B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) A. Division bench of this court consisting of A. D. Desai and C. V. Rane JJ. hearing this appeal found difference of judicial opinion on the point whether a Municipality constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 is entitled to file suit for recovery of octroi duty referred the following questions for our opinion:1 Whether the provisions of secs. 93 to 98 of the Municipal Act of 1925 and secs. 121 to 127 of the Municipalities Act of 1963 impose a personal liability on the importer to ply octroi duty on octroiable goods imported by him within the municipal limits far consumption use or sale. 2 Whether such personal liability is imposed by octroi Rules and Bye-laws of 1962 framed by the Godhra Borough Municipality. 3 Whether sec. 203 covers octroi dues other than those recoverable under Chapter VIII of the Municipal Act of 1925 and Chapter IX of the Municipalities Act of 1963. 4 If the answer to point 3 is in the negative whether the provisions relating to recovery of octroi dues and the provisions of sec. 203 of the Municipal Act of 1925 or sec. 249 of the Municipalities Act of 1963 bar a remedy of a suit to recover the octroi dues. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions urged in connection with the questions referred to us it would be necessary to notice a few facts in the context in which these questions arise. The respondent-plaintiff is the Godhra Borough Municipality which filed a Special Civil Suit been No. 6 of 1967 in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.) at Godhra against this State of Gujarat to recover Rs. 57 108 paise with interest and costs on the ground that the said amount was due in respect of the octroi duty payable by the State Government for having imported food-grains and other articles within the limits of the said Municipality in the course of the period commencing from April 1 1961 to April 30 1966 The case of the municipality was that it decided by its Resolution of August 21 1945 to impose octroi duty in respect of certain articles mentioned in the Schedule and imported by road and which were meant for sale consumption or use within the Municipal limits. After going through the procedure prescribed for imposition of tax under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 the plaintiff-Municipality made the Rules effective from March 1 1947 According to these Rules octroi duty was payable in respect of the goods mentioned in the Schedule and brought within the municipal limits for sale consumption or use. It appears that the plaintiff-Municipality has enacted fresh Octroi Rules and made their effective from June 1 1962 According to the plaintiff-Municipality the State Government imported food-grains etc. within the octroi limits of the said Municipality for purposes of sale consumption or use and therefore the State Government rendered itself liable to pay octroi duty. The plaintiff-Municipality there fore made demand on the State Government to arrange to pay the octroi duty payable under the Rules. As the State Government did not comply with the demand made by the plaintiff-Municipality the present suit out of which this appeal arises was filed against the State Government to recover the aforesaid amount of Rs. 57 108. 42 paise being the amount of octroi duty which was due and payable according to the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and the relevant Rules framed thereunder. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by the State Government contending inter alia that if the tax was not paid by the State at the time of import of the goods or articles the same could be collected only by the procedure of seizure and sale of the goods as provided in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 which were applicable to the respective parts of the period with which we are concerned in this appeal. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court decided against the State Government negativing all the contentions raised in the written statement and granted a decree as prayed for by the plaintiff-Municipality. The State Government there fore brought the matter in appeal to this Court by its First Appeal No. 50 or 1969. A number of contentions was advanced on behalf of the State Government before the Division Bench (Coram: A. D. Desai and C. V. Rane JJ) which heard this appeal. One of the main contentions advanced on behalf of the State Government was that the plaintiff-Municipality was not entitled to file suit for recovery of the octroi duty as sec. A number of contentions was advanced on behalf of the State Government before the Division Bench (Coram: A. D. Desai and C. V. Rane JJ) which heard this appeal. One of the main contentions advanced on behalf of the State Government was that the plaintiff-Municipality was not entitled to file suit for recovery of the octroi duty as sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 which empowers Borough Municipalities to file suit does not warrant the filing of the suit for purposes of recovery of octroi duty and the only liability of the importer prescribed under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 was a criminal liability and the only remedy which the Municipalities have under the said Act is the summary remedy of seizure and sale of the goods at the time when they are sought to be introduced within the municipal limits by actually seizing the goods. On this point as there is a diversion of opinion between the two decisions of the Division Benches of the Bombay High Court in (1) POONA CITY MUNICIPALITY V. R. N. PARANJPE AND SONS A. I. R. 1933 BOM. 296 AND (2) URAN ISLAMPUR MUNICIPALITY V. SHANKARRO AMRITRAO JADHAV A. I. R. 1960 BOM. 467 the Division Bench of this Court thought fit to refer the four questions set out hereinabove to the larger Bench of this Court so as to resolve the difference on the point. The Division Bench has made certain findings as to certain questions of fact in the order of reference in the following terms:in the suit octroi duty is claimed from the Government in respect of the goods which were imported during the period from April 1 1961 to April 13 1966 Octroi rules which were prevalent upto May 30 1962 have been challenged before us on the ground that the proper procedure at the time of amending the said rules had not been followed. So far food- grains etc. brought within the municipal limits by rail before May 1962 is concerned Mr. Vakil appearing for the Municipality does not press the claim for the octroi duty with the consequence that the Government is not liable for the same and the decree passed by the trial