Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs in O.S. Nos. 829 of 1969 and 194 of 1970 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Cuddalore, who failed in both the courts below, are the appellants. S.A. (94 of 1973 arises out of A.S. 367 of 1971 which arose out of O.S. 194 of 1970 and S.A. 695 of 1973 arises out of A.S. 368 of 1971 which arose out of O.S. 829 of 1969. The plaintiff in O.S. 829 of 1969, who has not got herself examined, is one Rajalakshmi Ammal. The plaintiff in the other suit is one Ramachandra Gounder, who has been examined as P.W. 3. 2. The suits were filed for declaration of the title of the plaintiffs and for recovery of possession of the suit properties with mesne profits of Rs. 87.50 from 20th March 1969 in O.S. 829 of 1969 and Rs. 230 from 17th March 1969 in O.S. 194 of 1970. The suit properties are 34 cents comprised in S. No. 17/6 forming the subject matter of O.S. 829 of 1969 and 41 cents comprised in S. No. 15/2 forming the subject matter of O.S. 194 of 1970. Rajalakshmi, the plaintiff in O.S. 829 of 1969 had purchased the 34 cents in S. No. 17/6 under Ex. A.49, dated. 20th March 1969 from one Perumal Padayachi (P.W. 1) and his wife and children. P.W. 3, the plaintiff in the Other suit, had purchased 41 cents comprised in S. No. 15/2 from P.W. 1 and his wife and children under Ex. A.5 dated 17th March 1969. 3. The case of the plaintiffs was that P.W. 1s father Munusami Padayachi and his brother Lakshmanan purchased S. No. 15/2 and 17/6 from one Manjini Gounder and another under Ex. A-1 dated 18th September 1899. Laxmanans sons Subramania and Srinivasa subsequently sold their fathers half share in both the survey numbers to their paternal uncle Munuswami Padayachi under Ex. A.2 dated 17th February 1951. Ramaswami Padayachis son Perumal (P.W. 1) settled S. No. 17/6 on his wife Loganayaki under Ex. A-3 dated 7th February 1966. Loganayaki had subsequently leased S. No. 17/6 to the first respondent in December 1966, and at about the same time Perumal (P.W. 1) had leased S. No. 15/2 to the first respondent. The plaintiffs in both the suits obtained the release deed Ex. A-3 dated 7th February 1966. Loganayaki had subsequently leased S. No. 17/6 to the first respondent in December 1966, and at about the same time Perumal (P.W. 1) had leased S. No. 15/2 to the first respondent. The plaintiffs in both the suits obtained the release deed Ex. B.1, dated 2nd April 1969, from Adilakshmi and Mottayammal, daughters of the two sisters of P.W. 1s father, Kaveriammal and Devanayakiammal, in respect of the suit properties. The second respondent had taken the sale deed, Ex. B-2 dated 2nd April 1969 in respect of one half of S. No. 15/2 from Mangalakshmi and Krishnammal, the daughters of P.W. 1s fathers sisters daughter Kaveriammal, and on the next day they have taken the sale deed, Ex. B-3, in respect of a half share in S. No. 17/6 from one Ammaniammal, the daughter of P.W.1s fathers other sister Devanayaki. Subsequently, the first respondent had executed the lease deed, Ex. A-7, dated 7th April 1969 in favour of the second respondent in respect of the half shares in S. Nos. 15/2 and 17/6 in regard to which the second respondent had taken the sale deeds Exs. B-2 and B-3. The plaintiffs thereafter filed the suit for declaration and possession with mesne profits on the ground that the first respondent had, by taking the lease deed under Ex. A-7 from the second respondent in respect of the half shares in the suit properties, forfeited the lease. The suit was filed after exchange of notices, Exs. B-4 and B-8 dated 14th May 1969, and the reply notices Exs. A-6 and A-8 dated 23rd May 1969. 4. The respondents did not deny the lease of the suit properties by Loganayaki and P.W. 1 in favour of the first respondent. But their defence was that the suit properties belonged to Munuswami Padayachi and his sisters daughters Adilakshmi, Mottayammal, and Kaveriaramal and Devanayaki Animal, and the plaintiffs in both the suits had obtained the release deed, Ex. B-1, from Adilakshmi and Mottayammal in respect of the suit properties and the second respondent became the purchaser of the half share in the properties under Exs. B-2 and B-3, and that the first respondent executed the lease deed, Ex. A-7, because the second respondent claimed title to a half share in the properties. B-1, from Adilakshmi and Mottayammal in respect of the suit properties and the second respondent became the purchaser of the half share in the properties under Exs. B-2 and B-3, and that the first respondent executed the lease deed, Ex. A-7, because the second respondent claimed title to a half share in the properties. The respondents further contended that there was no denial of the title of the plaintiffs or forfeiture of the lease in favour of the first respondent. 