JUDGMENT - M.S. APTE, J.:---The only point that arises in this revision petition is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit filed by the respondent against the petitioner defendant No. 1 and three others, who were the office bearers of defendant No. 1 Co-operative Society is ousted in view of section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Section 91, so far as relevant for our purpose provides:--- "91(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, elections of the office bearers, conduct of general meetings, management or business of a society shall be referred by any of the parties to the dispute, or by a federal society to which the society is affiliated, or by a creditor of the society, to the Registrar, if both the parties thereto are one or other of the following:--- (a) A society, its committee, any past committee, any past or present officer, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or the Liquidator of the Society; (b) A member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past member or a deceased member of a Society or a society which is a member of the society or a person who claims to be member of the society; (c) A person other than a member of the society, with whom the society has any transactions in respect of which any restrictions or regulations have been imposed, made or prescribed under sections 43, 44 or 45, and any person claiming through such person; (d) A surety of a member, past member or deceased member, or surety of a person other than a member with whom the society has any transactions in respect of which restrictions have been prescribed under section 45, whether such surety or person is or is not a member of the society; (e) Any other society, or the Liquidator of such a society". 2. There was formerly sub-section (2) in this section but that was deleted by section 16(h) of Maharashtra Act, No. 27 of 1969. Although sub-section (2) was deleted, no corresponding change was made in the number of sub-section (3). 2. There was formerly sub-section (2) in this section but that was deleted by section 16(h) of Maharashtra Act, No. 27 of 1969. Although sub-section (2) was deleted, no corresponding change was made in the number of sub-section (3). Really speaking, when sub-section (2) was deleted, sub-section (3) should have been renumbered as sub-section (2) but that is besides the point. 3. Sub-section (3) of section 91 takes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute referred to in sub-section (1). 4. The question that arises in the present case, therefore, is whether dispute which is involved in the present suit is one which falls within the scope of sub-section (1). 5. As already stated above, the present petitioner, original defendant No. 1, is a Co-operative society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It is styled as The Godavari Sahakari Vahatuk Sanstha Niyamit, Nanded. At the relevant time, defendant No. 1 Shamrao Sakharam Kadam was a Chairman, while defendant No. 3 Vithalrao Ganpatrao Pawar and defendant No. 4 Anandrao Narsingrao More were the Directors of the said society. 6. The plaintiff, respondent No. 1 in this petition, is Dena Bank, a body corporate established under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970, having its head office at Bombay. 7. Now, it appears that the 1st defendant through its office bearers, defendants 2 to 4, approached the plaintiff Bank to open a Cash Credit Account in the name of the 1st defendant-Society in their Branch at Nanded. The plaintiff agreed to do so on condition that the said account whole be secured by demand promissory note executed by the defendants and on execution of a Deed of Hypothecation, hypothecating and charging in favour of the plaintiff all the vehicles, such as trucks, tractors, trailors, accessories and stores etc. as security. Accordingly a Deed of Hypothecation was executed by defendants 2 to 4 on behalf of defendant No. 1 society and also by way of collateral security a promissory note was also executed by them on behalf of the society as well as on behalf of themselves, that is to say, personally binding themselves to repay the debt. This transaction was entered into on 16th December 1969. The promissory note was for Rs. This transaction was entered into on 16th December 1969. The promissory note was for Rs. 20,000/- for value received together with interest at 4% per annum over and above the published Reserve Bank of India rate with a minimum rate of interest at 9% with quarterly rests. This demand promissory note was to be treated as a continuing security. 8. Thereafter the Bank advanced several sums to the Co-operative Society on the above security from time to time. The sums so advanced amounted to Rs. 20,00,000/- which was the maximum limit under the promissory note and the hypothecation bond. 9. Despite repeated requests by the bank, the defendants failed to repay the loan which was outstanding. 10. The suit in which the present revision petition arises was therefore instituted in December 1972 by the Bank against these defendants for recovery of the dues amounting to Rs. 15,64,195/- with future interest at the rate of 10% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of suit till payment and other incidental charges. 11. The defendant No. 1 Society filed a separate written statement while defendants 2 to 4 filed a joint written statement separately raising various contentions all of which need not be considered here. 12. On these pleadings as many as 11 issues were framed by the trial Court at Ex. 58 on 4-9-1973 and the suit was posted for hearing on 26-9-1973. However, the hearing was not commenced till 10-10-1974, because of each of the dates fixed, for one reason or the other the hearing of the suit was adjourned at the instance of one or the other of the parties. 