JUDGMENT - N.B. NAIK, J.:---This is an application by the State to set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Criminal Revision Application No. 16 of 1976 whereby the learned Judge allowed the revision application and released the respondents-accused on bail on each of them furnishing security of Rs. 5000/- and the P.R. for the like amount. The facts giving rise to this application which are not in dispute are briefly these. It appears that on or about October 16, 1975 one Gulam Rabbani was murdered. Information about the same was given by Ajiz Shah to the Police Station at Bhokardan on October 16, 1975. The respondents-accused were arrested in connection with the investigation of that case on the 17th and 18th November, 1975 and they were taken into custody. On February 2, 1976, the respondents-accused made an application to the learned Magistrate to release them on bail by relying on the provisions of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The learned Magistrate did not pass any order thereon but subsequently the police having filed what they called a provisional chargesheet, the learned Magistrate rejected the application for bail. The propriety of the said order was challenged by the respondent-accused by filing a revision application. The learned Sessions Judge relying on the provisions of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, allowed the revision application and granted the application of the accused for being released on bail. It is the propriety of the said order which is being challenged by this application. Now the question raised by this application is really concluded by the authority of the Supreme Court reported in (Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 145. It is the propriety of the said order which is being challenged by this application. Now the question raised by this application is really concluded by the authority of the Supreme Court reported in (Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 145. It may be mentioned that section 167(1)of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that : "Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completely within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57 and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the Police Station or the Police Officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate." Sub-section (2) of section 167 provides : "The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, or a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction :" Then follows the proviso (a) which is applicable to the facts of this case. That proviso is to this effect : "Provided that--- The Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this section for a total period exceeding sixth days, and on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail; and every person released on bail under this section shall be deemed to by so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter." It would, therefore, appear that the mandatory, provisions of the section are to the effect that during the course of the investigation a Magistrate has no power to authorise the detention of the accused person in custody for a total period exceeding sixty days and on the expiry of the period of sixty days, the accused person has a statutory right to be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. In the instant case there is no dispute that the accused were in fact arrested on the 17 and 18th November, 1975 and the investigation was still incomplete inasmuch as no chargesheet was sent by the time the accused made an application for being released on bail on February 2, 1976. It is also clear that the detention of the accused from and after January 18, 1976 was clearly for a period exceeding sixty days. Therefore, in view of the mandatory provisions of sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the Magistrate had no power to authorise the detention of the accused and the accused were entitled to be released on bail the moment they expressed their desire to be released on bail and they offered to furnish the requisite security. In fact as we pointed out earlier this position of the law is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Natabars case. In fact as we pointed out earlier this position of the law is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Natabars case. The Supreme Court has observed that "the law as engrafted in proviso (a) to section 167(2) and section 309 of the New Code confers the powers of remand to jail custody during the pendency of the investigation only for the former and not under the latter. Section 309(2) is attracted only after cognizance of an offence has been taken or commencement of trial has proceeded." The Supreme Court further observed that "In such a situation what is the purpose of Explanation I in section 309 is not quite clear. But then the common of the legislature in proviso (a) is that the accused person has got to be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail and cannot be kept in detention beyond the period of 60 days even if the investigation may still the proceeding." The Supreme Court did consider the difficulties in the way of the investigation in respect of serious offences giving effect to this provision. The Supreme Court observed that "in serious offences of criminal conspiracy-murders, dacoities, robberies by inter-state gangs or the like, it may not be possible for the police, in the circumstances as they do exist in the various parts of or country, to complete the investigation within the period of 60 days." The Supreme Court pointed out that "yet the intention of the legislature seems to be to grant no discretion to the Court and to make it obligator for it to release the accused on bail." The Supreme Court took note of the fact that "it has been provided in proviso (a) that the accsued released on bail under section 167 will be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII and for the purposes of that Chapter. That provision, pointed out that Supreme Court, may empower the Court releasing him on bail, if it considers necessary so to do, to direct that such person be arrest and committed to custody as provided in sub-section (5) of section 437 occurring in Chapter XXXIII." The Supreme Court further observed, "it is also clear that after the taking of the cognizance the power of remand is to be exercised under section 309 of the new Code. The Supreme Court concluded that "if it is not possible to complete the investigation within a period of 60 days then even in serious and ghastly types of crimes the accused will be entitled to be released on bail". Such a law, observed the Supreme Court, may be a "pradise for the criminals", but surely it would not be so, as sometimes it is supposed to be because of the courts and that it would be so under the command of the legislature. Having regard to these observations and the clear provisions of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 167, on the facts of this case, no execution can be taken to the order of the learned Sessions Judge. In the result, the application fails. It is, therefore, dismissed and the rule is discharged. -----