Court to that extent has to be varied. No octroi duty is also payable on food-grains etc. transmitted by the Government Godowns outside the limits of the Municipality. No octroi duty is also payable on food-grains etc. transmitted by the Government Godowns outside the limits of the Municipality. The octroi duty is payable on food-grains weighing Q. 303972 which were sold by the Government to the whole-sale dealers within the municipal limits. The octroi duty in respect of these goods is payable under the Octroi Rules of 1962 which came into force from June 1 1962 ( 5 ) AT the time of hearing of this appeal before us Mr. G. T. Nanavati Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State Government which is the appellant in this appeal urged that under sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 the plaintiff-Municipality was not competent and for that matter no borough municipality is competent to file the suit for recovery of octroi duties because sec. 203 only permits a suit to be filed in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of any sum or sums recoverable under Chapter VIII of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 or of any compensation expenses charges or damages payable under the said Act against the person liable to pay the same. In other words the contention of Mr. Nanavati is that since the recovery of the octroi duty is not one liable to be recovered under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 nor the amount of octroi duty can be classified as compensation expenses charges or damages payable under the Act the suit for recovery of the octroi duty is not competent. ( 6 ) THE above contention of Mr. Nanavati has been sought to be repelled by Mr. Kaji. learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-Municipality as the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the State Government does not give full effect to the provision contained in sec. 203 of the said Act and it completely ignores that the recovery by the method of suit is merely an alternative procedure to be resorted to in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under the Act. 203 of the said Act and it completely ignores that the recovery by the method of suit is merely an alternative procedure to be resorted to in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under the Act. ( 7 ) THE neat questions which therefore arise in this appeal are whether alternative procedure by a suit is available in respect of the amounts other than those recoverable under Chapter VIII of the Boroughs Act 1925 or not and whether the clause in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act and clause or in case of failure to realise by such process the whole or any part of any amount recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII are to be read disjunctively or conjunctively. In order to answer the questions referred to us it would be profitable at this stage to shortly advert to the scheme contained in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 192 in respect of the levy collection and recovery of the octroi duty. ( 8 ) SEC. 3 (12) of the Boroughs Act defines Octroi as including the terminal tax and sec. 3 (20) defines Tax as to mean any toll rate cess fee or other impost leviable under the said Act including water rate. Chapter VII deals with the Municipal taxation. Part (1) of Chapter VII comprises of secs 73 to 77. Sec. 73 empowers Borough Municipalities to impose taxes and classifies different taxes which can be imposed by the Municipalities. The material part of sec. 73 which is relevant for purposes of this appeal reads:73 (1) Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf and to the provisions of secs. 75 and 76 a municipality may impose for the purposes of this Act any of the following taxes namely : (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) an octroi on animals or goods or both brought within the octroi limits for consumption (use or sale) therein;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SEC. 75 is an important section which has a bearing on the questions with which we are concerned in this appeal- The material part of sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SEC. 75 is an important section which has a bearing on the questions with which we are concerned in this appeal- The material part of sec. 75 reads: 75 A municipality before imposing a tax shall observe the following preliminary procedure : (a) it shall by resolution passed at a general meeting select for the purpose one or other of the taxes specified in sec. 73 and approve rules prepared for the purposes of clause (j) of sec. 58 prescribing the tax selected and in such resolution and in such rules specify : (i) the classes of persons or of property or of both which the municipality pro poses to make liable and any exemptions which it proposes to make; (ii) the amount or rate at which the municipality proposes to assess each such class; (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) xxx xxx xxx (b) When such resolution has been passed the municipality shall publish the rules so approved with a notice in the form of Schedule II prefixed thereto. (c) Any inhabitant of the municipal borough objecting to the imposition of the said tax or to the amount or rate proposed or to the classes of persons or property to be made liable thereto or to any exemptions proposed may within one month from the publication of the said notice send his objection in writing to the municipality the municipality shall take all such objections into considerations or shall authorize a committee to consider the same and report thereon; and unless it decides to abandon the proposed tax shall submit such objections with its opinion thereon and any modifications proposed in accordance therewith together with the notice and rules aforesaid to the State Government. SEC. 76 empowers the State Government to sanction and modify the Rules with or without conditions. Sec. 77a provides for the power of the State Government to permit a Municipality to levy tax at the varying amounts or varying rates. Part (2) of Chapter VII provides for assessment of and liability to rates on buildings or lands with which we are not concerned. Part (2) comprises of secs. 78 to 89. Part (3) of Chapter VII deals with the power to charge fees. It consists of only one section viz. sec. 90. Part (2) of Chapter VII provides for assessment of and liability to rates on buildings or lands with which we are not concerned. Part (2) comprises of secs. 78 to 89. Part (3) of Chapter VII deals with the power to charge fees. It consists of only one section viz. sec. 