13. On 10-10-1974 an application, which is at Exh. 110, was made by the defendants to try the issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit as a preliminary issue. The learned Judge acceded to this request and heard the parties on that issue and held he that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not ousted by sub-section (3) of section 91 inasmuch as the suit was not one between the parties mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of section 91. Consequently the learned Judge held that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit and therefore, directed the suit to be fixed for further hearing. It is the correctness of this order that is questioned in this revision petition. Consequently the learned Judge held that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit and therefore, directed the suit to be fixed for further hearing. It is the correctness of this order that is questioned in this revision petition. 14. Section 91(1) has already been quoted at the very outset. From that sub-section it is clear that in order to bring a dispute within the ambit of sub-section (1), two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the dispute must be one touching the Constitution, elections of the office bearers, conduct of general meetings, management or business of the society, and (2) that both the parties to the suit must be one or the other as mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e). These two conditions are conjective and not disjunctive, in other words, both the conditions must be satisfied in order to attract the provisions of section 91 to oust the jurisdiction of the Court under sub-section (3). The question that arises in the present case, therefore, is whether the dispute which arises in the suit that has been filed respondent for recovery of the dues is one touching the business of the society. 15. The business of the society has been set out under the heading objects in the bye-laws of the society, the relevant portion of which has been translated at page 17 of the paper book. These objects are :--- "(1) To provide facility, to keep running the passenger business, goods, trucks, taxies, autorikshas, boats, bullock-carts and other vehicles after obtaining permission from the State Government or concerned local or other authority. And to purchase or give on rent (hire or sell other instruments of vehicles or carries and to keep then in working condition.) (2) To establish a workshop for testing and repairing and cleaning the vehicles belonging to the society or taken by society on rent (hire). To work as an agent of producer for sale of spare parts and other subsidiary instruments of vehicles in stock. (3) To open branches, agencies outward stages or stands and to conduct a stand or bus route allotted to the society. (4) To purchase or acquire in any other manner such land needed to fulfil the objects of society or to obtain movable property patta basis and to purchase, building workshop, godowns, places of office, to construct these or give on rent (hire). (4) To purchase or acquire in any other manner such land needed to fulfil the objects of society or to obtain movable property patta basis and to purchase, building workshop, godowns, places of office, to construct these or give on rent (hire). (5) To enter into agreement, with Government, or any other recognised society, in regard to supply of transport vehicles on hire and to secure all such rights, facilities and special powers, as are beneficial to the objects of society. (6) To work as out-agency of Railway Station to carry students to and fro, to arrange for tourist transport, picnics and tours to transport the sugarcane, belonging to members or non-members of Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. Kalamber, Kalamber area, Pedhies and societies. To transport the sugar etc. of the factory and to conduct transport business. For this taking contracts will be allowed. (7) To impart training to the members in regard to conducting the means of transport and the structure of machines, concerning the business of society and the work of the society. (8) And, to continue such other works, going on which are conducive and incidental, to the above mentioned objects". The objects do not in any way state that business of the society also included borrowing of loans and, therefore, on the face of it, it appears that the dispute that is raised in the present case cannot be said to be one touching the business of the society. 16. Mr. Deshpande, for the petitioner, however, argued that the business as set out in the objects inter alia included transport business by maintaining buses, goods, trucks, taxies, autorikshas and similar other vehicles either power driven or animal driven, and since under the hypothecation bond, these vehicles were hypothecated as security for the repayment of the loan transaction, it really touches the business of the society. In this connection he also pointed out that a resolution to open a Cash Credit Account on the aforesaid terms was passed by the society and it was in pursuance of that resolution that the transaction was entered into after duly obtaining permission or consent of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. It was, therefore, contended that since the transaction was entered into pursuant to a resolution with the consent of the Registrar, the transaction must be regarded as one touching the business of the society. It was, therefore, contended that since the transaction was entered into pursuant to a resolution with the consent of the Registrar, the transaction must be regarded as one touching the business of the society. But it is difficult to accept this contention. 