JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, M. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out the order of Addl. Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dated March 5, 1970, dismissing the appeal filed by Ram Karan and Shubh Karan against the judgment and decree dated April 22, 1967, passed by an Assistant Collector, 1st. Class, Allahabad under Section 229-B of Act I of 1951. 2. The plaintiffs Ram Karan and Shubh Karan filed a suit for declaration on the ground that the land in suit was the acquisition of the common ancestor of the parties and the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 has share therein. Mangal was the head and the Karta of the family and his name was recoded in a representative capacity. On the death of Mangal, Ram Das became the Karta of the family and he, too, was recorded in a representative capacity. After Ram Das the name of defendant No. 1 Badri also came to be recorded in a representative capacity. Actually, however, all the family members had a share in the holding and were in possession and occupation according to their respective shares. The plaintiffs claimed ?rd share and since their names were not recorded in revenue papers, they filed a suit for declaration. The plaintiffs set up the following pedigree : 3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 alone. Badri, defendant No. 1, maintained that the plaintiffs had never any share in the land in suit nor were they ever in possession. According to him the land in suit was not the acquisition of Mangal but was the sole tenancy of Ram Das. Some of it was acquired by Ram Das himself and the rest of it was obtained through a family partition. The land in dispute was mortgaged by the mother and father of defendant No. 1 with the plaintiffs through various mortgage deed which were redeemed by the defendant. According to him he was the sole Sirdar of the land in suit. 4. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and the plaintiffs went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner who also dismissed it. They have now come up in second appeal before the Board. 5. According to him he was the sole Sirdar of the land in suit. 4. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and the plaintiffs went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner who also dismissed it. They have now come up in second appeal before the Board. 5. Before the hearing of this appeal could be taken up, the learned counsel for appellant filed copy of the judgments-one of High Court dated January 13, 1972 and the other of Deputy Director of Consolidation dated August 19, 1970 - as additional evidence. This evidence was admitted on payment of Rs. 25/- as costs. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties parties and have also gone through the records of this case. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants have relied on the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated August 19, 1970 and on the judgment of Allahabad High Court dated January 13, 1972 in support of their contention that there has been no partition between the parties. The so-called deed of partition was Annexure-A to the writ in the High Court whose judgment has been filed as additional evidence. In this judgment his lordship of the Allahabad High Court has held that the reasons given by the Deputy Director of Consolidation as well as by the Settlement Officer Consolidation for discarding the document seem to be plausible and has thus come to the conclusion that no partition took place. This would virtually prove that the appellants' case that there has been no partition in the family has been upheld not only by the consolidation courts but also by the court. 8. The learned counsel for appellants have also made a distinction between 'separation' and 'partition'. According to them 'separate' means that there should be separate arrangement for mess, worship and living etc. It does not necessarily mean that there has been a regular partition of holding. In other words a holding can continue to be joint even if the co-sharers have be joint even if the co-sharers have started living separately ; that the cultivation of the holding remained joint is further borne out by the statement of Badri defendant No. 1, that the plaintiff Ram Karan was doing the cultivation and knew of all about it. 9. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that if there had been no partition, it would not have been possible for the mother of Badri (as his guardian) to mortgage plot No. 1732/1057 in favour of Ram Karan, plaintiff No. 1 nor should it have been possible of Badri to mortgage area of plot No. 1220 in favour of Ram Karan plaintiff. Both these mortgages were redeemed at subsequent dates and according to the learned counsel for the respondent these transactions showed that Badri was the sole tenant. 10. I do not see much force in this argument. Even in a joint property, one person can mortgage his share to another co-sharer who may be his brother or cousin, if he is in need of money, and the mere fact that some of the land in suit was mortgaged and redeemed cannot be conclusive proof of the fact that a partition had taken place and that the disputed plots were part of the respondents' exclusive share. 11. In the various ruling which have been discussed by the courts below, great discussion by the courts below, great emphasis has been lead on the word 'separation' and their view appears to be that because separation had taken place, there was also a partition of the holding. I do not think that this is a correct proposition. A holding can continue to remain joint even after separation has taken place between the family members. In the instant case separation between the family members is not very much in doubt. However, the theory of partition has been fully disbelieved by the consolidation courts as well as by the High Court. The pedigree set up by the plaintiff is more or loss admitted. Thus, it cannot be challenged that the plaintiffs are the cousin of defendant No. 1. There is also no doubt that the land came down from the common ancestor and thus the right of plaintiffs to tenancy cannot be deemed to have been extinguished simply because their names were not recorded. Section 190 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act lays down clear situation in which the interest of a Sirdar will extinguished. These conditions are : (a) when he dies leaving no heir entitled to inherit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 190 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act lays down clear situation in which the interest of a Sirdar will extinguished. These conditions are : (a) when he dies leaving no heir entitled to inherit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (b) when the holding has been declared as abandoned in accordance with the provisions of Section 186 ; (c) when he surrenders his holding or part thereof ; (cc) when the holding or part thereof has been transferred, let out or used in contravention of the provisions of this Act ; (d) when the land comprised in the holding has been acquired under any law for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of land ; (e) When he has been ejected in accordance with the provisions of this Act ; or (f) when he has been deprived of possession and his right to recover possession is barred by limitation. The case of the plaintiff does not fall within any of the categories mentioned above and hence it would be very unfair to hold that the interest of the plaintiffs have extinguished merely on account.of the fact that their names could not be recorded in the revenue papers. 12. In view of all these considerations I feel that the title and interest of the plaintiffs in respect of the disputed land still subsists and they are certainly entitled to a declaration for the same. 13. In the result, the appeal succeeds and the orders of both the lower courts are set aside. The suit will stand decreed throughout. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs. 14. Judgment dated, signed and pronounced in open court.