90. Part (4) of Chapter VII makes special provisions relating to certain taxes and it comprises of two sections viz. sees. 91 and 92. Part (5) of Chapter VII deals with octroi and tolls. See. 93 thereof enjoins a municipality to observe the requirements of sub-secs. (2) and (3) of see. 61 before framing Bye-laws in connection with octroi and tolls. See. 94 empowers the municipalities to exempt articles liable to octroi when brought within the municipal limits. The material part of see. 94 (1) reads as under:94 (1) A person bringing into or receiving from beyond the octroi limits of a municipal borough any animal or goods on which octroi is payable shall when required by an officer authorized in this behalf by the Chief Officer and so far as may be necessary for ascertaining the amount of tax chargeable (a) permit that officer to inspect examine weigh and otherwise deal with such animal or goods; and (b) communicate to that officer any information and exhibit to him any bill invoice or document of a like nature which he may possess relating to such animal or goods; (c) make a declaration in writing to that officer regarding the correctness and accuracy of the document shown to him. Sub-see. (2) of see. 94 empowers the officer concerned to search the goods brought by the person from beyond the octroi limits of municipal borough on which octroi is levied. Sec. 95 is a material section for purposes of the questions referred to us and it provides:95 An officer demanding octroi by the authority of the municipality shall tender to every person introducing or receiving anything on which the tax is claimed a bill specifying the animal or goods taxable the amount claimed and the rate at which the tax is calculated. Sec. 96 provides for penalty for evasion of octroi duty. Sec. 96 provides for penalty for evasion of octroi duty. It reads as under: 96 Where any animal or goods passing into a municipal borough are liable to the payment of octroi any person who with the intention of defrauding the municipality causes or abets the introduction of or himself introduces or attempts to introduce within the octroi limits of the said borough any such animal or goods upon which payment of the octroi due on such introduction has neither been made nor tendered shall be punishable with fine which may extend to ten times the amount of such octroi or to fifty rupees whichever may be greater sec. 97 deals with the tables of tolls with which we are not concerned. Sec. 98 empowers the officer concerned of the municipality to seize vehicle or animal or goods on nonpayment of octroi. It reads as under:98 (1) In the case of non-payment on demand of any octroi or of any toll leviable by a municipality any person appointed to collect such octroi or toll may seize any animal or goods on which octroi is chargeable or any vehicle or animal on which the toll is chargeable or any part of the burden of such vehicle or animal which is of sufficient value to satisfy the demand and may detain the same. He shall thereupon give the person in possession of the vehicle animal or thing seized a list of the property together with a written notice in the form of Schedule VII. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 98 empowers the officer concerned to sell the property seized and the circumstances in which that power can be exercised. Sub sec. (3) thereof enables the officer concerned to release the property so seized if the payment of octroi dues together with all the incidental expenses is made before the sale is commenced. Sub secs. (4) and (5) are not of any importance for purposes of this appeal. Sub sec. (3) thereof enables the officer concerned to release the property so seized if the payment of octroi dues together with all the incidental expenses is made before the sale is commenced. Sub secs. (4) and (5) are not of any importance for purposes of this appeal. Sec. 99 which is another important section and which has a bearing on the questions referred to us reads as under:99 The standing committee if it thinks fit instead of requiring payment of octroi due from any person mercantile firm or public body to be made at the time when not the animals or goods in respect of which the octroi is leviable are introduced within the octroi limits of the municipal borough may at any time direct that an account current shall be kept on behalf of the municipality of the octroi so due from such person firm or body. Such account shall be settled at intervals not exceeding one month and such person firm or public body shall give such information or details and make such deposit or furnish such security as the standing committee or any officer authorized by it in this behalf shall consider sufficient to cover the amount which may at any time be due from such person firm or body in respect of such dues. Any amount so due at the expiry of any such interval shall for the purposes of Chapter VIII be deemed to be and shall be recoverable in the same manner as an amount claimed on account of any tax recoverable under the said Chapter. (Emphasis supplied by us)THE remaining sections of Part (5) viz. secs. 100 and 101 are not relevant for purposes of this appeal. Part (6) of Chapter VII deals with the powers of the State Government in respect of the municipal taxes. ( 9 ) CHAPTER VIII provides for the recovery of municipal claims. Sec. 104 is the only section which has a bearing on the questions referred to us and it provides as under: 104 (1) When any amount (a) which by or under any provisions of this Act is declared to be recoverable in the manner provided by this Chapter or (b) which not being leviable under sub-sec. (1) of sec. Sec. 104 is the only section which has a bearing on the questions referred to us and it provides as under: 104 (1) When any amount (a) which by or under any provisions of this Act is declared to be recoverable in the manner provided by this Chapter or (b) which not being leviable under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 98 or payable on demand on account of an octroi or a toll is climbable as an amount or installment on account of any other tax which now is imposed or hereafter may be imposed in any municipal borough shall have become due the Chief Officer shall with the least practicable delay cause to be presented to any person liable for the payment thereof a bill for the sum claimed as due. (Emphasis supplied by us)SUB-SEC. (2) prescribes the contents of bill referred to in sub-sec. (1 ). Sub- sec. (3) provides as under: (3) If the person to whom a bill has been presented as aforesaid does not within the fifteen days from the presentation thereof either (a) pay the sum claimed as