JUDGMENT - N.D. KAMAT, J.:---This Revision Application arises out of a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The property in dispute consists of a factory shed situate at 302 Block A Dhanraj Industrial Estate, Sun Mill Road, Lower Parel, Bombay-13. On 9th February, 1976, the first respondent Jain made an application to the Executive Magistrate, Greater Bombay, alleging that the petitioners had forcibly dispossessed him of the aforementioned property in dispute on 7th February, 1976 and on being satisfied that in respect of this property in dispute there was likelihood of a breach of the peace, the learned Executive Magistrate, passed a preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 10th February, 1976 calling upon both the parties to the dispute to appear before him and to put in written statements of their respective claims in regard to the fact of actual possession of the subject matter of the dispute. The Learned Executive Magistrate, further took the view that this was a case of emergency and attached the property in dispute under section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and directed to the police to seal the factory premises. Accordingly, the police sealed the factory premises. On 13th February, 1976 the present petitioners appeared before the learned Executive Magistrate and made an application saying that the first respondent Rupchand Jain had unjustifiable snatched an ex parte order by suppressing several material facts and that as a matter of fact, the petitioners themselves were in actual possession of the factory premises and they were also running the factory. They prayed that the attachment of the factory premises should be vacated and the seal of the police should be ordered to be removed. On 25th February, 1976, the learned Executive Magistrate vacated the attachment of the factory premises and passed an order directing the police to remove the seal and handover possession of the premises to the present petitioners. Against that order, the first respondent preferred Criminal Application No. 436 of 1976 to this Court on 26th February, 1976 and obtained an order directing stay of execution of the order of the learned Executive Magistrate. The said order of this Court was received in the Court of the learned Executive Magistrate on 28th February, 1976. In the meanwhile, the learned Executive Magistrates order dated 26th February, 1976 had already been executed. The said order of this Court was received in the Court of the learned Executive Magistrate on 28th February, 1976. In the meanwhile, the learned Executive Magistrates order dated 26th February, 1976 had already been executed. It is presumably on this account that on 27th February, 1976 the first respondent withdrew Criminal Application filed by him in the High Court, and the writ of the High Court saying that the first respondent had withdrawn his application was received in the Court of the learned Executive Magistrate in due course; but on the strength of the earlier writ directing stay of the learned Executive Magistrates order dated 25th February, 1976, the learned Executive Magistrate again attached the property in dispute under section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the police to reseal the premises. During the pendency of these proceedings, in the Court of the learned Executive Magistrate and the High Court, the first respondents wife filed a Civil Suit No. 2114 of 1976 in the City Civil Court, Bombay, and obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the petitioners and some others from taking possession of the factory premises in dispute and also from representing themselves as the partners of the firm. "M/s. Kamal Automatic Industries". After the second respondent Smt. Jaywanti Jain obtained this interin ex parte injunction from the City Civil Court, Bombay, the first respondent made an application dated 7th April, 1976 to the learned Executive Magistrate, Greater Bombay, saying that in view of the injunction issued by the City Civil Court Bombay, in Civil Suit No. 2114 of 1976, the likelihood of a breach of the peace in respect of the property had completely disappeared and the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, commenced on the strength of his application dated 9th February, 1976 should be dropped. On receipt of this application, the learned Executive Magistrate, issued notices to the present petitioners and it appears that only the first petitioner came to be served with that notice. In response to that notice the first petitioner appeared before the learned Executive Magistrate and requested him that as per his order dated 25th February, 1976 the factory premises should be unsealed and handed over into his possession. In response to that notice the first petitioner appeared before the learned Executive Magistrate and requested him that as per his order dated 25th February, 1976 the factory premises should be unsealed and handed over into his possession. The learned Executive Magistrate, heard the arguments advanced on behalf of both the rival claimants and passed the following order on 15th April, 1976:--- "Since the Civil Court is now seized of the matter, no order can be passed which is in conflict of the Civil Courts order. I am therefore, of the opinion that the proceedings under section 145 Cri.P.C. are redundant. I, therefore, cancel the preliminary order dated 10th February, 1976 and stay the proceedings. (Section 145(5) Cri.C.P.). I also withdraw the attachment order under the proviso to section 146(1) Cri.P.C. As regards the restoration of possession. I direct that the police should unseal the premises and in view of the injunction granted by the Civil Court imposing restrictions on the respondents not to interfere with or disturb the possession of the applicants wife and partner of the firm, the possession of the premises in dispute should be handed over to Smt. Jaywanti R. Jain wife of the applicant and partner of the firm pending final decision of the suit filed by her in the City Civil Court." The petitioners have felt aggrieved by the above order, passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Greater Bombay, on 15th April, 1966 and they have approached this Court in revision. They have made no grievance against the order of the learned Executive Magistrate directing that in view of the injunction issued by the City Civil Court, Bombay, the proceedings should be dropped. As a matter of fact, Mr. Vimadalal, learned Counsel for the petitioners stated in his arguments more than once that once his clients do not seek to challenge this part of the order of the learned Executive Magistrate. He however, made a very serious grievance against the order of the learned Executive Magistrate directing that the seal put on the premises in dispute should be removed and possession of the premises should be handed over to the second respondent Smt. Jaywanti R. Jain, who is not even a party to the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He urged that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Greater Bombay, who issued the ex parte injunction, had clearly and expressly stated in his order that the injunction order passed by him will not apply to any judicial proceedings and consequently the learned Executive Magistrate was clearly in error in directing possession of the property in dispute of be handed over to the second respondent Smt. Jaywanti R. Jain relying solely upon that ex parte injunction order. Mr. Vimadalal further urged that in view of the clear provisions contained in section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was