5. The first respondents case in his written statement in O.S. 829 of 1969 regarding the claim of the second respondent was that it would not amount to denial of title, and his contention in the other suit was that the plaintiff had no title to the western 20 cents and that the second respondent had acquired title to the same. 6. Both the courts below found that the properties belonged originally to Muthuswami Padayachi and his brother Lakshmanan and the half share of Lakshmanan had been sold by his sons Subramania and Srinivasa to Munuswami Padayachi under Ex. A.2. They further found that the second respondents vendors under Exs. B-2 and B-3 had no title and that the lease by the second respondent in favour of the first respondent under Ex. A was true, but there was no wilful denial of title of the plaintiffs in both the su its and that there was no forfeiture as the denial was only in respect of only a half share in the properties. On these findings they dismissed the suits holding that the first respondent was a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Tamilnadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. 7. S. 3(i) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 lays down— “Subject to the next succeeding sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof, by or at the instance of his landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a court or otherwise.” But Sub-S. (2)(d) lays down— “Subject to the next succeeding sub-section, sub-S.(1) shall not apply to a cultivating tenant who has wilfully denied the title of the landlord to the land.” The courts below had relied upon the decisions in Niamatulla v. Bajiulla 26 I.C. 619 and Abbakka Shethi v. Seshamma 25 I.C. 944 in coming to the conclusion that as the lease deed (Ex. A.7) had been executed only in respect of a portion of the property in each of the suits, it would not amount to denial of title of the landlord. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decisions in Hashmat Hussain v. Saghir Ahmed A.I.R. 1958 All. 847 and Ramanuja Reddiar v. Kamalammal , 1962-1-M.L.J. 336 and submits that the conduct of the first respondent in executing the lease deed (Ex. A.7) in favour of the second respondent in respect of a half share ni the properties, which had already been leased to him by the plaintiffs prodecessor-in-title, would amount to denial of title and that the first respondent, therefore, is not entitled to the benefits of S. 3 of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. He also submits that the provisions of S. 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act had not been taken note of in the decisions in Niamatullah v. Bajiulla 1 and Abbakka Shethi v. Seshamma 25 I.C. 944. 9. In Ramanuja Reddiar v. Kamalammal 1962-1-M.L.J. 336 when the landlord wanted to put up an electric motor to pump water from a well situated near the tenants lands for the purpose of irrigating not only the tenants lands but also the other lands of the landlord lying in the vicinity, the tenants refused to allow the landlord access to the land to put up a shed to house the motor. Ganapatia Pillai, J. had observed in that decision that what is done inadvertently would not be wilful, but what is done with a consciousness of the intended effect is certainly wilful, and that a tenant who knows that the landlord is entitled to go upon the land for effecting an improvement and, despite this knowledge, does not allow the landlord to go upon the land for that purpose is doing a wilful act and this is wilfiil denial of title of the landlord. But this decision will not apply to the facts of the present case. 10. In Hashmat Hussain v. Saghir Ahmed A.I.R. 1958 All. 847 one Abdul Hameed owned the three shops and hall in suit and on his death one Saghir Ahmed and Fazal Ahmed took those properties on lease from his heirs. But this decision will not apply to the facts of the present case. 10. In Hashmat Hussain v. Saghir Ahmed A.I.R. 1958 All. 847 one Abdul Hameed owned the three shops and hall in suit and on his death one Saghir Ahmed and Fazal Ahmed took those properties on lease from his heirs. The plaintiff Hashmat Hussain purchased those shops and hall along with another house from the heirs of Abdul Hameed and informed the two tenants about it and subsequently included a portion of the hall with their consent in his house and gave a proportionate reduction in the rent. He filed a suit for recovery of rent against the tenants. The tenants contested the suit and alleged in their written statement that one Fayyaz Alam was also a co-sharer in the proprietary right on the ground that his father Shaukat Hussain was the co-sharer of Abdul Hameed in respect of the shops and hall and that the plaintiff had purchased only the rights of the heirs of Abdul Hameed. Fayyaz Alam filed another suit for declaration of his title to a half share in the properties against Hashmat Hussain, the heir of Abdul Hameed and the tenant Saghir Ahmed and