due in the bill or (b) show cause to the satisfaction of the Chief Officer why he is not liable to pay the same or (c) prefer an appeal in accordance with the provisions of see 110 against the claim the Chief Officer may cause to be served upon the person liable for the payment of the said sum a notice of demand in the form of Schedule V or to the like effect. Sec. 105 provides for the remedy if the notice of demand issued under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 104 is not complied with. It provides for the recovery of the amount mentioned in the aforesaid notice of demand by distress and sale of the moveable property or the attachment and sale of the immovable property of the defaulter and for incidental matters as to whom and how the warrant is to he executed before the summary remedy is enforced. Sec. 106 provides for the sale of goods distrained in special cases under sec. 105 which are subject to speedy and natural decay or when the expense of keeping it in custody together with the amount to be levied is likely to exceed its value. The other sections of Chapter VIII are not relevant for our purposes. Sec. 106 provides for the sale of goods distrained in special cases under sec. 105 which are subject to speedy and natural decay or when the expense of keeping it in custody together with the amount to be levied is likely to exceed its value. The other sections of Chapter VIII are not relevant for our purposes. The important section thereafter to which we should refer and on the interpretation of which there are conflicting decisions is sec. 203 which provides for the alternative procedure to municipalities for recovery of their dues. It reads as under: 203 In lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act or in case of failure to realise by such process the whole or any part of any amount recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII or of any compensation expenses charges or damages payable under this Act it shall be lawful for a municipality to sue in any Court of competent jurisdiction the person liable to pay the same. ( 10 ) THIS is broadly the scheme of levy collection and recovery of the octroi duty under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 The entire thread running through the contention that a regular suit in a Civil Court by a borough municipality is not competent under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 for recovery of the amount due and payable on account of octroi duty imposed by the Municipality is broadly that no civil liability is imposed on the person owning such goods which have been brought within the municipal limits for sale consumption or use or on the importer of such goods because there is no charging section to that effect and more so particularly because in the very nature of the octroi duty the impost can be on the goods and not on the person. In the first decision of the Bombay High Court in Poona City Municipalitys case (supra) this contention has found favour with the Division Bench consisting of Beaumont C. J. and Baker J. The Bombay High Court was concerned in that case with an order of Small Cause Court Judge Poona in a suit where the plaintiff-Municipality prayed for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 34-8-0 as due to them in respect of octroi on certain goods which belonged to the defendants. 34-8-0 as due to them in respect of octroi on certain goods which belonged to the defendants. The Small Cause Court Judge dismissed the suit as he found that the suit was not competent. The Division Bench affirmed that view of the Small Cause Court Judge as the Division Bench speaking through Beaumont C. J. did not find in the scheme contained in the different sections of the Bon bay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 pertaining to levy and recovery of octroi duty that any liability was imposed on the persons importing goods to pay octroi duty and inasmuch as the Poona Municipality failed to prove that a current account was kept under sec. 99 of the said Act and therefore the powers of recovery conferred by Chapter VIII were held as not available to the plaintiff-Municipality. It should be noted in the first instance that the most important sections. viz. secs. 75 and 95 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 were not pointed out in terms to the Division Bench hearing Poona Municipalitys case (supra ). Sec. 75 as we have set out above enjoins a municipalitys before it can validly impose a tax to select one or other of the taxes specified in sec. 73 by a proper resolution passed at the general meeting and also approve the Rules prepared for purposes of Clause (j) of sec. 58 prescribing the tax selected and also specify therein the classes of persons or property or both which the municipality proposes to make liable Sec. 95 provides for presentation of bills for octroi to the persons bringing into or receiving from beyond the octroi limits of the municipal borough any animal or goods on which octroi is payable. Sec. 94 in the first instance requires such a person to permit the officer concerned to inspect examine weigh and otherwise deal with such animal or goods and also enjoins him to communicate to that officer any information and exhibit to him any bill invoice or document of a like nature which he may possess relating to such animal or goods and also compels him to make a declaration in writing to that officer regarding the correctness and accuracy of the document shown to him. Sec. 95 as stated above empowers the officer concerned to tender to every person introducing or receiving animals or goods liable to octroi and on which the tax is claimed a bill specifying the animal or goods taxable the amount claimed and the rate at which the tax is calculated Sec. 98 empowers the officer concerned in case of non-payment of demand of any octroi to seize the animals or goods on which octroi is chargeable which may be of sufficient value to satisfy the demand and may detain the same. Now these provisions had not been clearly brought to the notice of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Poona City Municipalitys case (supra) and it appears therefore that its attention having not been drawn to these sections especially secs. 75 94 and 95 the Division Bench made the observation that there is no liability imposed on the persons bringing the goods or animals within the municipal limits to pay any octroi duty and therefore unless current account is main- tained under sec. 99 it would not be an amount recoverable under Chapter VIII and therefore the suit under sec. 203 would not be competent. We have not been able to appreciate