17. When the office bearers of the 1st defendant society approached the Bank, naturally the Bank must have insisted the proper authorisation by the society for borrowing the loan by defendants 2 to 4 on behalf of the society. Without the proper resolution passed by the members of the society, the office bearers could not have any authority to borrow such a huge amount, especially because this was not part of business of the society to borrow loans. Therefore, merely because a resolution was passed by the society authorising them to raise this loan by way of cash credit with the plaintiff Bank, it cannot be said that the dispute is one touching the business of the society. Similarly, only because the Registrar gave his consent to the raising of the loan by opening a Cash Credit Account with the Bank, the transaction would not become one touching the business of the society. The argument, therefore, that the effect of the permission given by the Registrar to raise loan would make the transaction of borrowing as one touching the business of the society cannot be accepted. 18. Reliance was first placed on the un-reported decision of the Supreme Court in (Keshava Narayan v. Nandal Co-operative Marketing Society and others)1, Civil Appeal No. 1224/1966 dt. 18-8-1969 S.C. but the facts of that case were quite different. The appellant in that case had supplied to the respondent society on credit food grains such as wheat, pulses, oil and other food-stuff. By a letter dated January 6, 1964, the amount of Rs. 10,267.48 which was due to the appellant from the respondent Nandal Co-operative Society was agreed to be paid by one Adivasi Society. Since both the societies failed to discharge the obligation, a suit was instituted by the appellant Keshava Narayan in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Shivapuri for recovery of the dues impleading both the societies and two other persons by name Shobha Ram and Panchu, the last two being respectively member and President of the Nandal Society. Since both the societies failed to discharge the obligation, a suit was instituted by the appellant Keshava Narayan in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Shivapuri for recovery of the dues impleading both the societies and two other persons by name Shobha Ram and Panchu, the last two being respectively member and President of the Nandal Society. The claim was inter alia resisted on the plea that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit under section 82(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 but it was only the Registrar of the co-operative societies or his nominee who had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Incidentally it may be stated that section 82(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was analogous to section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. 19. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the claim was made in the suit did not raise a dispute touching the business of the society and therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the action was not barred was negatived, because obviously under the bye-laws the society was formed with the object of purchasing forest produce from members of the Schedule Tribes and of supplying them food stuff. The business of the society was, therefore, clearly the function or activity of the society having some continuity and regularity. It was observed; "The expression touching the business of a society means in reference or in relation to, respecting regarding or concerning the business of the society". Since it is part of the business of the society to purchase food stuff for its members, it was held that the dispute was touching business of the Nandal Society. 20. In the present case, however, the business of the society was to do transport business by purchasing vehicles and to purchase vehicles, they borrowed money. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that borrowing of money was part of the business of the society. 21. The reference was made to the decision in (Navagarh Co-operative Central Bank v. Narayana)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1896. But that case is also distinguishable on facts from the present case. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that borrowing of money was part of the business of the society. 21. The reference was made to the decision in (Navagarh Co-operative Central Bank v. Narayana)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1896. But that case is also distinguishable on facts from the present case. There the appellant society was a society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act of Orissa and among its objects was one of raising funds for financial co-operative societies registered under the Act affiliated to it, besides carrying on the general business Bank. Three such co-operative societies had applied to the appellant bank for loans and on the recommendation of the first respondent who at the relevant time was employed as Secretary of the Bank, various sums were advanced to these co-operative societies. Attempts to recover the loan advanced to the aforesaid societies having failed, the appellant Bank referred the disputes concerning the said transactions to arbitration under section 68 of that Act praying for an award in each case for the sum advanced with interest, the claim was made in each case against the indebted society, its office bearers and the first respondent jointly and severally. It was held that the dispute was one touching the business of the society, obviously because one of the objects of the society was raising of funds for financial co-operative societies registered under the Act affiliated to it and also to carry on business of bank and in the course of this business the appellant society had advanced the loan and, therefore, the dispute in the case was one which touched the business of the society. 22. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this question again in (Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others)3, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1320. That was also a case in which the question arose as to whether section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act was attracted. The case arose out of a writ petition filed by the respondent M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain against the appellant Co-operative Bank. The petitioner occupied the ground floor of a building as a tenant of the original owner. That was also a case in which the question arose as to whether section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act was attracted. The case arose out of a writ petition filed by the respondent M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain against the appellant Co-operative Bank. The petitioner occupied the ground floor of a building as a tenant of the original owner. The property had already been mortgaged by the original owner by depositing the title deeds with the said Co-operative Bank and the loan not having been repaid, arbitration proceedings had been taken by the Bank against the original owner and an award was made against him for recovery of Rs. 6,00,000/- to be recovered by stated instalments. The award was passed by consent. The original owner, having committed default in making payment, the property was put to auction but could not be sold for want of buyers and therefore, under section 100 of the Act, the Collector issued a certificate to transfer the property to the Bank and accordingly the property was transferred to the Bank. 23. Thereafter the Bank addressed a letter to the petitioners stating that they were unauthorisedly occupying the ground floor and called upon them to surrender vacant possession. The petitioners denied these allegations and maintained that they were in lawful possession. The Bank it appears, had applied to the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bombay under sections 91 to 96 of the Act, praying that the dispute between the Bank and the petitioners be referred to arbitration and the Registrar referred the dispute to his nominee. The petitioners, therefore, filed the writ petition in the High court challenging the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act to decide the dispute and the question arose whether the dispute was one touching the business of the appellant society. 24. The Supreme Court observed that the word Business in sub-section (1) of section 91 has been used in narrower sense and it means the actual trading or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and bye laws. That sub-section mentions five kinds of disputes, the first four of which relate to the affairs of the society. That sub-section mentions five kinds of disputes, the first four of which relate to the affairs of the society. It is necessary to point out that the Supreme Court held that although the nature of business which a society does can be ascertained from the objects of the society, it cannot be said that whether the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects is part of the business. It was further observed : "The word touching is very wide and would include any other matter which relates to or concerns the business of a society, but is doubtful whether the word affects should also be used in defining the scope of the word touching. The question whether a dispute touching the assets of a society would be a dispute touching the business of the society would depend on the nature of the society and the Rules and bye-laws governing it, ordinarily if a society owns buildings and let out parts of buildings which it does not require for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. But it may be that it is the business of a society to construct the houses and let them out to its members. In that case letting out property may be part of its business. Where the society is a Co-operative Bank it cannot ordinarily be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned by it. Therefore, the dispute between a tenant and a member of the Bank in a building which has subsequently been acquired by the Bank cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Bank." 25. From this decision, therefore, it was obvious that although in the present case the society was required to borrow loan in order to purchase vehicles to carry on its business, it cannot be said that the borrowing of loan was part of the business of the Society. In view of the aforesaid decision, therefore it is difficult to countenance the submission made on behalf of the revision petitioner that the transaction in this case was one which touched the business of the Society. In view of the aforesaid decision, therefore it is difficult to countenance the submission made on behalf of the revision petitioner that the transaction in this case was one which touched the business of the Society. Consequently, section 91(1) is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case and, therefore, under sub-section (3) of that section the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court will not be barred. 26. The order passed by the trial Court is, therefore, correct and is up-held though for different reasons. 27. In the result, the rule is discharged with costs. -----