JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a defendant's revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 30th January, 1975, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mainpuri. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving use to this revision application are that the plaintiffs opposite parties are the owners of the shop in suit. It was let out to the defendant-revisionist on a monthly rent of Rs. 27/-. As the rent was not paid since 1-8-1971 the plaintiffs-opposite parties gave a notice on 22nd of December, 1971, demanding Rs. 135/- as arrears of rent. This notice was served on the defendant-applicant on 23-12-1971. According to the plaintiffs, the rent was not paid to them within a month from the receipt of notice by the defendant. Besides it, he also made material alterations in the accommodation in suit. Therefore, the plaintiffs opposite parties filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 168.75 as arrears of rent and damages from 1-8-1971 to 7-2-1972 at the rate of Rs. 27/- per month and for eviction of the defendant-revisionist. The defendant-revisionist contested that suit, inter alia, on the grounds that he had remitted the rent (Rs. 135/-) by money order on 17-1-1972 in the name of Purshottam Das, one of the landlords, but the latter refused to take it and that he did not make any alteration, much less a material alteration, in the accommodation insuit. 3. After going through the material on the record the learned trial court held that the rent was sent by money order and one of the landlords refused to accept it and that no material alteration was effected in the accommodation in suit. Accordingly, the suit for ejectment was dismissed but it was decreed for Rs. 168.75. 4. The plaintiffs went up in revision and the learned District Judge held that there was no evidence on the record to show that the defendant revisionist had remitted rent by money order. Therefore, he committed default in the payment of rent. He did not go into the merit of the question whether the defendant had made material alteration in the shop or not. The suit for ejectment was accordingly decreed. 5. Therefore, he committed default in the payment of rent. He did not go into the merit of the question whether the defendant had made material alteration in the shop or not. The suit for ejectment was accordingly decreed. 5. The defendant has now come up in revision challenging the finding of the learned District Judge mainly on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to disturb the findings of fact given by the learned Judge Small Cause Court. In the alternative it is urged that he did not make a correct assessment of the evidence on record. 6. The solitary point which has arisen for consideration before this court is whether the defendant-revisionist committed default in the payment of rent. Admittedly the rent was in arrears from 1-8-1971. On 22-12-1971 the plaintiff- Opposite parties gave a notice to the revisionist to pay the entire arrears within one month from the receipt of notice. It is also admitted that this notice was served on the defendant-revisionist on 23-12-71. According to the defendant, he had remitted rent by money order on 17-1-1972 but it was refused by Purshottam Das, Opposite party, It is coupon Ex. A-6 was filed. Before going into its merit it may be stated that the question whether the rent was paid or not being one of fact and the trial court having decided it on proper assessment of evidence on the record, it was not open to the learned District Judge to disturb that finding in revision. In this connection reference may be made to the cases of Reserve Bank of India v. Ram Kumar Varshny, AIR 1963 Allahabad 574 and Ram Narain v. Kanhaiya Vishwakaram, 1965 A.L.J. 989. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has relied on the case of Hira Prasad v. Beni Madho, AIR 1963 Allahabad 109 to show that if proper assessment of evidence has not been made and the finding is perverse the court hearing the revision under section 25 of the Small Causes Court Act is competent to re-assess the evidence. Even in this view of the matter the finding given by the learned District Judge was wrong. It is true that the coupon (Ex. Even in this view of the matter the finding given by the learned District Judge was wrong. It is true that the coupon (Ex. A-6) which is said to bear an endorsement of the Postman to the effect that the money order was refused by Purshottam Das is a suspicious document inasmuch as the coupon should have been returned to the revisionist with the acknowledgement. There is also some difference in the date inasmuch as the money order is alleged to have been sent on 17-1-1972 but on the back of it the date given is 8-10-1973. Neither the Postman was examined nor the postal records were produced to show that the endorsement on the coupon is in the handwriting of the Postman. In these circumstances the learned revisional court was correct in not placing much reliance on this document. However, there is host of other material on the record to substantiate the revisionist's contention that he had remitted the rent within 30 days from the receipt of notice (Ex. A-6) is the postal receipt which shows that a money order of Rs. 135/- was sent to Purshottam Das on that date. It is true that this receipt does not contain the address of Purshottam Das but in his statement on oath the defendant-revisionist clearly gave out that this receipt relates to the money order which was sent to Purshottam Das, opposite party. As will be presently discussed, this statement of the defendant-revisionist is supported by other evidence on the record. At present it will suffice to say that the defendant-revisionist had received the notice of demand on 22-12-71. He was required to pay Rs. 135/-. The same sum he had remitted to Purshottam Das on 17-1-1972. There appears to be no reason why he would have sent it to some other Purshottam Das than the opposite party. This document coupled with the statement of the defendant goes a long way in proving that the amount claimed i.e. Rs. 135/-, was remitted by the defendant-revisionist to one of the landlords within one month from the receipt of notice. At this very stage it may be stated that in such cases the post office acts as an agent of the landlord. There is nothing on the record to warrant that the plaintiffs-opposite parties were not prepared to receive rent by money order. At this very stage it may be stated that in such cases the post office acts as an agent of the landlord. There is nothing on the record to warrant that the plaintiffs-opposite parties were not prepared to receive rent by money order. Therefore, in view of Bhikhan Lal v. Munna Lal, AIR 1967 Allahabad 366, tenant cannot be said to have committed default in respect of payment of rent which he had sent to the plaintiffs-landlords by money order will within time. 8. In the second place, after remitting Rs. 135/- to Purshottam Das, the defendant-revisionist had taken care to send a reply to the notice of the opposite parties. This reply to the notice is Ex. A-7 and is of the same date when the money order was sent. By means of this reply he communicated to Purshottam Das that the amount claimed was already remitted by money order. He should not have done so, if he had not remitted any rent. 9. In the third place when the defendant-revisionist came to know that suit for ejectment was filed against him he moved an application under section 7-C and sought permission to deposit the rent. In this application also he clearly gave out that the rent was sent to the landlords by money order but it was refused. The copy of the application is Ex. A-3. This application was disposed of on 5-8-1972 by means of the following order ; "The applicant has stated on oath that the landlords refused to accept rent. There is no cross-examination though one of the landlords is present. Under the circumstances I allow 4-C ........................" The aforesaid makes it clear that in the presence of one of the landlords the revisionist had given out that he had remitted rent by money order but it was not accepted. The landlord who was present, did not challenge this contention with the result that the court assumed jurisdiction and passed orders on that application. Without going into the merit of the question whether this order operates as res judicata, there can be no manner of doubt that it is an essential piece of evidence which goes to show that in the presence of one of the landlords the defendant-revisionist had asserted that the had remitted rent by money order and it was refused but the landlord who was present did not controvert it. It also lends considerable support to his contention that the rent was sent by money order. In his written statement also the defendant revisionist alleged that he had sent rent by money order which was refused by Purshottam Das but the plaintiffs- opposite parties did not chose to file any replication for reasons best known to them. All this evidence leads to an irresistible conclusion that the defendant-revisionist had sent money order to Purshottam Das on 17-1-1972. The money was received back obviously because it must have been refused by Purshottam Das to whom it was sent. In these circumstances the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that it was not established from the material on the record that any rent was remitted by the defendant-revisionist within one month from the date of receipt of notice. The view taken by the learned trial court was correct. 10. For all these reasons the revision application is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge is set aside. The plaintiffs opposite parties suit for eviction shall remain dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.