the contention of the learned Assistant Government Pleader urged on behalf of the State Government relying on this decision that there is no liability imposed by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 on any person to pay octroi duty and the only liability according to the learned Assistant Government Pleader is the criminal liability which has Seen provided under sec. 96. The learned Assistant Government Pleader also contended that the only right which the Municipality has if the octroi duty is not paid on demand being made at the time of import of the goods or animal within the municipal limits is to seize the goods and to detain them and to sell the same for recovery of the duty payable. The learned Assistant Government Pleader also contended that the only right which the Municipality has if the octroi duty is not paid on demand being made at the time of import of the goods or animal within the municipal limits is to seize the goods and to detain them and to sell the same for recovery of the duty payable. We are afraid we cannot agree with such a broad contention which has been urged by the learned Assistant Government Pleader It is no doubt true that the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Poone City Municipalitys case (supra) apparently lends support to this contention But as observed above it seems to us clear from the short paragraph by which a similar contention was upheld by the said Division Bench that this provision contained in sec. 75 and the provisions contained in secs. 94 and 95 and 99 of the Municipal Boroughs Act have not been clearly brought to the notice of the said Division Bench so as to consider the problem from that aspect whether the liability for the octroi dues on the person importing the goods is imposed under the Act or not. We are of the opinion that on plain reading of sec. 75 (a) (i) the Legislature has empowered the Municipality and as a matter of course enjoined it to select one of the taxes specified in sec. 73 by an appropriate resolution and approve Rules prescribing the tax so selected and specify classes of persons or property which the Municipality proposes to make liable. The Rules therefore would be the appropriate place where in the first instance we have to find out whether a liability on the person importing goods or animal is prescribed or not. Secondly secs. 94 and 95 clearly in our opinion impose an obligation on the person bringing into or receiving from beyond the octroi limits of a municipal borough any animal or goods on which octroi is payable to pay the same on the bill being presented to him by the officer concerned. It is no doubt true that sec. 96 provides for a penalty for non-payment of such amount of octroi duty after the bill is presented. It is no doubt true that sec. 96 provides for a penalty for non-payment of such amount of octroi duty after the bill is presented. Sec. 98 at the same time empowers the officer concerned in case of non-payment of the duty according to the bill to seize and detain the goods and empowers further the Municipality to sell the goods in case the amount is not paid after the detention and seizure. But the liability of being penalised under sec. 96 is sort of a criminal liability while powers of seizure detention and sale under sec. 98 are the powers by which summary demand can be enforced. But to contend from sec. 96 or 98 that no civil liability is created on the person importing the goods or animals from outside the octroi limits of a municipal borough is in our opinion not well founded. The very fact that non-payment of duty as demanded in the bill would expose him to penalty and summary enforcement is conclusive on the question of liability of importer or owner. Even under the alternative procedure envisaged in sec. 99 of maintaining an account being in lieu of requirement of immediate payment of such octroi dues by the person concerned at the time of import of the goods in the octroi limits as expressly stated in sec. 99 this liability of importer or owner is clearly envisaged. Besides the particular rules with which we are concerned in this appeal clearly make the importer or owner liable and the relevant provisions contained in Rules 4 (3) 6 (1) (e) (k) (1) and (m) and (5) 14 and 15 clearly indicate in this direction and fortify the view which we are inclined to take that the contention about the absence of any provision creating civil liability to pay tax either in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and for the Rules is not well conceived. If that is the legal position that a liability is entailed on a person bringing into or receiving from beyond the octroi limits of a municipal borough any animal or goods on which octroi is payable to pay the duty on the demand being made we do not think that the contention which has been advanced that the Municipality is not competent to file suit under sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 is well founded. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 is well founded. The view which has appealed to the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Poona City Municipalitys case (Supra) that inasmuch as there is no liability on any person to pay the octroi duty on the goods or animals which he brings within the municipal limits no suit can be filed under sec. 203 cannot be accepted by us in the view which we are taking of the matter. Sec. 203 as set out above is an alternative remedy which a Municipality can pursue in lieu of the summary remedy which is available to it. The learned Assistant Government Pleader made a strenuous attempt to impress upon us that the only right to file a suit in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under the Act is in cases of recovery of whole or any part of the amount recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII or for recovery of any compensation expenses charges or damages payable under the Act and in so far as sec. 104 of Chapter VIII of the said Act saves and excepts the amounts of octroi duty payable from the general class of the amounts which can be enforced in the manner provided in Chapter VIII suit under sec. 203 is not competent. The contention prima facie appears to be attractive and it no doubt has impressed the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Poona City Municipalitys case (Supra) but in our opinion on close scrutiny it does not help the cause which the learned Assistant Government Pleader is pleading before us obviously for two reasons: in the first place the interpretation which he advances on the phraseology of sec. 203 read with sec. 104 of the Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 would in our opinion not give the full scope and effect to sec. 203. In the ultimate analysis it is the provision contained in sec. 203 which must bear out the right of a Municipality to file suit for recovery of the octroi duty provided there is any liability under the Act to pay the duty. Sec. 203 opens with the words :in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act. The interpretation which has been advanced by the learned Assistant Government Pleader if accepted would render the first clause of sec. Sec. 203 opens with the words :in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act. The interpretation which has been advanced by the learned Assistant Government Pleader if accepted would render the first clause of sec. 203 which we have set out above otiose. It is any recovery allowed by or under the Municipal Boroughs Act which can be recovered by filing a suit. The learned Assistant Government Pleader therefore urged that it would not be a proper reading of the section in the manner in which we are trying to read. According to the learned Assistant Government Pleader we must read the first and the second clauses of sec. 203 together. He wants us to read clauses In lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act and or in case of failure to realise by such process the whole or any part of any amount recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII conjointly. We are afraid that the manner suggested by the learned Assistant Government Pleader of reading this Section would completely defeat the right of the Municipality to recover the octroi duty except by enforcing summary remedy or resting itself satisfied with imposition of the penalty under sec. 96 on the importer. In our opinion the first two clauses of sec. 203 provide for two different contingencies. The remedy provided in sec. 203 it should be noted is in lieu of summary process. The alternative remedy none-the-less is provided in the matter of recovery allowed by or under the Act. The attempt of the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the suit is competent only in respect of the two matters viz. the amount recoverable under Chapter VIII and the amount of compensation expenses charges or damages payable under the Act would militate against not only the accepted principles of construction of statutes but would result in an extremely absurd position that the Municipality is entitled to file suit for the incidental claims of compensation expenses charges and damages but would not be entitled to file suit in respect of the main matter such as for the amount due and payable on account of taxes or fees. The learned Assistant Government Pleader made an attempt to explain this by urging that because the summary method of recovery is provided and a criminal liability is provided the legislature has not thought fit to provide for the competency of suits to recover such amounts. We do not think that this explanation is satisfactory. As we have said it begs the question whether the liability is provided in the Act and also in the Rules on the persons bringing into or receiving from beyond the octroi limits goods or animals to pay the octroi duty. In this connection our attention has been drawn by the learned Assistant Government Pleader to a provision which according to him is similar in the Bombay District Local Boards Act. The decision on this provision of the Bombay District Local Boards Act has been rendered by the Division Bench consisting of Stone C. J. and Divatia J. in DISTRICT LOCAL BOARD RATNAGIRI V. SHANTARAM RAJARAM AND OTHERS A. I. R. 1946 BOMBAY 117 The Division Bench Speaking through Stone C. J. stressed the etymological meaning of the term octroi by reference to its nature of impost and similar impost in different countries and has taken the view that in the very nature of the impost of octroi duty incidence can be only on the goods and cannot be attached to the persons. The Division Bench thereafter considered the scheme contained in the Bombay District Local Boards Act 1923 as amended by Act 23 of 1938 and the relevant provision which empowered the Local Board to file suit is contained in sec. 72 of the said Act. The material part of the said section provides :in lieu of proceeding by distress and sale or in case of failure to realise by so proceeding the whole or any part of any amount recoverable under the provision of Chap. VIII or of any compensation expenses charges or damages awarded under this Act the district local board may sue in any Court of competent jurisdiction the person liable to pay the same the Division Bench held that before the 1938 amendment became operative on written demands or notices or bills which could ratify sub sec. (2) of sec. VIII or of any compensation expenses charges or damages awarded under this Act the district local board may sue in any Court of competent jurisdiction the person liable to pay the same the Division Bench held that before the 1938 amendment became operative on written demands or notices or bills which could ratify sub sec. (2) of sec. 104 were served and hence the amount of octroi could not be recovered by distress under the subsequent sections of Chapter VIII because there was no demand and no delivery of a bill under sec. 104 and accordingly the alternative procedure of suing the importer in a Civil Court by virtue of sec. 72 for recovery of octroi duty by obtaining a personal decree against him could not arise unless the machinery of sec. 104 with regard to the giving of a bill which is mandatory had been complied with. The Division Bench further took the view that even after the amendments of 1938 the alternative procedure laid down in sec. 72 of suing the importer in a Civil Court has no application to the ease oh ax octroi. In our opinion this authority would not be of much assistance to the appellant-State. The provision contained in see. 72 of the Bombay Local Boards Act 1923 is in the first instance not pari materia with see. 203 of the Municipal Boroughs Act but on the contrary the said see. 72 appears to be nearer to the provision contained in sec. 164 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 and therefore in view of the difference between the provisions of sec. 72 of the Bombay Local Boards Act 1923 and sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 we do not think that this decision can be successfully pressed into service by the learned Assistant Government Pleader in support of his contention. The marked difference between the provision contained in sec. 164 of the District Municipal Act (which is pari materia with sec. 72 of the Bombay District Local Boards Act 1923 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1938) and see. The marked difference between the provision contained in sec. 164 of the District Municipal Act (which is pari materia with sec. 72 of the Bombay District Local Boards Act 1923 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1938) and see. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 has been noted as a significant distinguishing feature by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of VYAS AND TAMBE JJ URAN ISLAMPUR MUNICIPALITY V. SHANKARRAO AMRITRAO JADHAV A. I. R. 1960 BOMBAY 467 where the Court was concerned with a similar question of competency of suit for recovery of octroi duty under sec. 164 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901we read sec. 164 as under: in lieu of proceeding by distress and sale or in case of failure to realise by so proceeding the whole or any part of any amount recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII or of any compensation expenses charges or damages awarded under this Act it shall be lawful for the Municipality to sue in any court of competent jurisdiction the person liable to pay the same as also any other person who may have in any other way caused or may appear likely to cause any injury to any property rights or privileges of the Municipality. The Division Bench in Uran Islampur Municipalitys case (Supra) distinguished the decision of WASSOODEW J IN BHUSAWAL MUNICIPALITY V. HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION CO. BOMBAY A. I. R. 1943 BOM 30 which was sought to be relied upon by the Advocate for Uran Islampur Municipality in support of the contention that such a suit for recover: of the octroi duty was competent under sec. 164 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 The Division Bench while distinguished the said decision observed as under at page 470 in paragraph 6: there are more reasons than one why this decision would not avail the plaintiff Municipality. In the first place as I have said there is no provisions in part (5) of Chapter VII of the Act which is the only part relating to octroi and tolls which makes a person who introduces an article into the octroi limits of a municipal district liable to pay. Therefore unless there is a provision in the Act which makes a person sued liable to pay that person cannot be sued. Then again and this is importance 44 Bom. Therefore unless there is a provision in the Act which makes a person sued liable to pay that person cannot be sued. Then again and this is importance 44 Bom. L. R. 890: (AIR 1943 Bom. 30) was not a case under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 but it was a case under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 Now if we turn to sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and compare the language of that section with the language of sec. 114 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 we would find a substantial and fundamental difference between the language of the two sections. After setting out sec. 203 and sec. 164 of the respective Acts the Division Bench proceeded to observe further as underthe important words which find place in sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Borough Act 1925 and which are significantly absent in sec. 164 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 are by or under this Act. If for instance sec 164 had read as follows: In lieu of proceeding by distress and sale allowed by or under this Act. etc. etc then Mr. Albal would have been right in his contention and he would also have been right in relying upon the above mentioned case in support of his contention that the words distress and sale would relate not merely to distress and sale provided under Chapter VIII but also to distress and sale provided under Chapter VII of the Act. But the Legislature while enacting sec. 164 of the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 did not use the significant words by or under this Act after the word5 distress and sale. Instead while dealing with a case of failure to realise the whole or any part of the amount of octroi they dealt with a case of failure under Chapter VIII of the Act clearly indicating thereby that when they used the words distress and sale in the opening part of sec. 164. they intended to refer to distress and sale under Chapter VIII of the Act. WE are of the opinion that the phrase in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act is a phrase of a very wide import and on the plain reading of the section it cannot be restricted to the amounts recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII only. WE are of the opinion that the phrase in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act is a phrase of a very wide import and on the plain reading of the section it cannot be restricted to the amounts recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII only. There are different types of process of recovery prescribed under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. One of them is by seizure and detention of the goods at the time of import of the goods and articles within the octroi limits if the duty is not paid on the bill being presented to the importer or owner. That is one of the modes of recovery under the Act. In lieu of that recovery the right to file a suit is granted to the Municipality under sec. 203. The attempt to read the first two clauses of sec. 203 jointly is in our opinion misconceived. It is no doubt true that in the second clause namely or in case of failure to realise by such process the whole or any part of any amount recoverable under the provisions of Chapter VIII the words used 8re such process. But that would not warrant that the first clause viz. in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by under this Act should be restricted to the amounts recoverable under Chapter VIII only These two clauses should be read disjunctively; otherwise we fail to give full scope and effect to the first clause contained in sec. 203 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 namely in lieu of any process of recovery allowed by or under this Act. In the ultimate analysis we have to find it out from the Act with which we are concerned in this appeal whether civil liability has been prescribed or not. As we have stated above we are not inclined to agree with the learned Assistant Government Pleader that it is only a criminal liability which has been prescribed under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act for non-payment of the octroi duty on the importer of animals or goods and that there is no civil liability for