 25. The appellant, who is appearing in person, has a justifiable grievance that notwithstanding the passage of 15 years since he tiled his suit, in the Bombay City Civil Court, the Courts have not been able to decide whether the suit in the City Civil Court is maintainable having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Dastoor5. 25. The appellant, who is appearing in person, has a justifiable grievance that notwithstanding the passage of 15 years since he tiled his suit, in the Bombay City Civil Court, the Courts have not been able to decide whether the suit in the City Civil Court is maintainable having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The unfortunate result could have been avoided if the Judge in the City Civil Court had decided all the issues instead of following the often deprecated practice of deciding doubtful preliminary issues. However, we cannot cut short the course of the litigation at this stage by dealing with every question which has been raised in the matter. The only question which is referred to us for decision, as stated above, is the question referred to by Naik J. on an assumption that there was an apparent conflict between the judgments of Patel J. and Chandrachud J. which, in our opinion, does not exist, for the reason stated above. 26. It is well-known that a property which is subject to a mortgage is likely to fetch less price than the property which is free from encumbrances. A property which is subject to a charge for maintenance is bound to have a less price in the market than the property which is not subject to such a charge. Similarly, a property which is subject to liability for taxes, or other statutory and non-statutory interest, subsidiary to the interests of a tenant, either de hors the interest of the tenant under the statute or deriving from the interests of the tenant will be taken into consideration by a prudent purchaser when purchasing such properties. 27. Of course, we are concerned in the Courts with only what is known as "white market value" and not the "black market value" which the Court has no means of knowing unless the parties begin to place all facts of the black market before the Court. Nevertheless, it is well-known that in congested cities and the towns the fact that vacant possession is or is not available is very important factor in determining the market value of any urban property. It is in the light of these principles that Patel J. and Chandrachud J. have determined the valuation in the cases before them. Nevertheless, it is well-known that in congested cities and the towns the fact that vacant possession is or is not available is very important factor in determining the market value of any urban property. It is in the light of these principles that Patel J. and Chandrachud J. have determined the valuation in the cases before them. When the Court is called upon to determine the fair or reasonable market value, on the date of the suit, of the subject-matter of the suit which may consist of a house or a part of a. house; the Court is expected to deal with the matter bearing all these principles in mind. 28. In view of what we have stated above, we do not think it necessary to decide any other question which the appellant has raised in the appeal from the order apart from the question which was referred to Division Bench by Mr. Justice Naik which, in our opinion, was not necessary as there is no conflict between Chandrachud J. and Patel J. 29. We, therefore, direct that the matter may be placed before any single Judge for disposal of the Appeal from order on the other points raised by the appellant. Costs of this reference shall be costs in the appeal. Order accordingly.