JUDGMENT S. Mubarak Hasan, Member. - This is a second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated May 22, 1968 passed by Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur in appeals against the judgment and decree date January 25, 1967 passed by Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Deoria in a case under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Plaintiff filed suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act alleging that he along with this uncle Sundar were hereditary tenants of the land in suit and after the death of Sundar he became sole tenant and after the death of vesting he become sole Sirdar. He also alleged that he had been in possession as sole Sirdar but the names of the defendants first second and third set were wrongly recorded over the disputed land. He also alleged that he did not file any compromise and if there was an such compromise then it was fictitious. He prayed for a declaration that he was sole Sirdar of the land in suit. Kalika defendant first set filed written statement claiming to be sole Sirdar of plot No. 175 on the basis of possession since long. Mist. Ganga defendant second set field written statement claiming to be Sirdar of plot Nos. 175 and 259 on the basis of possession and also on the basis of civil court compromise decree. Mahendra and Sagar defendants 3rd set filed written statement alleging that they written statement alleging that they were sole Sirdar's of plot Nos. 40, 70-B, 71, 98 , 163, 368 and 393. They alleged that there was a compromise in a civil suit for injunction in which plaintiff had admitted their possession as Sirdar's. They pleaded that the compromise decree was binding on the plaintiff. They also alleged that after the compromise decree in the suit they applied for correction of papers and the S.D.O. by his order dated December 27, 1958 ordered their names to be recorded as Sirdar's. 3. On January 25, 1967, the trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the compromise decree was fraudulently obtained and was fictitious. 4. Mst. Ganga defendant second set, Kalika defendant first set and Mahendra and Sagar defendants third set filed three appeals before the Additional Commissioner. On May 22, 1968, the Additional Commissioner dismissed the three appeals holding that the compromise decree was fraudulently obtained and was fictitious. 4. Mst. Ganga defendant second set, Kalika defendant first set and Mahendra and Sagar defendants third set filed three appeals before the Additional Commissioner. On May 22, 1968, the Additional Commissioner dismissed the three appeals holding that the compromise decree was fraudulently obtained and was fictitious. It also held that the appeal No. 1108 filed by Mst. Gagna had already been dismissed and, therefore, the decision in that appeal operated as resjudicata in the remaining two appeals. It also held that the plaintiff remained in possession. 5. The respondents are absent. Firstly the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the compromise filed in the Civil Court was valid and binding on the parties. He further argued that the compromise decree passed in the civil suit operate as resjudicata. Secondly, he argued that appeal No. 1109-D filed by Mst. Gagna before the Additional Commissioner was regarding plot Nos. 175 and 289 only. He further argued that the present appellants defendants third set had filed appeal No. 1035-D before the Additional Commissioner regarding other plots. He contended that the subject matter in appeal No. 1108-D filed by Mst. Gagna and appeal No. 1035-D filed by defdts. third set was different and, therefore, the decision in appeal No. 1108-D filed by Mst. Gagna could not operate as res judicata in the other two appeals. Thirdly, he argued that the defendant-appellants were recorded as Sirdars in the village records since 1958. He contended that the present suit filed on January 7, 1968 was time barred. Lastly, he argued that the lower appellate court erred in dismissed the appeal No. 1035-D filed by the present appellants. 6. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the record. The present appeal has been filed by Mahendra and Sagar defendant third set only regarding plot Nos. 40, 708, 71, 98, 99, 163, 368 and 393. Other defendants did not file appeal and the order of the lower appellate court against them has become final. It appears from the record that Mst. Ganga defendant second set and the present appellants defendants third set filed a civil suit for injunction against the plaintiff on September 16, 1958. A compromise is alleged to have been arrived at between the parties and that suit was decreed in terms of compromise on October 3, 1958. It appears from the record that Mst. Ganga defendant second set and the present appellants defendants third set filed a civil suit for injunction against the plaintiff on September 16, 1958. A compromise is alleged to have been arrived at between the parties and that suit was decreed in terms of compromise on October 3, 1958. The present defendant-appellants claimed the disputed plots on the basis of compromise decree passed by the civil court. It was contended by the appellant's counsel that compromise decree operates as resjudicata. I fail to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. The compromise decree in question was not a decision by the court. It was the acceptance by the court of something to which the parties had agreed. The compromise decree merely set the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The court did not decide anything nor can it be said that the decision of the court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the court can be resjudicata, whether statutory under Section 11 of the C.P.C. or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. The decree in question cannot strictly be regarded as a decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided an consequently it cannot operate as res judicata. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that the compromise decree was fraudulent. The finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court in this regard cannot be assailed. I have no reason to disagree with the finding of the lower appellate court in this regard. 7. Mst. Gagna defendant second set who claimed rights in plot Nos. 175 and 289 on the basis of civil court compromise decree filed appeal No. 1108-D before the Additional Commissioner. The present appellants were also parties in that appeal. That appeal was dismissed by Additional Commissioner as time-barred. The present appellants had filed appeal No. 1035-D before the Additional Commissioner. They claimed rights in other plots on the basis of the same compromise decree which was relied upon by Mst. Gagna defendant second set. The appeal filed by Mst. Gagna having been dismissed the decision in that appeal operated as res judicata in appeal No. 1035-D filed by the present appellant before the Additional Commissioner. 8. They claimed rights in other plots on the basis of the same compromise decree which was relied upon by Mst. Gagna defendant second set. The appeal filed by Mst. Gagna having been dismissed the decision in that appeal operated as res judicata in appeal No. 1035-D filed by the present appellant before the Additional Commissioner. 8. After considering the evidence or record the lower appellate court did not accept the possession of the appellants over the disputed plots. The finding of fact regarding possession recorded by the lower appellate court cannot be assailed. I find that the order of the lower appellate court does not suffer from any illegality. Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.