payment of the duty for which a suit can be filed for the enforcement thereof. As a matter of fact we do not think that this conflict is still open and alive in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in RAJA JAGDISH PRATAP SAHI V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH A. I. R. 1973 SC 1059 where a suit was filed by the State for recovery of agricultural income-tax and the question arose before the Supreme Court as to the maintainability of such a suit in view of sec. 32 of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act 1948 which provided the mode of recovery of penalties. It was contended before the Division Bench that the only mode of recovery of arrears of tax or penalty due under the said Act was to be found under sec. 32 only and the State could not recover any such amount by any other mode such as by a suit. The facts in the case before the Supreme Court was that the appellant Raja Jagdish Pratap Sahi was assessed to agricultural income-tax for the year 1359 Fasli in a sum of Rs. 53 97 and was directed to pay the same in four instalments of Rs. 13 274 each payable on 9-12-52 9 9 and 9-6-53. The first instalment was recovered from the assessee with penalty. Notice to pay second and third instalments was served on him but instead of paying the amount the assessee filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court and obtained a stay order which was subsequently vacated. The State of U. P. therefore filed a suit against the appellant for the recovery of the tax in arrears after the action of the State to recover the amount under sec 32 was held to be time barred. Negativing the contention urged on behalf of the appellant about the incompetency of the suit Jaganmohan Reddy J. speaking for the Court observed as under: before we deal with the main contention it may be stated that once a notice of demand is served on the assessee for payment of tax due under the Act and the assessee makes a default after the date for payment specified therein his expired a debt is created in favour of the State. This debt the State can recover by any of the modes open to it under the general Law. This debt the State can recover by any of the modes open to it under the general Law. THE Supreme Court thereafter considered the position available for recovery of the tax by summary methods as well as by regular civil action under the Income-tax Act 1922 as amended by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1953. By the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act 1953 an Explanation was added to sub-section (7) of sec 46 In the Explanation no clear right was conferred on the Revenue to recover the arrears of tax by any other mode other than those provided in the Act. The Supreme Court thereafter observed as under: it is manifest that this explanation does not in any way confer a right on the Revenue to recover arrears of tax by any mode other than those provided under that Act. That right which the State or the Revenue has for recovering arrears of tax which is a debt due to it is a general right conferred on it under the jaw either by a suit or by some other method open to it. THEREAFTER the Supreme Court referred to sec. 32 of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act 1948 and proceeded to observe as under: sec. 32 though it does not have an Explanation analogous to sec. 46 nonetheless does not preclude either specifically or by necessary implication a right to recover the arrears of tax due by a suit. The method prescribed in this section is one of the modes of recovery which is a summary remedy. It is however open to the State to adopt any method available to it for the recovery of tax in the same way as it would be open to it to recover ordinary debt due to it. It can institute a suit and obtain a decree with costs against the assessee or other persons liable to pay It could also probably without obtaining a decree or attachment apply to a Court for the payment of dues if there are funds lying to the credit of the assessee in the Court or it may perhaps demand payment in the hands of the receiver appointed in respect of any property of the assessee if due notice to all the parties interested he funds is given. On these aspects however we do not propose to express any views. On these aspects however we do not propose to express any views. As already observed after an assessment is made upon the assessee quantifying she tax due from him and a demand for the payment thereof is issued within the period specified therein it creates a debt payable by the assessee in favour of the State. It is well established that once a debt is created the State has the right to recover it by any of the modes open to it under the general law unless as a matter of policy only a specific mode to the exclusion of any other is prescribed by the law. No such prohibition is enacted in sec. 32 of the Act. THE Supreme Court thereafter referred to the judgments of various High Courts and held as under: on principle as well as on the consistent view of the High Courts it is beyond doubt that where a taxing statute provides for a summary mode of recovery and is not exhaustive it will be open to the State to have recourse to any other mode open to it under the general law. In view of this settled legal position we do not think that it is open to the learned Assistant Government Pleader Who incidentally represent the State here which has committed a default in payment of the tax to the Municipality to contend even faintly that the Municipality is not competent to file the suit because the method of recovery prescribed in sec. 203 is by way of and in the nature of alternative remedy and sec. 98 which empowers the Municipality to seize and detain and thereafter sell the goods or animals. or sec. 104 which provides the mode of recovery by distress and sale of moveable and immovable properties cannot be said to be exhaustive. In that view of the matter therefore we do not think that the contention urged on behalf of the State Government about the incompetency of the suit can be sustained. We therefore answer -Question No. 1: In the affirmative; question No. 2: In the affirmative; question No. 3: In the affirmative; and question No. 4: Does not arise. THIS appeal shall go back to the Division Bench with the direction to dispose of the matter in the light of the opinion which we have given on question Nos. 1 2 and 3. THIS appeal shall go back to the Division Bench with the direction to dispose of the matter in the light of the opinion which we have given on question Nos. 1 2 and 3. The costs will be costs in the cause in the appeal. Answers accordingly. .