ORDER Tankha, J:- 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is directed against-(i) an order dated 21-9-1974 whereby S.V.H. Pagare. Special Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, disposed of the objection; preferred against the proposed Scheme No.9 M, relating to Road Transport Nationalisation as prepared under section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter called the Act') by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation') and (ii) the final publication of the approved scheme in the State Gazetted dated 11th October, 1974 as required by section 68-D of the Act. Thus, the petitioner has prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for purposes of quashing the aforementioned order and the notification and in addition it has also prayed for issue of a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from acting upon Scheme No. 9 M and to give effect to the same. 2. Facts, in brief, leading to the present petition are that the Corporation (respondent No.6). which has been established by the Government of Madhya Pradesh under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (No. 64 of 1950) had proposed Scheme No 9 earlier for nationalisation of road transport services on the routes mentioned in that scheme which was later approved by the State Government under section 68-D(2) of the Act and was published in the M P. Raj Patra dated 12th February, 1965 under section 68-D (3) of the Act and came into force In that scheme highway from Jabalpur to Sagar was reserved for exclusive operation by the vehicles of the Corporation but on the portion between Nohta. Abhana, Darnah and Garhkota conjoint operations were permitted along with private operators. Subsequently; a modified Scheme No. 9-M (Annexure C) was proposed by the Corporation (respondent No.6) under section 68-E or the Act which was published in M.P. Raj Patra dated 7th December. 1973. By this proposed scheme the Corporation (respondent No. 6) proposed to eliminate conjoint operations on the portions Nohta-Garhakota as was permissible under the earlier Scheme No.9 so as to cover the entire route Jabalpur to Sagar for its own exclusive operation In addition the modified proposed scheme also included Pathariya-Garhakota Damoh and Jabalpur-Sagar via Rehli-Garhakota routes. That scheme has been approved by respondent No.2 vide its impugned order (Annexure-K) after hearing the petitioner and other objectors. That scheme has been approved by respondent No.2 vide its impugned order (Annexure-K) after hearing the petitioner and other objectors. and also published under section 68-D (3) by the State Government in the Raj Patra (Annexure-L) as an approved scheme. 3. At the outset we would like to mention that a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent to the effect that this petition is not maintainable on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the same in view of the proclamation of emergency by the President of India on 25th June, 1975 under Article 352 (1) of the Constitution, the Presidential Order dated 27th June, 1975 issued by him under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution which protects the challenge to the scheme on the ground of infringment of Art. 14 and secondly the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act. 1976 in pursuance of which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution has been amended by virtue of section 3 of the Amending Act whereby Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) has been included as entry 125 in that Schedule Therefore. the approved scheme published in the Raj Patra under section 68-D (3) of the Act bring law would not be open to challenge in any manner. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply urged that the right of the petitioner to challenge the scheme on the ground that the procedure for the formulation and approval of the same as given in Chapter IV-A of the Act has not been followed would not enjoy the protection of Article 31 A of the Constitution or by inclusion of Chapter IV-A as entry 125 in the Ninth Schedule. 4 The approved scheme under Chapter IV-A of the Act is law within the meaning of Article 358 of the Constitution has been settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in H.C. Nararyanappa & others v. State of Mysore and others AIR 1960 SC 1073 . Therefore, in toe changed circumstances referred to as the basis of the preliminary objection, we arc of opinion that it is not open to the petitioner either to challenge the scheme being ultra vires or otherwise as it is protected by Article 31-B of the Constitution and on account of Chapter IV-A being now included in the Ninth Schedule. 5. Therefore, in toe changed circumstances referred to as the basis of the preliminary objection, we arc of opinion that it is not open to the petitioner either to challenge the scheme being ultra vires or otherwise as it is protected by Article 31-B of the Constitution and on account of Chapter IV-A being now included in the Ninth Schedule. 5. Now, we shall proceed to deal with the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proposed scheme as published in the M.P. Raj Patra dated 7-12-1973 as Scheme No. 9-M (Annexure-C) under section 68-C of the Act was not in conformity with the resolution and, therefore, it was in contravention of the provisions of the said section of the Act. To say in other words, the proposed scheme as published was not in accordance with what the Corporation had actually directed by its afore-mentioned resolution to be published. In that connection it was submitted that the petitioner had made a demand for the production of the said resolution by the Corporation in the proceedings before the respondent No.2, but the Corporation did not produce the same and therefore, an adverse inference be drawn against the Corporation and on that basis it be held that the proposed Scheme No. 9-M as published in M.P. Raj Patra dated 7-12-1973 (Annexure-C) was a nullity and could not be acted upon for action under section 68-D (2) and (3) of the Act. In our opinion, the contention has no substance. In fact, this amounts to challenge to the scheme itself which has now become the law and any attack in any manner to that scheme would be attacking the law which is now forbidden in view of the inclusion of Chapter IV-A of the Act in entry 125 under Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, Even otherwise, the contention is devoid of any substance as the proposed scheme (Annexure-C) as published in M.P. Raj Patra would be deemed to have an approval of the Corporation and it would not be open to the petitioner to challenge the same on the ground that it was not in accordance with the resolution dated 20-8-1973. An objector can raise such objections against the proposed scheme as he may like in the light of four purposes indicated under section 68-C of the Act alone. An objector can raise such objections against the proposed scheme as he may like in the light of four purposes indicated under section 68-C of the Act alone. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be permitted to go behind the publication of the proposed scheme in the M.P. Raj Patra to find out as to how the proposed scheme came into existence. Such a right is not available to it and we are supported in our view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Capital Multi Purpose Co-operative Societies, Bhopal and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others AIR 1967 SC 1815 . The scheme is not required to give any further particulars in order to enable the objectors to show that the same did not provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated transport service. Therefore, the attack that is permissible to an objector is only to the proposed scheme as it is published with reference to four fold purposes alone. The intendment of section 68-C is that the undertaking when it reached the decision that it should itself operate transport services on particular routes for the interest of the public, it should publish the scheme so that all the persons affected by the scheme might file objections before it or place their views to enable them to make up their mind in that behalf. Thus, the declaration of the opinion is not a condition precedent to section 68-C coming into operation and it need not form part of the scheme and, therefore, the absence of it did not entitle the petitioner to call in question the very scheme itself. Their non disclosure of the resolution No. 1354 dated 28-8-1973 leading to the publication of the scheme under section 63-C of the Act during the enquiry or at any antecedent stage can have no impact on the draft scheme which was properly published. Nor could the approval of the scheme be assailed on the ground that the respondent No.2 did not direct its disclosure or the production. It seems to us that the very fact that a scheme was proposed and published suggests that it had the approval and sanction of the Corporation to carry it out. So there was no question of asking for production of the resolution of the Corporation relating to the formation of the opinion or direction contained therein in relation to the draft scheme. So there was no question of asking for production of the resolution of the Corporation relating to the formation of the opinion or direction contained therein in relation to the draft scheme. Thus, respondent No.2 was not obliged to direct respondent No.6 to place on record the said resolution. 6. There is yet another aspect of the point that from the order-sheets of the proceedings of respondent No. it is no doubt true that a request for production of the resolution of the Corporation dated 20.8.1973 was made as it appears from the order-sheet dated 20-8-1974 of the proceedings before respondent No. 2. But from the proceedings of the subsequent dates it appears that it was not insisted upon and the case was argued on behalf of the petitioner without any further insistence for the production of the said resolution. In these circumstances also no grievance can now be made if such a resolution was not produced by the Corporation during the proceedings before respondent No.2. In any case, it was for the officer concerned (respondent No.2) to decide whether the production of the resolution was necessary and relevant to the enquiry before him. The fact that he made no such direction indicates that he found it possible to render the decision without it and thought that the resolution was not relevant. [See Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan and others AIR 1961 SC 1575 pp 1578. 7. Actually the petitioner has now no locus standi for the grounds mentioned in the preliminary objection above to challenge the validity of the scheme on any ground including the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act. If it is permitted to do so it would be open to argument that the challenge in question substantially seeks to challenge the approved scheme under Chapter IV-A which cannot be permitted. Therefore, the draft scheme would naturally be protected from an attack under Article 31-A of the Constitution. [See: Latafat Ali Khan and others v. The State of U.P. (1971) 2 SCC 355 . The first contention is accordingly rejected. 8. Therefore, the draft scheme would naturally be protected from an attack under Article 31-A of the Constitution. [See: Latafat Ali Khan and others v. The State of U.P. (1971) 2 SCC 355 . The first contention is accordingly rejected. 8. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that under Clause 5 of the approved Scheme (Annexure-L) the petitioner has been allowed to operate only on the portion Abhana-Jabalpur via Tendukheda and Patan out of the total route Sagar-Jabalpur-via-Rehli, Garhakota, Adhana, Tejgarh and Patan of his two permits Nos. 49 and 52 of 1961 and disallowed to operate on the portion Garhakota to Sagar via Rehli although the said portion also has not been reserved for exclusive operation by the Corporation, which cannot be justified. But, in our opinion, the submission has no force. Both the permits have been shown as curtailed and to remain operative under the approved scheme as mentioned above under Clause (7) 2-B at serial numbers 22 and 23. It is no doubt true that the portion Garhakota Sagar via Rehli was also not reserved for exclusive operation under the approved scheme but this Court cannot sit over the judgment of the approved scheme in relation to which portion of the route to be allowed for operation and which should be curtailed from the permits of the petitioner. Permits of the petitioner though curtailed under the scheme could still survive for a part portion would be no ground for interference with the scheme in the present proceedings. A Division Bench of this Court in Raipur Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. Raipur and another v. State of M. P. & other 1968 JLJ 242 = 1968 MPLJ 854 held as under: “Still another point submitted in Raj Kumar Gurwara v. State of M.P. & others (Misc. Petition No. 112 of 1966) was that the Scheme proposed cancellation of a permit for Jagdalpur-Dantewara route; that this permit could not be cancelled as a portion of the route covered by the permit namely Gedam to Dantewara did not fall within the route Jagdalpur-Bhopalpattanam proposed to be nationalised. The contention cannot be accepted. A major portion of Jagdalpur. Dantewara route, namely, one from Jagdalpur to Gedam falls within a nationalised route. The contention cannot be accepted. A major portion of Jagdalpur. Dantewara route, namely, one from Jagdalpur to Gedam falls within a nationalised route. In such a situation, it is open under section 68-P (2) (b) and (c) of the Act either to cancel the existing permit or to modify its terms so as to curtail the area of operation. The petitioner cannot insist that the permit for Jagdalpur-Dantewada route should have been curtailed so as to permit operation by him on Gedam-Dantewada route and should not have been cancelled. The distance between Gedam and Dantewada is only of a few miles and. therefore from a practical point of view, it would not have been advantageous to anybody to keep the permit alive for Gedam-Dantewada. In any case, the matter whether the permit should have been curtailed or cancelled was one entirely within the discretion of the competent authority. That discretion cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution." That being so, the petitioner has to remain content with the part of the portions of the routes in relation to its two permits which it has been allowed to operate under the approved scheme (Annexure-L). 9. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The outstanding security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner.