JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure filed by appellant-plaintiffs against the judgment and decree dated 17-11-1973 passed by the and Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil appeal. No. 25 A of 1973. ( 2. ) BRIEF facts of the case are that Smt. Manorama Bahadur (appellant plaintiff No. 1) and her daughter Mrs Pramila Daniel (original appellant-plaintiff No. 2), who having died during the pendency of this appeal was substituted by her legal representatives, now appellants 2 (a) to 2 (e) had filed the present suit against the respondent for his ejectment from the suit accommodation (shown in red colour in the plaint map as a portion of house No. 623 located in West Ghamapur in Jabalpur City) on the ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act) that the accommodation was required bona fide by Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as landlady for occupation as a residence for herself and also for the members of her family, namely, her husband and children and she has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation of her own in her occupation in the city of Jabalpur. The case, thus, set up in the plaint was that Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was the owner of the house of which the suit accommodation is a part by virtue of a will executed in her favour by her maternal grand-father. Though Manorma (plaintiff No. 1) was also joined as co-plaintiff but in the plaint she was not alleged to be owner of the suit accommodation. All that was said about her was that she was collecting rent on behalf of her daughter. Therefore, the suit was clearly on the basis that pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was the owner and landlady of the suit accommodation and required the same bona fide for occupation as residence for herself and her family members. The respondent-defendant contested the suit by raising various pleas and denying the claim of Pramila (original plaintiff No 2) that she required the suit accommodation bona fide for the residence of herself and her family members It was also alleged that the notice (Ex. P-1) terminating the tenancy was invalid. The respondent-defendant contested the suit by raising various pleas and denying the claim of Pramila (original plaintiff No 2) that she required the suit accommodation bona fide for the residence of herself and her family members It was also alleged that the notice (Ex. P-1) terminating the tenancy was invalid. It was also further pleaded that Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was not the owner of the house, but her mother manorama (plaintiff No. 1) and, therefore, the suit must fail on that count as well. ( 3. ) THE trial Court held both the plaintiffs as land-ladies, but it was of opinion that Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was not the owner or even a co-owner of the suit house as the house belonged to Manorama (plaintiff No. 1), her brothers and sisters. Therefore, it could not be got vacated for residential need of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2 ). It was further held that after the dismissal of the suit at one stage in default, Manorama (plaintiff No. accepted rent from respondent defendant which amounted to waiver of quit-notice and creation of a fresh tenancy In view of these findings, the first court dismissed the suit. An appeal preferred by plaintiffs 1 and 2 was also dismissed. That Court also while affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court held that Pramila (original plaintiff No 2) was not the owner and landlady of the suit accommodation. Hence, this second appeal was filed by both the plaintiffs. ( 4. ) HAVING heard learned counsel of the parties, I am of opinion that this appeal has no force and it must be dismissed. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant plaintiffs submitted that the lower appellate Court acted illegally in dismissing the suit on the basis that it has not been proved that pramila (original plaintiff No 2) was the owner and landlady of the suit accommodation. According to the learned counsel the finding with regard to the ownership was wholly irrelevant in a tenancy suit. The finding of the lower appellate Court in that regard was also tried to be assailed on the basis that rent receipts (Exs. P-7 to P-11) show the name of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as the owner and even respondent-defendant (D. W. 1) in his evidence admitted payment of rent to her after the year 1966 as land-lady of the accommodation. P-7 to P-11) show the name of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as the owner and even respondent-defendant (D. W. 1) in his evidence admitted payment of rent to her after the year 1966 as land-lady of the accommodation. Thus on the basis of this evidence on record even if finding about ownership was necessary to be arrived at, the lower appellate Court was wrong in holding otherwise. Before I proceed to answer the points raised, I would like to reproduce section 12 (1) (e) of the Act: "section 12 (1) (e)-That the accommodation letter residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. " ( 5. ) IN my opinion, on perusal of the above clause, in a case like the present one where the plaintiff alleged as the owner of the accommodation and required it for her residential purposes, then the term, "landlord", cannot be given the wide meaning contained in its definition in clause (b) of section 2. In such a circumstance it would mean only the person who is the owner of the accommodation. I may refer to the words, "if he is owner there of", occurring under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act are of importance in relation to bona fide need by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family. Therefore an analysis of this clause shows that there are two categories of persons for whose requirement an accommodation can be got vacated, the one besides the owner includes as landlord any person realising rent on behalf or for the benefit of any other person. Therefore, where plaintiff landlord is himself owner of the premises, he can get eviction of the tenant for his own bona fide need or that of any of his family member. But in the case where plaintiff only holds the premises for the benefit of somebody else the premises can be got vacated for the bona fide