incumbent upon the learned Executive Magistrate to hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, after such further evidence if any, if he thinks necessary and then decide which of the two contesting parties was at the date of the preliminary order, in possession of the subject matter of the dispute. Before I proceed to consider the above submissions made by Mr. Vimadalal it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Saldhana, learned Counsel for the respondent to the maintainability of the present revisional application. Mr. Saldhana urged that sub-section (2) of section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 expressly lays down that---"The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of section 397 shall not be exercised in relations to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. According to Mr. Saldhana, the impugned order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Greater Bombay, is an interlocutory order and a revision against that order expressly bared. The learned Executive Magistrate has taken the view that in view of the injunction issued by the City Civil Court, Bombay, the likelihood of a breach of the peace in respect of the property in dispute had totally disappeared, and, he has, therefore, directed that the proceedings initiated by him should be dropped though he has used the word "stayed". He has further directed that in view of the injunction order issued by the City Civil Court, Bombay, possession of the property in dispute should be handed over to the second respondent Smt. Jaywanti R. Jain, till the disposal of the Civil Suit filed by her. He has further directed that in view of the injunction order issued by the City Civil Court, Bombay, possession of the property in dispute should be handed over to the second respondent Smt. Jaywanti R. Jain, till the disposal of the Civil Suit filed by her. After such an order is passed nothing remains to be done in a proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a matter of fact, the likelihood or possibility of the breach of peace in respect of some immovable property is the very basis or foundation of the jurisdiction of the learned Executive Magistrate and such a foundation or basis having gone, he was right in passing an order in dropping the proceedings. By virtue of the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been disposed of and nothing remains to be done in that proceeding. The order passed by the learned Magistrate cannot at all, therefore, be regarded as an interlocutory order. In my opinion, it is a final order so far as the proceedings under section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are served, and a revision against such an order is certainly not barred. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Saldhna, to the maintainability of this revisional application, though I may state that the petitioner instead of approaching the High Court, should have approached the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay. I have already pointed out that the learned Judge, who granted the ex parte injunction in Civil Suit No. 2114 of 1976, has himself clearly and expressly stated in his order that---"This injunction will not apply to any judicial proceedings." It is therefore, rather surprising that the learned Executive Magistrate should have relied upon this ex parte injunction order for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the second respondent Smt. Jaywanti R. Jain was in actual possession of the property in dispute on the date of the preliminary order or within two months prior to that date. What is still more surprising is that he was arrived at this conclusion solely on the basis of the injunction order itself which was under the directions of the learned Judge himself not to be used in any judicial proceedings. What is still more surprising is that he was arrived at this conclusion solely on the basis of the injunction order itself which was under the directions of the learned Judge himself not to be used in any judicial proceedings. If the injunction order issued by the learned Judge is left out of consideration, there is no evidence on record to show which of the two contesting parties was really in possession of the property in dispute on date of the preliminary order. In Criminal Application No. 118 of 1975, a Division Bench of this Court has clearly held as under :--- "The provisions of sub-sections (1), (4) and (6) of section 145 are thus a complete Code providing for the nature of the orders which a Magistrate is entitled to make in a proceeding under section 145. The provisions of these sub-sections contemplate that either a party which is in possession on the date on which preliminary order is passed is to continue in possession until dispossessed in due course of law or if a party is forcibly and wrongfully disposed within two months from the date on which the report of the Police Officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), then for the purposes of sub-section (4) he is deemed to be in possession and possession has to be restored to him. An order for restoration of possession to a party can be passed by a Magistrate only at the conclusion of the enquiry while acting under the proviso to sub-section (4). It is only in case a party has been forcibly has and wrongfully dispossessed either within two months next before the date on which the report of the Police Officer or other information was received by the Magistrate or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), that there is power to order restoration of possession. In other words, even in the case of a party which is dispossessed prior to the date of the preliminary order and after the date on which information is given to the Magistrate or to the Police Officer the power to restore possession can be exercised only at the time when the final order in those proceedings is passed. In other words, even in the case of a party which is dispossessed prior to the date of the preliminary order and after the date on which information is given to the Magistrate or to the Police Officer the power to restore possession can be exercised only at the time when the final order in those proceedings is passed. There does not seem to be any power under section 145 to order restoration of possession except in the case referred to in the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Code." In the present case, the procedure laid down in sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not at all be followed, when the learned Executive Magistrate has simply done is that relying upon an order of the City Civil Court, which was not be used in an judicial proceedings he has proceeded to pass an order of restoration. This part of the order passed by him is, therefore, clearly without jurisdiction and it will have to be set aside. Before ordering that the property in dispute should be put in the possession of any of the contesting parties, it was necessary for the learned Executive Magistrate to follow the procedure laid down in sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That not having been done, this part of his order is clearly unsustainable and will have to be set aside. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Greater Bombay, dated 15th April, 1976, is set aside and the proceedings are remanded back to his Court for disposal according to law. Rule is made absolute. The learned Executive Magistrate, should dispose of the proceedings as early as possible and in any case not later than six weeks from the date of the receipt of the papers in his Court. -----