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1976 DIGILAW 112 (ALL)

Kamla Devi v. Deen Dayal Sharma

1976-02-20

M.P.SAXENA

body1976
JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a defendant's revision application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 19-2-1974 passed by the learned District Judge, Meerut. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this revision application are that in 1965 the plaintiff opposite party had purchased the house in suit which was in the tenancy of the defendant-applicant from before on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/- According to the plaintiff opposite party, the defendant started raising constructions in this house in 1968 and she filed a suit for injunction restraining him from doing so. It was suit No. 935 of 1968. The defendant was restrained but in spite of it he completed the constructions. Therefore, she withdrew that suit and filed this suit in 1969 for his ejectment on the ground of making material alterations in the house without her written consent. She also claimed a sum of Rs. 600.67 as arrears of rent from 15-7-66 to 15-1-69 @ Rs. 20/- per month and Rs. 65/- mesne profits from 18-1-69 to 6-4-69 at the rate of rupee one per day. Requisite notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was alleged to have been given. 3. The defendant contested the suit, inter alia,on the grounds that he had raised the constructions in 1961 with the consent of the then landlord and incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 4,000/-. It was agreed between them that in case the landlord chose to retain the constructions he will pay its costs otherwise the defendant will be entitled to remove the constructions. He denied his tenancy in respect of the constructions existing on the first floor. 4. The learned trial court arrived at the conclusion that the constructions were made sometime in 1957-68 and were material alterations. It further held that no written permission was obtained. Therefore, the defendant was liable to eviction on that ground. The suit for ejectment as well as for arrears of rent and damages was decreed with costs and the defendant was allowed two month's time to deliver possession of the suit property on the condition that he deposited two months rent in advance within a period of 15 days from the date of the judgment, failing which he was liable to be evicted after 15 days only. The defendant went up in revision and the learned District Judge agreeing with the findings of the learned trial court, dismissed the revision. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the learned trial court relied on inadmissible piece of evidence and ignored from consideration admissible piece of evidence and thereby acted illegally and with material irregularity. The judgment is liable to be set aside on that score and more so when the learned revisional court has also not referred to any evidence. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the whole matter and I find that this contention of the learned counsel is not without force. The relevant portion of the trial court's judgments reads as follows : "Admittedly the entire constructions has been raised afresh, but there is not even an iota of evidence to prove this fact. The old landlord has not been proved as dead, so his evidence so far as the defendant is concerned, has been withheld and I am constrained to draw an inference in favour of the defendant. He spent about Rs. 4,000/- But the permission for this purpose was not taken in writing. Even accounts have not been maintained although allegedly it was so agreed that the landlord would have to pay the price of these construction. The constructions lie in the Municipal Board area. The permission of the Municipal Board was essential before these could be raised but even that too was not done. All these things go to show that the constructions were not raised with the permission of the previous landlord. We have the report of the commissioner in suit No. 935 of 1968 on the record. The commissioners have given a definite opinion that these constructions could not be of 1961 but the data collected by him also leaves no doubt in my mind that these constructions were raised sometimes in 1967-68." The aforesaid makes it clear that the learned trial court primarily relied on the report given by the commissioner in previous suit No. 935 of 1968. The copy of this report is 24 C. It is dated 26-11-68. The commissioner who had submitted that report was not examined by the plaintiff for reasons best known to her. In its absence that report was inadmissible in the instant case and should not have been relied upon. The copy of this report is 24 C. It is dated 26-11-68. The commissioner who had submitted that report was not examined by the plaintiff for reasons best known to her. In its absence that report was inadmissible in the instant case and should not have been relied upon. If this report is ignored, there remains nothing to substantiate the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that the constructions were raised sometime in 1967-68. It will not be out of place to mention here that in the instant case also commissioners had inspected the spot twice and submitted their reports. The first report is dated 5-5-1971 (39-C) according to, which the constructions were raised about four years ago. The second report is dated 1-10-1971 (44-C) according to which the aherations or constructions were done three or four years ago. Objections were filed by both the parties to these reports and on 29-10-1971 the court had ordered that these reports shall be read subject to the evidence in the case. As will be apparent from the material portion of the judgment reproduced above, the learned trial court neither referred to oral evidence adduced by the parties nor to the commissioners' reports and decided the case merely on the basis of the report given by the commissioner in the previous suit. As already stated this report was inadmissible in evidence as the commissioner was not examined. The result of all this discussion is that the trial court decided the case on the basis of in admissible evidence and completely ignored from its consideration the admissible evidence on the record, viz., the oral evidence of the parties and commissioners' reports given in this case. 7. The learned revisional court also fell into the same error inasmuch he endorsed the findings given by the trial court without referring to any evidence. While examining the revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act it was the duty of the learned revisional court to consider legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment. By ignoring the evidence it failed to do so. While examining the revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act it was the duty of the learned revisional court to consider legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment. By ignoring the evidence it failed to do so. As held in the case of firm Dori Lal Chhotey Lal v. Jagannath Rameshwar Prasad, 1967 A.W.R. 233, the jurisdiction of the revisional court is no doubt limited by the provisions of section 115 C.P.C. but it can interfere under clause (c) in case there is breach of the provisions of law or admissible evidence had been disregarded by the courts below. 8. Both the lower courts appear to have been very much influenced by this fact that the constructions in dispute amount to material alterations and as no written permission was obtained for raising them, it was wholly immaterial as to when they were raised. I am reluctant to subscribe to this approach of the case because if these constructions were raised in 1961 in the time of the previous landlord and he did not take any objection, the question would naturally arise as to what is its effect and can the vandee take advantage of it. I would not like to express any opinion on this aspect as the case is being remanded to the trial court for re-trial. 9. The revision is allowed. The judgment and decrees passed by the learned lower courts are set aside. The case is sent back to the learned Judge Small Cause Court with the direction that he will dispose it of according to law after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce such evidence as they may desire. The parties shall bear their own costs of this revision.