requirement of such other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. But in the case where plaintiff only holds the premises for the benefit of somebody else the premises can be got vacated for the bona fide requirement of such other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. It may be mentioned here that in such a case the requirement of the member of the family does not find place in the clause. In this view of the matter, it is clear that where the plaintiff landlord wants the premises to be got vacated for the bona fide requirement for occupation as a residence for himself, or for any member of his family the ownership of the accommodation would be a relevant factor to be determined before the Court can grant a decree in his favour on that ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. Thus the lower appellate Court cannot be said to have acted in an illegal manner in giving finding in the instant case about the ownership of the accommodation and holding that Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was not the owner and also the landlady of the suit accommodation. ( 6. ) AS regards a reference made by the learned counsel to the rent receipts (Exs. P-7 to P-ll) and also about statement of respondent-defendant (D. W. 1) is of no consequence so as to disturb the finding of fact. These few rent receipts relate to the period subsequent to the year 1966 in which alone name of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) is mentioned. All these few receipts relate to the period subsequent to the year 1966 and it appears that the name of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was started being mentioned in the rent receipts after she had shifted with her husband to Jabalpur for living with her mother (plaintiff No. 1) and at that stage question for accommodation for the married daughter and her family arose. Then to make a case of ownership over the suit accommodation this devise was thought of otherwise there is nothing on record of the case to show that pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) could be alleged as landlady of the suit premises so as to file the present suit on the basis of bona fide need for her residence. Then to make a case of ownership over the suit accommodation this devise was thought of otherwise there is nothing on record of the case to show that pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) could be alleged as landlady of the suit premises so as to file the present suit on the basis of bona fide need for her residence. It was admitted by Manorama, plaintiff No. 1 (P. W. 1) in her evidence that her another house in the city located near Ramlila ground had fallen vacant and for the last two years her daughter Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) had been residing in that house. In such a situation Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) had no right for getting the suit accommodation vacated but on the pretext that the same belonged to her daughter Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2 ). ( 7. ) IN furtherence of the objective, it is clear from the evidence of the respondent-defendant (D. W. 1) that Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) had approached him after the arrival of her daughter at Jabalpur to start paying rent to her as she was the owner on the basis of gift on account of this deception played upon him, the respondent-defendant started paying rent to Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) and in the rent receipts (Ex. P-7 to P-11) name of pramila finds mention as the owner when in fact she was not so. Subsequently he again started paying rent to Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) as he was doing earlier and which was also accepted by her as admitted in her evidence as well. In the circumstances the Court below rightly did not rely upon these rent receipts for holding Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as the owner of the accommodation. On the other hand these rent receipts (Ex. D-2 to D-37)prior to the year 1966 and ranging over several years on which name of manorama (plaintiff No. 1) finds place as the owner, along with her father a. J. Bahadur, of the suit accommodation. Even in a document (Ex. D-53) which is a certified copy of the assessment register for the year 1965 to 1970 relating to the conservancy and water tax of the City Corporation, Jabalpur, the name of Manorama Bahadur (plaintiff No. 1) has been mentioned as owner. Even in a document (Ex. D-53) which is a certified copy of the assessment register for the year 1965 to 1970 relating to the conservancy and water tax of the City Corporation, Jabalpur, the name of Manorama Bahadur (plaintiff No. 1) has been mentioned as owner. If Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) was the owner of the suit accommodation, it is difficult to understand why her name does not find place in the records of the Corporation. All this indicates that Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2)wanted the suit accommodation to be vacated under the false assertion of her claim as owner and landlady, in bona fide need of residence for herself and her family members. ( 8. ) NOW I would mention about the false plea taken by Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) for the purpose of showing her ownership of the suit accommodation In the plaint the ownership of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) has been alleged on the basis of a will executed in her favour by her maternal grand-father but the said will was not produced in evidence by the said plaintiff even though she examined herself as (P. W. 1) in this case and admitted possession of the same. Non-production of the alleged will falsifies her claim as owner. Her mother Manorama (P. W. 2) in her evidence stated that the house was purchased for her daughter Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) but the alleged sale deed like the will was also not produced in the evidence. Though this witness subsequently tried to support her daughter by stating execution of will in her favour but I find difficult to rely on the statements of both mother and daughter in that respect particularly in view of the fact that neither will nor the sale deed was produced in the evidence although their possession was admitted. I have no