others. The tenants tried to support his claim in that suit which was, however, dismissed holding that Fayyaz Alams claim was untenable. Basing his cause of action on the denial of the plaintiffs full ownership of the shops and hall, Hashmat instituted a suit from which the decision arose, for ejectment and arrears of rent. The defendants contested that suit on the ground that the plaintiff was not the sole owner of the hall in dispute. The trial court dismissed the suit for ejectment holding that the tenancy had not been determined by any forfeiture. The question raised before the learned Judge in the second appeal was whether the allegation in the written statement of the rent suit to the effect that the plaintiff was not the sole owner of the property in suit but had only a share in it, the other share being owned by Fayyaz Alam, did not amount to a denial of plaintiffs title by setting up a title in another. The leareed Judges observed— “The moment the tenant sets up title in a third person, whether to the extent of the whole or to the extent of a part, he does set up a title in a third person and therefore he becomes liable to ejectment as a result of the determination of the lease by forfeiture on account of his renouncing his character as a lessee We are therefore of opinion that the lease in favour of the defendants was determined by forfeiture on account of their renouncing their character as lessees of the plaintiff by setting u p a title in Fayyaz Alam, a third person. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court observed in Niamatullah v. Bajiulla 26 I.C. 619.“With regard to the question of forfeiture, we think it is settled law that where a tenant does not deny the whole title of his landlord but lets up the right of a third party as co-sharer, there can be no forfeiture. The case of Mallika Dasi v. Mukhanlal Choudry 9. C.W.N. 928 is authority for this proposition.” A Bench of his court has observed in Ambakka Shethi v. Seshamma 26 I.C. 619. “In Mallika Dasi v. Makhanlal Chowdry 9 C.W.N. 928 it was held that an assertion by a tenant that the person claiming to be his landlord is not entitled to the whole rent but has co-sharers who must join an action for rent, is not such a disclaimer as would effect a forfeiture of the tenancy. At page 393 the following passages occur. “It has not been suggested, nor do we think could it be, successfully suggested, that the partial denial of the title of the landlord effected a partial forfeiture of the tenancy and conferred upon the tenant two inconsistent characters, namely, that of a tenant in respect of an undivided share of the land included in the tenancy and of a trespasser in respect of the remainder. To constitute a disclaimer there must be a distinct and unequivocal renunciation of the tenancy and we are not prepared to extend the application of the doctrine to a case in which the tenant does not set up a title to the whole in himself or a title to the whole in others, but merely questions the extent of the interest of the plaintiff and his title to receive the entire rent. The present case is even stronger for the tenant as he never denied the landlords title to receive the entire rent but only admitted in good faith the superior title of a third person to a portion of the lands included in the tenancy. This decision of a Bench of this court is binding on me. In the present case also the lease deed, Ex. A-7, had been executed only in respect of a half share in each, of the properties in both the suits in favour of the second respondent and that too only after the second respondent asked the first respondent to do so, after obtaining the sale deeds, Ex. B-2 and B-3, from the ladies mentioned above and after the appellants themselves had obtained the release deed Ex. B-1, on the date of Ex. B-2 and one day prior to the date of Ex. B-1 from Adilakshmi and Mottayyamma J, the daughters of one of the sisters of Munuswami Padayachi, through whom the appellants claim title to the suit property. Therefore, it could not be stated that there was no bona fides in the conduct of the first respondent in executing the lease deed, Ex. A-7, subsequently in favour of the second respondent. Therefore, I respectfully share the view expressed in the afresaid decisions in Niamatullah v. Bajiullah 26 I.C. 619 and Abbakka Shethi v. Seshammal 25 I.C. 944 and agree with the Courts below that the first respondent has not willfully denied the title of the appellants to the suit properties by executing the lease deed Exs. A.7, in respect of a portion of the properties demised in favour of the second respondent and that the appellants are, therefore, not entitled to evict him having regard to the provisions of Sec. 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1955. 11. The second appeals are, therefore, dismissed with costs of the first respondent. Advocates fee one set. No leave.