JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgmnt and decree dated September 10, 1975 passed by Sri Banwari Lal, Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad Division in appeal No. 751 preferred against the order dated January 11, 1974 passed by the J.O. Sardar Faizabad in case No. 211/729/930 under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the record. 3. The respondent Pherai had filed a declaratory suit regarding certain plots claiming to be co-Sirdar along with Sahebdin and Rameshwar appellants. The suit was decided in terms of a compromise deed dated December 22, 1972 between both the parties. Against this order of the trial court Sahebdin and Rameshwar filed an appeal which has been dismissed by the Addl. Commissioner. They have now come up in second appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the concurrent judgments of the courts below on two courts. The first count is that he has challenged the compromise deed in question as fraudulent and also illegal. The second count is that notices under Section 106 Panchayat Raj Act and 80 C.P.C. not having been served the suit was not maintainable. 5. Coming to the question of the validity of the compromise deed I find that according to the pedigree furnished by the plaintiff-respondent he is the son of Gaya whereas the defendant-appellant Sahebdin and Rameshwar are the ss/o Musai and both Gaya and Musai were brothers being s/o Mohan. He has claimed co-tenancy on the basis that the land in dispute was joint Hindu family property. The defendant-appellants had furnished a written statement on September 22, 1972 contesting the claim. Subsequently on December 22, 1972 both parties filed a compromise deed which was also verified by their counsels. On January 1973 the defendant-appellants filed an application withdrawing the compromise deed. On July 13, 1973 they again filed an application to the effect that they had entered into the compromise on December 22, 1972 willingly and without any influence and their application of January 4, 1973 was given on the basis of some mis-understanding and may be treated as cancelled. They re-affirmed the compromise deed of December 22, 1972. This application was also signed by their counsel. The trial court on January 11, 1974 decided the suit in terms of the compromise deed. They re-affirmed the compromise deed of December 22, 1972. This application was also signed by their counsel. The trial court on January 11, 1974 decided the suit in terms of the compromise deed. The learned counsel for the appellant has now contended that the compromise in question amounts to transfer of Sirdar plots in favour of plaintiff-respondent which is prohibited under the law and therefore, the judgment and decree of the courts below are illegal arbitrary and without jurisdiction. This contention cannot be accepted. It is correct that Section 151 of the Z.A. Act prohibits the transfer of the interest of a Sirdar or Asami except as expressly permitted by the Act, but in the present case the plaintiff-respondent had claimed that the land in dispute was inherited as a joint Hindu family property and the co-tenancy arose not from transfer but from inheritance. Under Section 171 of the Z.A. Act the interest of a male Sirdar is heritable. The compromise deed in question is merely a family settlement relating to joint inheritance and does not amount to transfer of Sirdari holding. It cannot, therefore, be held to be prohibited under the law. 6. As regards the question of fraud, it is not enough to allege fraud. Fraud has to be proved. The compromise deed executed by both the parties on December 22, 1972 has been duly verified by their respective counsels. Further the learned trial court had recorded the statement of both the parties who had affirmed that they had compromised willingly without any pressure. This is quite enough to prove that the compromise deed was quite genuine and there was no fraud. On January 4, 1973 the defendant-appellant did give an application withdrawing the compromise deed but this application was again withdrawn by them on July 13, 1973 when they re-affirmed their earlier compromise. This application of July 13, 1973 leave no doubt at all about the genuineness of the compromise. It is established that there has been no fraud vitiating the compromise. The courts below have not acted illegally or with material irregularity in accepting the compromise. The contention of the learned counsel that the trial court did not properly enquire into the genuineness and validity of the compromise deed is incorrect on the fact of the record. It is established that there has been no fraud vitiating the compromise. The courts below have not acted illegally or with material irregularity in accepting the compromise. The contention of the learned counsel that the trial court did not properly enquire into the genuineness and validity of the compromise deed is incorrect on the fact of the record. As seen above the trial court had properly enquired into the genuineness of the compromise deed on the date it was filed. After the compromise deed had been filed and accepted no point at issue remains for adjudication and the question of recording further evidence did not arise. The judgment and the decree of the courts below are not vitiated because