hesitation in holding that both the plaintiffs have spoken a lie in the present case. The only irresistable conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record that can be drawn is that the accommodation in fact belongs to the ownership of Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) as held by the lower appellate court and not that of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) and who was also not the land-lady. ( 9. The only irresistable conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record that can be drawn is that the accommodation in fact belongs to the ownership of Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) as held by the lower appellate court and not that of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) and who was also not the land-lady. ( 9. ) NOTHING turns on a stray sentence in the evidence of respondent-defendant (D. W 1) that he paid rent to Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as landlady because subsequently he has explained the reason for saying so as manorama (plaintiff No. 1) had orally directed him to make payment of the rent to her daughter alleging her to be the owner by gift and he started acting accordingly for some time resulting issue of rent receipts (Ex. P-7 to P-ll) in the name of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) but then he again started paying rent to Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) and who was accepting the same, which is proved from money-order acknowledgment coupons (Exs. P-38, P-39, P-41 to p-51) admittedly bearing signatures of Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) having received the rent. In her evidence as well she has admitted receiving rents through money-orders, which relate to the years 1970 and 1971. This shows that the respondent defendant did not accept Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as his landlady and owner of the accommodation under his occupation. In my opinion, in the circumstances there was no attornment of tenancy in favour of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2), in the absence of something more which was also the view of the lower appellate Court. In any case, in the plaint the basis for getting the house vacated was on the ground of the need of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) as landlady and owner of the suit accommodation which was specifically denied in the written statement submitted by respondent-defendant. Therefore, the burden to prove that was on her which in the instant case she failed to discharge. Both the Courts below have concurrently held as a fact that Pramila (original plaintiff No 2) was neither landlady nor owner thereof in respect of the suit accommodation, and I find no reason to interfere with that finding of fact. The contention is accordingly rejected. ( 10. Both the Courts below have concurrently held as a fact that Pramila (original plaintiff No 2) was neither landlady nor owner thereof in respect of the suit accommodation, and I find no reason to interfere with that finding of fact. The contention is accordingly rejected. ( 10. ) ALTERNATIVELY, it was also submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that even if Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) was landlady and owner of the suit accommodation as held by both the Courts below the lower appellate Court, was in error in not passing the decree for eviction of respondent-defendant from the suit accommodation since need of Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) would be covered by the words occurring in section 12 (1) (e)of the Act with reference to the second category when the plaintiff holds the premises for the benefit of somebody else and the premises can be got vacated for the bona fide requirement of such other person for whose benefit the accommodation is held, which in the instant case was tried to be urged for her daughter Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2 ). It was also urged in addition that pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) being daughter of Manorama (plaintiff No. 1)was member of her family and the accommodation could be got vacated on the basis of Pramilas need. Even these submissions in my opinion are devoid of any merit. The earlier submission can be rejected straightway as in the plaint the case was not set up on the oasis that Manorama (plaintiff No. 1)wanted to get the accommodation vacated for the bona fide requirement of her daughter for whose benefit the accommodation was held. The case as pleaded in the plaint was specific that Pramila (original plaintiff No. 2) is a landlady and owner of the suit accommodation and she required the suit accommodation for her bona fide need for occupation as a residence. That being so, it is not open to the learned counsel to urge this submission for the first time also in this Court contrary to the pleadings. That is why the lower appellate Court also even though it held that Manorama (plaintiff No 1) was owner and landlady of the suit accommodation did not advert itself towards this submission which was wholly irrelevant in the context of the case. That is why the lower appellate Court also even though it held that Manorama (plaintiff No 1) was owner and landlady of the suit accommodation did not advert itself towards this submission which was wholly irrelevant in the context of the case. Now as regards the other submission that Pramila (original plaintiff No 2) being member of the family of Manorama (plaintiff No. 1) the suit accommodation can be got vacated on that basis, has also no force. It cannot be doubted that the term, "member of the family", which has been defined in clause (e) of sub-section 2 of the Act, has been used in that very sense in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. The term, therefore, would not include a married daughter, who is not a member of the family of the landlord and her need cannot be set up for eviction of a tenant. See, Ramkrishna v. Gajadharprasad, Second Appeal No. 255 of 1962, decided on 19-4-1963, reported in 1963 JLJ Note 154. Therefore, even this submission has to be rejected. ( 11. ) NO other point was urged for my consideration in the present appeal. ( 12. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee as per certificate or schedule whichever is less. Appeal dismissed.