Veeraswami, CJ.- These two related appeals arise from an order of Gokulakrishnan, J., who declined to interfere with a common order of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks in M.A.S. Nos. 127 and 128. 2. The 1st appellant had registered on 1st January, 1970 a trade mark under the name and style of “Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar.” The respondent was called on by the Assistant Registrar to file any objections to the application of the 1st appellant since the respondent was using the mark “ Omar Khayyam Wineries (P.) Ltd.” But no objections were filed. The respondent, however, on 10th January, 1970 applied to the Assistant Registrar under section 46 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 for rectification of the trade mark of the 1st appellant, registered and notified in the Trade Marks Journal on the date aforesaid. This application, was resisted by the 1st appellant, but all the same was allowed by the Assistant Registrar. Gokulakrishnan. J., declined to interfere. 3. The facts briefly are these: On 16th November, 1965. there was an advertisement in the Deccan Chronicle by the Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar. This notice said that this name and style had been used by the 1st appellant for his catering business at Hyderabad and that the expression “ Omar Khayyam” he was using also has a principal feature in his trade mark for the bakery, biscuits, pastry, tea, coffee. beer, ale and porter, for mineral and “ aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks, wines, spirits and liquors falling under clauses 30, 32 and 33 of the Fourth Schedule to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules. 1959 framed under the Act. The notice further announced that Omar Khayyam Hotel, Restaurant and Bar alone was entitled to use the name and stlye by virtue of adoption, invention and user as provided under the Act. It warred that any person or persons either imitating or in any manner making a colourable imitation of the aforesaid trading style or trade mark would make himself or themselves liable for both civil and criminal actions. Earlier on. 15th December. 1965. It warred that any person or persons either imitating or in any manner making a colourable imitation of the aforesaid trading style or trade mark would make himself or themselves liable for both civil and criminal actions. Earlier on. 15th December. 1965. the first appellant’s assignor of the trade mark had applied through its authorised agent one R. D. Sinha for registration of a trademark under clause 33 of the Fourth Schedule to the Rules under the Act in respect of wines spirits and liquors in the name of Agha Hyder Hussain National. Manufacturer and Trader, trading as Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar. It was said there that this mark had been continuously used, since 1st April, 1964 in respect of the said goods. 4. Section 46 (1) (a) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 reads: ”(1) Subject to the provisions of section 47, a registered trade mark may be taken off the register in respect of any of the goods in respect of which it is registered on application made in the prescribed manner to a High Court or to the Registrar by any person aggrieved on the ground either ; (a) that the trade mark was registered without any bona fide intention on the part of the applicant for registration that it should be used in relation to those goods by him or, in a case to which the provisions of section 45 apply, by the company concerned, and that there has, in fact, been no bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to these goods by any proprietor thereof for the time being up to a date one month before the date of the application ; or." Clause (6), the proviso and the rest of the section are not necessary to notice for our present purpose. 5. 5. A ‘trade mark ‘as defined in section 2 (v) means a registered trade mark or a mark used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor to use the mark ; and in relation to the other provisions of the Act, except Chapter X, a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right, either as proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark whether with or without any indication of the identity of that person. 6. Chapter III deals with the procedure for and duration of registration. One of the effects of registering a trade mark is as mentioned in section 28 (1). The registration of a trade mark in Part A or Part B of the register shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by the Act. 7. Once, therefore, a person gets a particular style registered as his trade mark, he gets exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods, in respect of which it has been registered. Under section 46 which provides for removal from register and imposition of limitations on ground of non-use, it is open to an aggrieved person to have the trade mark of any person who has registered it, removed from the register on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of that section. Under section 46 which provides for removal from register and imposition of limitations on ground of non-use, it is open to an aggrieved person to have the trade mark of any person who has registered it, removed from the register on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of that section. The two factors constituting that ground,which are Cumulative are (1) that the trade mark was registered without any bona fide intention on the part of the applicant for registration that it should be used in relation to those goods by him ; and (2) that there has, in fact, been no bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to these goods by any proprietor thereof for the time being up to a date one month before the date of the application. The first limb is a mental factor, the bona fide intention to use the goods covered by the trade mark, and the other relates to factual user of such goods covered by the trade mark registered, so, in order to succeed, the applicant should show (1) that he is an aggrieved person ; and (2) that the ground under clause (a) of section 46 (1) exists. 8. We may at once state that there is no controversy before us that the first appellant has never used the trade mark in relation to any alcoholic or non-alcoholic liquor or goods in trade or business under the name and style of "Omar Khayyam " or even "Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar". There is also an affidavit filed by the respondent to the effect. There can, therefore, be no dispute that the second limb of clause (a) of section 46 (1) has been satisfied by the applicant before the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. 9. Before us, in support of the appeal three grounds are urged: (1) the application for removal of the registered Trade Mark by the respondent made within a month of the registration is incompetent ; (2) the respondent is not a person aggrieved: and (3) in the circumstances, since the opening paragraph of section 46 (1) uses the word "may", the relief of removal is discretionary and since the respondent had used the trade mark after the 1st appellant had his trade mark registered, the discretion should not be exercised in favour of the applicant. 10. 10. As to the first ground, we are of theopinion that section 46 (1) addresses itself to a state of affairs upto a date one month before the date of the application. It therefore, looks to the past. If the first appellant had not used the trade mark in relation to the goods as its proprietor at any time upto a date one month before the date of the application, then, the second limb of clause (a) of section 46 (1) is satisfied. 11. The application for removal from the register need not have to wait until one month from the date of registration. There is no justification for such interpretation. Since as we said it is not in dispute that as a matter of fact, the 1st appellant had not used “ Omar Khayyam” as trade mark in connection with any goods covered by such trade mark at any time prior to 1st January, 1970, obviously, he is hit by the second limb of clause (a) of section 46 (1). 12. It is strenuously argued for the appellants that the first part of clause (a) of section 46 (1) has not been satisfied for according to the 1st appellant, he had always intended to use the trade mark in connection with both alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverage. But this is not made out. As we said, the advertisement in the Deccan Chronicle, dated 16th November, 1963 related to Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar and it did not mention any stocking or sale of alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverage under the name and style of “ Omar Khayyam” . We are not concerned with the question at the moment whether the 1st appellant-can continue to use the expression ‘Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant’ and say that ‘Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar ‘was either manufacturing or selling such beverage under the name and style of “Omar Khayyam” . Even the application, dated 15th December, 1965 to the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks made by the assignor of the 1st appellant did not say that he was selling alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverage under the name and style of “Omar Khayyam”. All that was mentioned in the application was that he applied for a trade mark in clause 33 in respect of wines, spirits and liquors in the name of Agha Hyder Hussain, Indian National. All that was mentioned in the application was that he applied for a trade mark in clause 33 in respect of wines, spirits and liquors in the name of Agha Hyder Hussain, Indian National. Manufacturer and Trader, trading as Omar Khayyam Hotel Restaurant and Bar whose address was in Hyderabad and who claimed to be the proprietor thereof and by whom the said mark had been continuously used since 1st April, 1964 in respect of the said goods. So, it is clear that there was no bona fide intention or otherwise on the part of the 1st appellant that the expression “ Omar Khayyam” would be used by him. We are of the opinion, thetefore, that both the limbs of clause (a) of section 46 (1) were proved to have been satisfied by the respondent. 13. The second ground of the 1st appellant is that the respondent was not a person aggrieved. So far as his trade mark registered under clause 33 is concerned, there is no doubt that he is a person aggrieved. This is because under the name and style of Omar Khayyam Wineries (P.) Limited, since obtaining licence therefor he has been manufacturing and selling goods covered by clause 33 relating to alcoholic beverage in the Fourth Schedule to the Rules under the Act. But so far as the goods covered by clause 32 of that Schedule are concerned, we are of the opinion that the respondent cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved. This is because it is not engaged in manufacturing or using of the goods covered by clause 32 in the Fourth Schedule to the Rules under the Act. The policy behind section 46 (1) (a) is that in competition with person dealing in the same kinds of goods, the person hit by clause (a) should not be regarded as a person aggrieved. This is for the obvious reason that such a person has nothing to do with such goods as in the case of the respondent here. 14. The effect of this finding is that the appellants will succeed in L.P.A. No. 2 of 1973 ; but the ground does not affect the respondent in the other appeal. 15. There remains for consideration the last ground. We think that there is not much substance in this ground. 14. The effect of this finding is that the appellants will succeed in L.P.A. No. 2 of 1973 ; but the ground does not affect the respondent in the other appeal. 15. There remains for consideration the last ground. We think that there is not much substance in this ground. The only ground on which it is said that the discretion of the Assistant Registrar should be used in favour of the 1st appellant is that he used the mark much earlier. But as we held this has not been substantiated factually. 16. Hence, L.P.A. No. 2 of 1973 is allowed and the other appeal is dismissed. No costs in either.