they are based on the compromise deed. 7. The learned counsel has also argued that the suit was not maintainable as notice under Section 106 Panchayat Ran Act and Section 80 C.P.C. were not served and has cited 1972 A.W.R. 874 in support of his contention. I do not agree that any notice under Section 106 Panchayt Raj Act is necessary in a suit under Section 229-B, Z.A. and L.R. Act. All that the law requires is that the Gaon Sabha shall be made a party to such a suit. The compliance of this provision was made. The Gaon Sabha as well as U.P. State through Dy. Commissioner, Faizabad were duly impleaded as parties and were duly served with the summonses. Section 106 Panchayat Raj Act reads as follows :- "106. Suits against Gaon Sabhas, Gaon Panchayats, the officers or the officers and servants of Nyaya Panchayats.-(1) No suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against a Gaon Sabha or Gaon Panchayat or against a member thereof or against an officer or servant of a Gaon Sabha. Section 106 Panchayat Raj Act reads as follows :- "106. Suits against Gaon Sabhas, Gaon Panchayats, the officers or the officers and servants of Nyaya Panchayats.-(1) No suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against a Gaon Sabha or Gaon Panchayat or against a member thereof or against an officer or servant of a Gaon Sabha. Gaon Panchayat or Nyaya Panchayat or against any person acting under the direction of any of these bodies or persons for any thing done or purporting to have been done in official capacity under this Act until the expiration of 2 months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a Gaon Sabha or Gaon Panchayat, delivered in or left at the office of the Gan Panchayat concerned and in the case of a member, officer or servant or any person acting under his direction or the direction of the Gaon Sabha, Gaon Panchayat or Nyaya Panchayat delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the reliefs sought the amount of compensation, if any, claimed and the name and place of abode of the intention plaintiff and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left." 8. A careful reading of the Section will made it clear that it only relates to institution of suits against Gaon Sabhas, Gaon Panchayat or their Members officers or servant in respect of anything done or purporting to have been done in official capacity under the Panchayat Raj Act. It would be quite meaningless to say that a notice under Section 106 is also required in a declaration suit. As regard other authorities cited by the learned counsel, Sooraj Bhan v. Executive Engineer, 1972 A.W.R. 874. This lays down that the provisions of Section 80 C.P.C. are explicit and mandatory. When a plea relating to bar under Section 80 is raised in suit the court must consider among other things whether a notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate authority mentioned in that section and whether the suit is instituted after the expiration of the requisite period of two months. The authority further lays down that Section 80 C.P.C. is obviously enacted for the benefit of the Government and the public officer. The authority further lays down that Section 80 C.P.C. is obviously enacted for the benefit of the Government and the public officer. It is, therefore, open to them to fore go the benefit and not raise an objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that no notice was served prior to the institution of the suit or the notice served by the plaintiff was bad. If no plea in regard to the non-maintainability of the suit for want of a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. on the ground of the illegality of notice is raised in the written statement of the Government or the public officer as the case may be and be and no issue is framed in that respect it may be inferred that the objection had been raised. Section 80 C.P.C. provides that no suit shall be instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by any such public officer in his official capacity until the expiration of 2 months after a notice in writing has been delivered. There is no mentioned either in this section or in the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act that a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. is necessary even in a suit under Section 229-B of Z.A. Act. All that Section 229-B requires that the State Government and the Gaon Sabha shall be impleaded as defendants. It would not be correct to stretch this provision to mean that 2 months' notice prior to the institution of the declaratory suit is also mandatory. Further neither the State Government nor the Gaon Sabha have at any stage taken the plea that the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. had not been given and as we have seen in (1) that if the State Government or the public officer concerned did not take this plea which is for their benefit they may be deemed to have waived of the plea. It is also not open to any third party to raise this plea merely to confuse the issue. 9. Thus I find that no prima facie force has been shown in this appeal. No perversity or mis-reading of evidence has been shown in the judgments of the courts below. There is no point of law involved. The is no point of law involved. The appeal is hereby dismissed summarily.